

THE  
PRESENT STATE  
OF THE

Socinian Controversy,  
*in the Church of England, being a*  
*Reply to Dr. South's Sermon, &c. &c.*  
AND THE

Doctrine of the Catholick Fathers

Concerning A

TRINITY in UNITY.

*P. Swilksland.*

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T H E

# P R E F A C E.

**I** Have little to say to the Reader, having sufficiently Explained the Design of this Treatise in the First Section. Those who remember how this Controversy has been of late managed, may possibly expect, what they will not find, some sharp Resentments of the Ill Usage I have met with, and as sharp Returns; but I write not to Revenge my self, but to Explain and Vindicate the Truly Ancient, Catholick and Apostolick Faith of a Trinity in Unity, which requires a Composed and Sedate Mind both in the Writer and Reader. For this Reason I have thus long delayed the Publication of this Treatise, the greatest part of which was Printed Two Years since, that those who will ever grow Cool, might have time to recover their Temper: And did I not hope that the Publication of it at this time would tend more to quiet Mens Minds, to stop the Mouths of Hereticks,

## *The Preface.*

reticks, and to secure the Catholick Faith, than a Passive Silence, it should never see the Light, how much soever my own Reputation might suffer by it. But I persuade my self, That the Authority of the Catholick Church, and of the Catholick Fathers, is not at so low an Ebb, even in this Age, as to be easily despised; and therefore their Explications, their Arguments, their Answers to the Objections of Hereticks, will have their due weight; and I have not gone one step further. I appeal to the Catholick Fathers, and am contented to stand or fall by their Sentence. I have not wilfully misrepresented their Sense in any thing, and have taken all possible care not to mistake it; and as far as Human Authority is concerned, here I must leave the matter, for I know of no further Appeal.

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
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THE  
PRESENT STATE  
OF THE  
SOCINIAN Controversy.

CHAP. I.

SECT. I.

*The Present State of the Socinian Controversy; the unreasonableness of it; and how to reduce the Dispute to the Original Question.*



THE Faith of the Holy Trinity is so fundamental to the Christian Religion, that if Christianity be worth contending for, that is: For if God have not an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, the whole Mystery of our Redemption by Christ, and of our Sanctification by the Spirit, which in its Consequences is the whole of the Gospel, and distinguishes it from all other Religions, is utterly lost.

## *The Present State of the*

Those various Heresies relating to the Divinity, Person and Offices of Christ and the Holy Spirit, which began to appear even in the Apostolick Age, and have ever since under several forms and disguises disturbed the Peace of the Church, is proof enough, how much the great Enemy of Mankind thinks himself concerned by all possible means to corrupt this Faith; and that great, unwearied, unconquerable Zeal, wherewith the Catholick Fathers have always defended this Faith, shews of what importance they thought it; and therefore it is no wonder, and ought to give no scandal to Christians, that these Disputes are again revived among us with as much fury and insolence as ever; for there never was a more unhappy Season for the Enemy to sow his Tares. But that which is most to be lamented is, That the lukewarmness of some, and the intemperate Zeal of others, have given greater scandal to the World, and more shaken the Faith of Christians, than all the Opposition of our Adversaries could have done. I need say no more, the Case is too well known, and the Evil Effects too visible among us.

I will make no new Quarrels, if I can help it, but sincerely endeavour to prevent the Mischiefs of what has already happened, as far as is necessary to secure the Faith of Christians, and to wrest those Weapons out of our Enemies hands, which some professed Friends have unwarily furnished them with.

To do this, I shall endeavour in the first place to restore this Controversie to its original state, and take off those Vizards which make it appear very frightful to ordinary Christians.

This Dispute about the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity, has of late been dressed up anew with some old School-Terms, which how proper soever they may be to give Learned Men a more distinct Idea and Conception of that  
Adorable

Adorable Mystery, only amuse common Christians, and confound them, instead of teaching them better.

This, as it was at first occasioned by Hereticks, who denied or corrupted the Christian Faith, which forced the Catholick Fathers to use some unscriptural Terms, which by degrees improved into great Subtilties, and disturbed the Church with very nice and wrangling Disputes; so our Modern Socinians at this day place the main strength of their Cause in these Disputes, and think it a sufficient Confutation of the Faith of the Ever Blessed Trinity, that the Trinitarians themselves cannot agree about the Sense of *Person*, *Hypostasis*, *Substance*, *Nature*, *Essence*, nor in what Sense God is *One and Three*; but advance very different, and, as they think, contrary Hypotheses, to reconcile the Unity of God with the distinction of Three Persons in the Godhead. As if there were no difference between what is fundamental in this Faith, and such Metaphysical Speculations: As if no man could believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, without determining all the Disputes of the Schools. Learned men may dispute these matters, and things may so happen as to make such Disputes necessary; but the Faith of Christians may be secured, and Heresies may be confuted, without them. The Faith is plain and certain, even all that is necessary to the purposes of Religion; but men may leap out of their depths, where they can find no footing; and when such Questions are asked, as no man can certainly answer, it is very likely, that they will be answered very different ways, and upon very different Hypotheses; and there is no great hurt in this neither, while these different Hypotheses are neither made new Articles of Faith, nor new Heresies, but serve only for Hypotheses, to give a probable Answer to such Questions as ought never to have been asked; and to stop the mouths of Hereticks, when they charge the Catholick Faith with Nonsense and Contradiction.

tradiction. To distinguish rightly between these two, will set this Controversy upon its true ancient bottom; which will spoil the Triumph of our Adversaries, and possibly may rectify the Mistakes, and allay and qualify the intemperate Heats and Animosities of those whom a common Faith ought to make Friends.

## S E C T. II.

*How to reduce this Dispute concerning the Trinity, to Scripture Terms.*

**T**HE Catholick Fathers have always appealed to the Form of Baptism as the Rule and Standard of Faith; that as we are baptized, so we must believe, *In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.* This is a plain simple Faith, which every Christian may understand, and which every Christian must profess, That there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, of the same Nature, and inseparably united to himself; and that this Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the joint Object of the Christian Faith and Worship.

This is the true Christian Faith, and this is all that we are concerned to defend against our Adversaries; and would men stick to this, without engaging in Philosophical Disputes, which we know little or nothing of, and which the Scripture takes no notice of, we should soon find how weak and impotent all the Attempts of Hereticks would prove. Whatever Disputes there are about the signification of those words *Nature, Essence, Substance, Person, Hypostasis, Subsistences, Relations, &c.* there is no Dispute about the signification of *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*; we have natural Ideas belong to these words, when applied to Creatures; and when God is pleased in Scripture to represent himself



to us under these Characters, if we must understand any thing by them, we can understand nothing else, but what the words signify all the World over: only allowing for that infinite distance there is between God and Creatures, which requires us to abstract from all material and creature imperfections. We must not think that God begets a Son as men do, by corporeal passions, or division of his substance; or that he begets a Son without himself, or separate from himself; or that because a Creature-father is always older than his Son, therefore God can't beget a Son coeternal with himself; for all these Circumstances do not belong to the essential Notion of a Father, but of a Creature-father: But then it is essential to the Notion both of Father and Son, that the Father communicates his own Nature to the Son, and that the Son receives his Nature and Being from his Father; that Father and Son do truly and really subsist by themselves, though they may be, and when we speak of God the Father and his Son, are inseparably united to each other: that the Son, with respect to his Nature, is perfectly the same that his Father is: the son of a man, as true and perfect Man as his father is; and therefore the Son of God, as true and perfect God.

By these Arguments the Catholick Fathers confuted both the *Sabellians*, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but Three Names; and the *Arians*, who denied the Consubstantiality of the Son, or that he had the same Nature with his Father. For both these Heresies destroy'd the essential Notion and Idea of Father and Son; which includes in it both a real distinction and sameness of Nature; that they are as really Two, but infinitely more one and the same, than any other Father and Son in Nature are.

Now I cannot see, but that as these Names and Characters are better understood, and liable to less dispute; so they convey to our Minds a more distinct conception of

God

God the Father and his Eternal Son, than any other artificial Terms.

Were there no Controversy about *Nature, Essence, Person, Substance, Hypostasis*, yet they immediately convey no Idea of God the Father and his Eternal Son to my mind, much less give me a more distinct Conception, than these Terms *Father and Son* do: For they neither acquaint me what God is, nor what Father and Son is; and as the Schools themselves assert, cannot be Univocally, or in the same sense spoken of Creatures and of God, who is Super-Essential, above all Prædicaments and Terms of Art; that is, *Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, Person*, do not, and cannot signify the same thing, when spoken of God, as when applied to Creatures. And this has occasioned all those Disputes concerning the Use and Signification of these words, when applied to God; which indeed is no reason for wholly discarding these Terms, which the Perverseness and Importunity of Hereticks has forced the Church to use, and which have now been so long used, that the Ecclesiastical Sense of these Words is very well known to Learned men, if they would be contented to use them in that Received Ecclesiastical Sense in which the Catholick Fathers have always used them; but yet it is a reason not to clog the Faith of ordinary Christians with them, who are not skilled in Metaphysical and Abstracted Notions; and it is a reason to reduce the Controversy, as much as possibly we can, to Scripture Terms; when these Artificial and Metaphysical Terms divide even the Professors of the Catholick Faith, and give too just occasion to the vain Boasts and Triumphs of Hereticks.

To represent this matter plainly, I observe, That all all those Unscriptural Terms which the Catholick Fathers made use of for the Explication of this Adorable Mystery, were intended for no other purpose, but to give us some distinct Ideas and Conceptions of what the Scripture teaches concerning

concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, by using such Terms as signify something in Creatures, which bears some, though a very imperfect, analogy and resemblance to what we are to conceive of God. And therefore the Fathers justify the use of such words, by shewing, That all they mean by them is contained in Scripture, and reject any Words, and any such Sense of Artificial Words, as cannot be justified by Scripture: Which, by the way, is a more infallible Rule than all Metaphysical Subtleties, to find out in what sense the Fathers used such Words, by observing to what Scripture-Notions they apply them, and how they justify their use from Scripture, when they are Disputed.

If this be the truth of the Case, as it certainly is, then the Catholick Faith does not depend upon the use of these Terms, for it was before them; for they were intended only to explain and illustrate the Catholick Faith, and to comprise Scripture-Notions in Terms of Art, which must be acknowledged to be of great use, and was by experience found to be so in the Disputes with ancient Hereticks, while the Fathers agreed in the sense of these Terms. But when these Terms themselves are become the great matter of Dispute; and men who, as is to be hoped, agree in the Catholick Faith, cannot agree about the Propriety and Signification of such Terms, nor how they are to be applied and used, whether in the singular or plural Number, whether substantively or adjectively, in recto or obliquo; and our Adversaries abuse such Disputes to the Reproach of the Catholick Faith, as a perplex'd, uncertain, contradictory Riddle and Mystery, which men can know nothing of, or can never agree in; it becomes absolutely necessary at present to take this Controversy out of Terms of Art, and to let our Adversaries see, That our Controversy with them is not concerned in these Disputes: That it is not about the Signification and Use of such words

words as Essence, Nature, Substance, Person, &c. but, Whether the Supreme, Eternal, Self-originated Father, have not an Eternal Son, eternally begotten of himself, and an Eternal Spirit, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, eternally proceeding from them: And whether this Eternal Son, and Eternal Spirit, are not True and Perfect God.

In this all sincere *Trinitarians* do heartily agree with each other, and are ready to join issue upon this State of the Controversy, with all their Adversaries, of what denomination soever. And if we can prove from Scripture, That God has an Eternal Son begotten of himself, and that this Eternal Son is True and Perfect God, as the Father is; and that the Father and Son have an Eternal Spirit, who is True and Perfect God, as Father and Son is; I hope this is a sufficient Confutation of *Socinianism*; and yet all this may be proved, without concerning our selves in any Metaphysical Disputes: And therefore such Disputes as these, though they give opportunity to our Adversaries to make some Flourishes, and to cast Mists before peoples eyes, are not of that moment as they would represent them; they neither prove *Socinianism* to be true, nor the Catholick Faith of the Trinity to be false or uncertain.

I do not intend at present to dispute this Point with the *Socinians*, Whether the Son and the Holy Spirit (for there is no dispute about the Father) be not each of them True and Perfect God: This has been proved often enough already, to the satisfaction of all sober Enquirers, who pay a just Veneration to Scripture; and shall be done again, when a fair occasion offers: But the Question under Debate now is, Whether we cannot explain and defend the Doctrine of the Trinity, without the use of Ecclesiastical or Scholastick Terms; and whether the Disputes of Divines about the Use and Signification of such Terms, proves any Disagreement in the Faith, when they all con-

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sent to the Scripture Explications of it. The great Dispute is about the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead, and by what Terms to express this *Wonderful Distinction, and Wonderful Union*, as some of the Fathers call it. All sincere *Trinitarians* do agree, That God is *Unus & Trinus*, One and Three; but we having nothing in Nature like this, we know not by what Names to call it: Those who have most critically examined the force of words, find them all upon some account or other defective, or improper for this purpose: That *St. Austin* well said, That in these Sublime Mysteries we can no more express what we conceive of them in Words, than we can conceive of them as they are. When we profess to believe that there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead, the next question is, What Three they are? That is, By what common Name to call them, which may be multiplied with them, or spoken of them in the Plural Number; which

*Quæ nec dicuntur ut cogitantur, nec cogitantur ut sunt. Aug. de Trinit. l. 5. c. 3.*

*St. Austin* thinks not easily found. The *Greeks* called them *Three Hypostases*, which signifies Three Individual Substances: This seemed hard to the *Latins*, who acknowledged but *One Substance* in the Godhead, and therefore they called them *Three Persons*; though this did not satisfy *St. Austin*, who looked upon *Person* as an Absolute, not a Relative Term, and therefore the Plural Predications would not agree with his Rule, *quæ ad se dicuntur*; that what is predicated absolutely, must be predicated only in the Singular Number: And in truth, if this be a good Rule, it is a demonstration that there can be no common Name for these Three; for whatever is a common Name for them all, must be absolutely predicated of each of them: And therefore *St. Austin*

*Cum ergo quaritur quid tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen, quo complectamur hæc tria, neque occurrit animo, quia excedit supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloqui facultatem. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 3.*

*Ad se quippe (Pater) dicitur Persona, non ad Filium, aut Spiritum Sanctum. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 6.*



## The Present State of the

could give no other reason why we say Three Persons, and not Three Essences, or Three Gods, but only this, That since we acknowledge there are Three, it is fitting to agree upon some common Name to denote the Trinity by; and Ecclesiastical Use had given this Signification to the word *Person*.

*Cur ergo  
non hac*

*tria simul unam Personam dicimus, sicut unam Essentiam, & unum Deum, sed tres dicimus Personas, cum tres Deo, aut tres essentias non dicamus, nisi quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi quâ intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interrogati, quid tres, cum tres esse fateremur. Ibid.*

*Quidigitur restat, nisi ut fateamur, loquendi necessitate partita hac vocabula, &c. l. 7. c. 4.*

But then besides this, the great Dispute is, What is meant by a Person, when applied to the Three in the Blessed Trinity: Some adhere to the old approved Definition of a Person, That it is the Individual Substance of a Rational

Nature; which is the very definition of the Greek *Hypostasis*, as *Boetius* owns.

*Nos hac definitione eam quam  
Græci ὑπόστασιν dicunt terminavi-  
mus. Boet. de Una Persona Christi.*

Others are afraid of this; for if every Person be an Individual Substance, and

there are Three Persons, they know not how to avoid the Consequence, That then there are Three Individual Substances in the Trinity. And consequently, since we can have no other Notion of the Divine Substance, but Infinite Mind and Spirit, there must be Three Infinite Minds and Spirits in the Godhead, which they think infers Three Gods. And therefore they will not allow a Person to be a Substance, at least not an Individual Substance, but a Mode, or at most a Mode of Subsistence, or Relation, or Property, or a Person, in the *Tragedian* or *Comedian* sense of a Person, as one represents and personates another; or to signify an Office or Magistracy, and so one man may be as many several Persons as he has Offices.

I can't answer for all these different significations of the word *Person*, as applied to this Sacred Mystery, especially

as

as they are used by some Modern Writers ; for I believe there is no such material difference between the Fathers and the Schools, as some men imagine ; of which more hereafter : But as to my present purpose, I must profess, I can see no necessity why we must find out a Common Name for the Three in the Blessed Trinity, when the Scripture has given us no Common Name for them ; much less why we should dispute eternally about the propriety and use of such words, to hazard the Catholick Faith, at least the Honour and Reputation of it, together with the Peace of the Church. If I am asked not only Who but What the Three in the Ever-blessed Trinity are ? I know no better Answer to make, than what the Scripture has taught me, That they are *God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost* ; which signifies all that can be express'd by any Artificial and Unscriptural words ; is an Answer liable to no Exceptions or Misrepresentations, and in which all must agree, who believe a Trinity ; and it shames and silences all those Disputes which are often occasioned by other words, though never so wisely and reasonably chosen.

This Answer shews us what their Nature is, what their Distinction is, and what Relation they stand in to each other ; which is the most perfect knowledge we can have of the Ever-blessed Trinity in this world.

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## S E C T. III.

*That the Title of G O D, attributed in Scripture distinctly to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, gives us the best Account of their Nature, and must determine the Signification of Ecclesiastical Words.*

I. **A**S for the first, the design of some common Name for these Three, is to form some common Notion and Idea of them, in which they all agree : And is any thing else so common to them ? Is there any thing else which is common to them, but the Name and Nature of God ? Can any thing else give us so true and perfect a Character and Idea of each of them, as this does ? When we say the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, we attribute every thing to each of them, which signifies any Perfection ; for the Idea of God comprehends all possible Perfections : And we reject every thing which has the least signification of Imperfection ; we abstract our minds from all Material and Creature-Images, which Names common to Creatures are apt to impose upon us ; and when we are forced to apply any such Names to God, we learn from hence in what Notion to understand such Words, when applied to God.

Men may very subtilly distinguish between the formal Conceptions of *Nature*, *Essence*, *Substance*, *Hypostasis*, *Existence*, *Subsistence*, *Person*, *Personality*, *Suppositality*, and the like, and neither understand God nor Creatures much the better for it : But let them but tell us what they mean by these Terms, and then every Child can tell whether they belong to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, or not : For as far as they are included in the Notion of God, and signify

signify true Divine Perfections, so far they belong to all Three: For if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, then Father, Son and Holy Ghost, each of them by themselves are whatever is included in the Notion and Idea of God, excepting their Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whereby they are distinguished into Three.

As for Example: If by *Nature*, *Essence*, *Substance*, *Existence*, *Subsistence*, however they may differ in their formal Conceptions, they only mean a true and real Being, who actually, perfectly, compleatly is what it is; God is Essence, Substance, Subsistence, in the most perfect sense of all; for he is All Being; his Name is *Jehovah*; which as Learned Men most probably conclude, signifies a Plenitude and Perfection of Being, which is such a Perfection as includes all other Perfections in it; for Perfect Being is every thing which perfectly is.

This is the peculiar Name and essential Character of God, and of God only: God is, that is, is Eternal, Essential, Immutable Life and Being; in which sense the Apostle tells us, That He only has Immortality. Creatures are, but are not Essential Life and Being: Being is not included in the formal Conception or Definition of any Created Nature. *Man is a Reasonable Creature*, was a true Definition of Human Nature, before any man was created; and would be so for ever, though all mankind were annihilated. And therefore we may reasonably enough in Creatures distinguish between Nature, Substance, Existence, Subsistence; if by Nature we understand that Idea or Pattern according to which they are made; and by Substance, that which is made, whatever it is, whether Matter or Spirit, which is the Subject of those Moral or Natural Perfections which belong to the Idea of such a Creature; and by Existence and Subsistence, their actual Being, which they receive from their Maker, with regard to their compleat or incompleat manner of Existence.

But

But now we can form no Idea of God without perfect life and being ; for whatever else, according to our imperfect manner of conceiving, is contained in the Idea of God, is nonsense and contradiction without it : Infinite Wisdom, Infinite Power, and Infinite Goodness, is the Idea of nothing, without Eternal and Necessary Being ; and an Infinitely Perfect Nothing is a contradiction in the very Notion. But Infinite, Perfect, Life, and Being, includes all other Perfections, and is the most simple and comprehensive Idea of God ; for whatever perfectly is, is whatever is any real Perfection. So that there is no foundation, nor any occasion, for such Distinctions, of Essence, Nature, Substance, Existence, Subsistence, in God ; for his Essence, Nature, Substance, is his Being ; and his Being is perfect Existence and Subsistence. These Terms differ in their formal Conceptions, when applied to Creatures ; but in essential Life and Being, these cannot be formally distinguished ; for we cannot conceive Existence or Subsistence, as superadded to Nature, as we do in Creatures ; because Necessary Essential Being, is the Divine Nature : Nor can we distinguish between Essence, Nature, and Substance, because there is no distinction in God between the Subject, and its Faculties and Powers, which is the Foundation of that distinction in Creatures. Men, who do not love to use words without any Notion belonging to them, find themselves extremely puzzled to fit any distinct Ideas to these words when applied to God.

When the Fathers and Schoolmen apply these Terms to God, they take care to shew how differently they are used when applied to God, from what they signify when applied to Creatures : They assert the most absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature without the least composition, and indeed expound all these Terms to the sense of *τὸ ὂν* & *Esse*, to signify the most Absolute Being, or the most Perfect *Is*, the *ὁ αὐτός*, who is Simple, Perfect Existence : One.

*St. Austin,*



St. *Austin*, whose Authority is sacred in the Schools, will furnish us with sayings enough to this purpose. Nothing is more certain with him, than that in God, to Be, to Live, to Understand, or whatever else we can attribute to God, is all the same, is Perfect Being, or Essence: And therefore he owns the impropriety of those Terms, *Substance*, and *Subsistence*, when applied to God. But notwithstanding this, that God is the most Pure Simple Being, without any imaginable composition, yet since we cannot comprize all that is necessary for us to know of God, in one simple uncompounded thought, we must unavoidably conceive the Idea of God by Parts, under different formal Conceptions, such as his Wisdom, his Power, his Goodness, his Truth and Faithfulness, &c. for such distinct representations as these, God makes of himself in the Holy Scriptures; they are what we can distinctly apprehend, and are absolutely necessary for the Government of our lives, and to know what we are to expect from God. But such distinctions as we can frame no distinct conceptions of, as are apt to corrupt our Notions of God with corporeal Representations, and perplex our Minds with endless and inextricable difficulties, ought to be cautiously used, and carefully explained, to prevent all mistakes, and to reduce them to such plain and simple Notions, as come nearest to the absolute Simplicity of the Divine Essence.

And now, I suppose, it will admit of no dispute, Whether the Father, who is God, be Essence, Substance, Subsistence; or whether the Son, who is God, be Essence, Substance,

*Prima & summa vita, cui non aliud est vivere, & aliud esse, sed idem est esse & vivere. Primus & summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere, & aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia. Aug de Tr. l. 6. c. 10.*

*Si tamen dignum est, ut Deus dicatur subsistere. — Deus autem si subsistit ut substantia propriè dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tanquam in subiecto, & non est simplex. — Nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat, & subsistat Deus bonitati suæ. — Unde manifestum est, Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatore intelligatur essentia, quod verè & propriè dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat esse essentiam. — Ego sum qui sum, & qui est misit me ad vos. Id. l. 7. c. 4, 5.*

Substance, Subsistence ; and so in like manner the Holy Ghost. For this signifies no more than *To Be* in the most perfect and absolute sense of *Being*, which is the first and most simple Idea of God, *Absolute Essence and Being*. So that if the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is ; each of them is Essence, Substance, Subsistence, in the most Perfect and Absolute sense of these Terms : For if each of them is, and each of them is God ; each of them is, only in that Notion of Being, which is included in the Idea of God, which contains the most absolute Perfection of Being ; that is, all that is absolutely Perfect. And will any *Trinitarian* deny, *That the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is ?* And then I know not what other Dispute there can be about this matter ; if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, then the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is, in the most Perfect Notion of Being, and that is all that is meant by Essence, Substance, Subsistence, when spoken of God.

In the same manner we may examine the signification of the word *Person*, which has occasioned no small Dispute. We say that there are Three Persons in the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; and each of these Divine Persons is in himself True and Perfect God. Now if we must call these Divine Three, Three Persons, ( which long Use and Custom has made Reasonable, and in some measure Necessary ) the most certain way to determine the signification of *Person*, when applied to God, is to consider in what sense one who is True and Perfect God, may be called a Person ; for *G O D* is the Scripture Name and Character which is distinctly attributed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; and therefore that must give the Signification to all other words of Human Use and Institution, as far as relates to this Mystery.

These words *Person* and *Hypostasis*, were very anciently used, without any Definition to determine their Signification,

tion, till they became matter of dispute. *Boetius* has given us a definition of *Person*; which has been generally allowed of ever since, that a *Person is an individual Substance of a rational Nature*. Let us then examine whether this definition can belong to a Divine Person, to one who is True and Perfect God.

As for *Substance*, *Boetius* tells us, That it is essential to the Notion of *Person*; for a Person cannot subsist in Accidents, (much less in Modes, which are less than Accidents); and it is certain no other Notion of Person can belong to one who is God: For a Person who is God, must be *Substance* in the most Perfect and Absolute sense; that is, as I have already explained it, *Perfect Being and Essence*: As *St. Austin* expressly tells us, *That in God, to Be, and to be a Person, is the same thing; and that when we say the Person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the Substance of the Father*; and thus it is with respect to the whole Trinity.

It is certain *St. Austin* never dream'd of defining a *Person*, much less a Divine Person, by a *Mode*: For to make a *Person*, who is God; and therefore the most Perfect Being, a *Mode*, which if it be any thing, is next to nothing, no Substance, but a meer Modification of Substance, is both new Divinity, and new Philosophy, unknown either to Fathers or Schoolmen.

But meer *Substance* can't make a *Person*, unless it be a Living, Understanding Substance, the Substance of a rational Nature: And this must be the Notion of a Person, when applied to God; for God is Pure Infinite Mind and Intellect, the First and

*Personam in accidentibus non posse constitui, relinquitur ergo, ut Personam in Substantiis dici conveniat. Boet. de una Christi Persona.*

*Non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud Personam esse, sed omnino idem.*

*Neque in hac Trinitate, cum dicimus Personam Patris, aliud dicimus, quam Substantiam Patris. Aug. Tr. l. 7. c. 6.*

*Personam in Substantiis dici conveniat — non autem in non viventibus corporibus, vel sensu carentibus, vel intellectu & ratione. Boet. ibid.*

Supreme Life and Intellect; in whom, to Live, to Understand, and to Be, is the same thing; as I observed before from St. *Austin*; and if a Divine Person signifies One who is God, every Person in the Godhead is Supreme Absolute Life and Intellect: And this is what we must understand by a Person, when we say, That the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person; for no other Notion of a Person can belong to any one, who is True and Perfect God.

There is another Term of great consideration in this definition, which still remains to be Explained, and that is *Individual*, That a Person is an *Individual Substance* of a Rational Nature; which *Boetius* opposes to *Universal Substances*, which are nothing else but the abstracted Notions of generical or specifick Substances; which have no real and actual Subsistence, and therefore are not properly Substances, but only the Ideas of Substances, and therefore are not Persons neither; for Substance and Person are only in Singulars and Individuals, which Subsist by

*In universalibus Persona dici non potest, sed in singularibus atque individuis. Boet. Ibid.*

*Cum ipse Substantia in Universalibus quidem sint, in particularibus vero capiant Substantiam, jure Substantias particulariter Subsistentes ἰσχυρίζεσθαι (Græci) appellaverunt. Id.*

themselves. Thus Human Nature considered in general as common to all Mankind, has no actual Subsistence, and therefore is not a Human Person, but it subsists only in particular Men, and that makes every particular Man a Human Person; for the Person of the Man, is nothing but the Man himself. And so St. *Austin* tells us it is in the Holy Trinity; the Person of the Father, is the Father himself; and the Person of the Son, is the Son himself; and if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three, they must be Three Persons; for each of them is himself, and not the other; and *Three Selves* are Three Persons; *I*, and *Thou*, and *He*, are Personal Pronouns: I my self, Thou thy self, He himself; by which Argument the Catholick Fathers prove  
against

against the *Sabellians*, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three Persons, by these Personal Pronouns, which the Scripture applies to them; as our Saviour speaks of himself in the first Person, *I and my Father*; of his Father in the Second Person, *I thank Thee, O Father*; of the Holy Ghost in the Third Person, *when He the Spirit of truth shall come*. Now *I*, and *Thou*, and *He*, must signifie Three distinct Persons, or *Three Selves*: Person indeed, as St. *Austin* observes, is not a Relative Term, but is spoken *ad se* of the thing it self: For if Person were a Relative, then as we say, The Father is the Father of his Son, so we must say, The Person of the Father is the Person of the Son, which is absurd; but yet Person must be prædicated Plurally according to the number of *Selves*; for as many *Selves* as there are, so many Persons are there; for *Selves* make numbers, because *one self* is not another. Three singular intelligent Selves, *singulares intelligentes*, as *Melancton* calls them, is the proper Notion of Three Persons; and in this sense, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are Three Persons, if each of them be True and Perfect God. For God is certainly himself. If the Father be God, the Father himself is God; if the Son be God, the Son himself is God; if the Holy Ghost be God, the Holy Ghost himself is God. This is the plain express Doctrine of Scripture, and what every man may understand, and what every one who believes a Trinity must profess, and no man needs believe more.



## S E C T. IV.

*These Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, prove the real Distinction of Persons in the Trinity.*

II. **T**H E S E Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, especially when the Name G O D is Attributed to each of them, *That the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God,* proves a real and substantial distinction between them; for these are opposite Relations which cannot meet in the same Subject: For a Father cannot be Father to himself, but to his Son; nor can a Son be Son to himself, but to his Father; nor can the Holy Ghost Proceed from himself, nor in this sense be his own Spirit, but the Spirit of the Father and Son, from whom he Proceeds. And therefore the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; nor the Son the Father, or Holy Spirit; nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son: And yet, if each of them be God, each of them Perfectly is, or is *Perfect Being*, and therefore are as Perfectly Distinct, as three which perfectly are, and are not one another. To talk of Three Distinct *Beings, Substances, Minds, or Spirits*, may be Misrepresented by perverse Wits, to the prejudice of the Divine Unity, though the Catholick Fathers, besides *Hypostasis*, did not scruple to use the same, or other equivalent Expressions, concerning the Holy Trinity, when they disputed against the *Sabellians*; yet if we believe a Trinity, whether we will or no we must acknowledge Three; each of which Perfectly *Is*, or is *Perfect Being*, and no one is the other: For if we deny this, we must either deny, that the Father *Is*, or that the Son *Is*, or that the Holy Ghost *Is*; and to deny either of these, is to deny a Trinity.

And

And if it be Objected against this, That according to St. *Austin's* Notion, ( though it was not peculiarly his, but common to all the *Greek* and *Latin* Fathers, nay to the Schoolmen themselves, and must be owned by all Men of Sense ) that *esse, vivere, intelligere, sapere, velle, bonum esse, magnum esse, &c.* to be, to live, to understand, to be wise, to will, to be good, and to be great, or whatever else we can attribute to the Divine Nature, is but *unum omnia*, all one and the same in God : I say, if it be Objected, that the consequence of this is, That to say, that in this sense of *Is*, the Father *Is*, the Son *Is*, the Holy Ghost *Is*, is equivalent to asserting Three Distinct Substances, Minds, Spirits, Lives, Understandings, Wills, &c. in the Trinity, I cannot help it. St. *Austin* was never yet charged with *Tritheism*. Let them either deny what St. *Austin* and the rest of the Fathers teach about this matter, and try if they can defend the absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature without it; or let them deny, if they think good, that the Father *Is*, the Son *Is*, and the Holy Ghost *Is*, in this Notion of Perfect and Absolute Being; or try if they can find such a medium between Perfect *Is*, and *is not*, as can belong to any Being which is True and Perfect God; or allow ( which is the true solution of it ) that *Is*, and *Is*, and *Is*, *Essence*, and *Essence*, and *Essence*, are but One Eternal *Is*, One Eternal *Essence*, as they are but One God: Of which more presently.

I always was of opinion, that these Terms in the plural number, ought not to be familiarly used, because few Men can conceive of them, as they are worthy of God; and therefore the Fathers were very cautious in using them, which they very rarely did, but when they were extorted from them by the perverse importunity of Hereticks; but I cannot see how it is possible to deny three *Selves*, or three *Is's* in the Unity of the Godhead, without denying a Trinity; and if each of these Three be himself and not another, and each of them

*Is,*

*Is*, and *Is* by himself; this is the least we can say of the Ever Blessed Trinity, and this is all with respect to their Distinction, that we need say of them. So that if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be so in a true and proper Notion, are in truth and reality what these Names of Father, Son, and Spirit, signify: That the Father is ἀληθῶς πατήρ, a true, proper, natural, Father; the Son ἀληθῶς υἱός, a true, proper, genuine, Son; and the Holy Ghost, ἀληθῶς τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, in a true, proper sense, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, as the Catholick Fathers always Professed; they must be as truly and perfectly Distinct, as Father and Son are.

The only Question then is, Whether these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify naturally and properly when spoken of the Holy Trinity, or are only metaphorical and allusive Names; though what they should be Metaphors of, is not easy to conceive, and as absurd to conceive, that there should be any Metaphors in God, who is all Perfect Essence and Being. The Divine Nature and Perfections, which we cannot conceive of as they are, may be expressed by Metaphors taken from some thing which is analogous in Creatures; upon which account we read of the Hands, and Eyes, and Ears, and Bowels, and Mouth of God. Creatures may serve for Metaphors, for Shadows, and Images, to represent something of God to us, but the reality of all is in God. So that we may allow Father and Son in some sense to be Metaphorical Names, when applied to God; not that God the Father is not in the highest and most perfect sense a Father; and his Son a most proper, natural, genuine Son, but because the Divine Generation is so perfect a Communication of the Divine Nature and Being from Father to Son; that Human Generations, Creature-Fathers and Sons, are but obscure, imperfect images and resemblances of it. When any thing is spoken Metaphorically of God, the Metaphor and  
Image

Image is always in the Creatures; the Truth, Perfection, and Reality of all in God. And if this be a certain and universal rule, then if God be a Father, if he have a Son, an only Begotten Son, Begotten Eternally of himself, not Made, nor Created, but Begotten; though this Eternal Generation be infinitely above what we can conceive, yet it is evident, that God the Father is more Properly and Perfectly a Father, and his Son more Properly and Perfectly a Son, than any Creature-Fathers or Sons are.

But, I think, this will admit of no Dispute, if we own, that God has a Son, who is himself True and Perfect God: For a Son, who is Perfect God, is God of God. That he is a Son, proves that he receives his Nature from his Father, for this is Essential to the Notion of a Son; That he is Perfect God, proves the Perfection of his Generation from the Perfection of his Nature: For to be Perfect God, of Perfect God, is to receive the Whole, Perfect, Undivided Nature of his Father, which is the most perfect Generation that is possible, for a Whole to beget a Whole. And if God the Father, and his Son, be Truly and Perfectly Father and Son, they must be Truly and Perfectly Distinct; That is, they are in a proper sense Two, and by the same reason, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three: And we need no other proof of this, but the very Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, if we understand them in a proper and natural Sense.

## S E C T. V.

*These Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, prove the Unity, Sameness, Identity of Nature and Godhead.*

III. **T**H E S E Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as they signify and prove a real Distinction between these Three, so they also signify and prove the Unity, Sameness, Identity of Nature, and Godhead : Which reconciles the Faith of the Trinity with the Faith of one God : The same One Divine Essence and Godhead, being and subsisting, Whole, Perfect, and Entire in each of these Divine Three.

I shall Explain and Confirm this matter more at large hereafter ; and therefore at present shall only briefly represent this Notion, and the reason of it.

One Eternal Self-Originated Divine Nature, is One Divinity and One God ; and nothing can destroy the Unity of God, but what destroys the Unity of the Divine Nature, by Division or Multiplication : And if this be the true Notion of the Unity of God (and if it be not, I would desire to know, why this is not, and what is ) then the Unity of God may be preserved in Three, each of whom is True and Perfect God, if the same One Divine Nature, or Divinity, subsists distinctly in them all : And the very Characters and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do necessarily infer and prove, the same One Divinity in them all : And therefore the Christian Trinity is so far from contradicting, that it establishes the Faith of one God : As to explain this in a few words.



All Christians agree, That God, whom we call the Father, is an Eternal Self-Originated Being, who had no beginning of Being, and received his being from no other, and that there is no other Self-Originated Being, but himself. This is the Notion which all Mankind have of One God, That there is one Infinite, Eternal, Self-Originated Being or Nature ; and if there be (as it is certain there is) but one such Nature and Divinity, there can be but One God. And this is Established in the Christian Faith, which owns but One God the Father, who is therefore in Scripture, in a peculiar manner, called *the One God, and the Only True God.*

Thus far all Christians are agreed ; but here our *Arian* and *Socinian* Adversaries stop : For how can the Son be God, and the Holy Ghost be God, if the Father be the only Self-Originated Being, and the One True God.

Now the very Notion of a Son Answers this difficulty, or at least proves, that so it is, however it may exceed our finite Comprehension.

It is Essential to the Notion of a Son, to be of another, of him, whom we call his Father, and to receive the same Nature from him. Man begets a Man, and God begets God ; but there is an infinite distance between these two, as there is between God and Creatures.

When Man begets a Man ; he does not Communicate his own whole entire numerical Nature to his Son, but with part of his own Substance Communicates the same specifick Nature to him, or a Nature of the same kind ; and therefore a Man and his Son are two Men, as having two particular Natures, though specifically the same.

But if we believe, that God has a Son, begotten by him of himself, I say, not created out of nothing, nor made of any other pre-existent Nature or Substance, but eternally begotten of himself, we must acknowledge,

that the Father and the Son are perfectly One, excepting that one is the Father, and the other the Son.

All men, who know any thing of the Divine Nature, know, that God is the most Pure, Simple, Uncompounded Being; and if God, who has no parts, and cannot be divided into any, begets a Son, he must Communicate his Whole, Undivided Nature to him: For to beget a Son, is to Communicate his own Nature to him; and if he have no parts, he cannot Communicate a part, but must Communicate the Whole; that is, he must Communicate his whole self, and be a second self in his Son.

Now a Whole, and a Whole of a Whole, are certainly two, but not two Natures, but one Nature, not merely Specifically, but Identically One; for it is impossible that a Whole, which is Communicated without Division, or Separation, should have the least imaginable diversity from it self, so as to become another Nature from it self; for a Whole of a Whole must be perfectly and identically the same with that Whole of which it is; for a Whole can be but One. This is that *numerus* *id est* Sameness and Identity of Nature, which the Fathers assert, and whereon they found the Unity of the Godhead. And this is the meaning of that distinction of the Schools, between *unum numero*, and *re numerata*, one in number and in the thing numbred. Two must always be allowed to be Two in number, as Father and Son are, though they are but One *in re numerata*, in the Sameness and Identity of Nature, as Christ tells us, *I and my Father are One*; & in the Neuter Gender, which must relate to Nature, not to Number.

To distinguish or multiply Natures, there must be some real or notional diversity and alterity between them, as *Boetius* observes: But a Whole can never differ in the least from the whole of which it is, no more than the same Whole can differ from it self; and it is this Sameness and Identity, which is called a Numerical Unity of Nature, and

and is peculiar to the Divine Nature, there being nothing like it in Creatures: Not that the Divine Nature considered as in the Father, is the same in number with the Divine Nature as communicated to, and subsisting distinctly in the Son; for then the Father and the Son can't be two; for the Person of the Father and his Divinity, or Divine Nature, is the same; and the Person of the Son, and his Divine Nature is the same; and if this Oneness relate to number, there can be but One Person, as there is but One Nature: but a Numerical Unity of Nature does not exclude a Number of Persons, each of whom has the whole Divine Nature Perfectly and Distinctly in himself; it does not exclude the actual and perfect communication of the same Divine Nature to more than one, but only excludes all imaginable diversity and alterity; and what is not *aliud*, is *unum*; that which is not another thing, another different Nature, is but One: That is, the Divine Nature is numerically One, in opposition to any other Absolute, Self-originated Divinity, not in opposition to the Eternal Communications of its self to the Son and Holy Spirit. If the Divine Nature, as actually and distinctly subsisting in Three, be as perfectly One, as the Idea of God is One, as any specifick Notion, suppose of Human Nature, is One; then it is Identically and Numerically one and the same. And indeed this is the true reason why the Catholic Fathers so often represent the Unity of the Divine Nature by Allusions and Metaphors signifying a specifick Unity; because the Divine Nature, as subsisting in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is as perfectly one and the same, as the specifick Notion and Idea of any Nature is, which abstracts from all the diversities and differences which are found in Individuals. Which one Observation will help us to expound several disputed passages in the Fathers, as I could easily shew, were that my present business.

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they have one undistinguished, undiversified Nature, and therefore are One in Nature; yet are Three in Number, because they have this one undivided, undistinguished, undiversified Nature, after a different manner, which the *Greeks* called *τὸν ὁμοῦ*, the manner of Existence, or the manner how they come to be, which though it sounds very harshly when applied to that which has no beginning of Being, (as most other expressions do, when applied to God, and Criticized on by perverse and Comical Wits) must be allowed in such a qualified sense as is proper to an Eternal Being, or we must deny Eternal Generation and Procession, which is, though not the beginning, yet a Communication of Being: And thus the Fathers *τὸν ὁμοῦ*, or Mode, or manner of Existence, and Being is, that he is Self-originated, and receives his Being from no other; the Son's is, that he is Eternally Begotten of the Father, and receives his Nature and Being without any beginning, from the Father; the Holy Ghost's is, that he Eternally Proceeds from Father and Son; and this is all the distinction that is between them: They have but one undivided, undiversified Nature; but these opposite Relations necessarily prove them Three in Number, as I have already shewn; though the Divine Essence, the *res numerata*, is but One; it being Communicated from Father to Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Ghost, Whole of Whole; which makes it perfectly one and the same Undivided, Undiversified, Essence, Subsisting Distinctly, but not Separately, in Three.

That this is the true Notion both of the Fathers and Schools, and all that the wisest Schoolmen meant by the Singularity of the Divine Essence and Nature, which they acknowledged to subsist in *Tribus Suppositis*, or *Personis*, whole and entire in Three distinct Persons or Subjects, may appear in due time, when Men have recovered their

their Temper so far, as to be capable of hearing Reason, and of understanding plain Sense. But my only design at present is to shew, that these Relations in the Ever Blessed Trinity, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Vindicate the Faith of the Trinity from the Imputation of *Tritheism*.

Three Gods must signifie Three Absolute, Independent, Self-originated Divinities, Three such as we acknowledge the Person of the Father to be, who is Infinitely Perfect, and is of himself; and all the Catholick Fathers acknowledge, that Three Fathers would be Three Gods: Three such Absolute Beings, though equally Perfect, and every way alike, would be Three Divine Self-originated Natures, or Three Individuals of the same specifick Nature; that is, Three Gods, as Three Individuals of Human Nature are Three men.

But Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not Three Absolute Divine Natures, nor Three Individuals of One specifick Nature, but are Three Singulars of One Individual Nature, Communicated whole and entire from Father to Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Ghost: So that there is but one and the same Divine Nature in all Three, and therefore but One Divinity, and One God; unless one and the same Divine Nature can be Three Gods. To number Three, each of whom is himself True and Perfect God, does not prove Three Gods, unless you can multiply and number Natures too; for One Divine Nature is but One God; but Three Gods must have Three Appropriate, and Incommunicable Divine Natures; which the very Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, deny in the Christian Trinity. There is but One Self-originated Divinity in the Person of the Father; and the very Name of Son proves that he is not of himself, but has, and is, all that he has, and is, from the Father, and is all that the Father is: He is God of God; now God of God, is Another, and is True and Perfect God, but is not Another God, be-  
cause



cause he receives all from his Father, has the same Divine Nature that his Father has, has nothing but what his Father has, and has all that his Father has; *Titus ex Toto*, Whole of Whole; which is but One Undivided, Undiversified, One Numerical Whole, One God.

This seems to be the true Reason why *St. Austin*, and after him the Schoolmen, lay such stress upon the Relations in the Trinity, to save the Unity of the Divine Nature. For by Relations the Schools mean, *Relationes Subsistentes*, Subsisting Relations, or Relatives, not Relations without a Subject; which *St. Austin* rejects as absurd: For nothing can be Predicated Relatively which has not some Being and Substance of its own to be the foundation of that Relation:

*Omnis essentia, quæ relativè dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo, ut homo dominus, homo servus — ad se dicuntur, & substantiæ sunt vel essentia: dominus verò & servus — ad aliquid relativè dicuntur: sed si non esset homo, id est, aliqua substantia, non esset qui relativè dominus diceretur. — Quapropter si & Pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relativè dicatur ad aliquid, Aug. de Trinit. l. 7. c. 1.*

A Man who is a Master, a Man who is a Servant, must be a Man, or he could not be the Subject of any Relation, either of Master, or Servant; and thus, as he adds, Father must signify a positive Being, something that he is himself, or else there is nothing to sustain a Relation to another; and the like must be said of the Son and Spirit.

Now these Relations in the Trinity, of Father, Son, and Spirit, though each of them have the whole Divine Nature and Substance, do yet prove that there are not Three Absolute Independent Divinities, but only One Divine Nature and Substance: As *St. Austin* speaks of Father and Son, *utrumque Substantia, & utrumque Una Substantia*; they are both of them Substance, and both of them One Substance; for the Son must receive his whole Being from his Father, and therefore have the same One Nature and Substance that his Father has; which proves, that a Trinity of Relatives can be but One God, because they can have but One Divine Nature in them all. But this is beyond my present design.

Thus

Thus I have given a short view of the Catholick Faith of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity: We are Baptized into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; and if we are Christians, we must Believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and we need not believe nor understand any more than what these Names, when applied to God, do plainly and necessarily signify. This I have explained as easily and familiarly as possibly I could, that ordinary Christians, who are not skilled in School Terms or Subtilties, may know what they are to Believe, and see the plain Reasons of it. This is what all Christians, who sincerely Believe a Trinity, are agreed in; That there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, of the same Nature with himself: That the Father is God, God of himself; The Son is God, God of God, True and Perfect God, Begotten of his Father from all Eternity; That the Holy Ghost is God, True and Perfect God, Eternally Proceeding from Father and Son: That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost Father or Son; but they are Three, truly and really distinct from each other: But that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have all the same One Divinity, Communicated from the Father to the Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, and therefore are but One God. All this, as I have shewn, is necessarily included in the Names and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which if they be not empty Names, but signify any thing real, must signify all this.

And what is there unintelligible in all this? Such a Distinction, and such an Unity as is signified in the very Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove that God is Three and One: If the Father is himself True and Perfect God, the Son himself True and Perfect God, the Holy Ghost himself True and Perfect God, and the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father,  
nor

nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son; then there are Three, each of whom is in himself True and perfect God, and that is a Divine Trinity: And if the Father communicates his whole Nature without division or separation to the Son, and Father and Son communicate the same whole Nature to the Holy Spirit, they are in the most perfect notion One, there being one and the same whole entire perfect Divinity in all Three. A Whole, a Whole, and a Whole, are Three in number, but are but one Identical Nature; for a Whole of a Whole must be the same Whole; and in this Unity of Nature consists the Unity of the Godhead.

I grant a Whole of a Whole is very unconceivable to us; and so is the Notion of an Eternal self-originated Being, and of Creation, to the full as unconceivable, as the Eternal Generation of a Whole from a Whole: But this is a difficulty in the Notion of an Eternal Generation, not of a Trinity in Unity: If God begets a Son, as the Scripture assures us he has an only begotten Son, he must communicate his own Nature to him; and besides the Testimony of Scripture, That all the Father has is the Son's, his whole Nature and Divinity, Reason assures us, that God being a pure simple Being, without composition or parts, if he communicate his Nature to his Son, he must communicate it whole and entire, without division or separation; and if this be so, it is certain, that Father and Son, he who begets, and he who is begotten, are Two; and it is as certain, that the same whole Divinity, communicated by the Father to the Son, is but the same One Divinity; and One Divinity, though actually subsisting in Three, can be but One God, not Three Gods: It is certain, this is the most perfect Unity that can be, between Three who are truly and really the same, and yet distinct; for they can never be more One, than to be Three Sames, and Three Wholes; for the Communication of a Whole may make a Number, but cannot distinguish or multiply Nature. SECT.

SECT. VI.

*Concerning the Unity of God.*

**B**UT our *Socinian* Adversaries, and some who would not be thought *Socinians*, have espoused such a Notion of *One God*, as makes the Faith of a Trinity absolutely irreconcilable with the Faith of *One God*.

By *One God*, they mean *One* who is God; but the Faith of the Trinity owns Three, each of whom is by himself True and Perfect God; and I grant it is as absolutely impossible to reconcile these two, as it is to reconcile Contradictions; for to say that there is but *One* who is God, and to say that there are Three, each of whom is God, is a manifest Contradiction; and yet without saying this last, we must deny a Trinity. It is in vain to think to solve this with Words without Sense: If there is but *One* who is God, we must either make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Names, or Modes, or Manifestations of the same *One Numerical Divine Person*; which was the ancient, exploded, anathematized Heresy of *Noetus* and *Sabellius*; or we must make the Son and Holy Spirit to be mere Creatures, if we allow any Personality to them, as *Arius*, *Macedonius*, *Paulus Samosatenus*, and such like Hereticks, and our Modern *Socinians* do.

But we, with the Scriptures and the Catholick Church, reject this Notion of the Unity of God, which is to assert the Unity, but to deny a Trinity. And because this seems to be so prevailing a Notion at this time, I shall shelter myself as well as I can, under the Authority of the Catholick Fathers, and the Catholick Church.

That there is but *One God*, was always the Faith of the Catholick Church, as appears from all the Ancient Creeds;

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but then they did not believe in One God, as One God signifies One Divine Separate Person; which is never expressed in any Christian Creed, but in *One God the Father*, who has an only begotten Son, and an Eternal Spirit, in the Unity of the same Godhead. There is no Christian Creed, which teaches the Belief of One God who is not a Father; and if the One God be a Father, he must have a Son of his own Nature and Substance; and the Son of God, consubstantial with God the Father, must be God

*Nos vero unicum, quidem Deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione, quam aconomiam dicimus, ut unici Dei sit & filius, & sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, per quem omnia facta sunt, & sine quo factum est nihil. Tert. cont. Prax. c. 2. p. 501 Oxon.*

*Dum unicum, Deum non aliter putat credendum, quam si ipsum eundemque & Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum dicat, quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiam scilicet unitatem, & nihilominus custodiatur aconomia sacramentum, qua unitatem in Trinitatem disponit, tres dirigit Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum. Ibid.*

the Son. This is what *Tertullian* tells us, That there is One God, with his *Oeconomy*, that is, with his only begotten Son, and Eternal Spirit. The Catholick Church so believed in One God, as to acknowledge Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, each of which is truly and really God, as they must necessarily do, if they believed a Trinity: And upon this account they were charged with *Tritheism*, or with asserting Three Gods, because they owned a Trinity of Divine Substantial Persons, really distinct from each other, each of which is truly and perfectly God. So that this is no new Charge

against the Asserters of a Real and Substantial Trinity; and the Ancient Christians had no regard to it; for *Tritheism* in this Objection signified no more than the Belief of the Trinity, or of Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, which is the true Christian Faith. As to shew this briefly:

In answer to this Objection against the belief of a Real Substantial Trinity, from the Unity of God, they tell us it is Judaism and Heresy, to place the Unity of the Godhead in the Unity of a Person; to teach that there is but  
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One Divine Person, as there is but One God. We may find enough to this purpose in *Tertullian* against *Praxeas*, and *Athanasius* against the *Sabellians*; in *St. Hilary*, *St. Austin*, and many others.

*Athanasius* commends the *Jews* for opposing the *Polytheism* and *Idolatri* of the *Gentiles*: But then he charges them with as great *Impiety* themselves, in denying the Son of God, by whom all things were made, and in accusing those of *Polytheism* who worship the Father by the Son.——And he exhorts his Readers to separate themselves from those *Judaizers* who corrupt *Christianity* with *Judaism*, who deny *God of God*, and teach One God in the *Jewish* Notion of it: In which he taxes the *Sabellians*, who taught that the Word of God is like the Word and Wisdom of a Man, within him, in his Heart and Soul; and therefore that God and his Word are but One Person.

*St. Hilary* frequently takes notice of this Corruption of the Evangelical Faith, as he calls it, under the Pious Profession of One God, to deny the *Only begotten God*, to deny Christ to be *born God*, or to be *True God*, but only a *Powerful Creature*, thereby to preserve the Faith of One God, which they think the Birth of God does overthrow. In which he distinctly charges the *Sabellians* and *Arians*; the first for making God but One Person, for fear of intro-

*Judaica fidei ista res est, sic unum Deum credere, ut Filium adnumerare ei nolis, & post Filium Spiritum. Tert. c. Prax.*

Ἀλλ' ἔχ' ὅτι συνίσταναι ἐλάττωσι, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἐκτελεῖν ὁμολογηθέντος, & ὅτι τὸ Θεῷ δι' ὅ τα πάντα γέγονεν, ἀρνούμενοι, καὶ τοῖς δι' αὐτῶν & πατέρα σκευόμενοι ἐγκαλῶντες πολυθεότητα. *Ath. cont. Sabell. Tom. 1. p. 651. Paris.*

Χωρίζομεθα & καὶ τῷ Ἰουδαϊζόντων, καὶ & χρεῖται νισμῶν ἐν Ἰουδαϊσμῷ παρεσθαιζόντων, οἱ & ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ Θεὸν ἀρνούμενοι Θεὸν ἕνα ἀθεοῦ ἀποσώας Ἰουδαίους λέγουσι. *Ibid.*

Λόγον δὲ διον πρὸς ἐκ κατὰ διὰ ἀνδρώπα νομίζουσιν & τὸ Θεῷ, καὶ σοφίαν ὁπίαν πρὸς ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῦ αἵματος ἐν & Θεῷ, αἷμα πρὸς λόγον φασίν. *Ibid.*

*Quidam ita Evangelica fidei corrumpunt Sacramentum, ut sub unius Dei piâ tantum professione, naturam Unigeniti Dei abnegent — Qui sub unius Dei solâ sanè utilis ac religiosâ predicatione, aut Deum natum Christum negant, aut verum Deum non esse contendunt, ut Creatio potentis Creatura intra unum Deum fidei Sacramentum relinquant, quia natiuitas Dei extra unius Dei fidem religionem protrahat consuetum.*

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ducing a Trinity of Gods with a Trinity of Persons; the other for making Christ a mere Creature, though the first and most powerful Creature, for fear of making a Second God, should they have owned him to be God of God, of the same Substance with the Father.

*Sed nos edocēti divinitus, neque duos Deos predicare, neque solum, hanc Evangelicā ac Prophetici præconiū rationem in Confessione Dei Patris & Dei Filii afferemus, ut unum in fide nostra sit uterque, non unus; neque eundem utrumque, neque inter verum & falsum aliud consentiens: quia Deo ex Deo nato, neque eundem natiuitas permittit esse, neque aliud. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1.*

In opposition to this, he tells us what the true Faith is, which they have learned from Divine Revelation, Neither to preach Two Gods, nor One Solitary Divine Person (for so *solus* must signify in this place); and undertakes to prove both from the Evangelists and Prophets, That when we profess our Faith in God the Father, and God the Son, we must neither own

God the Father and God the Son to be One Person, as the *Sabellians* did, nor Two different Substances, as the *Arians* did: For when God is born of God, this Divine Nativity will neither admit a Unity of Person, nor a Diversity of Nature: For Father and Son, he who begets, and he who is begotten, must be Two Persons; and the Son who is begotten of the Substance of his Father, must be consubstantial with him.

It were easy to multiply Quotations to this purpose, both out of these and numerous other Ancient Writers; but this is Proof enough, that the Primitive Fathers would not be frightened out of the true Catholick Faith of a Real and Substantial Trinity, by the loud Clamours of *Tritheism*; but rejected such a Notion of One God, as confined the Godhead to One Single Solitary Person, as *Judaism*, and an *Anti-trinitarian* Heresy. For we know in what sense the *Jews* owned but One God; viz. in the very sense that the *Socinians* and all *Anti-trinitarians* do; that is, That there is but One who is God, but One Divine Person; and in this sense these Ancient Fathers rejected it.

But

But besides these general Sayings, they industriously confute this Notion of the Unity of the Godhead, which confines it to one single Person ; that the One God is so One, that there is and can be but One Divine Person, who is true and perfect God.

The Scriptures both of the *Old* and *New Testament* do expressly teach, that there is but one God ; This the Ancient Hereticks perpetually objected against the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity :

And St. *Hilary* observes, what danger there is in answering this Objection, if it be not done with great caution : For it may be equally impious to deny, or to affirm it. For the True Catholick Faith of One God lies between two such contrary Heresies, as are ready to take advantage one way or other, whatever Answer you give. If you own that there is but One God, without taking notice, that this One God has an only begotten Son, who is True and Perfect God, the *Arians* take advantage of this against the Eternal Godhead of the Son : If you say, That the Father is God, and the Son God, and yet there is but One God, the *Sabellians* hence conclude, That Father and Son are but One Person, as they are One God.

But in opposition to both these Heresies, he tells us, That though the Catholick Church did not deny One God, yet they taught *God and God*, and denied the Unity of the Godhead both in the *Arian* and *Sabellian* No-

*Cum enim unum Deum prophana assertio infidelitatis ingereret, & rursum unum Deum negare fides sana non posset, tractari de eo non sine incipitis periculi conscientia potuit, quod non minus impie confirmaretur, quam negaretur. Hil. de Trinit. lib. 5.*

*Non ignorans, quantum in eo sit, vel responsionis periculum vel silentii, & ex utraque opportunatatem impietatis expectans.*

*Atque ita sapientia mundi, quae stultitia apud Deum est, specie blanda & pestifera simplicitatis illuderet, cum hoc fidei suae constitueret exordium, in quo sibi impie assentiremur aut adversaremur. Et per hoc utriusque rei periculum, Dei filium Deum non esse obtineret, quia Deus unus est ; aut extorqueret alterius haereticos necessitatem, si & patrem Deum & filium Deum confiteres, unum Deum predicare secundum Sabellii opinionem impiam existimaremur. Ibid.*

*Non negantes Deum, unum, sed Deum & Deum—Pradicantes, & Deum unum non per unionem docentes, neque rursum ad diversitatis numerum descenantes ; neque contra in nominibus tantum confiteres, sed Deum & Deum. Ibid.*

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tion of One God. And consequently, That they professed to believe God, and God, and God, though not Three Gods, but One God ; yet in that very sense which both Ancient and Modern Hereticks call Tritheism.

There is no dispute but the Scripture does very fully and expressly teach us, That there is but One God. *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, 6. Deut. 4.* which our Saviour himself approves, *12. Mark 29.* and the Scribe expounds *32. Well master, Thou hast said the truth, for there is One God, and there is none other but He :* And this is often confirmed both in the *Old and New Testament :* But then the Fathers think that they have an unanswerable Argument to prove, That by One God, is not meant, that there is but One who is God, because the same Holy Scriptures which teach us, that there is but One God, do attribute the Name, and Dignity, and Power, and all the Natural Perfections of God, to more than One.

*Nemini dubium esse oportet ad divinarum rerum cognitionem divinis utendum esse Doctrinis — Non subeunt ingenia nostra in cælestem scientiam, neque incomprehensibilem virtutem sensu aliquo infirmitas nostra concipiet. Hilary. l. 4. de Trin.*

*Ipsi de se Deo credendum est, & iis, quæ cognitioni nostræ de se tribuit, obsequendum ; aut enim more Gentilium denegandus est, si testimonia ejus improbantur ; aut si, ut est, Deus creditur, non potest aliter de Deo, quàm ut ipse est de se testatus, intelligi. Ibid.*

St. Hilary explains this Argument at large; the sum of which in short is this : That we must learn the knowledge of God from Divine Revelation ; for Humane Understandings, which are accustomed to Corporeal and Bodily Images, are too weak of themselves to discern and contemplate Divine things ; nor is there any thing in our selves, or in Created Nature, that can give us an adequate notion and conception of the Nature and Unity of God : We must believe God concerning himself, and his own Nature, and yield a ready assent to what he reveals to us. For we must either deny him to be God, as the Heathens do, if we reject his Testimony ; or if we believe him to be God, we must conceive

conceive no otherwise of him, than as he himself hath taught us.

This is very reasonable, if we believe upon God's Authority, To believe all that God reveals, and to expound the Revelation by it self; not to put such a sense upon one part of the Revelation, as shall contradict another; but to put such a sense upon the words, as makes the whole consistent with it self.

As in the present Dispute concerning the Unity of God. The Scripture assures us, that there is but One God, and we believe that there is but One God. Excepting the *Valentinians*, and such kind of Hereticks, all Christians, both Catholicks, and Hereticks, agree in this Profession. But the Question is, In what sense the Scripture teaches that there is but *One God*? Whether this *One God* signifies One single Divine Person, or One God with his Only begotten Son and Eternal Spirit, who have the same Nature and Divinity?

The *Arians* and *Socinians* embrace the first Sense of the words, That One God is One Divine Person, and for this reason will not own Christ, or the Holy Spirit, to be True and Perfect God, because there is but One God, and Three Divine Persons, they say, are Three Gods. Now unless we will pretend to understand the Divine Nature, and the Divine Unity, better than God himself does, we must refer this Dispute to Scripture; and if we have the same Authority to believe more Divine Persons than One, that we have to believe but One God, then the Unity of God in the Scripture-notion of it, is no Tritheism, nor any objection against the belief of a Trinity; for there may be but One only God, and yet Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the same Godhead.

This is St. *Hilary's* Argument, and it is a very good one, That *Moses* himself, who has taught us, that there

*Non negantes Deum unum, sed eo ipso Autore Deum & Deum, per quem Deus unus predicatus est, pradicantes.* —



*Atque ita non auctoritati contrarium est, sed ex auctoritate responsum est, ne per id filium liceret Deum negare, quia ad Israel Deus unus est: cum confitendi Dei filium Deum idem Autor est, qui Autor est Dei unius predicandi. Hilar. de Trin. l. 5. prope initium.*

is but One God, has taught us to confess, *God and God*; that we have the same Authority to believe the Son of God to be God, that we have to believe One God. And therefore, though we do, and must believe One God, we must not so believe One God, as

to deny the Son of God to be God, for this is to contradict *Moses* and the Prophets.

This Argument he prosecutes at large throughout the IV<sup>th</sup> and V<sup>th</sup> Books of the Trinity, and alledges all those *Old Testament* Proofs for the plurality of Divine Persons, and for the Divinity of Christ; which, whatever opinion some Modern Wits and Criticks have of them, have been applied to that purpose by all Christian Writers from the beginning of Christianity; and were that my present Business, might be easily vindicated from the Cavils and Exceptions of Hereticks.

St. Paul tells us, *That there is One God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and One Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him,* 1 Cor. 8. 6.

*Habes ergo Deum ex quo, habes Deum per quem; aut si id negabis, necesse est, id quod factum est, per quem factum sit, doceas.*

*Quod ergo dictum est, fiat firmamentum, in eo quod pater sit locus, ostenditur; & quod fecisse Deus dicitur, in eo persona efficientis est intelligenda, qui faciat. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 4.*

St. Hilary finds this God of whom are all things, and this Lord by whom are all things, in the *Mosaical* History of the Creation. *And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters; and God made the firmament, and divided the waters, &c.* 1. Gen. 6, 7.

Where, as he applies it, the Father commands, and the Son, his Almighty Word, makes all things. So the *Psalmist* tells us of the Father, *He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast,* 33. Psal. 9. Or as it is in the 148<sup>th</sup> Psal. 5. *He commanded, and they were created.* And by whom they were created, St. John tells us; *In the begin-*

*ning*

*But see below, p. 78.*

ning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made, that was made, 1 Joh. 1, 2. This he thinks proves a plain distinction of *jubentis Dei*, & *facientis Dei*, God that commands, and God that does; for common sense will not allow that they should be one single Solitary Person, much more reason have we to distinguish them, when both the Old and New Testament distinguish them.

*Sensus communis intelligentia*

*non recipiet, ut in eo quod dictum est, jussit & facta sunt, solitarius atque idem significatus creatur. Ibid.*

*Ceterum, etsi ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus coherentibus, tamen alium dicam oportet ex necessitate sensus, eum qui jubet, & eum qui facit: nam nec juberet, si ipse faceret, dum juberet fieri per eum: tamen jubebat, haud sibi jussurus si unus esset; aut sine jussu facturus, quia non expectasset, ut sibi juberet. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 12.*

But whatever dispute this may admit, that Account Moses gives of the Creation of Man, he takes to be an unexceptionable Proof of a Plurality of Divine Persons; And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.— So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, 1. Gen. 26, 27. Now if we understand these words as spoken by God, in the same sense as we should and ought to understand them, had they been spoken by men, ( which St. Hilary lays down as a Principle, That God speaks to us as we speak to one another, and expects to be understood by us according to the common use and acceptation of such forms of speech ) then let Us make man in Our Image, after Our Likeness, cannot signify a singular and solitary Person; for such a form of speech naturally imports a Plurality of Persons, and a common Nature and Likeness. No single solitary Person speaks

*Hac aut nega Scripta, aut quis est, ut non pntes accipiendâ quænamodum Scripta sunt; maxima quæ non in Allegoriis & Parabolis, sed in definitionibus, & certis & simplicibus habent sensum. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 13.*

*Deus enim per Legislatorem secundum intelligentiam nostram locutus est: Verbis videlicet quibus uti ipse nos voluit, cognitionem eorum nobis, quæ gessit, impertiens. Hilar. Ibid.*

*Sustulit singularis intelligentiam professione consortii: Consortium autem esse aliquod solitario ipsi sibi non potest.*

*Quid enim tam alienum ab eo qui solus esset, ut sibi faciendum diceret, cum voluntate tantum opus esset, ut fieret.*

*Neque rursum recipit solitarii solitudo, Faciamus, neque quisquam alieno à se Nostram loquitur, uterque sermo, & faciamus, & nostram, ut solitarium eundemque non patitur, ita neque diversum à se alienumque significat.*

*Cognita per id, quod nostram imaginem dicit, non etiam imagines nostras, unus in utroque proprietate natura. Hil. Ibid.*

to himself to do any thing, but only wills and chuses what to do, and executes his own purposes; much less does he speak to himself in the Plural Number, which in common use signifies some Companions and Partners in the work. Let *Us* make, cannot signify One single Person, nor can *Our Image* admit Two Persons of an unlike and different Nature, when the Image is but one and the same; and therefore this must prove, that there are more Divine Persons than One, and that they have all the same Divine Nature.

Were God but one single and solitary Person, this would be a most unaccountable form of speech; and there can be no pretence to put such a harsh sense on the words, unless we certainly knew that there was no other Divine Person, but he who spoke; but then if instead of knowing this, we certainly know the contrary; that when God made the World he was not alone, but had his Eternal Substantial Wisdom, the Person of the Eternal Word with him, by whom he made the world, this puts the matter out of doubt: And this St. Hilary proves from that account which Solomon gives of Wisdom, 8. Prov. 22, &c. *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. — Then I was by him, as one brought up with him, rejoicing always before him: And therefore the Father was not alone, and did not speak to himself when he made the world; his own Wisdom, a Divine Eternal Person, co-operating with him, and rejoicing in the Perfection of his Works.*

*Non ergo in fabricatione mundi solitarius Pater sibi loquitur, sapientiâ suâ secum & co operante, & consummata co operatione gaudente. Ibid.*

But

But besides this, he proves at large, that the Angel which so often appeared to *Abraham*, *Hagar*, *Jacob*, to *Moses* in a Burning Bush, and is in exprefs terms called God, the Judge of the world, the God of *Abraham*, and *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, was not a Created Angel, nor God the Father, and yet was True and Perfect God, even the Son of God, who in the fulness of time became Man; and adds several Passages in the *Psalms* and *Prophets*, which plainly own a Divine Person, distinct from God the Father, to be True and Perfect God.

I need not tell those who are acquainted with the Writings of the Ancient Fathers, that they all insist on the same Arguments to prove the same thing; that there is not in any one point a more universal Consent amongst them, which is too Venerable an Authority to be over-ruled by Criticism; it being no less than a Traditionary Exposition of Scripture from the Apostolick Age. But I am no further concerned in this at present, than to shew what Notion the Catholick Fathers had about the Unity of God. These Fathers did not fence against the Objection of *Tritheism*, by distinguishing away the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, by making the Son God *ex accidenti*, & *secundum quid*; for they knew nothing of an accidental or *secundum quid* God; which I must own sounds to me very like Blasphemy and Contradiction; that when this Name *God*, signifies the most necessary and absolutely Perfect Being, any Person to whom this Name does naturally and essentially belong, should be God *by Accident*, or only in a limited and qualified sense: But without fearing the Charge of *Tritheism*, they with *Moses* and the *Prophets* own another Divine Person distinct from the Father, but as Real and Substantial a Person, and as truly and perfectly God, as

*Tert. adv.  
Praxean.*

the Father is: Inſomuch that *Tertullian*, when he had alledged that Text, 45. *Pſal.* 6, 7. which the Apoſtle to the *Hebrews* applies to Chriſt, 1. *Heb.* Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever, the ſcepter of thy Kingdom is a right ſcepter. — Therefore God thy God hath anointed thee with the oyl of gladneſs above thy fellows; was not afraid to add, *Ecce Duos Deos!* Behold Two Gods! That is, Two Divine Perſons, each of whom is by himſelf truly and eſſentially God; for notwithstanding this, he would not ſay there are Two or Three Gods, and gives his reaſon for it: He owned a Plurality of Gods, even *Tritheism* it ſelf, in that ſenſe of the word *Tritheism* which the *Arians* and *Sabellians* objected againſt the Faith of the Trinity, as Three Gods ſignify no more than Three Divine Subſtantial Perſons, each of whom is truly and perfectly God, as having diſtinctly in himſelf the whole and perfect Divine Nature; but this he and the other Fathers deny to be *Tritheism*; they are *God*, and *God*, and *God*, but not Three Gods: And they think it a ſufficient proof, (as any man would, who believes the Scripture) that this is not the Scripture-Notion of *Tritheism*, becauſe the ſame Scripture which teaches us that there is but One God, attributes not only the Name and Title of God, but the Divine Nature and Perfections, to more Perſons than One. And this is the only Answer that need be given, and the beſt Answer that can be given to this Objection of *Tritheism*; for God knows his own Nature, and his own Unity beſt: And it is enough for us to acknowledge God to be One, as the Scripture teaches him to be One; that is, that there is but One God, but that this One God has an Eternal only begotten Son, and an Eternal Spirit, in the Unity of the ſame God-head.

This

This is the account *Tertullian* gives us of those Expressions, when the Scripture asserts that there is but One God, and that there is none besides him. For without denying the Son, we may truly affirm, That there is but One only God, whose Son he is. For though he has a Son, he does not lose his Name of the One and only God, when he is named without his Son; and so he is, when what is said, is appropriated to him as the first Person; for in the order of Nature, and of our Conceptions, the Father is before the Son, and therefore must be named before him: So that there is but One God the Father, and besides him there is no other; which does not deny the Son, but another God; which rejects the multitude of False Gods which the Heathens worshipped; but the Son, as being inseparably united to him, is included in the Unity of the Father's Godhead, though not named; which as he well observes, he could not be, without making another God of him. Had the Father said, There is no other God besides me, excepting my Son, this had made the Son another God, a new separate Divinity; and would have been as improper, as if the Sun should say, There is no other Sun besides me, excepting my Rays.

The Sum of which is this: That the Title of the One and only God, and besides him there is no other God, does in a peculiar manner belong to the Father, who is the One only God with his Son and Spirit; but this does not exclude the Son or Spirit from being true and perfect God;

for

*Salvo enim filio recte unicum Deum potest determinasse, cujus est filius. Non enim desinit esse qui habet filium ipse unicus, suo scilicet nomine, quoniam sine filio nominatur. Sine filio autem nominatur, quoniam principaliter determinatur ut prima persona, quae ante filii nomen erat proponenda; quia pater ante cognoscitur, & post patrem filius nominatur. Igitur unus Deus Pater, & alius absque eo non est. Quod ipsa inferens non filium negat, sed alium Deum. Ceterum alius à Patre filius non est. Denique, inspicere sequentia hujusmodi pronuntiationum, & invenies scire ad Idolorum sacrificatores atque cultores definitionem earum pertinere; ut multitudinem falsorum Deorum unio Divinitatis expellas, habens tamen filium quanto individuum & inseparatum à patre tanto in patre reputandum, etsi non nominatum, atquin si nominasset eum, separasset, ita dicens, alius præter me non est, nisi filius meus; alium enim etiam filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Puta solem dixisse, ego sol, & præter me non est, nisi radius meus; nonne denotasset vanitatem, quasi non & radius in sole deputetur. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 18.*



for they are not *other Gods* from the Father, but have the same Divinity, and are inseparably united to the Father, and therefore are included in the Unity of the Godhead, without being named; whereas their being named would have excepted them out of the Unity of the Godhead, and

made other Gods of them: And though the Son when he is named alone, is called God, this does not make Two Gods, because he is God only by his Unity with his Father.

*Qui etsi Deus vocatur, quando nominatur singularis, non igitur duos Deos faciat, sed unum, hoc ipso quod & Deus ex unitate patris vocari habeat. Ibid. c. 19.*

*Non alter ad eum Deus deputatur (filius) non enim ex alia substantia, sed ex Deo Deus est. Nihil itaque in eo novum, nihil extraneum, nihil recens est. Hilar. de Trin. l. 4. in fine.*

*Reliquis autem nunc omnis sermo ad id proficiet, ut qui Deus verus esse intelligitur, non in Deum alterum deputetur: Et quod in alterum non proficit, id unum intelligatur.*

*Non enim aliud quam Deus subsistit, quod non aliunde quam ex Deo Deus subsistit: Nam cum ipse Deus sit, tamen etiam per naturæ virtutem in eo Deus est: Et per id quod ipse Deus, & in eo Deus est, non est Deus præter eum: Cum non extet aliunde quod Deus est, & in eo Deus sit, habens in se & quod ipse est, & ex quo ipse subsistit. Id. l. 5.*

*Quoniam ego sum Dominus, & non est Deus præter me: Est enim unigenitus Deus, neque consortem unigeniti nomen admittit, sicut non recipit inascibilis, in eo tantum quod est inascibilis, participem. Est ergo unus ab uno, neque præter Deum inascibilem Deus inascibilis alius est; neque præter unigenitum Deum*

St. Hilary gives much the same account of it; That when the Scripture teaches that there is One God, and no other God besides him, this does not exclude the Son of God from being true and perfect God, because the Son is not another God: He being of the same Substance with God the Father, God of God, and inseparably united to him: Another God does not signify another Divine Person, but another Divinity, another separate and independent Principle and Fountain of Deity. And besides this, St. Hilary endeavours to prove at large from several Texts of the Old Testament, that this very expression, of *one God, and no other besides him*, is applied not only to the Father, but to the Son, and is very justly applicable to each of them, because each of them have a Personal and Incommunicable Unity. The Father is the One God, and there is none besides him; for he is the only Deus

*Innasci-*

*Innascibilis*, the only God, who is God of himself, without any Communication of the Divine Nature to him from any other Divine Person. The Son is the One God, and there is none besides him; that is, the *Deus Unigenitus*, the only begotten God; and there is no other begotten God but he: So that each of them is the One God: For between One and One, that is One of One, there is no Second Nature of the Eternal Deity.

I shall not dispute these matters now, which will be more proper in another place; it is enough at present, that we learn from them what Sense these Fathers had concerning the Unity of God; *viz.* That it is not the Unity of a Single Person, so as to exclude all other Persons from the Name and Nature of God, but a Unity of Nature and Principle; That there are not Two different Divinities, nor Two Principles of Divinity, which have no Communication with each other; but that there is One Self-originated Being, who communicates his own Nature, without Division and Separation to his Eternal Son, and by and with his Son to his Eternal Spirit: Thus St. *Hilary* concludes this Dispute, That to confess One God, but not a solitary God (that is, not one single solitary Person) is the Faith of the Church, which confesses *the Father in the Son*: But if out of ignorance of this Heavenly Mystery, we pretend that One God signifies One single Divine Person, we know not God, as not owning the Faith of *God in God*.

This is plain sense which every Christian may understand, and what every one must believe who will be a Christian: We must believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father,

*Deus unigenitus quisquam est. Uterque itaque Unus & Solus est, proprietate videlicet in unoquoque & innascibilitatis & originis. Ac sic uterque Deus unus est: Cum inter unum & unum, id est, ex uno unum, Divinitatis aeterna non sit secunda natura. Hil. l. 4.*

*In his ergo si unum magis quam solitarium Deum intelligis, ecclesiae religionem profiteberis, quia Patrem in Filio confectur. Sin vero unum Deum ad solitarii significationem, sacramenti caelestis ignarus obtendis, extra cognitionem Dei es, Deum in Deo esse non confitens. l. 5.*

Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son; and that each of these Three is in himself, as distinguished from the other Two, true and perfect God; but though they are Three, and each of them true and perfect God, yet they are not Three Gods, because there is but One and the same Divinity in them: The same individual numerical Divine Nature, being whole, perfect, undivided in them all; originally in the Father, by Generation in the Son, and by Procession in the Holy Ghost, as I have already explained it, which is the most perfect Unity we can conceive between Three Wholes, or Three, each of which have the same whole undivided Nature distinctly in themselves.

If this will not be allowed to be such a Unity as is included in the Notion of One God; that the natural Notion of One God is of One only who is God, which is contradictory to the belief of Three, each of whom is in himself true and perfect God; the answer the Catholick Fathers give to this (as I have now shewn) ought to satisfy all Christians; that this is not the Scripture-notion of One God, That there is but One, who is God; because the same Holy Scriptures which teach us, that there is but One God, do also teach us, that there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead. That not only the Father is God, as an Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Being, and upon this account in a peculiar manner called the One and only true God; but the Son also is true God, and the Holy Ghost true God, by the Communication of the same Divine Nature to them. Now God knows his own Nature and Unity best, and if he declares himself to be but One God, but yet requires us to believe his Eternal Son to be true and perfect God, and his Eternal Spirit to be true and perfect God; it is certain that the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is very reconcilable with the Unity of God. For as far as Revelation must decide this Dispute, we are

as much obliged to believe, That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, as we are to believe, That there is but One God.

Those who will not acquiesce in this, must appeal from Scripture to Natural Reason, which is a very absurd and impudent Appeal; for the plain sense of it is this, That they will believe their own Reason before the Scriptures, in matters relating to the Divine Nature and Unity, which all wise men acknowledge to be so much above human comprehension: That is, That they know the Unity of God better than God himself does; or, which is the same thing, That they will never believe any Revelation to come from God, or any thing, how express soever the words are, to be the meaning of the Revelation, any farther than their own Reason approves it: Of which more elsewhere.

And yet I dare appeal to any man of a free and unbiass'd Reason in this Cause, What is that Natural Notion we have of One God? Is it any thing more, than that there is and can be but One Eternal Self-originated Being, who is the Principle or Cause of all other Beings? And does not the Scripture, do not all *Trinitarians*, with the whole Catholick Church, own this? Do not all the Christian Creeds teach us to profess our Faith in One God the Father, from whom the Son and the Holy Spirit receive their Godhead? Thus far then Scripture, and Reason, and the Catholick Faith agree: Does Reason then deny, that God can beget of himself an Eternal Son, his own perfect Image and Likeness? If it does, then indeed Scripture and Reason contradict each other: But I believe these men will not pretend to prove from Reason, That God could not beget an Eternal Son; and if this cannot be proved by Reason, as I am certain it never can, then Reason does not contradict Scripture, which teaches us that God has an only begotten Son: And if God have an only be-

gotten Son, Reason will teach us that the Son of God must be True and Perfect God, and yet not another God, because he has one and the same Nature with his Father.

This is all that any Christian need to believe concerning this matter, and all this every Christian may understand; and all this every one who sincerely believes the Faith of the Holy Trinity, does and must agree in: Those who do not, I will at any time undertake to prove to be secret Hereticks, and Enemies to the Christian Faith: and as for those who do, I will never dispute with them about some Terms of Art, and the Propriety of Words, in a matter which is so much above all words and forms of speech.

And here I leave this matter upon a sure Bottom; and here we are ready to join Issue with our *Socinian* Adversaries. Our only Controversy as to the Doctrine of the Trinity with them is, Whether the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them, be True and Perfect God: If we can prove this, which has been the Faith of the Catholick Church in all Ages, we need dispute no other matters with them; nor can any Disputes among our selves give any Support to their Cause. A Dispute about Words may look like a difference in Faith, when both contending Parties may mean the same thing; as those must do, who sincerely own and believe, That the Son is True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost is True and Perfect God, and that neither of them are the Father, nor each other.

And therefore those different Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity which the *Socinians* of late have so much triumphed in, and made more and greater than really they are, and more senseless too by their false Representations, can do them no real service among Wise Men, tho it may help to amuse the Ignorant. If any men have subtilly distinguished away the Catholick Faith, they may take them to themselves, and increase their Party by them: But if this were the Case, as I hope it is not, it is no Objection

jection against the Catholick Faith, that some men openly oppose it, and others, at least in some mens opinions, do secretly undermine it. There is reason to guard the Christian Faith against all inconvenient or dangerous Explications, which seem to approach near Heresy, if this be done with due Christian Temper and Moderation ; but I hope the Disputes of the *Trinitarians* are not so irreconcilable, but that they will all unite against a Pestilent and Insolent Heresy, which now promises it self glorious Successes only from their private Quarrels.

## C H A P. II.

*An Examination of Some Considerations concerning the Trinity.*

## S E C T. I.

*Concerning the Ways of managing this Controversy.*

**B**Efore I put an end to this Discourse, it will contribute very much to the better understanding of what I have said, and give a clearer Notion of the Use of it, to apply these Principles to the Examination of a late Treatise, entituled, *Some Considerations concerning the Trinity*. The Author I know not; he writes with Temper ; and though he takes the liberty to find fault, he does it Civilly, and therefore he ought to meet with Civil Usage, and so he shall from me, as far as the bare Censure of his Principles will admit.

*By Bishop Gastrell: see Bp Randolph's  
English Grammar, H. 2, 2d ed. 3, p. 149.*



Considera-  
tions, p. 1.

I was, I confess, startled at the first entrance, to find him own the *Uncertainty of our Faith in these Points* ( concerning the Trinity ) ; for if after the most perfect Revelation of the Gospel that we must ever expect, and the Universal Tradition of the Catholick Church for above Sixteen Hundred years, this Faith is still uncertain, it is time to leave off all Enquiries about it. As for *the many absurd and blasphemous Expositions that have been made of this Doctrine* ; if by them he means the Ancient Heresies which infested the Church, they are so far from rendring our Faith uncertain, that ( as I shall shew him anon ) the very Condemnation of those Heresies by the Catholick Church, gives us a more certain account what the true Catholick Faith was.

I agree with him, that *the warm and indiscreet Management of contrary Parties*, has been to the Prejudice of Religion, among unthinking people, who hence conclude the uncertainty of our Faith ; and it concerns good men to remove this Prejudice, by distinguishing the Catholick Faith from the Disputes about Ecclesiastical Words, and the Catholick Sense of them ; and I hope I have made it appear this may be done, and then the Faith is secure, notwithstanding these Disputes ; and as for any other Offence or Scandal, let those look to it, who either give or take it.

This Considerer dislikes all the Ways and Methods which have hitherto been taken to compose these Disputes.

Consid. p. 2.

1. He dislikes those who are for *reverencing the Mystery of the Trinity, without ever looking into it at all* ; who think it proposed to us only as a Trial and Exercise of our Faith ; and the more implicit that is, the fuller do we express our Trust and Reliance upon God.

Now if by *not looking into it at all*, he means not enquiring what they are to believe concerning the Trinity, nor why they believe it ; this I acknowledge is a very odd sort of Faith ; but I believe he cannot name any such men whose

\* "How far the uncertainty of avowed  
"our faith in these points" depends

avowed Principle this is : An *Implicit Faith* is only meritorious in the Church of *Rome*, but then an *Implicit Faith* is to believe without knowing what or why ; but these *Ignoramus* or *Mystery-Trinitarians* (as some late *Socinian* Considerers have insolently and reproachfully called them, and whom our Author ought not to have imitated ) never teach such an *Implicit Faith* as this, much less admire *the Triumph and Merit of Faith in believing Contradictions, and the more the better.* Under all the appearance of Modesty and Temper, these are very severe and scandalous Reflections upon some of the Wisest and Greatest Men amongst us, and which this Considerer had little reason for, as will soon appear.

The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity is the most Fundamental Article of the whole Christian Faith, and therefore an explicate Knowledge and Belief of it is essential to the Christian Profession, and thus all Protestant Divines teach ; and whatever Voluminous Disputes there may be about it, the true Christian Faith of the Trinity is comprized in a few words, and the Proofs of it are plain and easy : For the Scriptures plainly and expressly teach us, that there is but One God ; and that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God ; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son ; as I have already explained it : This we all teach our people to believe upon the Authority of Scripture ( which is the only Authority we can have for matters of pure Revelation ), and expound those Texts to them which expressly contain this Faith, and vindicate them from the Cavils and perverse Comments of Hereticks : And this, I think, is not to *reverence the Mystery, without ever looking into it at all*, when we look as far as we can, till Revelation bounds our prospect : And this is to look into it as far as God would have us, and as far as is necessary to all the purposes of Religion ; that is, as far as the knowledge of this Mystery is of any use to us. Now

Now when this is done, there are a great many wise men who think we ought to look into this Mystery no further; and there seems to be a very good reason for it; *viz.* because with all our looking, we can see no further. There are indeed some curious Questions started about reconciling the Unity of God with the belief of a Trinity, in which there are Three, each of whom is by himself True and Perfect God; for if there be but One God, how can there be Three, each of whom is True God? Now whatever Answer may be given to such kind of Objections and pretended Contradictions, these Learned Men think there is no reason to clog the Christian Faith with them, nor to disturb the minds of ordinary Christians with such Subtilties: That the Authority of God who has revealed this, and the acknowledged Incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, is a sufficient Answer to all Objections; and as ridiculously as a Witty Man may represent this, That is the truest Faith, not which can believe Contradictions, but which can despise the pretence of Contradictions, when opposed to a Divine Revelation; for that resolves Faith wholly into Divine Authority, which is the true Notion of a Divine Faith.

To say that this will not suppress any of our Doubts or Disputes in Religion, is a manifest mistake; for such a profound Veneration for the Authority of God, would silence them all: And whatever is the Natural Propension of the Soul to the search of Truth, Natural Reason will tell us, that there are a thousand things which we can know nothing of, and that it is in vain to search after them; but that the Divine Wisdom is unsearchable, and therefore God is to be believed beyond our own knowledge or comprehension; and when we are agreed about the Truth and Certainty of the Revelation, that will silence all our Disputes about what is revealed, and set bounds to our Enquiries.

And

And I never knew before, the danger of submitting our Reason to Faith, of a *blind resignation of judgment* ( as he is pleased to call it ) to a Divine Revelation, for that is the matter in debate. *Blasphemies and Contradictions may, and have been imposed upon mens Faith, under the Venerable Name of Mysteries* ; but such Blasphemies and Contradictions were never revealed in Scripture, and therefore belong not to the present Enquiry, which only concerns believing what we allow to be revealed, without looking any farther into it. We allow all men to examine the Truth and Certainty of the Revelation, and to examine what is revealed ; but here we must stop, and not pretend to judge of what is revealed, by the measures of human Reason, which is so inadequate a Rule for Divine and Supernatural Truths. This is all very plain ; and if he will allow the Truth of this, he must confess, that what he has said upon this first Head is nothing to the purpose. It is a very popular thing to decry Mysteries, and to cry up Reason, but to be very cautiously imitated, because it is generally found that such men are either no great Believers, or no very deep Reasoners.

Confid. p. 3.

2. In the next place he tells us of a very strange sort of men, who call the Doctrine of the Trinity an Incomprehensible Mystery, and yet are at a great deal of pains to bring it down to a level with Human Understanding ; and are all very earnest to have their own particular Explications acknowledged as necessary Articles of Faith. An Incomprehensible Mystery is what Human Reason cannot comprehend ; to bring an Incomprehensible Mystery down to the level of Human Understandings, is to make it comprehensible by Reason ; and those are notable men indeed, who undertake to make that comprehensible by Reason, which at the same time they acknowledge to be incomprehensible : It is to be hoped this Considerer does a little mistake them : Men may believe the Trinity to be an Incomprehensible Mystery, and

P. 3.

and yet speak of it in words which may be understood, which does not pretend to make the Mystery comprehensible, but to deliver it from Nonsense, Jargon, and Herefy ; that is, not to explain the Mystery, which is and will be a Mystery still, but to secure the true Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, which they desire may continue an Article of the Christian Faith still.

- P. 5. There are, he tells us, a third sort of men who are for no Mystery ; that is, the *Socinians* ; and I was glad to find them censured and rejected, but wonder'd how they came to be numbred among those men who *have laboured in this good design* of explaining the Trinity, and reconciling the Disputes about it.
- P. 2.

- P. 9. Well : All these Methods have proved ineffectual ; let us then ( to omit other matters ) enquire what Course our *Considerer* took to make himself a fit and competent Judge of this Controversy : Take the account of it in his own words ; *I have endeavoured to deliver my self from Prejudice and Confusion of Terms, and to speak justly and intelligibly : And not being yet prepossess'd in favour of any particular Explication, the better to preserve my freedom of examining the Subject in hand, I have purposely forbore to search the Fathers, Schoolmen, or Fratres Poloni, or read over any later Treatises concerning this Controversy, while I was composing the present Essay, resolving to consult nothing but Scripture and my own Natural Sentiments, and draw all my Reflections from thence, taking only such which easily and without constraint offered themselves.*

Thus *Des Cartes* made a New Philosophy, and this is the best way that can be thought of to make a New Faith. This has an appearance of great Indifferency and Impartiality, but it is a great mistake when men boast in this as a virtue and attainment, and an excellent disposition of mind for the Examination of Matters of Faith. I never in my life yet saw any one example to the contrary, but  
that

that when men who had been educated in the Christian Faith, and tolerably instructed in the meaning and the reasons of it, could persuade themselves to be thus perfectly indifferent whether it were true or false, but this indifference was owing to a secret byass and inclination to Infidelity or Heresy. It is in vain to pretend such an absolute freedom of Judgment, without being perfectly indifferent which side is true or false: For if we wish and desire to find one side of the question true, and the other false, this is a Byass, and our Judgment is not equally poiz'd. And certainly in matters of such vast consequence as the Christian Faith, and especially that great Fundamental Article of the Holy Trinity, such an Indifferency as this is, can never recommend either an Author or his Writings to sober Christians. Will this Considerer then own, that it was indifferent to him when he undertook this design, whether the Doctrine of the Trinity should upon Examination appear true or false? If it were not, the *Socinians* will tell him that he had not preserved a Freedom of Judgment, and then he did well in not consulting the *Fratres Poloni*, for he had condemn'd them without hearing; or if he were persuaded concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity, Was it indifferent to him whether the *Sabellian*, or *Arian*, or True Catholick Notion of a Trinity, contained in the *Nicene* and *Athanasian* Creeds, were the True Faith? That is, Was it indifferent to him, whether the Ancient Heresies condemn'd by the Catholick Church, or that Faith which the Catholick Church has always own'd and professed, be the True Faith? For my part, I confess, I am not thus indifferent; I will never shut my eyes against plain Conviction, which is all the Freedom of judging which is allowable; but my Prejudices are, and I hope always will be, on the side of the Catholick Faith. No wise man can be thus indifferent. And we shall find this *Considerer* was not so very indifferent; for the main Principles he reasons on, are some Po-



pular Mistakes and Prejudices, which he seems to have espoused without due Consideration.

But let us allow him to be as free and unprejudic'd as he pleases, I cannot think that he took a good method to understand this Sacred Mystery. He laid aside *Fathers, Schoolmen, and other later Treatises concerning this Controversy, and consulted nothing but Scripture, and his own natural Sentiments*. To consult Scripture is indeed a very good way, and absolutely necessary in matters of pure Revelation, which can be certainly known no other way; but the Fathers at least are very good Guides, and have very great Authority in expounding Scripture; and our *Natural Sentiments*, otherwise called Natural Reason, is a very bad, a very dangerous Expofitor of Scripture in such Supernatural Mysteries, and has no Authority in these matters; and how our *Considerer* has been misled by his Natural Sentiments, will soon appear.

A few words might serve for an Answer to the *Considerer*; but since this is the great Pretence of *Socinians* and other Hereticks, to set up Scripture and Natural Reason, against Scripture and the Traditionary Faith of the Catholick Church; and our *Considerer* and some other unwary Writers chime in with them, it will be very necessary to shew how this betrays the Catholick Faith, and makes Reason and Criticism the Supreme Judge of Controversy; and then men may dispute on without end, and believe at last as they please.

P. 10.

The *Considerer* tells us, *I take it for granted in a Protestant Country, that Scripture is the only Standard of all necessary Revealed Truths: Neither in the present Case is there any room for a Traditionary Faith. For besides that all the Fathers and Ancient Writers ground their Exposition of the Trinity wholly upon Scripture, I cannot conceive that the Subject is capable of a plainer Revelation; as I shall endeavour to shew more fully in the following Discourse.* What this last Clause

Claufe means, we fhall underftand better hereafter ; but his *denying a Traditionary Faith*, is very extraordinary ; for if we can prove from the moft Authentick Records, what the conftant belief of the Catholick Church has been, efpecially in the firft and pureft Ages of it, This I take to be a *Traditionary Faith* ; nor is it the lefs *Traditionary*, *becaufe the Fathers and Ancient Writers found their Expositions of the Trinity wholly upon Scripture* : For if this be true, then we have a Traditionary Faith of the Trinity, and a Traditionary Exposition of the Scripture, for the Reafon and Proof of that Faith, both in one ; which I take to be a greater Authority, and fafer Guide, than mere *Scripture* and our *Natural Sentiments* : And though Proteftants allow *Scripture* to be the only Standard of Faith, yet he might have remembred, that the Church of *England* requires us to expound Scripture as the Ancient Fathers expound it.

But this *Wholly* is a Miftake ; for the Primitive Fathers pleaded Tradition as well as Scripture againft the Ancient Hereticks, as two diftinct, but agreeing Testimonies ; as this Author might have known, would he have been pleafed to have confulted *Irenæus* and *Tertullian de præfcriptionibus*, with divers others. What he means by a *plainer Revelation*, I cannot tell ; it makes it fomewhat *plainer*, to know what the Catholick Faith has always been, and what the Catholick Interpretation of Scripture has always been ; which is the plaineft and ftrongeft Answer to Wit and Criticiſm, and Natural Sentiments, when they contradict this *Traditionary Faith*. But to difcourſe this matter more particularly, I fhall enquire,

1. What that Catholick Church is, from whence we muſt receive this Traditionary Faith.
2. What Evidence we have of this Tradition concerning the Trinity, in the Catholick Church.
3. Of what Authority this ought reaſonably to be in expounding Scripture,

## S E C T. II.

*Concerning the Traditionary Faith of the Church, with respect to the Doctrine of the Trinity.*

**F**irst then, Let us consider what that Catholick Church is, from whence we must receive this Traditionary Faith.

Now since Christ gave the Supreme Authority of preaching the Gospel, and planting Churches, to his Apostles, those only must be reckoned the true Apostolick Churches, from which we must receive the true Christian Faith, which were planted by the Apostles, or by Apostolick men, and lived in Communion with them.

It is not sufficient to prove any Doctrine to be the true Primitive Faith, That it was preached in the Apostles days, but that it was the Faith of the Apostolick Churches, which were planted by the Apostles, and received their Faith from them; for that Only is the Primitive and Apostolick Faith. And therefore though *Arians* and *Socinians* could prove their Heresies to be as Ancient as the Apostolick Age, (as we grant something like them was) this does not prove theirs to be the true Christian Faith, if it were not the Faith of the Apostolick Churches.

And this was very visible in those days, what these Churches were which were planted by the Apostles, and lived in Communion with them, and is very visible still in the most Authentick Records of the Church. For the Hereticks which sprang up in that Age, separated themselves from the Apostles, and thereby made a visible distinction between the True Apostolick Churches, and Heretical Conventicles: And in after-Ages they either separated themselves, or were cast out of the Communion of the Church.

Church. This St. John accounted a great advantage to the Christian Church, and an Infallible Proof of False Doctrine and Heresy, as it certainly was at that time; for if the Apostles taught the True Faith, those who separated from the Apostles, and preached another Gospel, which they never learnt from them, must be Hereticks; 1 Joh. 2. 18, 19. *Little Children, it is the last time; and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now there are many Antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time: They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they no doubt would have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest, that they were not all of us.*

The Separation of Hereticks in that Age was a visible renouncing the Apostolick Faith and Communion; and therefore how many Heresies soever started up, it was still visible, where the Apostolick Faith and Tradition was preserved; and this was of admirable use to preserve the Faith of the Church sincere and uncorrupt: For had these Hereticks continued in Communion with the Apostles and Apostolick Churches, and secretly propagated their Heresies, and infected great numbers of Christians, without dividing into distinct and opposite Communions, it would have been a great dispute in the next Age, which had been the true Apostolick Faith, when the Members of the same Churches, which all their time lived in Communion with the Apostles, should preach contrary Doctrines, and pretend with equal confidence, Apostolick Tradition; which the greatest Hereticks might very plausibly have done, had they always lived in Communion with the Apostles: But *they went out from us, says St. John, that they might be made manifest, that they were not all of us*; that the world might know how to distinguish between Catholick Christians, and Hereticks; and between the True Catholick Faith, and the Corrupt Innovations of Perverse men.

And

And this I take to be a good reason to this day, why we should keep the Communion of the Church sincere and uncorrupt, and not set our doors open for *Arians* and *Socinians*, and all sorts of Hereticks to mix with us. For though, since the Communion of the Church has been so broken and divided by Schisms, and Factions, and Heresies, it is no proof of the True Apostolick Faith, merely that it is the Faith of such a Church, (though the Church of *Rome* still vainly pretends to such Authority) yet it would soon ruin the Christian Church, and the Christian Faith, to have no distinction preserved between true Apostolick Churches, and the Apostolick Faith, and the Conventicles of Hereticks, the impure Off-spring of *Cerintus* and *Ebion*, of *Photinus* or *Arius*. And therefore I cannot but abhor that Accommodating-Design which some men have expressed so warm a Zeal for, to Comprehend away the Faith of the Holy Trinity, in some loose general Expressions, without any particular determined Sense, and to purge our Liturgies of every thing that favours of the Worship of the Blessed Trinity, that *Arians* and *Socinians* may join in Communion with us: Which is a plausible Pretence, under the Notion of Christian Charity and Communion, to betray the Christian Faith: Not expressly to renounce it, but to bury it in silence, as a Useless and Church-dividing Dispute. I am satisfied this Holy Faith can never be Confuted; but could these men prevail, it might soon be Lost.

But to return: This is a sure Foundation for our Enquiries into the Faith of the Primitive Church, To know what the Primitive Church is; for otherwise we may mistake Old Heresies for the Primitive Faith. But those Churches which were planted by the Apostles or Apostolical men, and received their Faith from them, and lived in Communion with them, are the true Primitive and Apostolick Churches, and their Faith is the true Primitive Apostolick Faith; and what that was, *Justin Martyr* and *Irenæus* assure

sure us; The Faith and Worship of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: And what their Faith was as to all these Three Divine Persons, is evident from the Writings of those Ancient Fathers, who preserved the Succession and Communion of these Apostolick Churches. But this is not what I intend at present; but from hence it appears, That those Ancient Heresies which were rejected and condemned by the Apostolick Churches, as soon as they appeared, could not be the Apostolick Faith. These Hereticks separated from the Apostles, and Apostolick Churches, and therefore could not receive their Faith from them; nor did they pretend to this, while the Apostles lived, though they forged new Gospels, and Acts, and Revelations for them when they were dead. And thus all the Heresies of *Simon Magus, Menander, Cerinthus, Ebion, Valentinus*, and all those other Divisions and Subdivisions of Hereticks, who denied or corrupted the Doctrine of the Divinity of our Saviour, or his Incarnation, are all rejected from the Apostolical Faith; for these Hereticks did not receive their Doctrines from the Apostles and Apostolick Churches, as they themselves owned by their Separation from the Apostolick Churches; and these Churches gave Testimony against their Corruptions, as soon as they were known; and there is no need of any other Confutation of them, if we allow the Doctrine of the Apostles to be the only Infallible Rule of Faith.

This is the Argument from Prescription, which *Tertulian* insists so largely on, and is frequently urged by *Irenæus*, and other Catholick Writers; which is not, as some mistake it, an Argument merely from Antiquity; for though the true Faith was ancients than any Heresies, yet some Heresies had Antiquity enough to make them venerable, if that alone would do it; but the Argument was from the Tradition of the Apostolick Churches, which were planted by the Apostles, and had preserved an un-

interrupted



interrupted Succession from them, and all the world over taught the same Faith, without any material change or variation : Whereas none of these Heresies, how Ancient soever they might be, could pretend to such an Original, were never taught by the Apostles, or any Apostolical men, nor were received or owned by any Churches planted by them. And this is an unanswerable Argument, as long as we can reasonably suppose the Tradition of the Catholick Faith, and the Communion of the Church, was preserved entire, which it visibly was, at least till the first *Nicene* Council; and during all this Period, had we no other ways to know it, we might learn the Faith of the Catholick Church, by its opposition to those Heresies which it condemned.

2dly. And this is the only Evidence which I shall at present insist on for the Catholick Tradition of the Faith of the Holy and Ever blessed Trinity; for we may see the plain Footsteps of the Ancient Catholick Tradition concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in those Ancient Heresies.

*Simon Magus* was the first Heretick we read of, and may be very justly accounted the Father of many of the Ancient Heresies, having led the way, and sown the Seeds and Principles of them.

Now if we believe that Account which *Epiphanius* gives of him, this wicked Impostor pretended himself to be God, both Father and Son, and affirmed that his Lewd Woman, who was called sometimes *Helena*, sometimes *Selene*, was the Holy Ghost.

These Names and Distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he could not possibly learn from any persons, but only from the Christian Church, in which he was baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And therefore we may observe, that before his Baptism he only pretended to be some Great One, and the delu-

deluded people thought him to be *the great power of God*, 8. *Acts* 9, 10. But when he was baptized, and soon after apostatized from the Christian Faith, the Devil, whose *great Power* he was, set him up for the God of the Christians, both Father and Son. And though he blasphemously attributed these Titles of God the Father and Son to himself, and wickedly corrupted this Faith, by making the Father and Son but one Person under different appearances; that he appeared to his Countrey men the *Samaritans* as God the Father, and to the *Jews* as the Son; yet there had been no pretence for this, had not the Christian Church owned Jesus Christ, the Son of God, to be true and perfect God. For had the Father been God, and the Son a mere Man, it is certain Father and Son could never be the same Person: And besides the Wickedness and Impudence of the Impostor, in pretending himself to be Father and Son, it had been ridiculous to pretend this to Christians, had he not known that the Catholick Faith taught the Son to be True and Real God, as well as the Father; and then if he could persuade them that he was God the Father, he might with the same ease persuade them that he was God the Son too, under a different appearance.

Thus when he pretends that his wicked Strumpet was the Holy Ghost, by whom he created the Angels, which created the World; the very Prophanation of this Holy Mystery shews what the Faith of the Church in that Age was concerning the Divinity of the Holy Ghost; for he could have no other Inducement to make his Woman, whom he calls the Holy Ghost, such a Divine Power, but because he knew the Christian Church believed the Holy Ghost to be God, and the Spirit of God, as he made her to be his Divine Creating Intelligence.

Another Heresy concerning the Person of Christ, attributed Divinity to him, owned him to be the Son of God, though not of the Maker of the world, (who they

said was but an Inferior Angel), but of the Unknown and Incomprehensible Father; and that he appeared indeed in the world like a Man, but was no true and real Man. Now what should put such a wild Conceit as this into their heads, had they not known this to be the Catholick Faith,

*Alii quoque Hæretici usque adeo Christi manifestam amplexati sunt Divinitatem, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine Carne, & totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne decoquerent in illo divini nominis potestatem, si humanam illi sociassent, ut arbitrabuntur, natiuitatem. Novat. de Trinit. c. 18.*

That Jesus Christ was the Son of God? Their eyes could not see him to be God, but they saw him to be a Man, and yet they deny him to be a Man, and teach that he was the Son of God, in the form and apparition of a Man: Which is a plain indication what the Catholick Faith was, That Christ was both God

and Man. This they could not believe, that the Son of God would so unite himself to Human Nature, as to become true and real man; and yet they thought it so evident that he was the Son of God, or at least saw that this Faith was accounted so sacred, that they would not venture to deny that, and therefore chose to deny his Humanity, and make a mere Apparition of him!

But then on the other hand, *Cerinthus* and *Ebion* thought it too evident to be denied, That he was a true and real Man; and therefore they taught, That *Jesus* was a Man, and no more than a Man, born as other Men are, of *Joseph* and *Mary*. But then it is worth considering, how they came to make this the distinguishing Doctrine of their Sect, That Christ was but a mere Man, if the Apostolick Churches, whom they opposed, and from whom they separated, had not taught, That he was more than a Man, That he was God as well as Man. Was there ever any Dispute either before or since, concerning any other Man in the world, who was owned to be a Man, Whether he were a mere Man or not? When one sort of Hereticks deny Christ to be a Man, and another deny him to be God, and both of them in contradiction to the Apostolick Faith,

Faith, it is a very strong presumption at least, what the True Catholick Apostolick Faith was, That Christ was both God and Man.

And yet *Cerintus* himself, though he makes Jesus to be a mere Man, owns Christ to be a Divine Person, and that this Christ descended on Jesus at his Baptism, in the form of a Dove, and rested on him, or dwelt in him, and wrought Miracles by him, but left him at his Crucifixion, and flew up again to Heaven.

So that, according to *Cerintus*, from the time that Jesus was baptized, till he was crucified, the Divinity was very nearly and intimately united to him ; not that he was God and Man in one Person, as the Catholick Faith teaches, but yet that Jesus Christ was a Divine and Human Person, though Christ was one Person, and Jesus another. And therefore as the *Nicene Creed* ( which we find also in the *Ancient Oriental Creeds* ) teaches us to believe in *One God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible* ; not to exclude Christ from being the Maker of the World, but in opposition to those Hereticks who would not allow the Supreme God, who is the Father of Christ, to be the Maker of the World, but attributed the Creation of this World to one or more Inferior Angels ; So they add, *And in One Lord Jesus Christ*, the only begotten Son of God, in opposition to those who made Christ and Jesus Two Persons. And yet in this very Heresy we may see what the Ancient Catholick Faith was, That Jesus Christ was God and Man ; as *Cerintus* himself owned, though he would not unite Christ and Jesus into One Person, nor make the Union inseparable.

The *Valentinian Heresy*, though dressed up after the mode of the *Pagan Theology*, was a manifest Corruption of the Christian Faith, under a Pretence of a more perfect knowledge of Divine Mysteries ; and we may still see the broken Remains of the Catholick Tradition of the Trinity among them.

Their *Pleroma*, by which they seem to understand the Fulness of the Deity, as St. Paul uses that Phrase, 2 Col. 9. *πλήρωμα τῆς Θεότητος*, That the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Christ bodily. I say, this *Pleroma* consisted of several *Æons* or Divine Persons, which were propagated from the Unknown and Incomprehensible Father in gradual Descents, and all together made up the Compleat and Perfect Deity; which were more or fewer, according to the various Fancies of Hereticks.

Now from these wild Conceits we may in some measure learn what the Catholick Faith was: That the Godhead was not confined to one Single and Solitary Person, but that there is such a Fœcundity in the Divine Nature, as communicates it self to more Persons than one. For had it been the known and received Faith of the Christian Church, That there is but One Person in the Godhead, as well as but One God, there had been no pretence for these Hereticks, who called themselves Christians, and boasted of a more perfect knowledge of the Christian Faith, to have invented such a number of *Æons*, which they included within their *Pleroma*, as the several Emanations of their Deity. And we may observe, that most of the Names which they gave to their several *Æons*, are Scripture-Names and Titles, which the Pagan Theology knew nothing of, and which they could learn no where, but from the Christian Church.

*Basilides*, I think, was one of the first who gave us any distinct account of these *Æons*, which was new modell'd by *Valentinus*, and other succeeding Hereticks; and his first and Supreme *Æon*, as *Epiphanius* tells us, was *ἐν τῷ ἀγέννητον, ὁ μόνος καὶ πάντων πατήρ*; The Unbegotten One, who only is the Father of all, and by others is called the *Propater*, and the Unknown, Invisible, Incomprehensible Father.

Epiph. l. 1.  
Tom. 2. Her.  
4. frus 24.

Now

Now though the Heathens very familiarly call their Supreme God, the Father of Gods and Men, with respect to his Creating Power; yet as the Notion of Father is founded in a substantial Generation, as these Hereticks plainly understood it, so it is the peculiar Character of God under the Gospel, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son. It is certain the first Person in the Godhead was never called the *ἐν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ*, the One that is unbegotten, but to distinguish him from One who is begotten; the *μονογενὴς*, the only begotten; who is God also, but God of God. And it is observable what *Tertullian* tells us of *Heracleon*, That he made his first *Æon* to be *illud quod pronunciat*, which some Criticks not understanding, think to be a defect in the Copy; but the sense is plain, that his first *Æon* is he that pronounceth, or speaketh; by which he represented the Eternal Generation of the Word: So that his first *Æon* is the Pronouncer or Speaker, that is, the Father of the Eternal Word, which *St. John* tells us was in the beginning, was with God, and was God: Which shews that this is nothing else but a disguised Corruption of the Catholick Faith, concerning the Eternal Generation of the Word from the Eternal Unbegotten Father.

*Tertul. de  
prescript.  
Hæret.*

To confirm this, I observe farther, That most of the Names which they give to their other *Æons*, are such Names, Titles, or Characters, as the Scripture gives to Christ, or the Holy Spirit, which they have multiplied into so many distinct Persons or *Æons*, such as the *Mind*, *Word*, *Prudence*, *Power*, and *Wisdom*; *Truth*, *Life*, *Light*, *the Only begotten*, *the Paraclete*, and the like.

*Valentinus* indeed, as *Epiphanius* observes, did model his Thirty *Æons* according to *Hesiod's* Genealogy and Number of Gods, and with some manifest allusions to them; but yet he retained as many Scripture Names as he could, the better to reconcile unwary people to his fabu-

lous



lous Genealogies, as the hidden and mysterious sense of Scripture. And it is impossible such Fables should ever have obtained any Credit, had they not been grafted on the Catholick Faith, and pretended to improve it with new degrees of Light and Knowledge.

When these Heresies were pretty well silenced, up start *Noetus* and *Sabellius*, who ran into the other Extreme. The *Valentinians* had corrupted the Doctrine of the Trinity, by multiplying Three Divine Persons into Thirty *Æons*, besides all their other Pagan and Fabulous Conceits about them: This offended these men, as downright *Polytheism* (as indeed it was no better); and to avoid this, they reject a Trinity of Real and Substantial Persons, for a Trinity of Names; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names of the same Person, who is sometimes called the Father, at other times the Son, or the Holy Ghost, with respect to his different Appearances or Operations: Or they made the Son and Holy Ghost not Two Persons, but Two Personal Attributes in God, his Wisdom, or Power: Or they made the Trinity but Three Parts of One Compounded God, as a Man consists of Body, Soul, and Spirit; which of late have been revived among us, under different Names.

After these men, arose *Arius* and his Followers, who out of great Zeal also for the Unity of God, framed a New and more Subtile Heresy: They were sensible that Father and Son were not Two Names, but Two Real Distinct Persons, and therefore they attributed the whole entire Divinity to the Father, and made the Son not to be God by Nature, but the most Perfect and Excellent Creature, as Perfect an Image of God, as any Creature can be, but not *Consubstantial* with God, nor Coequal and Coeternal with him.

All these Heresies were rejected and condemned by the Catholick Church in their several Ages, as soon as they appeared,

appeared, and were taken notice of: And this is one very good way to learn what the Catholick Faith was, from its Opposition to those Heresies which the Catholick Church condemned, and from the Corrupted Remains of the Ancient Faith which appeared in them. For these Hereticks were originally Christians, and professed themselves Christians, and therefore did not wholly renounce the Christian Faith, but grafted their Heresies on it.

As to confine my self to the Subject of the present Dispute, What we are to understand by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Whether Three Distinct, Real, Substantial Persons, or not; each of whom is distinctly by himself True and Perfect God, but in the Unity of the same Divine Nature and Godhead. Now that this was the received Faith of the Catholick Church, we may learn both from the *Valentinians*, *Sabellians*, and *Arians*.

Though the *Valentinians*, as I observed before, had corrupted the Doctrine of the Trinity, either with the *Platonick* Philosophy, as that it self had been corrupted by the *Junior Platonists*; or with the *Pagan* Theology; yet the Propagation of their *Æons* in different Degrees and Descents from the first Supreme *Æon*, the Unbegotten One, and the Invisible and Incomprehensible Father, as they stile him, shews what they thought the Catholick Faith was, concerning the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Procession of the Holy Spirit, which they took to be a Substantial Generation and Procession; and accordingly in imitation of this Faith, asserted a Substantial *παραβολή*, or Emanation of one *Æon* from another; and which is more, none of the Ancient Fathers who wrote against this Heresy, as far as I have observed, ever quarrel with them upon this account. Nay *Tertullian*, though he abominates these Heresies, owns this *Probole* or Emanation in a true Catholick Sense; and tells us, that these Hereticks borrowed this word from the Catholick Faith, though they fitted

Hoc si qui putaverit me *probolum* aliquam introducere, id est, prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit *Valentinus*, alium atque alium *Æonem* de *Æone* producentem; primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utitur & *Veritas* vocabulo isto, & re & censu ejus, quia & *hæresis* potius ex veritate accepit, quod ad mendacium suum strueret. Prolatus est Sermo Dei an non? Hic mecum gradum fige. Si prolatus est, Cognosce probolum *Veritatis*, & videris *Hæresis* si quid de *Veritate* imitata est. Jam nunc quaeritur, quis quomodo utatur aliquis re & vocabulo ejus? *Valentinus* probolas suas discernis & separat ab Autore: Et ita longe ab eo ponit, ut *Æon* Patrem nesciat. Denique desiderat nosse, nec potest; immo & pene devoratur, & dissolvitur in reliquam substantiam. Apud nos autem solus filius patrem novit & suum patris ipse exposuit, & omnia apud patrem audit & vidit. — Sermo ergo & in patre semper, sicut dicit, Ego in patre. Et apud Deum semper, sicut scriptum est, & sermo erat apud Deum, & nunquam separatus à patre, aut alius à patre; quia, Ego & Pater unum sumus. Hæc erit probola *veritatis*, custos unitatis, quæ prolatum dicimus filium à patre, sed non separatum. Tert. adv. Praxeam. c. 8.

fitted it to their Heresy: And challenges any man to say whether the Divine Word be now produced by the Father; and if it be, Here, says he, is the Prolation or Emanation, which the true Catholick Faith owns. And adds, That the fault of this Heresy was not their producing one *Æon* from another, but that besides the number of their fictitious *Æons*, they did separate these Emanations and *Æons* from their Author; that the *Æon* knew not the Father, nay, desired to know him, but could not know him; and was e'en dissolved with Passion and Desire; whereas in the Catholick Faith there is the most Inseparable Union of the Son with the Father, and the most Intimate and Perfect Knowledge of him. So that *Tertullian* allows of a Real and Substantial Production of the Person of the Son from the Person of the Father; as the *Valentinians* pretended of their *Æons*; and asserts, that these Hereticks learnt this from the Catholick Faith of the Trinity: And that the Church must not

reject this Probola, Prolation, or Emanation, in an Orthodox, Catholick Use of those words, because Hereticks abuse them, to countenance their own Heresies.

As for the *Noetians* and *Sabellians*, (for however they explain the Doctrine of the Trinity, whether by Three Names, or Three Powers, or Three Parts, while they Teach, That the One God is but One Single Person, the Heresy is the same) it is impossible the Catholick Church should

should reject this Heresy, without asserting Three Distinct, Real, Substantial Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, each of whom is as True and Perfect God, as each of Three Men, *Peter, James, and John*, is a True, Perfect, Distinct Man; though these Three Men are not united, as the Three Divine Persons are.

The occasion of this Heresy was, That they thought that Three Real Distinct Persons in the Godhead were Three Gods; and therefore, though being profess'd Christians, and consequently baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, they durst not deny Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, yet neither would they own Three Divine Persons, but turned them into Three Names, or Three Parts of One Person; which has much more sense in it than Three Modes; though Three Modes of the same Person, let them call them Three Personalities if they please, is the same Heresy, if there be but One *Suppositum*; as One Man may be the Subject of Three, or Three and twenty Modes, and be but One Human Person still.

*Noetus* and *Sabellius* did certainly apprehend, that by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Catholick Church understood Three Distinct, Substantial, Divine Persons, or else why should they charge them with *Tritheism* upon this account, and turn Three Persons into Three Names, or Three Parts of One and the same God, to avoid the Imputation of Three Gods? And if this had not been the belief of the Catholick Church, what meant their Zeal against this Heresy? For all the Wit of Man can't find a Medium between *Sabellianism*, and Three Divine Substantial Persons. A Trinity must be *Three Somewhats*, as it has been lately called; and then it must either be One *Suppositum* or Person, under Three Names, or Three Modes, or compounded of Three Parts; or be Three Distinct *Suppositums* and Persons. Now if this had been the Catholick Faith, That the Trinity is but One *Suppositum* or Person, under  
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Three Names or Modes, &c. I cannot imagine why the Catholick Church should have quarrell'd with these Hereticks, or they with the Catholick Church, unless they both mistook one another: But if the *Sabellians* and Catholicks understood themselves and each other, and did intend to contradict each other, we certainly know what the Catholick Faith was: For there is nothing contradicts a *Noetian* and *Sabellian* Trinity, but a Trinity of Distinct, Substantial, Divine Persons.

And *Novatianus* well observes, That these Hereticks did acknowledge the Divinity of Christ; That whoever Christ was, it was evident from those Characters given of him in Scripture, That he was True and Perfect God: And because the Father is True and Perfect God, and Christ True and Perfect God, for fear of owning Two Gods, they make the Father and the Son to be but One and the same Person.

*Firmum est  
genus proba-  
tionis,*

*quod etiam ab adversario sumitur, ut veritas etiam ab ipsis inimicis veritatis probetur. Nam usque admodum manifestum est in Scripturis esse Deum tradi, ut plerique hæreticorum divinitatis ipsius magnitudine & veritate commoti, ultra modum extendentes honores ejus, ausissent non filium, sed ipsum Deum patrem promovere vel putare. Quod etsi contra veritatem Scripturarum est, tamen divinitatis Christi argumentum grande atque præcipuum est: qui usque adeo Deus, sed quâ filius Dei natus ex Deo; ut plerique illum (ut diximus) hæretici, ita Deum acceperint, ut non filium, sed patrem pronuntiandum putarent, &c. Novat. de Trin. c. 18.*

The *Arians* denied the Eternal Godhead of Christ, and made a Creature of him, though the most excellent Creature, the Minister and Instrument of God in making the World; and the reason of this Heresy was the same; viz. for fear of a Plurality of Gods, should they allow Christ to be True and Perfect God. And this still is a plain evidence what they thought the Catholick Faith to be; not only that Christ was True and Real God, but that he was Truly and Really a Distinct Person from God the Father; so distinct, that if they should acknowledge him to be True God, he would be a *Second God*; which they thought contradicted the Faith of One God.

Well:



Well: Though they would not own him to be True God, yet they own him to be a distinct Person from the Father, as distinct as God and a Creature are distinct. Do the Catholicks now quarrel with the *Arians*, that they have made a Substantial Person of the Son (as in reason they ought to have done, had they not believed the Son to be a distinct Substantial Person); this Dispute we hear nothing of; but the only Dispute was concerning the *Consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father; and that proves, that they did own the Son to be a Substantial Person; for were he not in a true proper sense a Person, and a Substantial Person, he could not be Consubstantial with the Father.

Nay, St. *Austin* expressly tells us, That *Arius* agreed with the Catholicks against the *Sabellians*, in making the Son a distinct Person from the Father; and if so, the Catholicks taught, That the Son was as distinct a Person as *Arius* did, though not a Separate and Created Person, as he did.

*In eo quod credit (Arius) alium esse Patrem, alium Filium, necum est contra Sabellianos. Aug. de 5. Hæres. c. 5.*

Now when *Arius* would have reduced Christ into the number of Creatures, though he made him the first and most excellent Creature, created before the World, and God's Minister in making the World, as like to God as a Creature can possibly be, but not of the same Nature with God; the Catholick Church would not bear this, but in a most Venerable Synod collected from most parts of the Christian World, condemn this as contrary to the Faith always received and owned in their several Churches.

Thus far, at least, the Tradition of the Church was Sacred and Venerable, and the concurrent Testimony of all these several Churches, was a more certain Proof of the Apostolick Faith, than all the Wit and Subtilty of *Arius*: For Wit may patronize New Errors, but cannot prove That to be the Ancient Apostolick Faith, which the Church had never received from the Apostles, nor ever heard of before.



This I take to be a very sensible Proof what the Faith of the Christian Church was, from the Times of the Apostles till the Council of *Nice*; and consequently, what that Faith was which the Church received from the Apostles: And this abundantly satisfies me, That whatever loose Expressions we may meet with in some of the Fathers, before the *Arian* Controversy was started, and managed with great Art and Subtilty (though I know of none but what are capable of a very Orthodox Sense), it is certain that they were not *Arians*, nor intended any such thing in what they said. For had *Arianism* been the Traditionary Faith of the Church, it must have been known to be so; and then how came the Church to be so strangely alarm'd at the first news of it? Or what shall we think of those Venerable Fathers and Confessors in that Great Council, who either did not know the Faith of the Church, or did so horribly prevaricate in the Condemnation of *Arius*, when they had no other apparent Interest or Temptation to do so, but a Warm and Hearty Zeal for the Truly Ancient and Apostolick Faith?

It is certain *Arius* never pretended Catholick Tradition for his Opinion, but undertook to reform the Catholick Faith by the Principles of Philosophy, and to reconcile it to Scripture by new-coin'd Interpretations; though in this he fail'd, and found the Great *Athanasius* an over-match for him.

It is not with Faith, as it is with Arts and Sciences of Human Invention, which may be improved in every Age by greater Wits or new Observations; but Faith depends upon Revelation, not Invention; and we can no more make a New Catholick Faith, by the power of Wit and Reason, than we can write a True History of what the Apostles did and taught, out of our own Invention, without the Authority of any Ancient Records: Men may do such things if they please, but one will be Heresy, and the other a Romance.

And

And yet this is the bold and brave Attempt of *Socinus* and his Disciples: They are so modest indeed, as not to pretend Antiquity to be on their side; they can find no other Antiquity for themselves, but in *Cerintus* and *Ebion*, who separated from the Catholick Church, and were rejected by them; and it does not seem very modest, to set up such men as these, against the Universal Consent of the first and purest Ages of the Church.

The *Socinians*, who know very well what the Charge of Novelty signifies in matters of Religion; That a New Faith is but another Name for New Heresies; Though they reject the Doctrine of the Fathers, and the Catholick Tradition of the Faith from the Apostolick Age, yet they appeal to *Scripture* and *Natural Sentiments*, as the greatest and best Antiquity, in opposition to Apostolick Tradition. This is our *Considerer's* way, which he prefers before a Traditionary Faith; and by the same reason the *Socinians* may oppose it to a Traditionary Faith: And if we must always expound Scripture by our Natural Sentiments, this Author had best consider whether he can prove a Trinity by Natural Reason; or fairly reconcile the Natural Notion of One God, with the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, or of Three, each of whom is True and Perfect God, from the mere Principles of Natural Reason; for if he can't, he must not in his way find a Trinity in Scripture: But of this more hereafter.

3. Let us now, in opposition to this pretence, consider of what Authority the Traditionary Faith of the Catholick Church ought to be, in expounding Scripture.

The Holy Scripture, at least in pretence, is allowed on all hands to be a Compleat and Authentick Rule of Faith; but the question is, since men differ so much in expounding Scripture, What is the safest Rule to expound Scripture by; whether the Traditionary Faith of the Church, or our *Natural Sentiments*, or *Natural Reason*?

*See Gassell, above, p. 51.*

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I do not mean, that we must learn the Critical Sense of every Text from Catholick Tradition ; for we have not in all points such a Traditionary Exposition of Scripture ; though even in this respect, we shall find that the Catholick Fathers have unanimously agreed in the Interpretation of the most material Texts relating to the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ. They sometimes indeed alledge such Texts, especially out of the Old Testament, as our Modern Criticks will not allow to be proper and apposite ; but even this shews what their Faith was ; and yet these very Expositions, which have been so anciently and unanimously received ( though they may appear at this distance of time too forc'd and mystical ) have too Sacred and Venerable an Authority to be wantonly rejected. We may learn from Christ and his Apostles, what mysterious and hidden Senses were contain'd in the Writings of the Old Testament, such as it is very probable we should never have found in them, had not Christ and his Apostles explained their meaning : And the nearer any Writers were to the Apostolick Age, the more they were addicted to these Mystical Interpretations ; which is a good reason to believe that they learnt it from the Apostles themselves.

But this is not what I now intend ; my present Argument reaches no farther than this ; That if we can learn what the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Holy Trinity , and the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ has always been : Then

1. It is very reasonable to conclude, That they received this Doctrine from the Apostles, it being the Faith of those Churches which were planted by the Apostles, received their Faith from them, and always lived in Communion with them.

2. This

2. This makes it reasonable to believe, that this very Faith is contained in the Writings of the New Testament; for, I suppose, no man questions, but that the Apostles taught the same Faith by Writing, which they did by Preaching; and then this is a Demonstration against all such Interpretations of Scripture as contradict the Catholick Faith; whatever fine Colours Wit and Criticism may give them. Nay,

3. It is a certain Proof, That these Primitive Christians, who received these Inspired Writings from the Apostles which now make up the Canon of the New Testament, did believe that the same Faith which the Apostles and Apostolical men had taught them by Word of Mouth, was contained in their Writings; for they could not possibly have believed both what the Apostles taught, and what they writ, if their Preaching and Writings had contradicted each other. We know what the Faith of the Primitive Church was, and we know they received these Apostolical Writings with the profoundest Veneration, as an Inspired Rule of Faith; and had we no other presumption of it but this, we might safely conclude, That they found the same Faith in these Writings, which the Apostles had before taught them by Word of Mouth.

But besides this, we find that all the Catholick Writers appeal to the Scriptures, and prove their Faith from them; and the Authority of such men who were so near the Fountain of Apostolick Tradition, must be very Venerable.

4. I shall only add this, That since we know what the Catholick Faith was, and how the Catholick Fathers expounded Scripture, if the Words of Scripture will naturally and easily admit that Sense, much more if they will not admit any other Sense without great force and violence, let any man judge which is most safe and reasonable, to expound Scripture as the Catholick Faith and Catholick Fathers expound it, and as the Scripture most easily and naturally

turally expounds it self, or to force New Senses and Old Heresies upon Scripture, which the Catholick Church has always rejected and condemned.

This, I hope, may satisfy our *Considerer*, that he did very ill in rejecting a Traditionary Faith, and venturing to expound Scripture by his *Natural Sentiments*, which is a very Unsafe Rule in Matters of Pure Revelation, of which mere Natural Reason is no competent Judge.

### S E C T. III.

*What is sufficient to be believed concerning the Trinity.*

**T**HUS far, I fear, our *Considerer* has been a little unfortunate; or if it do not prove a Misfortune to him in forming his Notion of a Trinity, his Luck is better than his Choice.

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Let us proceed to his next Enquiry, *What is sufficient for Christians to believe concerning the Trinity; or, which is all one in this case, what is necessary to be believed?* What the meaning of this Question is, I can't well tell; nor why he makes *sufficient* and *necessary* all one; for, at least, they are not always so. That is *sufficient* which is enough for any man to believe; that is *strictly necessary* which every man must believe: But let him take his own way; he quits the Term *sufficient*, and enquires what is *necessary* to be believed; whereas in many cases, that which is absolutely *necessary* for all, may not be *sufficient* for some: I should much rather have enquired how much may be known concerning this Glorious Mystery, than how little will serve the turn; which argues no great Zeal for it.

Well: What is necessary to be believed concerning the Trinity? He answers, *Nothing but 1. What's possible to be believed. And 2. What's plainly revealed.*

Here

Here we begin to see what the effect is, of consulting nothing but Scripture and Natural Sentiments. I hope he meant honestly in this; but if he did, he expressed himself very incautiously; for these two Conditions are very ill put together, when applied to matters of Revelation. Plainly revealed, had been enough in all reason, unless he would insinuate, that what is plainly revealed may be impossible to be believed; and that how plain soever the Revelation be, men must judge of the possibility of the thing by their own Natural Sentiments, before they are bound to believe it; which makes Natural Reason, not Scripture, the final Judge of Controversies.

But we must follow him where he leads us; and thus he divides his whole Work. 1. To consider how far it is possible to believe a Trinity. 2. What the Scripture requires us to believe in this matter.

As for the first, he tells us, There are two requisites to make it possible for us to believe a thing. 1. That we know the Terms of what we are to assent to. 2. That it imply no Contradiction to our former Knowledge: Such Knowledge I mean, as is accompanied with Certainty and Evidence.

This in some sense may be true; but as it is thus loosely and generally expressed, it is very like the Socinian Cant and Sophistry.

By knowing the Terms, he means having distinct Natural Ideas of what is signified by such Terms; as he himself explains it; — *I can believe it no farther than the Terms of which it is made up, are known and understood, and the Ideas signified by them consistent.* So that all Divine Mysteries must be examined by our Natural Ideas; and what we have no Natural Ideas of, we cannot, we must not believe: And this once for all condemns all Supernatural Faith, or the belief of Supernatural Objects, though never so plainly revealed; for we have no Natural Ideas of Supernatural Objects: And though Revelation may furnish us from

P. 14.



the Resemblances and Analogies in Nature with some Artificial Ideas, this will not serve the turn; for though they know what such Terms signify when applied to Natural, they know not what they signify when applied to Supernatural Objects, nor have they any Ideas to answer them: As for Instance; We know what Father and Son signify when applied to Men; but when we say, God is not only Eternal himself, but an Eternal Father, who begot an Eternal Son; these Terms of *Father and Son, begetting and being begotten*, must signify quite otherwise than they do among men, something which we have no Idea of; and therefore say the *Socinians*, All this is unintelligible and impossible to be believed, unless we can believe without understanding the Terms: This *Considerer* asserts the Premises, he had best consider again how he will avoid the Conclusion.

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Another *Socinian* Topick is *Contradiction*, and this our *Considerer* makes another requisite to the possibility of believing, That the thing *do not imply a Contradiction to our former knowledge*; that is, to any Natural Ideas: And here he learnedly disputes against believing Contradictions; and that it is *not consistent with the Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness of God to require us to believe Contradictions*. But if instead of all this he had only said, That God cannot reveal such plain and evident Contradictions, as he cannot require us to believe; and consequently, That whatever is plainly revealed, implies no Contradiction, how much soever it may be above our comprehension, because God does require us to believe what he plainly reveals; this had put an end to this Dispute, and left the belief of the Trinity possible, whatever difficulties we might apprehend in conceiving it: But this great Zeal against believing Contradictions, when applied to the belief of the Trinity, is a very untoward Insinuation, as if the Doctrine of the Trinity, as commonly understood, were clogg'd with Contradictions, and that we must cast all such Contradictions (which

( which in the *Socinian* account is the Doctrine it self ) out of our Faith ; and therefore, That whatever the Scripture says, we must put no such sense on it as *implies any Contradiction to our former knowledge*. This is an admirable Foundation for *Considerations concerning the Trinity* ; and what an admirable Superstructure he has rais'd on it, we shall soon see.

I may possibly discourse this Point of Contradictions more at large elsewhere ; at present I shall only tell this Author, That as self-evident as he thinks it, this Proposition is false, *That it is impossible to believe what implies a Contradiction to our former knowledge* ; and that God cannot require us to believe it.

I grant that all Logical Contradictions which are resolved into *is*, and *is not*, are impossible to be believed, because they are impossible to be true ; and such is his Contradiction about the Whole and its Parts ; for to say, *That the Whole is not bigger than any of its Parts*, is to say, That a Whole is a Whole, and is not a Whole ; and that a Part is a Part, and is not a Part. But contradictory Ideas may both be true, and therefore both be believed, and every man believes great numbers of them: *The Ideas of Heat and Cold, White and Black, Body and Spirit, Extension and No Extension, Eternity and Time, to have A Beginning and to have No Beginning*, are contradictory Ideas, and yet we believe them all ; that is, we believe and know that there really are such things, whose Natures are directly opposite and contrary to each other. Now when there are such Contrarieties and Contradictions in Created Nature, it may justly be thought very strange to *true Considerers*, that our Natural Ideas should be made the adequate measures of Truth or Falshood, of the Possibilities or Impossibilities of things ; that we must not believe what God reveals concerning himself, if it contradicts any Natural Ideas. And yet I challenge this *Considerer*, and all the *Socinian, Sabellian, Arian* Fraternities,

to shew me any appearance of Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity, but what are of this kind; that is, not Logical Contradictions, but Contradictions to our other Natural Ideas: And if our Natural Ideas of Created Nature contradict each other, it would be wonderful indeed if the Divine Uncreated Nature should not contradict all our Natural Ideas. Every thing we know of God is a direct Contradiction to all the Ideas we have of Creatures; an Uncreated and a Created Nature, an Infinite and a Finite Nature, are direct Contradictions to each other: Eternity without Succession, Omnipresence without Extension, Parts, or Place; a pure simple Act, which is all in one, without Composition; an Omnipotent Thought, which thinks all things into Being, and into a Beautiful Order; these and such like Ideas of God are direct Contradictions to all the Ideas we have of Creatures; and can any Contradiction then to any Ideas of Created Nature be thought a reasonable Objection against believing any thing which God reveals to us concerning himself? But of this more hereafter.

#### S E C T. IV.

*Concerning his State of the Question, That One and the Same God is Three Different Persons.*

**T**Hese are his *Preliminaries, Axioms, Postulata's*, all in the strict demonstrative way; but now he comes to apply all this more closely to the business in hand; but then he very unfortunately stumbles at the Threshold.

The Proposition he proposes to examine by these Principles, is this, *That One and the same God is Three Different Persons.*

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Where

Where he met with this Proposition in these very Terms, I know not; I'm sure there is no such Proposition in Scripture, nor did I ever meet with it in any Catholick Writer: It is very far from giving us a true and adequate Notion of the Catholick Faith concerning the Trinity; it is of a doubtful signification, and in the most obvious sense of these words ( which I fear will appear to have been intended by this *Considerer* ) is manifest Heresy: For if by *One and the same God*, he means, That there is but One who is God; and, That this *One and same God is Three different Persons*; it is the Heresy of *Sabellius* at least, if he would have owned the Term *different*, which inclines more to the signification of *diversity*, than of *mere distinction*, which favours of *Arianism*, and more properly relates to Natures than to Persons.

We meet with different forms of speech in Catholick Writers concerning the Unity and Trinity in the Godhead, all which must be reconciled, to form a distinct and compleat Notion of the Trinity. That *Deus est Unus & Trinus*, God is One and Three, is very Ancient, and very Catholick. That the Father is *the One God*, in a peculiar and eminent sense, is both the Language of Scripture, and of the Church. That each Person, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is by himself True and Perfect God, is likewise the Doctrine both of the Holy Scriptures, and the Catholick Fathers. That the Trinity is One God; That Father and Son are *ſv*, *Unum*, One Divinity, Christ himself teaches us: That Father, Son, and Spirit, are also *ſv*, *One*, St. *John* teaches us. And nothing is more familiar both with the *Greek* and *Latin* Fathers, than to call the Trinity One God; and in consequence of this, That One God is the Trinity; though this they rather chose to express by *μία Θεότης ἐν τρισὶ πρόσωποις*, or *ἰσοπρόσωπον*, One Divinity in Three Persons. And whoever would give an account of the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, must have respect to all these Notions,

tions, and not content himself with any one of them, as, to make the best of it, the *Considerer* here does, when he only proposes to enquire, *How One and the same God is Three Persons*: But he ought to have enquired also in what sense each Person is by himself True and Perfect God; and the Person of the Father in a peculiar and eminent sense the *One God*; and to have framed his Notions of Unity and Distinction with an equal regard to all these Catholick Expositions; which would have secured him from the *Sabelian* Heresy, which now his Words are very guilty of, whatever He himself be.

But let us now proceed to his Examination of these Terms, *God, Unity, Identity, Distinction, and Number, and Person*.

P. 14. *As to the Notion of a Deity*, he confesses he has not a full and adequate Idea of God; but yet he knows which of those distinct Ideas he has in his mind, are applicable to God, and which are not. But the present question does not concern the Idea of God, which I hope we are all agreed in, That God is a Being infinitely perfect: But whether this Name God, in the Question of the Trinity, signifies only *One who is God*, or *One single Divine Person*? Or, Whether this Name, and the perfect Idea which belongs to it, be applicable distinctly to Three, to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; That each of them is True and Perfect God, and neither of them is each other, and all Three but One God? This had been the true Explication of the Term God, as applied to the Doctrine of the Trinity, To have told us what is meant by God, when this Name is peculiarly attributed to the Person of the Father, when it is attributed to each Person distinctly, and when it is jointly attributed to them all, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God: It is certain all this must be resolved into the same One Divinity, which is perfectly in each of them, and inseparably and indivisibly in them all: And the true stating of this matter

matter had been very proper, and would have saved all his other Labour. And therefore to save me some labour, I will briefly tell him how the Catholick Fathers understood it; which is the only possible way I know, of reconciling these different Expressions.

When they tell us, That the Person of the Father is in an eminent and peculiar manner the *One* God; by this they understand, That the Father alone is self-originated, and from himself; That the Whole Divinity and Godhead is originally his own, which he received from no other: Which is the first and most natural notion we have of God, and of One God.

When they say, That though the Father in this sense be the One God, yet the Son also is True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost True and Perfect God, they ascribe Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost, upon account of the Eternal and Perfect Communication of the Divine Nature to them: For he who has the True Divine Nature, is True and Perfect God: And therefore the Son, who is eternally begotten of his Father, of the Substance of his Father, and is Consubstantial with him, is True and Perfect God, but God of God; and the like may be said of the Holy Spirit, who eternally proceeds from Father and Son.

When they teach, That the Trinity is One God, they mean by it, That the same One Divinity does subsist whole and entire, indivisibly and inseparably, but yet distinctly in them all, as I have already explained it: So that the Unity of the Godhead gives an account of all these Expressions, Why the Father is said to be the One God, and yet that the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One God. All this is taught in Scripture, and is the Faith of the Catholick Church; and I would never desire a better Proof of the Truth and Certainty of any Notion, than that it takes in the whole Mystery,



stery, and answers to every part of it ; which no other account I have ever yet met with, can do.

## S E C T. V.

*An Examination of his Notions and Ideas of Unity, Distinction, Person, &c.*

AND now the *Sabellian* Scene opens apace: If the Heresy of *Sabellius* was, That there is but One who is God, but One Divine Intelligent Person, as well as One Divine Nature, this our *Considerer* expressly owns, and does his Endeavour to prove it absolutely impossible that it should be otherwise ; that is, That the Catholick Faith, asserted and defended by the Catholick Church, against *Sabellius*, is absolutely impossible.

- P. 20. To explain the word *Person*, he tells us, *It signifies one of these two things ; either a particular Intelligent Being ; or an Office, Character, or some such complex Notion, applicable to such a Being : If you would know in which of these senses we must understand the word Person*, when we say there
- P. 24. *are Three Persons in the Trinity*, he tells us plainly, That the simple Idea ( of God ) can be applied but to One single Person, in the first sense of the word *Person*, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, or Principle. — And that all the Personal Distinction we can conceive in the Deity, must be founded on some accessory Ideas, extrinsecal to the Divine Nature ; a certain Combination of which Ideas , makes up the second Notion signified by the word *Person*.

And for this he appeals to Natural Sentiments, mistaking Heresy for Nature. And if we fairly and impartially examine our own Thoughts upon this Subject, we shall find, That when we name God the Father, we conceive the Idea of God, so far as we are capable of conceiving it, as acting so and so,

so, under such respects and relations; and when we name God the Son, we conceive nothing else but the same Idea of God over again, under different relations; and so likewise of the Holy Ghost. Noetus, Praxeas, or Sabellius, never taught their Heresy in more express words than these.

And what is to be done now? Must we dispute this Point over again with the *Considerer*, and confute a Heresy which has been so early, so often, and so constantly condemned by the Catholick Church? For my part, I can pretend to say nothing new, which has not long since been much better said by the Catholick Fathers; and therefore before we part, I shall acquaint him with their Judgment in the Case, and leave it to rest on their Authority and Reasons.

But it may not be amiss to mind this *Considerer*, That he has all the Schoolmen (as far as I have heard, or had opportunity to consult them) as well as the Catholick Fathers, against him, in his Notion of a *Person*; for they all receive Boetius's Definition, That a *Person* is an *Individual Substance of a Rational Nature*. Or it may be the Authority of Melancthon may be more considerable

with him; who tells us, That the Church in this Article of the Trinity understands by *Person*, an *Individual, Intelligent, Incommunicable Substance*: And adds, That the Ancient Ecclesiastical Writers distinguish between *Essence* and *Person*, that there is but One Essence or Nature, and Three Hypostases; that is, Three really subsisting, not commentitious, vanishing, confused, but distinct, particular, Intelligent Persons. And the Censure he passes upon *Servetus* upon this score, is very remarkable.

*Persona, ut Ecclesia in hoc articulo loquitur, est substantia individua, intelligens, & incommunicabilis. Satis constat veteres Scriptores Ecclesie solitos hac duo vocabula discernere, ὁσια & ὑποστασις, & dicere unam esse ὁσιαν, id est, essentiam aeterni Patris, Filii & Spiritus Sancti, sed tres ὑποστασεις, id est, tres vere subsistentes, non commentitias, non caducas, non confusas, sed distinctas, singulares intelligentes.*

*Lupis homo Fanaticus Servetus de vocabulo Persona, & disputat olim Latinis significasse habitum aut officii distinctionem, ut dicimus Roscium alias sustinere Personam Achillis, alias sustinere Personam Ulyssis; seu alia est Persona Consulis, alia servi: ut Cicero inquit, Magnum est in republica tuam Personam Principis. Et hanc veterem significationem vocabuli hyephantice detorquet ad Articulum de tribus Personis Divinitatis. Sed has impias praestigias fugiamus & execremur, & sciamus in hoc Articulo aliter loqui Ecclesiam, & Personam dici substantiam individuum, intelligentem, & incommunicabilem. Ac prodest in hac cogitatione saepe mente intueri baptismum Christi, ubi tres Personae illustri discrimine monstrantur. Pater sonat hanc vocem: Hic est Filius meus dilectus. Filius stans in flumine conspicitur: & Spiritus Sanctus specie visibili demittitur. Melanct. loci Theolog. de tribus Personis Divinitatis.*

“That Fanatical Fellow *Servetus* plaid with the word *Person*, and contended, That in *Latin* it anciently signified a Dress or Habit, or the distinction of an Office; as *Roscium* is sometimes said to act the part of *Achilles*, sometimes of *Ulysses*: Or, the Person of a Consul is one thing, and the Person of a Slave is another, as *Cicero* speaks; that it is a great thing to maintain the Character of the Person of a Prince in the Commonwealth: And this Ancient Signification of the Word he silyly wrested and applied to the Article concerning the *Three Persons of the Godhead*: But let us fly from, and abhor such wicked Artifices; and know, That the Church speaks after another manner; and that *Person signifies an Individual, Intelligent, Incommunicable Substance.* And

“it will be of great use to form and fix this Notion in our minds; to contemplate the Baptism of Christ, where all Three Persons were most evidently represented and distinguished: The Father spoke in an audible Voice, *This is my beloved Son*; the Son is seen standing in the River; and the Holy Spirit descends on him in a visible Appearance.

But since the *Considerer* makes a great Flourish with his Ideas, and clear and distinct Conceptions, and fetches his Proofs from the most intimate knowledge of Nature, he may take it ill if no notice or regard be had of them: We see very well where he has been trading; and I doubt the Ingenious Author of *Human Understanding*, will have more Disciples of different kinds than he was well aware of, in whom

whom he will have no great reason to glory : For it requires more Skill than every man is Master of, to form simple and distinct Notions and Ideas, and to apply them dexterously to their proper Subjects. And to refer all men to Natural Ideas and Perceptions, when so very few know how to distinguish between Natural Notions, and the Prejudices and Prepossessions of Education, the Delusions of Fancy, and the Byas of Inclination, is like the Quakers appeal to the Light within, which is just what every man will have it to be.

Our *Considerer* reduces all the Notions he can find of *Unity and Distinction*, to Three Heads : The Unity or Distinction of *Ideas*, of *Principle*, and of *Position*; and undertakes to prove from them all, That it is impossible, or absolutely unconceivable, that there should be more than *One Intelligent Person*, in the proper Notion of a Person, in the Godhead.

Now in the first place I would be glad to hear a good reason why the *Considerer* takes no notice of that old received definition of *One*, that *Unum est Indivisum*; that is *One*, which is Undivided : The most perfect *One* is that which neither is nor can be divided; an absolute perfect *Monad*, which is absolutely and perfectly Simple, without any Parts to be divided into : And this is the Unity of the Divine Nature, as Scripture, Fathers, Schoolmen, and all men of improved and exercised Reason teach ; and it is strange he should not find this Notion of Unity among all his Natural Ideas, which is the only Natural Notion of the Divine Unity, and belongs to no other Being. And this would have given him a true Catholick Notion of the Unity of God in a Trinity of Persons ; for all agree, That the Divine Nature is indivisibly and inseparably *One*.

And this is another thing I would be glad to know the reason of, Why in such an Enquiry concerning the Unity and Distinction of the Trinity, he takes no notice of that

Old Catholick distinction, *That God is One in Nature, and Three in Persons*; which would have been a good direction to him, what kind of Unity, and what distinction to have enquired after: What Unity belongs to Nature, and what it is which distinguishes Persons: But our *Considerer* has no regard to the different Notions of Nature and Person, but applies all his Notions of Unity to a Person, which as far as they are true, belong to Nature, and from the Unity of Nature proves against the Catholick Faith, that there can be but One proper Divine Person.

P. 20.

And there is one thing I am sorry for, That having mentioned a very good Notion, he let it slip between his fingers without making any use of it. He tells us, *That Identity is nothing else but a repetition of Unity, as Number is of difference.* This is very Catholick, and it is great pity we hear no more of it. Upon this Principle the Fathers justify the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons: For the Divine Nature is but One, a perfect *Monad*, and is communicated whole and entire, without the least Division or Separation, to the Son and Holy Spirit, and therefore is perfectly and identically one and the same in all Three; for the perfect repetition of a *Monad* and Unit makes no Number: God, and God, and God, are not Three Gods, but One God, because the same Divine Nature, without the least difference or diversity, is distinctly in them all; and the repetition of what is perfectly the same, makes no Number; but Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are Three, for they are really distinguished from each other, not by any difference of Nature, but only by Personal differences, or the different manner of having the same Nature: That the Father has the Whole Divine Nature originally in himself, is God of himself: The Son receives the same Divine Nature by an Eternal Generation, and is God of God: And the Holy Ghost in like manner by an Eternal Procession from Father and Son: This incommunicably

municably distinguishes Persons, that one can never be another ; and this is difference enough to make a Number ; not to make Three Gods of them, because the Divine Nature is perfectly One and the same in Three, but to distinguish them into Three Persons, each of whom is True and Perfect God, and all but One God. Why the *Considerer* should wave such a Notion as this of Unity and Distinction, which any one would have thought his own Notions of *Identity* and *Number* must unavoidably have led him into, I cannot guess ; but I hope this may satisfy him, that there are other Notions of Unity and Distinction, than what he insists on, and such as may be as easily understood, and which fairly reconcile the belief of Three proper Divine Intelligent Persons, with the Unity of the Godhead : But let us now briefly consider his Ideas of Unity and Distinction.

1. The first is, *The Unity of Idea* : This he discourses of very confusedly, and does not seem well pleased with it himself : The Unity of the Idea he places in being *perceivable at one view, and having one uniform appearance* : Which makes it one Idea indeed, right or wrong, but proves no other kind of Unity : This he grew sensible of, that *the reality of things* may not answer our *Ideas or Appearances* ; and I know not how they should, unless our Ideas answer *the Reality of Things* ; for Things are to be the Patterns for our Ideas, not our Ideas for *Things*. P. 137

But the *Considerer*, by forsaking his good old Rules, for new Methods of Thinking, has quite mistaken the Question. When we enquire into the general Notion of Unity, the meaning is not, When we conceive of any thing as *One*, but what it is that makes any thing *One*. The Unity of Idea, whether simple or compounded, may be Answer enough to the first Question, That all that is comprized in one Idea, if our Idea be right, belongs to one thing ; but, as he owns, we cannot prove that our Idea answers the Reality



Reality of Things, and therefore I know not what this Rule is good for at all. But our general Notion of Unity is of a very different Consideration; and our particular Ideas of particular Things, contribute nothing to it: For the question is not, How many Things are united in One Being? or, How many partial Conceptions are united in One Idea? But, What it is that makes it One; or what the formal Conception of its Unity is?

- P. 21. But our *Considerer* takes heart at last, from the Unity of the Idea of God, to prove that there can be but One Divine Person in a proper sense; or but One who is True and Perfect God. His Argument is this; *We cannot conceive that any Object should be truly and adequately represented to any Mind or Understanding under One Idea, and truly and adequately represented under Three Ideas.* And what is the Consequence of this? That he tells us plainly, That *all*
- P. 24. *the Perfections (of the Deity) though considered separately under different apprehensions by our imperfect Faculties, being really but One simple Idea, can be applied to but One single Person, in the first sense of the word Person, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, and Principle.*

1. Now in the first place this Argument supposes an Idea which *truly and adequately represents its Object*, and yet our *Considerer* is so modest as not to pretend to a full and adequate Idea of God: And therefore, according to his own way, he can never conclude from the Idea of God, That it can belong but to One single Person, because he has not an adequate Idea of the Divine Nature; and then there may be something in the Idea of God, which he does not comprehend, which may make it applicable to more Persons than one. Certainly it seems very reasonable, when we confess that we have not an adequate Idea of the Divine Nature, to refer this whole Dispute, not to Natural Ideas, which can never determine it, but to Revelation, which

which is more certain and more perfect than our Natural Knowledge.

2. I grant, That *One Object cannot be truly and adequately represented to my mind under One Idea, and truly and adequately represented under Three different Ideas*: But it is as true, That *One and the same Idea may be truly and adequately applied to Three distinct and different Persons*: The adequate Idea of *Peter* can be applied to none but *Peter*; but the Idea of *Man*, or of *Human Nature*, may be truly and adequately applied to *Peter, James, and John*, and to every single human Person in the world.

The Idea of God, as abstracted from the Consideration of a Trinity of Persons, is only the Idea of the Divine Nature, which is but *One*, and can never be *Three different Natures*; for the *Divine Nature* always was, and always will be but *One and the same*; and this is that *One Object* which is *adequately*, in his sense, represented by *One Idea*. And this is the account the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of God, That there is but *One Divinity, One Divine Nature in Three Persons*; and thus the Trinity is the *μία Οὐσία*, the *One Divinity*, that *One Object* represented by the *One Idea of God*. The *Divine Persons* are not distinguished by any difference of Nature, which is *One and the same in all*, but by *Personal differences*; That the *Father* is *unbegotten*, the *Son begotten*, and the *Holy Ghost proceeds* from *Father and Son*: There are *Three different Ideas* for the *Three Divine Persons*; but the *Idea of the Divinity* is but *One*, as the *Divine Nature* is *One and the same in all*.

Could he indeed prove, That the Idea of God is not only *One simple Idea*, but the Idea of *One single Person*, that would be somewhat more to the purpose; it would be such an *Argument* against a Trinity of Persons, from the Idea of God, as *Necessary Existence*, as included in the Idea of God, is for the Being of God: But this he can never prove;

prove ; and at best, these Arguments from Ideas are thought too fine and subtle by most men.

P. 16, 20, 21. 2. His next kind of Unity is a *Unity of Principle* ; that is One thing , which has but One Principle of Action : And we cannot conceive that One Principle or Nature should be but One, and yet Three different Principles and Natures. But I suppose he can conceive, That if One and the same undivided Principle and Nature be and act in Three, these Three are One by the Unity of Principle and Nature. And this is the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, not *Three different Principles and Natures* in Three Persons, but One and the same Principle and Nature, inseparably and indivisibly subsisting and acting in Three: Upon account of which Identity of Principle and Operation, the Catholick Fathers asserted but One Life, Energy, and Power, not confusedly, but distinctly in Three ; which asserts the Unity of Principle, together with the real distinction of true and proper Persons. If indeed he can prove from his *Unity of Principle*, That One Nature and Principle can live, subsist, and act but in One ; such a Unity of Principle as this, will admit but of One single Person, and must overthrow the Catholick Faith of a Real Trinity. But though the Unity of Principle does prove That to be but One, which has but One Principle ; it does not prove, That this One Nature and Principle can be but in One.

P. 16. 3. His Third kind of Unity is very surprizing, especially as applied to the Unity of God ; it is the Unity of *Position*, of Place, or of *Ubi*. When we perceive any Object in a continued Position, bounded and fenced out from other things round about it, all within such Terms and Limits we call One. Bless me ! thought I ; How is this applicable to the Unity of God ? who has no Body, no Parts, no continued Position ; can't be bounded and fenced round about, nor confined within Terms and Limits ; and therefore can never have this *Unity of Position*, which is a very sorry kind of Unity at best.

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His Philosophy belonging to this Head is very admirable; but to let that pass, he would not be thought to attribute Extension to Spirits; but the *Idea of a Point* is more applicable to *Spiritual Beings*; but a Physical Point is extended still, though it be the least conceivable Extension, and has parts, and therefore can't represent simple Unity, and is the Idea of Body, not of Spirit. Nor does he *think local presence or determination any way contained within the Idea of a Spiritual Being*, and therefore this can't belong to the Unity of a Spirit. Well: *But he is not able to comprehend the Union or Separation of Two Spiritual Beings, without considering them in the same or different Localities.*

P. 18.

P. 19.

I know not how to help this, that he can't conceive of Spirits, but only after the manner of Bodies. Are Spirits united by Juxta-position of Parts, or Penetration of Dimensions? If not, One *Ubi* can't unite them, though Separate *Ubi's* may prove them Separate.

But still what is all this to the Unity of God? Why, he tells us, *It is plain at first sight, that we cannot possibly conceive God under any difference of Position*: I add further, That we cannot conceive God under any Position, and therefore the Unity of Position can never belong to the Unity of God. But the reason he gives why we can't conceive God under any difference of Position, is, because we cannot exclude Omnipotence from any imaginable point of Space; nor can we include it in it; which proves that God has no Position, but is present without Position, as he is without Extension, and without Parts. God needs no place to subsist in, but is Place to himself, and Place to every thing else; as the *Hebrews* called God *Makom*, or Place; according to St. Paul's Notion of it, That in him we live, move, and have our being; that as all things receive Being by his Almighty Word, so all things subsist in Infinite Mind, as the Ideas and Notions of things do in Finite Minds. God could not create any thing without himself, because

P. 21.

*P. 103*  
*Ex. Theo. 9.3*  
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there is nothing *extra* without him; and this is the *Omnipresence* of God, not his *Commensuration to Infinite Space*; which is a gross Corporeal Representation of Omnipresence by Infinite Extension, or Commensuration to Infinite Extension, and makes something else as Infinite as God, *viz.* Infinite Space, which must be commensurate to God, if God be commensurate to Space; but the Omnipresence of God is his Comprehension of all things in himself.

And yet his way of proving the *Omnipresence* of God from his *Omnipotence*, *That we cannot exclude Omnipotence from any imaginable Point of Space*, if by *Omnipresence* he means an *Essential Omnipresence*, as he must do here, is not so self-evident as he seems to think it: The only foundation of it is this, That nothing can act where it is not; which holds true only where Contact is necessary to Action, that is, only in Bodies, whose Power consists in Contact, or touching each other; but any Being which acts without Contact, as God certainly does, may be Omnipotent, without being Omnipresent; that is, may act at an Infinite distance, without any Local Presence with the thing on which it acts. It is the first time, to the best of my remembrance, that ever I met with this Notion, *That 'tis the limited Powers and Faculties of Created Beings, which are the foundation of all local distinction.* Finite Creatures indeed have finite and limited Powers; but it is not the limitation of their Powers and Faculties, but of their Presence, which makes a local or *Ubi* distinction: If this were so, Power must be proportioned to Presence, which we know is false; for the greatest things, which fill the largest space, are not the most powerful: Spirits, which fill no space at all, have the greatest Power, and most enlarged Faculties.

But it is time to see the Pinch of this Argument from the *Unity of Position*; and the Sum of it is this: Whatever is One, must be in some One Place or *Ubi*, which distinguishes and separates it from other things: That he cannot

con-



conceive the distinction of two or three Beings from each other, without considering them in so many different Places or Localities: That God is *Omnipresent*, and he can no more conceive *Three Omnipresents*, than he can conceive *Three straight Lines drawn between the same Points*. That is, in plain *English*, There are not *Three Distinct Infinite Spaces* for *Three Distinct Omnipresent Persons* to be in, and therefore there cannot be a *Trinity of True and Proper Persons*; but as there is but *One Omnipresent Divine Nature*, so there can be but *One single Omnipresent Person*; and there is an end of the *Trinity*, till we can find room in the world for *Three Persons*, each of whom is *Omnipresent*.

P. 22.

I perceive our *Considerer* has not been so fair and equal as he pretended to be. He would not consult the *Fathers*, for fear of *Prejudices and Prepossessions*; but either good *Wits jump*, or he has taken care to consult the *Ancient Hereticks*; for this was the old *Sabellian Argument*, which was long since answered and scorned by *Athanasius*; as he will find in the Chapter of *Sabellianism*, to which I refer him and the Reader.

But in good earnest, does any sober Christian want an Answer to this Argument? Does God then fill a Space, as Bodies do, that *Three Divine Omnipresent Persons* must have *Three separate Localities*, and be commensurate to *Three Infinite Spaces*? Has God any Place; does he subsist in any thing but himself? If the *Considerer* can't conceive any Beings to be distinct without distinct Localities, How does he distinguish God from Creatures, when he owns that God is in every imaginable Point of Space, that is, in the very same *Ubi's* and Localities, whereever any Creatures are?

But do not all Catholic Christians own, That there is but *One Infinite, Inseparable, Undivided Nature*, in *Three Persons*? And must this *One Undivided Monad* be in *Three separate Localities*, because it subsists in *three distinct Per-*



sons? especially when these distinct Persons are whole and entire in each other; as our Saviour assures us, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*. And is not this a wonderful demonstration against Three Real and Proper Persons in the Trinity, That there cannot be Three such Infinite Omnipresent Persons, unless they subsist in Three Infinite and Separate Localities? But enough of this in all reason.

P. 24.

These are the Premises, from whence with so much open Assurance and Confidence he draws that *Sabellian Conclusion*, That the Idea of God *being really but One simple Idea, can be applied but to One single Person, in the first sense of the word Person, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, or Principle*. — From whence, he says, it follows, that according to the Notions we are capable of framing of *Unity and Distinction*, — all the Personal distinction we can conceive in the Deity, must be founded on some accessory Ideas, extrinsecal to the Divine Nature. So that there is not a Trinity in the Divine Nature, as the Catholick Church has always believed; but the Divine Nature, which really is but One single Person, is a Trinity with respect to something which does not belong to the Divine Nature, but is extrinsecal to it. Whether these be not *New Terms* and *New Doctrine* too, unknown to the Catholick Church, or known only as condemned Heresies, I appeal to all men, who will consult any Catholick Historian, or any Catholick Father, without prejudice.

And here I might reasonably enough break off; for I have followed the *Considerer* till we have heard him demonstrate against a Trinity of Real, Proper Persons in the Unity of the Godhead; which puts an end to the whole Dispute about a *Trinity in Unity*, because there is no such thing. He has found out indeed a Unity for God, but it is not a Unity in Trinity, but the Unity of One single Person; and he has found a Trinity, but it is not a Trinity in the

the Unity of the Divine Nature, but a Trinity of *extrinsecal accessory Ideas*. But since he has used some Art in pal-  
liating this Heresy, it will be necessary to take off the  
Disguise.

The first step he makes to it, is by seeming to own, That P. 24, 25.  
there may be some greater Mystery and Obscurity in the  
Doctrin of the Trinity, than that Account which he has  
given of it: *But if this Account*, says he, *of the Trinity be*  
*too easy, and falls far short of those high expressions of distin-*  
*ction found in Scripture (as I think it does), and no other,*  
*grounded upon any Notions our Souls have framed of Unity and*  
*Distinction, can be true or consistent (as I have before parti-*  
*cularly proved), then it necessarily follows, That God must be*  
*One and Three in some way or manner not conceivable by human*  
*Understanding.* Here he thinks he has found a safe Retreat:  
He asserts, and proves (as he would have us believe)  
from all the Notions of Distinction and Unity which our  
minds can frame, That God is and can be *One* in no other  
Notion, than of *One single Person*, in the first and proper  
sense of a Person, for an Intelligent Person; and that God  
neither is nor can be Three in the sense of Three Proper  
Distinct Persons: If you charge him with *Sabellianism* for  
this, then he retreats to an *obscure, confused knowledge*; to  
such a way and manner of God's being One and Three, as  
is not conceivable by human Understanding.

Well: But will he allow us with this *obscure and confused*  
*knowledge*, to believe the Holy Trinity to be Three Divine,  
Proper, Distinct Persons, and One God, *in a way and man-*  
*ner unconceivable by Human Understanding?* By no means!  
This he has proved by all the Notions of Unity and Dis-  
tinction cannot *be true or consistent*; nor is it possible for us  
to believe what we do not understand the terms of, or  
what contradicts our former knowledge; and we are not  
bound to believe what is not possible to be believed, nor  
can God in Justice or Goodness require such a Faith of us,

as we have already heard : So that *Sabellianism* we may believe, and must not believe any thing contrary to it ; and then we may believe that there is something more in it than we understand, if we please.

And therefore we may observe, That he is not concerned about any difficulties in the Notion of the Divine Unity, which all Catholick Writers have been most concerned for ; how to reconcile the Unity of God with a Trinity of Divine Persons ; but that which troubles him most, is the *Distinction*, which the Catholick Fathers never disputed about, but positively asserted in the most proper and real sense, against the *Sabellian* Hereticks : But he seems sensible, as well he may be, that the *Sabellian* Notion of Persons falls very short of those high Expressions of Distinction which are found in Scripture : And here it is that he allows of an obscure and confused Knowledge. When he has rejected a True Personal distinction, all other kinds of distinction he can think of, will not answer those high expressions of distinction found in Scripture ; and therefore provided you do not believe them distinct Persons, you may believe, if you please, that there is some other unknown and unconceivable distinction between them.

This is plainly what he means by his *obscure confused Knowledge*, by his *general confused Faith*, by his *general confused Notion of the Trinity* ; and therefore he religiously keeps to that form of words, That *One and the same God is Three* ; which must be understood in his Notion of *One and the same God*, that is, *One single Person* ; for all his Notions of *Unity and Distinction* are on purpose designed to prove, That *One God* can't be *Three*, in a true and proper Notion of a *Person* ; and therefore he never so much as names that question, How *Three Divine Persons are One God* ? Which can never be reconciled to a *Sabellian* Unity of a *Single Person*.

S E C T. VI.

*What it is the Scripture requires us to believe concerning the Trinity.*

**T**HE Considerer having laid the Foundations of *Sabellianism* in his *Natural Sentiments*, proceeds to examine what the Doctrine of the Scripture is concerning this matter; and to reconcile the Scripture to his *Natural Sentiments*; though the more reasonable and safer way had been first to have learnt the Faith from Scripture, and then to have corrected the Mistakes of his *Natural Sentiments* by Scripture.

I do not intend to enter into a long dispute with him here, but shall only let the Reader see what it is he would prove, and what he asserts; for his whole business in short is to prove, That the *Sabellian* Notion of the Unity of God, or of *One single Person*, and of *Three Names, Titles, Characters, extrinsecal Respects and Relations*, is the True Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity.

This he very freely tells us, That *the Sum of all that the Scriptures plainly and expressly teach concerning a Trinity, is this, That there is but One only God* (and what he means by *One only God*, we have often heard), *the Author and Maker of all things*: But that *One God ought to be acknowledged and adored by us under those Three different Titles or Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*: Which Words are very remarkable. He does not say, That this *One God* is to be acknowledged and adored in Three, who have the same *One Divinity* subsisting whole, and perfect, and distinctly in each of them, which is the *Catholick Faith*: But this *One God is to be acknowledged and adored by us under these Three different Titles and Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*:

P. 29.

1715

*Ghost* : So that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not the One God, for neither of them is God, but they are only the different Titles and Characters of the One God. And though God, when represented by different Characters, is God still under each Character, yet neither of the Characters is God, no more than the Titles and Characters of a Man, is the Man.

Now one might have expected that the *Considerer* should have proved, That the Scripture-Notion of *One God* is, That there is but *One single Divine Person* (in the true and proper Notion of the word *Person*) *who is God*; and that these Names of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, do not in Scripture signify Three Distinct, Real Persons, but are only *Three Different Titles and Characters* of the same One Divine Person: This indeed had effectually proved what he pretends to; but he was too wise to attempt either. The first he says nothing at all of, but takes it for granted, that he has demonstrated That by his Natural Notions of Unity and Distinction; but had he not first demonstrated that nothing could be *true and consistent*, and that God can require us to believe nothing which contradicts his Natural Notions, he should have a little enquired what the Notion of Scripture is about this matter: But taking it for granted that he had already demonstrated this, That One God signifies One single Person, he only proves, That the Titles and Characters of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, belong to God; and therefore, That *these Terms must all be so understood, as to include the same God* (the One single Divine Person) *in their Signification*.

P. 3a.

The first, I think, he proves well enough, That these *Titles and Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, belong to God; and this vindicates him from being a *Socinian*: But when he applies all these *Titles and Characters* to *One and the same God*, that is in his sense, to One and the same *single Person*, this proves him to be a *Sabellian*; for this

this was the Doctrine of *Noetus* and *Sabellius*, That these different Titles and Characters did belong but to One single Person, who is God.

He proves, That these Titles and Characters, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, do signify God, from the forms of *Baptism, Salutation, and Blessing*. Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. From whence, as he adds, I infer, That all these terms, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, signify God; because I cannot possibly conceive 'tis agreeable to the nature of the Christian Religion, that the Ministers of it should teach, baptize, or bless the people in any other name but God's. I like this Argument very well, but if it proves any thing, it proves more than he would have it, That *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, are each of them by himself true and perfect God, and not all Three One single Person; for it seems altogether as absurd to teach, baptize, or bless in Three Names and Titles, when there is but One single Person signified by those Three Names. And therefore his Inference is not very plain, That if any One of these Terms signify God, they must all Three signify God; and if all Three signify God, they must all Three signify One and the same God; for God is One. P. 31.

This is very artificial, but not plain: The consequence is plain, That if *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, are the Names of God, they must all signify One God by the Unity and sameness of Nature, because there is but One God; but not by the Unity of Person, because the Scripture mentions Three, each of whom is God: Which proves, That God is One in Nature, but Three in Persons; as the Catholick Church has always believed. P. 32.

As for what he adds, That the One Supreme God, the Lord and Maker of all things, is here meant by the word *Father*, is a thing not questioned; and therefore *Son and Holy Ghost*



*Ghost* are terms expressive of the same Divine Nature; may in some sense be allowed, if he will distinguish between *Nature* and *Person*; but according to the sense of Scripture, and the belief of the Catholick Church, *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, are the names of Three Real, Distinct, Divine Persons, not of *One Divine Nature*, in the sense of *One Person*.

But though we allow this with the Catholick Church, That the Father is *the One Supreme God*; we have no reason to allow this to *the Considerer*, who will not allow *Father*, *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, to be Names of Divine Persons, or to be Names or Relations of the Divine Nature, considered as the Divine Nature; for he says they are *extrinsecal*, that is, *extra-essential*, *Ideas*, *Titles*, *Characters*, *Respects*, *Relations*; and therefore *Father*, according to this Hypothesis, is not the essential Name of *the One Supreme God*, but given to him for some *extrinsecal* and extra-essential reasons; is his Name, not by Nature, but by Institution, and then must be proved to be his Name; which the mere form of Baptism cannot do, for the Name *God* is not expressed in it; much less does it prove, That *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, are *One and the same God*, or *One single Person*.

It is evident indeed from other Texts, That *Father* is the Name of God, but then it is the Name of *God the Father*; and the *Son* is the *Son of God*, and the *Holy Ghost* the *Spirit of God*, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; and this does prove, That *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, have the same *One Divinity*, the same *One Divine Nature*, as the very Names and Relations of Father, and Son, and Spirit, prove: But surely this does not prove, That God the Father, and his Son, are the same *One single Person*, as well as *One God*; for Father and Son all the world over signify *Two distinct Persons*; for no *One Person* can be Father and Son to himself; nor can the *Eternal subsisting Spirit of God* be the same Person with that God whose Spirit he is.

Unless

Unless he allows that Father in the form of Baptism is the Name of a Person, he can prove nothing from it ; and if Father be the Name of a Person, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be the Names of Persons also ; and then the Names and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove, That they are not *One single Person*, but *Three Persons*.

Thus he proves the Son to be God, from that Religious Worship which is paid to him ; which does indeed prove him to be God, but not the same One Person with the Father : Our *Considerer* is much mistaken, if he thinks it sufficient to prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the Titles and Characters of the same *One single Person*, who is the One God, if he can prove that each of these Names signify One who is God. And the truth is, if these Names, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, do not signify *Persons*, they cannot signify *God* ; for then they are not Names of Nature, but *something extrinsecal and accessory to the Divine Nature* ; and therefore they may be the external Denominations of him who is God, but not the Names of God, considered as God, and therefore cannot signify *God* ; because they do not signify the Divine Nature in the Persons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but *something extrinsecal and accessory*, that is, something which is not *essential*, and therefore which the Divine Nature might be without. I hope the *Considerer* did not think of this Consequence, That it is possible that God might neither have been Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost ; which yet must be allowed possible, if these be mere *extrinsecal and accessory Titles and Characters*: Nay, this must be allowed, unless we will grant that these Names signify *Three Real, Subsisting, Intelligent, Coeternal Persons, in the Unity of the same Godhead*.

P. 37.

But these *Three Persons* do somewhat puzzle him. That God should be called Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is as easily to be believed, as that he should be called Adonai, Elohim,

P. 36.

and Jehovah : That the same thing should be signified and expressed by several Names, is no such incredible Mystery. Which still shews us what it is he believes and would prove in all this, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names of that *One single Person*, who is God. But, as he proceeds, if we allow that these terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are all applied to God in Scripture, 'tis not thought sufficient to say, That these are Three several Names, which signify God; but we are further required to believe, That God is One and Three; the same God (not the same single Person), but Three different Hypostases or Persons; and that one of these Three Hypostases or Persons is both God and Man.

These are the *Hard Sayings* which puzzle some mens understandings. This is the Faith of the Catholick Church, and will always be *Hard Sayings* to Sabellian Understandings, which they will never be able to reconcile with their Hypothesis of *One single Person* in the Godhead. But let us hear how he clears himself of these difficulties.

R. 37.

He observes in the first place, That these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are applied to God in Scripture in a different way from what any of his other Names are. So far he is in the right; but what is this different way? In short, it is this; That the other Names of God signify only partial Conceptions of the Divine Nature, such as Self-existence, Power, &c. and are all contained within the same Idea of God, and therefore cannot be the foundation of any distinction in the Godhead. Let this pass. But each of these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, includes the whole Idea we have of God, and something more; as being extrinsecal and accessory to the Divine Nature, and the whole Idea of God full and compleat, before the application of these terms. Let us examine this first.

He says, Each of these Names includes the whole Idea of God. I beseech you how can that be, when they signify something extrinsecal and accessory to the Divine Nature, and the

*the whole Idea of God may be conceived full and compleat without them? For if these Names are not included in the Idea of God, which is full and compleat without them (which Assertion, by the way, overthrows the whole Christian Faith of the Trinity), how can they include the Idea of God in them, which they are not so much as any part of, much less the whole, and something more?*

I grant the Names of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, may connote the Idea of God, as the Name of a King and a Father connote the Idea of a Man who is King and Father, which I suppose is all he intends by it; but then the King must be a Man, and the Father must be a Man, to connote the Idea of Man: And thus in the Blessed Trinity; if these Names, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, connote the Idea of God, the Father must be True and Perfect God, and the Son must be True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost must be True and Perfect God; for neither Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, connote the Idea of God upon any other account, than as the Whole and Perfect Divine Nature subsists in each of them, and that makes the whole Idea of God belong to each of them.

To proceed: He tells us, *That though all these Names are separately and together affirmed of God, yet each of them in so peculiar a manner, that there are several occasions, where, when one of these terms is used with relation to God, 'twould be improper to use either of the other.* That is, when it is proper to call God *Father*, it is improper to call him, *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, and so on the contrary: But the reason of this in his Hypothesis, is not that their Persons are distinct and incommunicable, but that there are several occasions which make such change of Names improper: As a Man who is a King, a Husband, and a Father, all these Names do separately and together belong to him, but you must have a care of speaking improperly, by applying these Names to improper Relations.

Well:

## The Present State of the

Well: however, *From hence, he says, it follows, that these Three Names of God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must denote a Threesfold difference or distinction belonging to God.* I grant, it makes a distinction of Names and external Offices and Relations in God, but no distinction of Hypostases and Persons, which was the distinction to be shewn; but this he absolutely rejects; for it must be no other difference or distinction, *but such as is consistent with the Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature.* This we would all subscribe to, did he mean honestly; but his *Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature*, is nothing else but the Unity and Simplicity of *One single Person*; and all the distinction he will allow these different Names to make, is no more than what *One single Person* is capable of.

*For each of these Names includes the whole Idea we have of God, and something more.* Very right; if we allow these Names, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, to be the Names of true and proper Divine Persons; for then each of them is true and perfect God, and *the whole Idea of God is included in each of them*, because the whole Divine Nature is in each of them; otherwise neither of these Names include the Idea of God, but only connote it, as I have already observed.

And what he adds, *That as far as these Names express the Nature of God, they all adequately and exactly signify the same*; is very true also, if by the same, he means the same Nature, not the same *One single Person*: And then what he adds, *'Tis the additional signification which makes all the distinction between them*, is very true also; but he ought to have told us what this *additional signification*, this *something more than the whole Idea of God*, is, which is included in these Names, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, and then we might have known what this distinction is.

All the *additional signification* that I know of, is this; That *Father* signifies God, *includes the whole Idea of God*; but

but besides this, *Father*, when it signifies God, signifies a Self-originated, Unbegotten God, who is God of himself, and begets a Son of his own Nature, and Coeternal with himself. *Son* signifies God, but *begotten God*, *God of God*, the living and perfect Image of his Father. *Holy Ghost* signifies God, but God proceeding eternally from Father and Son, in the Unity and Perfection of the same Divine Nature. And this is all the difference between them, not a difference of Nature, but a distinction of True, Real, Proper Persons.

The *Considerer* seems to allow this, That *Person* is a proper Name for this distinction; For *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* ——— have plainly a *Personal* signification; each of them, without any figure of speech, being determined to signify some *Intelligent Being*, acting in such a manner as is there related. P. 38.

These Words would betray an Unwary Reader, to believe the *Considerer* as Orthodox as the *Nicene Fathers*, and that he did acknowledge *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, to be Three Persons, without a Figure, as a Person signifies an *Intelligent Being*; but he has secured himself against this Imputation, by an artificial addition, *some Intelligent Being acting in such, or such, a manner*: He will not allow Person to signify absolutely an *Intelligent Being*, but an *Intelligent Being* with respect to some peculiar manner of acting; and thus *One single Person*, in the proper Notion of Person, for an *Intelligent Being*, may sustain *Three Persons*, or *Personal Characters*, with respect to extrinsecal Relations, and the different manner of acting.

The whole Mystery and Sophistry of this, is, That God, who is *One single Person*, is upon different accounts sometimes called *the Father*, sometimes *the S n*, and sometimes *the Holy Ghost*; and therefore *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, have a *Personal* signification, each of these Names signify *Person* in a proper sense, that is, *the Person of God*; but all of them *separately and together*, signify but *One* and the



the same single Person ; for they are all of them attributed to God, and God is but *One*, or *One Person*, though this *One* proper Person may sustain *Three* figurative Persons, or *Personal Characters*. This is plain dealing ; and this is his Answer to his first *Hard Saying*, *That God is One and Three ; the same God, but Three different Hypostases or Persons* : That God is *One* and the same single Person, under *Three Personal Characters*, which may be called *Three Persons*, because each of them signifies the *True* and *Proper* Person of God.

And here we see in what sense these Gentlemen allow, That each Person is *Substance*, is *Mind*, and *Spirit*, and yet that God is but *One Substance*, *One Mind*, and *Spirit* ; viz. in the very same sense that this Author affirms that God is but *One single Person*, and yet that the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person ; and for the same reason, that they decry and abhor *Three Substances*, *Three distinct Minds and Spirits* in the God-head, though affirmed to be indivisibly and inseparably *One Infinite Substance*, *Mind*, and *Spirit* ; for the same reason they reject *Three Intelligent Substantial Persons* ; though our Modern *Sabellians* have been more cautious generally than this *Considerer*, not to own it in express words.

Now as for these Terms of *Three Substances*, and *Three Minds*, there may be good reason to let them alone, tho when rightly explained no reason to condemn them of Heresy ; but we must insist on *Three Distinct, Infinite, Intelligent, Substantial Persons*, Each of which is *Mind* and *Substance*, and *One* is not the *Other* : If they disown this ( as the *Considerer* does ) they are downright *Sabellians* ; if they own it, we have no farther Dispute about this matter.

Let us now consider his other *Hard Saying*, *That One of these Three Hypostases or Persons should be both God and Man*.

Now

Now the *Hardness* of this *Saying* is not, That it is hard to prove from Scripture, that so it is; or that it is hard to conceive *how God and Man can be united*; which is all that he touches on: But it is and always will be a Hard Saying to the *Considerer* upon another account; that is, To reconcile it with a *Trinity of One proper single Person, and Three Personal Characters*.

The *Doctrine* of the *Incarnation* is this; That the *Eternal Son of God* became *True and Perfect Man*, by taking the *Human Nature* into a *Personal Union* to himself. That the *Son only* became *Man*, not the *Father*, nor the *Holy Ghost*: That two perfect distinct *Natures*, the *Divine and Human Nature*, were without *Confusion* united in the *One Person of Christ*; and that this *One Person* is the *Eternal Word and Son of God*. Now if there be but *One single Person* in the *Godhead*, and *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, are but *Three Names, or Personal Characters* of this *One single Person*, How can the *Son* be *Incarnate*, and not the *Father*, nor the *Holy Ghost*? It is only a *Person* that can be *Incarnate*, for a *Personal Character* can't be *Incarnate* without the *Person*; and if there be but *One single Person*, and this same *One Person* is *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, it is impossible that that *Person* who is the *Son*, should be *Incarnate*, but the *Person* who is the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost*, must be *Incarnate* also; because the same *Person* who is the *Son*, is the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost*.

The short *Question* is this; Whether a *True, Proper, Divine Person* was *Incarnate*, in the *Incarnation of Christ*? If not, then *Christ* was not a *Divine Person*, how *Divine* soever he might be upon other accounts; the *Divine Nature* did not *personally* subsist in him, he was not *personally* *True and Perfect God*; and then the *Person of Christ* was no more than a *Man*, whatever *Divine Influences* he might receive from *God*: But if the *Divine Nature* were truly

and properly Incarnate in the Person of Christ, then if there be but One single Divine Person in the Godhead, but *One Divine Nature*, in the sense of *One single Person*, then the whole Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which are but One True and Proper Person, was Incarnate in Christ.

P. 38. This is the true difficulty, and he is so wise as to take no notice of it. It does not appear to me, that he believes one word concerning the Incarnation of God, or of a True Divine Person; he says, *He that is in Scripture called the Son of God, did appear in the likeness of men*: He certainly was a True Man, but that is not our present dispute; Was he in his own Person True and Perfect God? Was he a Human Person; or the Person of the Son of God appearing in Human Nature?

P. 39. *He was*, he says, *in the Form of God, before he took the Nature of Man upon him*. This sounds well; but why does he not speak out, and tell us what this *Form of God* is? Whether the True Divine Nature subsisting in him, a True Divine Person?

Well: But God did suffer himself to be worshipped and adored in and by the Man Christ Jesus; the least that can be inferred from which is, That God was more immediately and peculiarly present in Christ, than ever he was said to have been any where else: as in the Heavens, the Jewish Temple, between the Cherubims, in Prophets and Holy Men, who spake as they were moved by the Spirit. Now all this might have been spared, would he but have said, That the Person Jesus Christ was worshipped with Divine Honours, as being in his own Person True and Perfect God, as well as Man; and without saying this, he says nothing to prove that Christ is the Son of God Incarnate.

To say, That God did suffer himself to be worshipped in and by the Man Christ Jesus, as he was worshipped in the Heavens, in the Jewish Temple, between the Cherubims. (for that must

must be the force of the Comparison ) does no more prove Christ to be God, than it proves the Heavens, the Jewish Temple, and the Cherubims, to be God: It may prove a more perfect symbolical Presence of God in Christ, which he calls *the Fulness of the Godhead*, but not the Incarnation of the Son of God. But this is not the Doctrine of Scripture, merely to say, *That God suffers himself to be worshipped in the Man Christ Jesus*; as if God, and the Man Christ Jesus, were not *One Person*; but that he commands us to worship that Person who is called Christ Jesus, not as a Man, in whom the Power of God dwells, and is present, as in *the Heavens, or in the Jewish Temple, or in the Prophets and Holy Men* ( who were never for this reason thought the Objects of Worship ) but as his own Eternal Son Incarnate. That *all men should honour the Son, as they honour the Father*; which does not only signify to honour the Father in the Son, but to pay Divine Honours to the Person of the Son, which makes them distinct Objects of Worship, and therefore True and Proper Persons, not *Personal Characters*, which may be distinct Reasons of Worship, but are not distinct Objects.

But we shall better understand this, by the account he gives of the Union of God and Man. In what manner Soul and Body, or God and Man, are united, is not the question; for we know nothing how this Physical Union is made; but the question is concerning the Nature and Kind of this Union: Whether, as the Soul and Body are united in One Person, so as to be One Man, so God and Man are united in One Person: *That as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is One Man, so God and Man is One Christ*. Whether the Divine and Human Natures are united in One Person; or God be united to Man only as an assisting Principle, by a perpetual and constant Influx of Divine Powers and Virtues. These two are vastly different: The first in-

deed always includes the second in the most perfect manner, but the second does not always infer the first.

A Personal Union is always a Union of Life, Influence, and Power; as he describes the *Union of Soul and Body*; *That there is some Intelligent Power that makes use of the Organs of my Body, and acts in conjunction with the motions there produced*: This is all true, and necessarily consequent upon a Personal Union, but a very lame account of the Vital Union of Soul and Body; for thus Angels may use the Bodies they assume, without a Personal Union: But a conscious Life, Sensation, and Government, which makes *One self*, is a great deal more than to *act in conjunction with the Motions of the Body*. The Union of Influence and Power may be without Personal Union, and therefore does not always make One Person.

P. 40. It is the first we enquire after, it is the first the Scripture teaches, That *the Word was made Flesh*; That *God sent forth his Son, made of a woman*: This is the Catholick Faith of the Incarnation; but this *the Considerer* takes no notice of; but all he says, relates only to the Union of Influence and Power.

And I may, says he, as well consider God united to Man, when he so acts by the Ministry and Operation of Man, that the Actions of God seem conveyed to us the same way as the actions of one man are to another. But does this make God True and Perfect Man? This falls short of the conjunct Operations of Soul and Body, which are much more close and intimate than the actions of one man are to another; however, to be sure the actions of one man upon another, do not make Two such Men One Person; nor therefore can the like Influence of God on Man, make God and Man One Person. But he proceeds:

*Had those who upon some occasions spake by the Extraordinary Assistance of a Divine Power, been constantly so directed and assisted, how could they have distinguished the Motions of their*

*their Souls from the Impressions of God?* Just as they did when they were *sometimes* thus assisted; for External Impressions are always distinguishable from Internal Motions. But suppose they could not distinguish them, does this prove that God is Incarnate in such men; or would it be a reason to worship such men as God?

He adds, *And why then should we not think such an extraordinary Power as this, as much united to such men, as that common ordinary Power we call the Soul, is to those Bodies in which it acts and exerts it self.* The Answer is plain, because it would be an External, not an Internal Principle of Life, and Motion, and Sensation, how constant soever its Influences were. He calls it an *Extraordinary Power*, which shews that it is not a Natural Principle of Action; it is an *Extraordinary Power united to a Man*, and therefore the Man is the *Person*, this *Extraordinary Power* only an external assisting Principle, of the same kind with that in Prophets, though more constant and regular in its actings: But here is nothing of *Incarnation* in all this.

Is this *Extraordinary Power* a Divine Subsisting Person; in the true and proper Notion of a Person? Is it the Son of God, that *Eternal Word, which was in the beginning, was with God, and was God*? Is this *Extraordinary Power* so united to Human Nature, as to become Man? Is it the Person of Christ Jesus, who was conceived in the Womb of the Virgin, lived in the World as a Man, suffered, and died, and rose again from the dead, and now sits at the Right Hand of God in the highest Heavens? Not one word of all this, which is the true Mystery, and the only Use of this Doctrine of the Incarnation, whereon all our Hopes of Salvation by Christ depend. This *Extraordinary Power* is not a Person, but such a *constant regular Inspiration*, as he says, *some are of opinion the Soul of man is*: But whether that be so or not, as he thinks *most probably it is not* (which yee argues some kind of Inclination to it), yet it seems to him  
plain



plain from Scripture, that such a Power as we ascribe to God ( he will not say such a Power as is God, or a True Divine Person ) *did as constantly and regularly act in and through Christ, as the Human Soul is perceived to do in any other man.* That such a Power did constantly appear and act in Christ, is true; but whether by Nature, or by a *constant and regular Inspiration*, is the Question. Our Saviour proves his Divine Nature from his Works; our Considerer thinks it proves no more than a *constant and regular Inspiration*: The first is necessary to the Catholick Faith of the Incarnation, *That the Word was made Flesh*; the second proves him only to be an extraordinary and perpetual Prophet: The first makes him *True God-Man*; the second makes him only a *Divine Man*. And this is all he can mean by this *Power regularly and constantly acting in and through Christ*: For if Christ be *God-Man*, he is this *Divine Power* in his own Person; it is his *Divine Nature*, not an external adventitious Principle, how *regularly and constantly* soever it acts; it is not merely an *uninterrupted Presence and Concurrence* of the Deity with the Man Christ Jesus, as he represents it, but the Personal Union of the Divine Nature of Christ to Human Nature. He was not only *as conscious of all the Divine Perfections in himself, as a man is conscious of his own thoughts*, (which yet, by the way, is absolutely impossible, without being True and Perfect God in his own Person), but he knew himself to be God, the Eternal Son of God, not the same Person with his Father, but *One with him*.

Were a man thus *regularly and constantly Inspired*, he would know that he was thus Inspired, and he would also know, that these Divine Perfections are not in himself, not seated in his own Human Person, nor under the Conduct of his own Will, as his own Natural Powers are, and therefore must know himself to be a mere Man still, not *God-Man*.

So that this *constant and regular Inspiration*, this *uninterrupted Presence and Concurrence of the Deity*, which is all he allows in this matter, cannot make any Person *God-Man*. This Inspiration is not a subsisting Person, is not the Person of the Son of God, is not Incarnate by its Union to Man, no more than it is Incarnate in other Prophets: The Man is the *Person*, and therefore a mere Creature still, tho never so Divinely Inspired.

This is such an *Incarnation* as Socinians themselves own, in as high expressions as the *Considerer* can invent. *Cerinthus* owned something more, That *Christ* who descended on *Jesus* at his Baptism, was a *Divine Person*, not a mere Inspiration, and rested on him, and was most intimately united to him, till his Crucifixion. That Sect of the *Noetians* and *Sabellians* who were called *Patripassians* ( for they do not seem by the accounts we have of them, to have been all of that mind ) did acknowledge the Incarnation of God in a true and proper sense, as the Catholick Church did the Incarnation of *Christ*: But then their Trinity being but One proper single Divine Person, distinguished by Three Names or Personal Characters ( which is the express Doctrine of the *Considerer* ) their whole Trinity was Incarnate, suffered, and died, in the Incarnation and sufferings of *Christ*, the Father as well as the Son; as it must of necessity be, if there be but One Divine Person, who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and if this One Person is in a true and proper sense Incarnate: But this the Catholick Church abhorred and condemned, under the name of the *Patripassian Heresy*. Others of them were *Sabellians* in the Doctrine of the Trinity, but *Photinians*, or *Samosatenians*, that is, *Socinians*, as to the Doctrine of the Incarnation, as *Athanasius* often intimates: And if I understand him, this is the *Considerer's* way, who believes a Trinity in *One single Person*, and an *Inspired Man for a God Incarnate*.

And

P. 41. And thus we have lost the Trinity and Incarnation, and must part with every thing which is peculiar and essential to Christianity, with them. And now one would wonder after all this, what he has to say more about the Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation; and yet this is his next Enquiry, *What the Scriptures necessarily oblige us to believe in this Point*, that is, concerning *the Trinity and Incarnation*? Though he has been careful all along never to use this term *Incarnation*, as being sensible that all he said about *God-Man*, would not reach the Catholick Notion of *Incarnation*.

When I met with this Enquiry, I was in hope that there was something behind to unsay all that he had hitherto said; for if what he has already said be true, it is certain the Scripture requires us to believe nothing about them. But upon Examination I found, that the Question was fallaciously stated; and the true meaning of it was, *What the Scriptures oblige us to believe, instead of what has hitherto passed for the true Catholick Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation*? I shall not dispute this Point with him now; to shew what he means, will be Confutation enough.

P. 42. *We must not*, he says, *look upon the Doctrine of the Trinity as a nice abstracted Speculation, designed for the exercise of our Understandings; but as a plainer Revelation of God's Love and Good Will towards men, and a greater Motive and Incitement to Piety than ever we had before this Doctrine was delivered.* P. 133+

This we grant, That the Christian Faith is not designed merely for Speculation, but for Practice; but yet all the Doctrines of Faith are matters of Speculation, and the Doctrine it self must be believed in order to Practice, or else the Revelation of it is of no use at all.

The Question then is, Whether we must not believe the Doctrines of *the Trinity and Incarnation*? Or how much we must believe of them? Must we not believe, That God has

has in a true and proper sense an Eternal and Only-begotten Son, begotten from Eternity of his own Substance; his True, Perfect, Living, Subsisting Image? Must we not believe, That this Eternal Son of God did in a true proper Notion become Man, by uniting Human Nature to his own Person; and that in Human Nature he suffered and died for the Redemption of Mankind? Truly, No; if I understand him: All this is a *nice abstracted Speculation*, and a very perplexing *exercise of our Understandings*; and we are bound to understand no more by God's giving his own Son to dye for us, but his *Love and Good Will to Mankind*, as it is a *great Motive and Excitement to Piety*.

But how can we learn *God's Love and Good Will to Mankind*, from this Doctrine, if it be not true? if God have no Eternal Son, and therefore did not give his Eternal Son to become Man, and to suffer and dye for us? The Gospel proves the great Love of God to Sinners, by the Incarnation, Death, and Sufferings of his Son; that if we do not believe this Doctrine strictly and literally true, we lose the Gospel-Proof of God's Love to Sinners, and of the Virtue and Efficacy of Christ's Death and Sacrifice to expiate our sins, and of the Power of his Intercession as the Eternal, Only-begotten, and Well-beloved Son of God.

But our *Considerer* will not allow this: These *Titles and Relations must be chiefly considered with reference to the great Work of Man's Salvation*: But must they not be considered as Three distinct proper Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, who have their distinct Parts and Offices in the Redemption of Mankind? No; but distinct Relations and Offices of One and the same single Divine Person, who is the *One Supreme God*, and is *All in One, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Saviour, Mediator, Comforter*.

But how then can these *Titles and Relations* signify an *Eternal Distinction in the Godhead*, an *Eternal Father*, an *Eternal Son*, and an *Eternal Spirit*, when these Of-

fices relating only to *Man's Salvation* were not *Eternal*?

This he resolves into the *Eternal Purpose and Decree of God, to redeem Mankind by the Death and constant Mediation of a Man chosen and enabled for this work by the Fulness of the Godhead dwelling in him: And in consideration of his Passion and Intercession, to impart such Gifts, Graces, and Spiritual Assistances, as would be sufficient to render this Redemption effectual to the saving of much people.* So that God decreed from Eternity, upon his Foreknowledge of *Man's Fall*, that in order to redeem Man he would take upon himself the *Distinctions and Offices of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Saviour, Mediator, and Comforter, in time; and this is all the Eternal Distinction in the Godhead.*

Well: But it seems God did not decree from Eternity to redeem Man by his own Son, but by a *Man chosen and enabled for this Work by the Fulness of the Godhead dwelling in him; that is, as we have already heard, by an Inspired and Deified Man, not by a God Incarnate: It is the Man who is the Saviour and Redeemer, though he be enabled to this work by the Fulness of the Godhead, or a constant regular Inspiration:*

This is downright *Socinianism*; the Catholick Faith is, That it is the Son of God who redeems us, though he redeems us in Human Nature.

But if God redeems us by a Man, however he be enabled by a Divine Power, Why is he said to give his Son for us? For this Divine Power is not a Person, and therefore no Son, nor is the Man his own and only begotten Son.

Now this would be a difficulty indeed, were we to understand *God's giving his own Son for us*, in a proper literal sense; but this is nothing but Figure and Representation, if we believe *the Considerer*. His words are these; *Thus when God is pleased to represent his Love to Mankind in the*  
high-

*Sin autem ideo dictum putant Deum, quod inspirationem divinitatis habuit, sicut & multi sancti viri — ergo non ultra homines eum praeferunt —* Ambr. de fide, l. 5. cap. 1.

highest Image of Nature, that of a Father sacrificing an only-begotten Son, the exact Transcript and Resemblance of himself, perfectly innocent, and obedient to his Will in all things, we are to believe (that God did thus sacrifice his Son, as he assures us he did? No; but) that by the Sufferings and Death of Christ, God has given greater Proof of his Love towards us, than any man is capable of doing to another; and that such an action of an Earthly Parent suggests the nearest and likest Conception we can possibly frame of what our Heavenly Father hath done for us; though at the same time we must acknowledge it comes infinitely short of expressing the Riches and Fulness of his Mercy and Loving kindness. It does so indeed. To believe that God has actually given his own Eternal and Only-begotten Son for us, as the Scripture assures us he has, is a much nearer and truer Conception of what God has done for us, and infinitely exceeds all earthly comparisons. Abraham's offering his Son Isaac at God's Command, was an Image and Figure, but a Typical Figure of it; but it was a Type without an Antitype, if Christ was not as truly and properly the Son of God, as Isaac was the Son of Abraham. But if we will believe the Considerer, the Scripture does not oblige us to believe this; if we do but believe, That God is as good to us as if he had sacrificed his only Son for us, we need not believe, That he did sacrifice his Son. I have no Patience to proceed any further; if this be true, there is an end of the Faith and Hope of Christians.

p. 136.



## C H A P. III.

*A Brief Account of the Sabellian Heresy,  
and by what Arguments the Catholick  
Fathers opposed it.*

THE Considerer has given us the most Compleat and Artificial Scheme of *Sabellianism* that I have yet met with, and has very fairly and openly confessed his Design, to prove, That *One God* must signify that there is but *One* who is God, but *One single Divine Person*, in the proper Notion of a Person, as it signifies an *Intelligent Being*. I have endeavoured to shew him his Mistake, and what it is that has mis-led him; and how hopeles an Attempt it is to reconcile his Hypothesis with the Catholick Faith of *the Trinity and Incarnation*.

This is so bold an Attempt, openly to assert and defend a Heresy which has been constantly condemned by the Catholick Church, since its first appearance, that I am apt to hope he does not believe his Hypothesis to be *Sabellianism*, or that Heresy which now is best known by that name, though *Sabellius* was not the first Author of it. And therefore I will shew him what *Sabellianism* is, and how the Fathers opposed it.

There were Two Points in dispute between them and the Catholick Christians.

*First*, Concerning the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

*Secondly*, Concerning the Unity of God, Whether it were the Unity of One Person, as they pretended.

That

That we may rightly understand this matter, we must distinguish between the several kinds of *Sabellianism*, because the Arguments and Answers of the Fathers are sometimes adapted to one, and sometimes to another Notion of it. *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, were but *One Person*, was asserted by them all, but explained very differently, and that altered the state of the Question, and required different Answers.

1. As first, They made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names, Appearances, or Offices of the same Person, as I observed before: And then the state of the Question was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, in as true and proper a sense as the Father was a Person? For this they owned by making Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Names of the same Person; whereas it is impossible they should be the same Person, if the Son were not a Person, nor the Holy Ghost a Person. If the Son be the same Person with the Father, the Son must be a Person, for *no* Person can't be the *same* Person: Which is the same Argument to prove that these Hereticks owned Christ to be a True and Real Person, that *Novatianus* used (as I observed before) to prove that they owned Christ to be true and perfect God, because they made him the same with the Father, who is true and perfect God, and a true, and real, and substantial Person. And if he be the very same with the Father, he must be the same we acknowledge the Father to be; *viz.* a true and real Person, and perfect God.

The Dispute then which the Catholick Fathers had with these Hereticks, with respect to this Notion, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were the very same Person, was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person? but, Whether the Son and Holy Ghost were truly and really distinct Persons from the Father, as the Catholick Church:

Church always believed? or, Whether they were the same Person, distinguished only by Three Names.

Now when the Fathers asserted not only the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (which this Notion did not oppose), but the real distinction of Persons, That the Son was a Person, but not the same Person with the Father, they must ascribe the same kind of Personality to the Son, which they do to the Father; That the Son is as truly and really a Person as the Father is, though not the same Person; as truly a Person as God would be, were there but One Person in the Godhead, as these Hereticks affirmed. For according to all the Rules of Disputation, we must take Words in the sense of those whom we oppose; for otherwise it is a mere wrangle about Words, without opposing one another. And therefore since the *Sabellians* by Person understood such a Person as every single Person is, (for they made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but Three different Names of the same single individual Person) nothing could oppose or confute them, but to prove, That Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three distinct Persons, in the same Notion of a Person which belongs to every single individual Person, as far as mere Personality is concerned. For to prove them Three in any other sense, whether Three Modes, or Three Powers, or Three Parts of the same One single Person, is what they would have; and allow them to be but One Person, and they will dispute no further; nay, will give you leave to call Three Modes, or Three Names, or Three Parts of the same One Person, Three Persons, if you please.

But for the clearer understanding of this matter, we must consider by what Arguments the Ancient Writers opposed this Herefy.

*Tertullian*, in opposition to *Praxeas*, reduces this to a short Question, Whether God have any Son, and who he is,  
and

and how he is his Son. For if God have a Son, the Son must be as true and real a Person as the Father, and Father and Son must be Two distinct Persons; for the same Person can't be both Father and Son to himself; the very Names of Father and Son signify, that one is of the other, and we must understand things to be what they are called, whether Father or Son, which can no more be the same than Night and Day, with respect to these different Relations. The Father makes the Son, and the Son makes the Father; and those who receive these Relations from each other, can never be these Relations to themselves, that the Father should make himself a Son to himself, or the Son make himself a Father to himself. This Order God has instituted in all other Beings, and he observes it himself. A Father must of necessity have a Son, to be a Father; and a Son must have a Father, that he may be a Son, but *to have*, and *to be*, are two things; as for instance, for a man to be a Husband, signifies that he has a Wife, not that he is a Wife to himself; and thus to be a Father, signifies to have a Son, not to be a Son to himself; in such Relations we must be one, and have another; that to be both is to be neither, because we can have neither. If I be Father and Son to my self, I am no Father, because I have no Son, who makes a Father, but am Son my self;

*Sed quia duos unum volunt esse, ut idem Pater & Filius habeatur, oportet & totum de filio examinari, ut sit, & qui sit, & quomodo sit. Tert. ad Prax. c. 5.*

*Ipsam quod Pater & Filius dicuntur, nemo aliud ab alio est. Utique enim omnia quod vocantur, hoc erunt; & quod erunt, hoc vocabuntur. — Ita aut pater aut filius est, & neque dies eadem & nox, neque pater idem & filius, ut sint ambo unus, & utrumque alter. Ibid. c. 9, 10.*

*Ipsæ se, inquiunt, filium sibi facit, atquin pater filium facit, & patrem filius. Et qui ex alterutro sunt, à semetipsis sibi fieri nullo modo possunt, ut pater se sibi filium faciat, & filius se sibi patrem præstet. Quæ instituit Deus, ipse custodit. Ibid.*

*Habeat, necesse est, pater filium, ut pater sit, & filius patrem, ut filius sit. Aliud est autem habere, aliud esse. Verbi gratia, ut maritus sim, habere oportet uxorem, non ut ipse mihi ero uxor; sic etiam, ut pater sim, filium habeo, non ipse mihi ero filius. Ibid.*

*Quæ enim me faciunt, si habuero, tunc ero pater, si filium habeam, filius ero, si patrem. Porro, si ipse ero quid eorum, jam non habeo, quod ipse ero; nec patrem, quia ipse ero pater, nec filium, quia ipse ero filius; in quantum verò alterum ex his habere me oportet; alterum esse, in quantum si utrumque fuero, alterum non ero, dum alterum non habeo. Si enim ipse ero filius, qui & pater, jam non habeo filium, sed ipse sum filius. Non habendo autem filium, cum ipse sum filius, quomodo pater ero? habere enim filium debeo, ut pater sim; non sum ergo filius, quia patrem non habeo, qui facit filium: Æque si ipse sum pater, qui & filius, &c. Hoc crit totum ingenium Diaboli, alterum ex altero excludere, dum utrumque in unum sub Monarchiæ favore concludens, neutrum haberi facit, &c. Ibid.*

and

and I am no Son, because I have no Father, who makes the Son, but am Son my self ; and thus while they make Father and Son one and the same Person, they destroy the Notion both of Father and Son.

Now would any man have argued at this rate, who did not believe Father and Son to be real and Substantial Persons, and as distinct from each other as a human Father and Son are ; for if they be not, all this reasoning from the distinct Relations of Father and Son, which require a real distinction of Persons, is quite lost : And whether this Argument be good, or no, ( which is not the present Enquiry ) it is certain that whoever uses it, if he understands himself, must believe, That Father and Son signify as true and real Relations, and as real and distinct Persons in the Godhead, as they do in human Nature.

The like may be said of that other Argument against the Father and the Son being One and the same Person, That then the same Person must, in order of Nature, be both before and after himself ; for he who begets must always in order of Nature ( though not of Time, in an Eternal Generation ) be before him who is begotten by him : That as Father, he is before himself as Son ; as Son, he is after himself as Father ; which had been ludicrous trifling, if they had not believed a real substantial Generation of the Person, and consequently that the Son is a real substantial Person : For this Argument will not hold in the Generation of Modes and Postures, or in one part of the Deity generating another.

Thus to prove the distinction of Persons between Father and Son, they urge all those Texts in which the Father speaks to or of the Son, and the Son speaks to or of the Father ; which are so many, and so well known, that I need not transcribe them. And *Tertullian* lays it

*Non posse unum & eundem videri, qui loquitur, & de quo loquitur, & ad quem loquitur: quia neque per-versitas, neque fallacia Deo congruat, ut cum ipse esset ad quem loquebatur, ad alium potius, & non ad seipsum loquatur. Ibid. c. 11.*

it down as a certain Rule, That he who speaks, and he to whom he speaks, and he who is spoken of, cannot be one and the same Person ; for this is such perverseness and deceit as does not become God ; that when he himself is the Person to whom he speaks, he should speak in such a manner as if he directed his speech to another, and did not speak to himself. And therefore when the Father says, *Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.* When Christ tells us, *That God is his Father ; That he came forth from the Father, and came into the world, and again leaves the world, and goes to the Father :* When he says, *I and my Father ; and I will pray the Father, and he shall send you Another Comforter : I, and He, and Another,* must signify Three as Real and Distinct Persons, as these words signify in common speech.

Thus they prove the distinction of Persons between Father and Son, from those Texts which tell us, That the Father sends the Son, and the Son is sent ; That the Father anoints, and the Son is anointed ; That the Father gives Commands, and the Son receives them, and doth the Will of his Father ; That the Father knows the Son, and the Son the Father ; That he sees all that the Father doth, and can do all that he sees the Father do : For there must be distinct Subjects for such different Acts ; the same Person, with respect to himself, can't with any propriety of speech be said to send, and to be sent ; to anoint, and to be anointed ; to command, and to obey ; to come forth from himself, and to come into the world, and to leave the world, and go to himself : And therefore he who sends, and he who is sent, &c. must be Two.

Nay, it is well observed by these Fathers, That Christ himself expressly teaches us, that He and his Father, with respect to the distinction of Persons, are Two ; so Two, as

Ὁ πατήρ ἕν θεὸν ἐαυτοῦ λέγει,  
τὸ υἱόν, θεὸν ὃς ἴσ' πατέρος, καὶ ἐν ὅ,  
θεὸν ὃς τὸ πνεῦμα ὁ, ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς  
ἐκ ὑποστασίας πατρὸς ἀρρῆκτως τὰ βία.  
Ath. cont. Gregales Sabellii.



Πῶς ἐκ ἀποστολῆς σαφὲς ἀρ-  
νηθεὶς τὰ βίαια, καὶ μόνον ἢ) λέ-  
γει ὅτι ὁρᾶσκοντα, ἐκ εἰμὶ μόν-  
ος, ὅτι ὁ πῶς καὶ μετὰ πατὴρ  
μετὰ ἐμὲ ἐστὶ. καὶ ἢ) καὶ νομικῇ  
φωνῇ, καὶ διὰ πάντας δύο παρὸν  
ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν πατέρα.  
ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γὰρ φησὶ γὰρ καὶ ἢ).  
ὅτι δύο ἀνθρώπων ἡ μαρτυρία  
ἀληθὴς ἐστίν. ἢ), φησὶν, εἰμὶ  
μαρτυρῶν περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, καὶ μαρ-  
τυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὁ πῶς καὶ μετὰ  
πατὴρ, ἢ) διὰ γὰρ δύο πρὸς ὅσον καὶ  
εἰ μὴ λέγεις δύο ἢ) κατ' ἀλη-  
θειαν, τὸτο λέγων ἢ) τὴν μαρ-  
τυρίαν ἐξ ἧς σωθήσονται ἔσονται ἀληθι-  
νῶν. τὸτο γὰρ πρὸς τὴν μαρτυ-  
ρίαν τὸ μὴ ἐφ' ἑνὸς γίνεσθαι μό-  
νον, ἀλλ' ἑκὸς δύο. Ath. Ibid.

to make a Legal Testimony of Two Witnesses ; 8. *John* 13, — 18. When the *Pharisees* objected against him, That he bore Record of himself, and therefore his Record was not true: He answers, *And yet if I judge, my judgment is true, for I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me. It is also written in your law, That the testimony of two men is true ; I am one that bear witness of my self, and my Father that sent me beareth witness of me.* This is as express as words can make it. If Father and Son were but One single Person, Christ could not have said, *I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me ;* for one single Person is in this sense alone, how many Names soever he has ; and if he and his Father are not Two distinct Persons, they are not Two Legal Witnesses, as Two distinct men are.

These and such like Arguments we may find in all the Ancient Writers who have engaged in this Controversy ; and from hence we learn not only what they thought of the distinction of Persons between Father and Son, but what kind of Person they believed the Son to be ; such a Person as has a Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power, who is capable of being sent, of receiving and executing Commands, and has all this as distinctly in himself, as he is a distinct Person. The Father knows the Son, and the Son knows the Father, but each of them know by their own Personal Knowledge ; the Father wills, and the Son wills, and wills all the same with the Father, but each of them wills by his own Personal Will ; the Father works, and the Son works, and they inseparably do the same things, but each of them work by their own Personal Power. Know-

Knowledge, and Will, and Power of acting, is essential to the Notion of a Person, and therefore every distinct Person must have a distinct Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power; and those must acknowledge this, who prove the distinction of Persons from distinct Personal Acts, as all these Fathers did. This is all we ask, when we assert a distinction of Persons in the Trinity; and this we must insist on, or deny a Trinity; for if there are not Three who have all the same distinct Personal Acts, there cannot be Three distinct compleat Persons; for Personal Acts shew a Person, and distinct Personal Acts prove distinct Persons; and in this sense (as all these Arguments prove) the Ancient Fathers owned a distinction of Three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead.

Their distinction between *Deus invisibilis*, and *Deus visibilis*, the invisible and visible God, whereby they proved the real distinction between God the Father and God the Son, is an undeniable Proof of their Opinion in this matter; for I urge it no farther.

It was the received Opinion (as far as I can find) of all the Ancient Fathers, till St. *Austin*, That God the Father never appeared in any visible Representation of himself; for he tells *Moses*, *No man can see my face, and live*: And St. *John* assures us, *No man hath seen God at any time, but the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him*: And yet in the Old Testament we frequently read of God's appearing to men, which they therefore expound of God the Son, and that his Appearance in a visible Form was a Proludium to his Incarnation.

This we may see largely proved by *Tertullian* and St. *Hilary*, and observed by St. *Athanasius*; and the plain consequence they draw from it, is, That this *invisible* and *visi-*

*Ipse enim ad humana semper collo-  
quia descendit ab Adam usque ad Pa-  
triarchas & Prophetas, in visione, in  
somnio, in speculo, in enigmate, ordi-  
nem suum praestruens ab initio semper,  
quem erat persecuturus in finem; ita  
semper ediscebat & Deus in terris  
cum hominibus conversari, non alius  
potuit quam sermo, qui caro erat fu-  
urus. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 16.*

*ble* God cannot be one and the same Person ; and the consequence is so self-evident, that it needs no Proof ; but it evidently proves what a real, substantial, as well as distinct Person they thought the Son, who could visibly appear, while the Father remained invisible ; for as a visible and invisible God can't be the same Person, so a visible God must be a real substantial Person.

And though *St. Austin* was of opinion, That those Three Men which appeared to *Abraham*, were the Three Persons of the Sacred Trinity, and thereby rejected the distinction of the invisible and visible God, by attributing a visible Appearance to God the Father, which none of the Ancients had done before him ; yet by these Three distinct Appearances he confirmed the real distinction of the Divine Persons, who were as distinct Persons as they appeared to be, and therefore as distinct as Three Human Persons, for they appeared as Three distinct men. And therefore he observes, That whereas Two of these Three went to *Lot* in *Sodom*,

*Lot* speaks to them as to One, 19. *Gen.* 18.

*Quid agis Lot sancte ? Angelos vides, non unum, sed duos, & dicis domine mi. Duos video, aequales video, unum rogo, nulli injuriam facio, quia patrem & filium non divido ; Sabellianus legat duos venisse, &c. Aug. de 5. Hares.*

And *Lot* said unto them, Oh, not so, my Lord : And justifies *Lot* in this, That though they were two, yet they were equal, and he would not divide the Father and Son ; and urges this against the *Sabellians*, who made Father and

Son One Person. I do not justify *St. Austin* in this, because I doubt whether the Argument be good ; but by this we may understand *St. Austin's* Judgment of the real distinction of Persons.

And to the same purpose the Voice from Heaven at our Saviour's Baptism, *This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased* ; and the Descent of the Holy Spirit like a Dove, and lighting upon him, is urged by the Ancient Fathers to prove a real Trinity of Divine Persons : The Voice from the Father in Heaven, the Son on earth, and the Holy Ghost descend-

descending like a Dove; which being Three distinct Manifestations, and all at a time, must represent the Father who spoke from Heaven, the Son who was on Earth, and the Holy Ghost who descended like a Dove, to be Three distinct Persons, not One single Person, which cannot speak of himself in the Third Person, nor descend on himself in a distinct visible Appearance.

*Audi tu Sabelliane, audi de celo patrem, vide in terra filium, & noli dicere, idem pater qui filius. Aug. de quinque Hæres. cap. 6.*

The *Sabellians* being unable to maintain this Point, which is so manifestly absurd, and so irreconcilable with all the forms of speech used in Scripture concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, found it necessary to allow some distinction between them, but yet were so afraid of *Tritheism*, that they kept religiously to their main Point, that One God was but One Person, and therefore would admit of no other distinction but what was reconcilable with the Unity of a Person.

2. Hence, secondly, some of them taught, That the Son is distinguished from the Father, not as one Person is distinguished from another, but as a man's Word or Wisdom which is in his Heart and Soul, may be distinguished from himself; that is, That the Son is not a living, substantial, subsisting Word, no more than the Word of a Man, which is only the motion of a living, subsisting heart, but does not live and subsist it self, but being spoke it vanishes, and being often repeated, never continues; and therefore is not another Man, nor Man of Man, nor with Man; as the

Λόγον γὰρ  
οὐκ ἔστιν ἑνὸς  
καρδίας  
ἀνθρώπου

νομίζουσι τὸ θεῶν, καὶ σοφίας ὑποίας τινὲς ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἐν τῷ θεῷ  
ἅμα τῷ λόγῳ φέρονται, ὡς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἅμα τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ ἀνθρώπων ἔνα. —  
εἰ γὰρ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἔχει μὴ γεννημένον, ἔστι ἀπὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὡς θεὸν  
ἐν θεῷ, πῶς ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὸ θεὸν ὁ λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη θεός, εἰ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῷ  
ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνθρώπος ὅτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπον, ἐπεὶ μὴτε ζῶν ὅτι μὴτε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ζῶ-  
ντος καρδίας καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κίνημα μόνον, καὶ λέγει παρεχρήματι καὶ ἕκαστος, καὶ πολλοὶς  
καλέμενος ἑτέροτα διαφέρει. Ath. cont. Gregal. Sabellij.

Divine

Divine Word is true and perfect God, God of God, and God with God; and therefore they make God and his Word but One Person, as Man and his Word is One Man.

In answer to this, St. *Athanasius* urges all those Texts which prove Christ and God the Father to be Two distinct Persons; for if they be Two Persons, then the Son is as True and Real a Person as the Father is. This I have already taken notice of, and need not now repeat it; only I cannot but observe what *Athanasius* tells us of these Hereticks, That when they were convinced by the plain Evidence of Scripture, that God the Father, and Christ who called himself the Son of God, were Two Persons, they then took Courage, and owned Christ to be a Person, but not a Divine Person, as the Eternal Word of God, but only a Human Person, as he was Man. But *Athanasius* tells them, That this was neither better nor worse than the Heresy of *Paulus Samosatenus*, or what we now call *Socinianism*, to make Christ a mere Man; for he can be no more, if the Divine Word, which St. *John* tells us was Incarnate, be not the Person: If the Word Incarnate be the Person, then Christ is God-Man; if the Man be the Person, he can be no more than a Man.

This *Athanasius* confutes at large, and proves, That what Christ says of himself, cannot belong to a mere Man. But that which I would observe, is this, That both these Hereticks, who denied the Divine Word to be a Person, and *Athanasius* and the other Catholick Fathers who affirmed him to be a Person, agreed very well in the Notion of a Person, viz. That a Person is a distinct, intelligent Being, who does really and actually subsist, and subsists distinctly from all other intelligent Beings. That the Divine Word in the Godhead is such a Person as a Man is in Human Nature: Such a Person these Hereticks would allow Christ to be, considered as a Man; and such a Person *Athanasius* affirms Christ

Christ to be, considered as God, or the Divine Word ; for otherwise they wrangle about words, and do not oppose each other.

The Fathers proved, That Christ was a Person, and a distinct Person from the Father, by those Texts which represent him as speaking to and of his Father, and which attribute many Personal Acts to him : The *Sabellians* could not deny but that these were Personal Acts, and did prove Christ to be a real subsisting Person ; but then would not allow the *Word* to be the Person, but only the Man Christ Jesus to be the Person : The Fathers, on the other hand, allow their Notion of a Person, which is the only true intelligible Notion, but prove, That the Divine Word which was Incarnate, not merely the Man Christ Jesus, was this Person ; and therefore that this Divine Word is a real, substantial, subsisting Word, not like the Word of a man, which is a transient Act, but has no subsistence of its own.

The *Sabellians* would have allowed a Trinity of Persons in any other Notion of a Person, than as a Person signifies a real, subsisting, intelligent Being ; but the Catholick Fathers would own no other Notion of Person but this ; and taught that there were Three Persons in the Trinity, in the same sense in which the *Sabellians* denied there were Three Persons ; Three such Persons as they affirmed there was but One ; that the Son and Holy Ghost were Divine Persons, in the same sense that the *Sabellians* owned the Father to be a Person ; that is, Three such Persons as they called Three Gods.

The reason of this I'm sure is not to be answered, That if the Catholick Fathers understood what they did, when they opposed the *Sabellians*, who made the Divine Word only to be the Word of a Divine Person, but not a Divine Person himself, they must assert the Divine Word in a strict and proper sense to be a Divine Person, and not merely



merely the transient Word of a Person, which has no subsistence ; which is a more sensible Argument than all the Criticisms about *Persona* and *ὑπόστασις*. And yet they express themselves so fully and clearly in this matter, that there is no need of guessing at their meaning.

*Ergo inquit, das aliquam substantiam esse sermonem ? plane. Non vis enim eum substantivum habere in re per substantia proprietatem, ut res & persona quadam videri possit, & ita capiat secundus à Deo constitutus duos efficere, patrem & filium, Deum & sermonem. Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi vox & sonus oris, & sicut Grammatici tradunt, aer offensus, intelligibilis auditu, ceterum vacuum nescio quid, & inane & incorporale. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 7.*

*Tertullian* reduces this Dispute to this one single Question, which is the true state of it ; whether the Son and Word of God, considered as distinct from God the Father, be a Substance, and has a Subsistence of his own : Which he expressly affirms, and offers his reasons for the Proof of it.

This he tells us is necessary to make the Word a real Being and Person, *Res & Persona*, that he have a real Substance, and a Substance of his own, proper to himself, *per Substantiæ proprietatem*, without which he cannot be Second to God ; nor the Father and the Son, God and his Word, be Two.

Now for the Son and the Word to be a substantial Being *per proprietatem Substantiæ*, by a Substance proper to himself, as distinguished from God the Father, must signify, That the Personal Substance of the Son is not the same, but a distinct Substance from the Personal Substance of God the Father ; so distinct, that the Father and Son are Two Persons, in the same sense and notion that the Father is One Person.

In answer to their Objection, That the Word of God was but like the Word of a Man, which was nothing else but a Voice and Sound, a Vibration of the Air, which conveyed some Notions to the Mind, but was it self Emptiness and Nothing, without any Substance of its own ; he answers, That God himself is the most real and perfect Substance, and therefore whatever proceeds from

from (or is begotten of) his Substance, must be a real substantial Being; much less can the Son and Word, who gave Being to all other Substances, be an insubstantial Nothing himself: For tho there may be equivocal Causes, which may produce things of a different nature from themselves, yet nothing can produce nothing.

He argues farther, That this Word is called the Son of God, and God; *The Word was with God, and the Word was God*: And that Word which is the Son of God, and himself God, can't be an insubstantial Nothing, unless God himself be Nothing. If God begets a Son, he must be a substantial Person, as all Creature-Sons are, much more the Son of God: And such a Son who is himself God, must have all the Reality and Perfections which belong to the Notion of God.

But he argues farther, from what *St. Paul* tells us, That he was *in the form of God, and thought it not robbery to be equal with God*. In Effigie, in the Image of God. Now, says he, in what Image of God, was he? Certainly in another, but not in none: The meaning of which is, That every Person, as a Person, has his own Personal Image; but thus he was not the Personal Image of the Father, because he was not the same Person with the Father; but yet if he was the Image of God, he must be his True, Substantial, though not his Personal Image; the true living Image of his Father's Person, but not his Person. He seems indeed in what follows, to have entertained too gross and corporeal imaginations of the Substance and Image of God;

T

but

*At ego nihil dico de Deo inane & vacuum prodire potuisse, ut non de inani & vacuo prolatura, nec carcere substantiâ, quod de tanta substantia processit, & tantas substantias fecit, fecit enim & ipse, quæ facta sunt per ipsum: quale est ut nihil sit ipse, sine quo nihil factum est? ut inanis solida, & vaneus plenus, & incorporealis corporalia operatus sit? Nam etsi potest aliquando quid fieri diversum ejus per quod fit; nihil tamen potest fieri per id, quod vacuum & inane est. Ibid.*

*Vacua & inanis res est sermo Dei, qui filius dictus est, qui ipse Deus cognominatus est? & sermo erat apud Deum, & Deus erat sermo.*

*Hic certe est, qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit esse se æqualem Deo. In qua effigie Dei? utique in alia, non tamen in nullâ.*



but this was his own Mistake, and a Mistake only in Philosophy, not in the Traditionary Faith of the Church; for which only we alledge his Authority. And the Conclusion of this Argument most fully acquaints us what he under-

*Quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico Personam, & illi nomen filii vindico; & dum filium agnosco, secundum a Patre defendo. Ibid.*

stood by a Person: Whatever, says he, the Substance of the Word is, that I call a Person; and to that I give the Name of Son; and by acknowledging him the Son, I own him to be second to the Father. Whoever reads this, must confess,

That *Tertullian* did believe Father and Son to be Two distinct substantial Persons; that though the Son be of the same Substance with the Father, as begotten of his Father's Substance, yet the Personal Substance of the Father was no more the Personal Substance of the Son, than Father and Son were One Person.

*In substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem. Nov. de Trin. c. 24.*

*Sermo filius natus est, qui non in sono percussu aeris, aut sono coacta de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in substantia prolata à Deo virtutis cognoscitur.—*

*Substantia scilicet illa divina, cuius nomen est verbum. Ibid. c. 30.*

*Deus utique procedens ex Deo secundam personam efficiens. Ibid.*

*Novatianus*, who was Cotemporary with *St. Cyprian*, though a Schismatick, was charged with no Heresy in this Article; and he opposes the *Sabellians* with the same Arguments, and almost in the same words that *Tertullian* had done before him: And tells us particularly, That this Divine Word, which is the Son of God, begotten and born of him, is not a mere Sound or Voice, like the Word of a Man, but that substantial

Virtue and Power which proceeds from God: A Divine Substance, whose Name is the Word: Such a Word as is both the Son of God, and God: God proceeding from God, and making a Second Person in the Godhead.

*Epiphanius*, in opposition to the Heresies of *Noetus* and *Sabellius*, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One Substantial Person, affirms over and over, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost

Ghost Substance; that is, each of them Substance by himself, and as distinct in Substance as they are in Person: Three Substantial Persons, which are not one another, nor all the same. These Hereticks allowed the Father to be Substance, the Son Substance, the Holy Ghost Substance, but denied them to be Three in Substance, but taught that they were but One Substance, as they were but One and the same Person, Three Names, or Three distinct Virtues and Powers of the same One Substance or Person. And therefore when in opposition to these men *Epiphanius* asserts, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost Substance, he can mean no less but that each of them is as distinctly Substance as he is a Person; for to oppose One Substance, and One substantial Person, you must assert, not Three diverse or different Substances, but Three as distinct in Substance as they are in Person, or Three distinct substantial Persons.

*Epiphanius* asserts against these Hereticks, That the Son is not the Father, but truly and properly a Son, begotten of God the Father, as to Substance. Now a Son which is substantially begotten of the Father, and is not the Father, must in Substance be distinct from God the Father, that is, a distinct, tho not separate Substance from God the Father.

*Athanasius* also is very positive in this, That this Divine Word is a Perfect Son of a Perfect Father, Being of Being, the Image or Character of his Father's Substance, not an insubstantial Word, but a living Power, and the Author of Life to all things; not like the Power of a Man, which denominates a Man powerful; for the Power of Man is not his Offspring or Son, whereas this Power of God is his Son; that the Father is Perfect Power, as the Father of Power,

Τέλειος ὁ υἱὸς πᾶσι παρὰ τὴν  
λαίαν πατρὶς, ὃν ἐξ ὀντοῦ, χα-  
ρακτὴρ ὁ πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως,  
ὃ ῥῆμα ἀνυπόστατον, ἀλλὰ ζῶ-  
ον δυνάμει καὶ τῷ ζῆνι ἀτία τῶν  
πάντων, ἐκ οὗ ἀνδράσιν δυνάμει,  
δι' αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι δυνάτης,  
ὃ δὲ ῥῆγμα ἀνδράσιν ὃ υἱὸς  
ἢ δυνάμει, ὥστε δυνάτης ἑαυτοῦ  
πατρὸς τελείως, ὅτι πατρὸς δυνά-  
μει, δυνάμει ὃ ὁ υἱὸς τελείως,  
ὅτι ῥῆγμα αὐτοῦ. Ath. cont.  
Sabellii Gregal.





In answer to this, *Athanasius* first observes what this Objection is levelled against, *viz.* To disprove the true and proper Generation of the Son, his Eternal Proceſſion from the Father, and Subſiſtence with the Father; that the Father does not compleatly and perfectly ſubſiſt by himſelf, nor the Son compleatly and perfectly ſubſiſt by himſelf. This

is the Faith the *Sabellians* opposed, and which *Athanasius* defended, as the Argument it ſelf will aſſure us; which contradicts no other Notion of Generation or Subſiſtence, but a ſubſtantial Generation, and a compleat Perſonal Subſiſtence of the Word; but they could not imagine how the Word ſhould be ſubſtantially begotten, and compleatly and perfectly ſubſiſt by himſelf in his own Perſon and Subſtance, diſtinct from his Father's Subſiſtence and Perſon, without going out of the Father, and ſubſiſting in a ſeparate place from the Father, as all Created Births do, which oppoſes nothing but a real ſubſtantial Birth, and a compleat diſtinct ſubſiſtence of the Word; and therefore this is what the *Sabellians* took for the Catholick Faith, and this is what *Athanasius* defends:

Who tells them that this is a very ignorant miſtake, to think that God is circumscribed by place, and to conceive the Son in another place, and to imagine that the Father and Son muſt be divided and ſeparated, one in this place, and another in that, if we acknowledge that the Son is begotten of the Father, and does appear and ſubſiſt by himſelf, diſtinct from the Father: This he proves from Scripture; That there is no place that can contain God, and

Τοιαύταις φαντασίαις ἀναγκῶν  
ἐπαχρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ  
τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αἰδίον προέ-  
σθαι, καὶ τὴν μετὰ τὸν πατέρα ὑ-  
παρῆναι, καὶ τὸ τελείως μὴ ὑφ-  
εῖναι πατέρα καὶ ἑαυτὸν, τι-  
λείως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ καὶ ἑαυτῷ  
ὑφῆσθαι. Ath. Ibid. p. 658.

Μαδίτουμεν ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν νοῦς,  
μὲντοι ὁ λόγος, μὲντοι θεὸς ἐν  
διακρίσει, τὸν θεὸν ἑα-  
χάροντες, καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐν-  
τέρεφ φανταζόμενοι τὸν υἱὸν, καὶ με-  
μνῆσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ὃ ἐν-  
δόξῳ νομίζοντες, ἑαυτὸν καὶ  
μὴ καὶ, περιμένοντες καὶ ἑαυτὸν  
ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὁμολόγηται.  
Ibid.

Τὸς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν πατέρα, μὲν  
ἐπὶ οὐκ ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὴν περὶ τὴν  
ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς  
ἐκ ἀρκῆσαι οὐκ, Σιλομὴν λέγει

there-



αὐτὸς ὁ Θεός. — ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ  
 ὁ ἐν πρῶτῳ ἐκρημίσθων, ὅτι δια-  
 φορὰ φερεται Θεῷ, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τῷ  
 πνεύματι, ἔπειτα ποικίλεις ῥασι-  
 μὸς, καὶ καὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατήρ  
 ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ὁ υἱὸν ἐκπέ-  
 τειν ἐκ τοῦ ἡμῶν ὑποστάσεως.  
 ἔπειτα γὰρ οἱ ἰδιότητες, μάλλον δὲ καὶ  
 ἀδελφοὶ λόγισμοι, φερεται τῷ ὑπαρξῆναι  
 τῷ ἡμῶν οἱ ἰδιότητες. Ibid.

Οὐ συμπαρακτινόμενον τοῖς  
 πᾶσι, πηδῆρα καὶ τὰ πάντα Θεός,  
 συμπαιδὸν γὰρ ἔστω — ἀλλ' οἱ  
 δυναμὶς συνάγει τὰ πάντα, διω-  
 κόμενος γὰρ ἀπομάχεται, ἀδελφός, καὶ  
 κυκλῶσα, καὶ κυκλῶσα, τὸ δὲ αὐ-  
 τὸ καὶ φερεται τῷ ἡμῶν, καὶ τῷ ἀρί-  
 πιδματι. ἀποκρίσεις τῶν καὶ ἡ-  
 τῶν καὶ ἐννοεῖν τότε ποτὶ ἔστω ὁ  
 Θεός, ἢ ὁ λόγος ἦν αὐτὸν εἰλη-  
 γαν — εἰ δὲ δια ἔστω τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ  
 τῷ πᾶσι ἐκ τῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν, ὅτι  
 τὸν αὐτὸν ὁ ἡμῶν ἀρεσκόμε-  
 τος καὶ ἀνδρείος, ὁ τοῦτον  
 ἐκ τῶν πατέρων φαίνεται ἡμῶν καὶ παῖς,  
 ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρξῶν Θεός.

therefore we must have no imagina-  
 tion of Place, when we think of  
 God, the Son, and the Holy Spi-  
 rit; That these are false and Athe-  
 istical Reasonings; That the Omni-  
 presence of God is not a co-extension  
 with all Creatures, which is a bodily  
 or kind of Corporeal Omnipresence;  
 but his Power holds and contains all  
 things, for Power is unbodied and in-  
 visible, which neither encompasses o-  
 ther things, nor is encompassed by  
 them; and therefore it is impious to  
 ask for, or to conceive what is the  
 Place of God, of the Word, or of  
 the Holy Spirit: And if a man will  
 deny that the Son is or was begotten,  
 because he cannot conceive nor find  
 out the place of his Essence or Sub-  
 stance, for the same reason he may de-  
 ny that there is a Father, or that there  
 is a God.

So that *Athanasius* acknowledges the Son to be as true  
 and substantial a Son, as the Father is a substantial Father;  
 and that he does as perfectly and compleatly subsist by  
 himself, as the Father does; but denies that it hence fol-  
 lows, as the *Sabellians* objected, That the Son, if he be a  
 distinct substantial Person himself, must be divided and  
 parted from the Substance of his Father, and that if he sub-  
 sist distinctly by himself, he must subsist in a separate place  
 from his Father; that this distinction of Persons and Sub-  
 sistence cannot be conceived without a Local Separation.

For he tells them, All these Mistakes are owing to Cor-  
 poreal Imaginations; that they conceive of God after the  
 manner

manner of Bodies; that because Body cannot generate another, without parting and dividing of Substance, nor subsist without being in some place, nor subsist distinctly without being in distinct and separate places, therefore if God beget a Son, and this Son subsist distinctly by himself, this Son must go out of the Divine Substance, and be locally separated from God the Father, as a human Son is from his Father; whereas the Divine Nature and Substance cannot be divided, nor does God subsist in a place; and therefore the Son may be substantially begotten of the Father, and subsist distinctly by himself, without any division of the Divine Substance, or separation of place.

Let us now proceed to a Third sort of these Hereticks, who did allow a real and substantial difference between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but made God a compound Being, but one Person, as well as one God, and that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were the Three Parts of this One God. This St. *Austin* calls *Triformis Deus*; and tells us, That these Hereticks did not allow the Father to be Perfect in himself, nor the Son Perfect in himself, nor the Holy Ghost Perfect in himself; that neither of these considered by themselves were Perfect God, but that all Three together made one Compleat and Perfect God.

*Est alia, qua triformem sic asserit Deum, ut quidam patri ejus sit pater, quidam filius, quidam spiritus sanctus, hoc est, quod Dei unius partes sint, qua istam faciunt Trinitatem, velut ex his tribus partibus compleatur Deus, nec sit perfectus in seipso, vel pater, vel filius, vel spiritus sanctus. Aug. de Hæres. ad quod vult. Deum. Hæres. 74.*

This all the Catholick Fathers unanimously reject, and for the same reasons; because there can be no composition in the pure and simple Nature of God; and it was the received Doctrine of the Catholick Church, That each Person is by himself True and Perfect God, not an incompleat Part of the Deity.

Thus

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ὁ πατήρ τέλειον ἔχον τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀνεκλήτως, ῥίζα καὶ πηγή τῶν υἱῶν καὶ πνεύματος. ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς ἐκ πατρὸς τῇ θεότητι ζῶν λόγος καὶ ἡγήνημα τῶν πατρὸς ἀνεκλήτως. πῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ υἱὸν, ἢ μέρους ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὁλόκληρον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ; καὶ ὅπως ἡ τοιαύτη ἀληθινῶς ἴσα, συνύψις μὲν ἀδιαστάτως, τὸ γὰρ διόειξεν ἑδὲν, σωσίης ὃ ἀδίδωκε, αἰών γὰρ ἑδὲς μεταξὺ παρεμπίπτει, μορφῶν ὃ παρφαίνει μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. —

Μὴ ταῖνυν ὡς ἐνομήματα ἀδιαιρέτα μέρη φανταζόμεθα εἶνα, δυνατὸς γὰρ ὁ λογισμὸς, ἀλλότεις αὐτομάτων τελείων ἀδιαιρέτων διεξέμμετα συνήσεις σωόντων ἀλλήλοις ἀδιαστάτως, καὶ τοιῶν γὰρ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐν τῷ εἶδ' ἐννοούμεν, ἀρχομένου καὶ ἐκ πατρὸς λαμβάνειν ὃ ἐν υἱῷ, καὶ φανερούμενον διὰ πνεύματος. Athan. con. Greg. Sab. p. 661.

Ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦτο συμπλέξαι τὸ εἶναι καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ᾧ βιάζομαι τὴν τοιαύτην μονάδα ποιῆν, ἢ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ σωθῆναι, πνεύματος, ψυχῆς, σώματος; ἢ τῶν καὶ θεῶν, καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πτωχῶν, ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀσθεὲς ἑαυτοῦ περιεμμεῖν τὸ ἀχρεῖον. — τὸ γὰρ τῷ σωθῆναι μέρη καὶ τὰ τῇ κινήσει κινήματα πρὸς ἀσωθῆναι καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον φύσιν, ἢ δὲ μίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν. Ibid. p. 662.

Thus *Athanasius* warns us against this Heresy, which conceives the Trinity like Three Bodily Parts, inseparably united to each other; which, he says, is an ungodly reasoning, contrary to the Nature of Perfect Unbodied Beings; and therefore attributes the Perfection of the Godhead to each Person, who are a real Trinity, inseparably united in the same Form and Nature. That the Father is Perfect Essence and Being, without any defect, the Root and Fountain of the Son and Spirit: That the Son in the Fulness of the Deity is the Living Word, and Perfect Offspring of the Father: That the Spirit is the Fulness of the Son, not Part of another Being, but Whole and Entire in himself: That we must conceive them inseparably united to each other, but yet Three real subsisting Persons in the same Form and Species, which is originally in the Father, shines in the Son, and is manifested by the Holy Spirit. And therefore he adds, That he did not compound the Trinity, nor force it into a Monad or Unit (that is, One single Person) to preserve the Unity of the Godhead; nor conceive of God as of a Man, who is compounded of Three Parts, Spirit, Soul, and Body; for such a composition cannot belong to a simple Nature.

This

This is the constant language of the ancient Writers, That the Divine Nature is not compounded of Parts, nor is God a compound Being; that each Person in the Trinity is a complete and perfect Person, and Three complete and perfect Persons cannot be One by Composition, as Three incomplete Parts are: that each Person by himself is perfect God and perfect Essence, though when we unite them and number Three, we acknowledge but One perfect God: for the Deity is not compounded but in Three, each of which is complete and perfect, there is One perfect Being, without Composition, and without Parts; that is, the same One Divine Nature subsisting distinctly, not by Parts or Composition, but Whole and Entire in Three.

Let us now then consider the true state of the Question between these *Sabellians*, and the *Catholick Fathers*: These Hereticks owned at last, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be Three distinct Substances, but not Three substantial Wholes, but Three substantial Parts, which by their Union and Composition made up One whole intire God. The *Catholick Fathers* join with them so far, as to own these Divine Persons to be Three substantial subsisting Persons, but reject their Notion of a compounded God, or Three Parts of the Deity, with the utmost abhorrence, and affirm, that each Person is by himself entire and perfect God, perfect and complete Divine Essence or Substance, *τελεία ὅσα*, as *Damascen* speaks; and that they are not One God by Composition, or as One Person is One God, but as Three

Θαυρὸν δὲ ἔχοντες ἡμεῖς τριῶν  
τελείαν ἔχον ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ  
τριῶν ἀτελῶν μίαν σωζήσιν φύ-  
σιν τελείαν γενεήσομεν, ἀλλ' ἐν  
τρισὶ τελείοις ὑποστάσεσι μίαν  
ἀπλῶ ὕσταν ὑπερβλήνῃ καὶ παντέ-  
λειον. πῶς γὰρ ἐξ ἀτελῶν συ-  
κρίνομεν, σωζήσιν πάντως ὄντιν.  
ἐκ τῶν τελείων ὑποστάσεων ἀδιωα-  
τον σωζήσιν γενεήσιν. *Damasc.*  
*Orth. Fidei. l. i. c. 10.*

Ὅτις ἐννοήσω μίαν ἡμῶν ὑπο-  
στάσεων, τέλειον αὐτῶν Θεὸν οἶ-  
δα, τελείαν ὕσταν: ὅταν ὅ συν-  
νάψω καὶ σωμασθῶμεν τὰ βία,  
ἵνα Θεὸν οἶδα τέλειον· καὶ γὰρ  
σωζήσιν ὄντιν ἢ ὑπότις ἀλλ' ἐν  
τρισὶ τελείοις ἐν τέλειον, ἀμε-  
ρὸς καὶ ἀσωζήσιν. *Id. ib. c. 13.*

complete and perfect Persons, each of which is perfect God, can be One God.

Now I think after this we need not dispute, what the Metaphysical Notions of Person and Personality are: for a Person in this Sacred Mystery, signifies One who is true and perfect God, and therefore is whatever God is; for the true and perfect definition of God, must belong to every Person who is true and perfect God. If then we acknowledge God to be Infinite Substance, Mind, Life, Knowledge, Power, every Person who is God must be all this; and if each Person be true and perfect God, and yet no One Person is the other, nor the Motion, Affection, or personal Power, nor part of the other, then each Person is distinctly and by himself complete and perfect God, and therefore has distinctly in himself all those Attributes and Perfections which belong to the perfect Notion and Idea of God; and to make any Person less than what God is, is to make him no God.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς ἀποστέλλει τὸ μὲν  
 πατὴρ, ἢ τὸ κίνημα αὐτοῦ ὁ πατήρ,  
 ἀποστέλλον τὸ υἱόν; ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα  
 τὸ ἅγιον ὁ υἱὸς ἐκπέμπων εἰς τὸ  
 κόσμον; Ath. contr. Gregal.  
 Sabell. p. 662.

But *Athanasius* has another Argument against the *Sabellian* compounded Deity, which must put all Compositions of the Deity for ever out of countenance. The Scripture assures us, that God sends his Son, and that the Son sends the Holy Ghost; whereas were the Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost, Three inseparable Parts of one compounded Deity, how could this One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, send part of himself, and one part of the same One God send another?

To send, and to be sent, necessarily supposes Persons really and substantially distinct, such as can give and receive, and execute Commands, who have distinct Understandings, Wills, and Powers of Action, for no other Beings are capable of sending or being sent; and Three such

such distinct Persons, each of which is complete and perfect God, is the Trinity asserted by the Catholick Fathers, in contradiction to the Heresy of *Sabellius*.

But there is one very good Rule of *Athanasius*, which is worth observing in this Controversy, That we must not imagine to find the Unity of the Godhead by denying Three, but we must find this Unity, or Monade, in Three.

Μονὰς ἀπρόμυθον τὰ ἅγια  
τῶ μαρτά ἐνείκεν νομίζοντες,  
ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τριάδι νομίζοντες τὸ ἓν.—  
Ibid. 658.

The *Sabellians* took the first way to secure the Catholick Faith of One God, they denied Three real, distinct, substantial Persons in the Godhead; but the Catholick Faith owns Three real, distinct, substantial, divine Persons, and teaches that these Three are One God; not with such an Unity as belongs to One Person, but as Three Persons are One God: which should be a warning to some late Writers, who think they cannot sufficiently defend the Unity of God, without opposing a real and substantial Trinity, which is to oppose the ancient Catholick Faith.

To conclude this *Chapter*, the result of the whole in short is this, That in opposition to the *Noetians*, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names of the same One Divine Person, whom we call God, the Catholick Fathers asserted that they were Three distinct Persons, not the same Person under Three Names, or Three Appearances; in opposition to those *Sabellians*, who denied the Substantiality of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, but made the Son like the Word in the mind or heart of man, which had no substantial, permanent Subsistence of its own, and the Holy Ghost in like manner to be a transient efflux of Power from God; so that God the Father was the only subsisting Person, and the One God, but the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the insubstantial, transient Word and Power of God. These ancient Fathers in like manner asserted the Substantiality of the Son,



and of the Holy Ghost, that they were real, distinct, subsisting Persons, as true and perfect Persons as the Father himself is: in opposition to those *Sabellians* who asserted a compound Deity, and made a Trinity of Parts, instead of a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead; they unanimously rejected all composition in the Deity, and asserted each Person distinctly by himself, not to be a part of God, but true and perfect God.

Now had these Fathers asserted nothing positively concerning the Three Divine Persons, but only rejected these *Noetian* and *Sabellian* Heresies, it had been evidence enough what their Faith was concerning the Ever-blessed Trinity; for remove these Heresies, and all such as are manifestly the same, however they may differ in words, and there is nothing left for any man to believe concerning a Divine Trinity, but the true Catholick Faith of Three real, distinct, substantial, Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly, and by himself complete, entire, perfect God: For if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not one and the same Person, distinguish'd only by Three Names, according to their different Appearances and Operations; nor one single Person with two personal Vertues and Powers, called the Son, and the Spirit, like the word and emotion in a man's heart, which is no person, and has no subsistence of its own; nor three parts of one compounded Deity, as a man is compounded of Body, Soul, and Spirit; then of necessity Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be Three complete, substantial, subsisting Persons, Three such Persons as the *Sabellians* would allow but One: for if they be not the same, nor affections and motions of the same, nor parts of the same, there is nothing left but to own them Three completely and perfectly subsisting Persons.

If God be One, not in the *Sabellian* Notion of Singularity, as One God signifies One single Person; but One in Three, without parts or composition, as the Fathers asserted

serted against *Sabellius*, then each Person must be by himself complete and perfect God: for God cannot be One in Three Persons, unless each Person be perfect God; for unless this One God be perfect God in each Person, he cannot be perfectly One in Three. If the Unity of God be not the Unity of a Person, it must be the Unity and Sameness of Nature, and the inseparable Union of Persons; and this is the Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, which the Catholick Fathers taught, and which is the only thing they could reasonably teach, when they had rejected the *Sabellian* Unity. There is no *medium* that I know of in this Controversy concerning the Unity of God, between the Unity of One single Person, and that Oneness which results from the Unity, and the Consubstantiality of Nature, and inseparable Union of Persons; and therefore if the first be Heresy, the second must be the Catholick Faith; and whatever Notions men advance against this, is *Sabellianism* in its Principle, and last result: for if the Unity of God be not the Union of Three complete Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly by himself perfect God, it must be the Unity of One Divine Person, which is the *Sabellian* Unity.

## C H A P. IV.

*Concerning the Homooouſion, or One Subſtance of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt.*

**I**N the laſt *Chapter* I have plainly ſhewn what *Sabellianism* is, and by what Arguments the Catholick Fathers oppoſed and confuted it, which is proof enough what they meant by Perſon, when in oppoſition to *Sabellius*, they taught that there were Three Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead ; not Three perſonal Characters and Relations, which *Sabellius* owned, but Three true and proper Perſons, each of whom is by himſelf true and perfect God.

But yet the *Nicene* Faith of the *Homooouſion*, or *One Subſtance* of Father and Son, is ſo expounded by ſome, as to countenance the *Sabellian* Hereſy, which all the *Nicene* Fathers condemned, though one would think that ſhould be an unanswerable Objection againſt it ; this has made it ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the Vindication of the Catholick Faith, and to compoſe ſome warm Diſputes, rightly to underſtand this matter, that I ſhall carefully inquire what the *Nicene* Fathers meant by theſe terms of the *Homooouſion*, and *One Subſtance*, which they have put into their Creed, as the moſt expreſs oppoſition to the *Arian* Hereſy.

And we cannot long doubt of this, if we conſider the true ſtate of the *Arian* Controverſy : There was no Diſpute between the *Arians* and Catholicks concerning the Perſonality of the Son ; they both condemned *Sabellius*, and therefore *One Subſtance*, when oppoſed to the *Arians*, can't ſignify a *Sabellian* Unity.

The *Arians* and *Sabellians* both agreed in this, That *One God* is but *One Divine Person*, who is truly and properly *God*; and that to assert *Three Persons*, each of which is true and perfect *God*, is to make *Three Gods*. The *Sabellians*, to avoid this *Tritheism*, make *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, but *One Divine Person*, and in that sense but *One God*. The *Arians* on the other hand, allow *Father* and *Son* to be two real distinct *Persons*, but attribute true and perfect *Divinity* only to the *Father*, and make the *Son* a *Creature*, though the most excellent *Creature*, made before the *World*, and as like to *God* as any *Creature* can be, and the *Minister of God* in making the *World*.

This Heresy was condemned by the first general Council assembled at *Nice*; and if we would understand the *Nicene Creed*, we must expound it in opposition to the *Arian Heresy*, without running into the other Extreme of *Sabellianism*. And therefore when we are taught to believe in *One Lord Jesus Christ, the Only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all Worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of One Substance with the Father, by whom all things were made*; We must understand a *Son*, who is a distinct *Person* from his *Father*, as the *Arians* allowed him to be, but not a made or created *Son*, as they taught, but a *Son by Nature*, begotten of his *Father's substance*, and that not in *Time*, but from all *Eternity*; and therefore not a *Creature*, but *God by Nature*, true and perfect *God*, as *God of God*, begotten of *God*, and therefore of *One Substance* with the *Father*; not in the *Sabellian* sense, as *One Substance* is *One Person*, but as *One Substance* signifies the same *Nature*, in opposition to the *Arians*, who made him not only a distinct *Person*, but of a different *Nature*, like his *Father*, but not the same; not of the substance of his *Father*, but a new created *Substance*, made out of nothing, as all other *Creatures* are. The opposition of this *Creed* to the  
*Arian*

*Arian* Heresy is certainly the best way of expounding it, and then we find nothing in it, but the true ancient Catholick Faith, of the real distinction of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence. But the present Inquiry is, What is the true Notion of the *Homoussion*, or *One Substance* of Father and Son; and besides that positive account the Fathers give us of it, we may learn this from those false Glosses and Interpretations which they reject, and those Rules they give for the expounding these words.

## S E C T. I.

*The true Sense of the Homoussion, from those Misrepresentations which were made of it, and the Answers which were given by the Nicene Fathers to such Objections.*

I. **F**irst then, Let us consider what Misrepresentations were made of this disputed word *Consubstantial*, by the Enemies of the Catholick Faith, and what Answers the Fathers gave to such Objections. *St. Hilary* mentions three in the beginning of his 4th Book of the *Trinity*; and I shall consider them in the Order in which he sets them down.

*Quin etiam id adjiciunt, cum unius substantia patrem & filium esse audiunt, ab anterioribus episcopis esse predicatum, ut id subtiliter per speciem haeretica opinionis infirmant; dicentes eos verbi hujus significationem, id est, unius substantia, quod gratè dicitur homoussion, hoc sensu usurpare atque eloqui, tanquam ipse sit pater qui & filius, ex infinitate videlicet suâ protensus in*

1. The first is, that this word *Homoussion*, or *Consubstantial*, is no better than *Sabellianism*; that it makes the Father and the Son to be but One, by One singular Substance, which being Infinite, extended it self into the Virgin's Womb, and taking a Body of her, in that Body took the Name of Son; and thus they say some former Bishops

Bishops understood it, and is therefore to be rejected as Heretical; which, as he adds, is the first misrepresentation of the *Homooouſion*.

Thus he observes in his Book *de Symodis*, that the Fathers in the Council of *Antioch*, which condemned *Paulus Samofatenus*, did also reject the *Homooouſion*, becauſe *Paulus* thereby underſtood the ſingularity of the Divine Nature and Subſtance, which deſtroys the real perſonal diſtinction between Father and Son; and adds, that the Church, though it retained the word *Homooouſion*, ſtill rejects that ſenſe of it as profane. The Learned Dr. Bull, notwithſtanding St. *Hilary's* Authority, can't believe that either *Paulus* or *Sabellius* did upon choice own the *Homooouſion*, but only put a forced and unnatural ſenſe on it, to favour their Heresies; and ſeems to have very good reaſon on his ſide; but that is not the preſent queſtion, How perverſly ſoever Hereticks underſtood this word, the *Nicene* Fathers rejected this ſenſe as profane and heretical. Now if *One Subſtance* does not ſignify *One ſingular Subſtance* in the *Sabellian* Notion of it, which leaves only a *Trinity of Names or Modes*, inſtead of a *Trinity of Perſons*, then *Three conſubſtantial Perſons* muſt ſignify *Three ſubſtantial Perſons*, who have the ſame Nature and Eſſence, but not the ſame ſingular Subſtance. And St. *Baſil* tells us, that this is the proper acceptance of the word *Homooouſion*, which is directly oppoſed to the *Sabellian* as well as to the *Arian* Heresy, as it deſtroys the Identity of *Hypoſtaſis*, and gives us a complete and perfect Notion of diſtinct Perſons; for

virginem, ex qua corpus aſſumens ſibi, in eo corpore quod aſſumpſit filii nomen addiderit; & hac quidem de homooouſio falſitas prima eſt. Hil. de Trin. l. 4.

Secundo id quodque addidiſtis, quod Patres noſtri, cum Paulus Samofatenus hareticus pronunciatus eſt, etiam homooouſion repudiaverint, quia per hanc unius eſſentia nuncupationem, ſolitarium atque unicum ſibi eſſe Patrem & Filium predicabat, & hoc ſane nunc quoque prophaniſſimum Eccleſia recognoviſcit, Patrem & Filium in his nominum profeſſionibus ad unionis & ſingularis ſolitudinem negata perſonarum proprietate revocare. Hil. de Synod. propoſe ſinem.

Bull. Deſenſ. Fidei Nicanae. p. 52.

Ἄντι ὅ ἡ φωνὴ καὶ τὸ τῷ Σαβελλίῳ καὶ ἐπαγορεύῃ. ἀναρροῦν καὶ ταυτίπῃτα ἡ ὑποστάσεις, καὶ εἰς τὴν τελείαν ὅν αὐτοῦ πῶν πῶν ἕννοιαν. ἡ καὶ αὐτὸ ἡ ὅτιν ἐαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἔπερ ἐπὶ πρ. Baſil. ep. 300.



the same thing is not consubstantial to it self, but to another; that there must be another, and another, to make two that are consubstantial.

*Sequens illa est, quod affirmant id enuntiationem homoousii significare, quod rei anterioris & alterius communio sit duobus, & tanquam prior substantia vel ulla materia alicujus extiterit, quæ participata duobus, & in utroque consumpta, utrumque illam & naturæ anterioris, & rei esse restetur unus. Atque idcirco improbare se homoousii aiunt confessionem, quod enuntiatio ejus neque Filium à Patre distinguat, & posteriori Patrem materia, quæ sibi cum Filio sit communis, ostendat. Hil. de Trin lib. 4. initio.*

*De homoousio verò, quod est unius essentia trahentes, primum idcirco respuendum pronuntiastis, quia per verbi hujus enuntiationem substantia prior intelligeretur, quam duo inter se partiti essent — prophanus hic sensus est, & communi judicio ab ecclesiis respuendus. Hil. de Synod.*

*Quis enim sana mentis tertiam substantiam, quæ & Patri & Filio communis sit, prædicabit.*

*Non hic sanctissima religionum virorum synodus, nescio quam priorem, quæ in duos divisa sit, substantiam introducit, sed Filium natum de substantia Patris. Ibid.*

*Tertio quoque hanc improbandi homoousii causam comminiscuntur, quod secundum verbi hujus significationem, ex divisione Paternæ substantiæ esse Filius existimetur, tanquam defectus ex eo fuerit, ita ut in duos sit res una divisa: & ideo substantia dicantur unus, quia portio defecta de toto, in natura ea sit vnde defecta est. Hil. de Trin. lib. 4.*

Another Objection against the *Homoousion* was this, That to be *consubstantial*, or of *One Substance*, signifies the communion of Two in some other thing, which is in order of Nature before them both; as if there were some prior Substance or Matter, of which they both did partake so as to have the whole Substance between them; which makes them consubstantial, or of one Substance both partaking of the same Being, Nature, or Substance, which was before them both; and therefore they rejected the *Homoousion*, because it did not preserve the relation between the Son and the Father, and made the Father later than that Substance or Matter, which is common to him with the Son. This also St. *Hilary* tells us the Church rejects and abominates; for nothing can so much as in thought be before the Substance of the Father; and the relation between Father and Son signifies to beget, and to be begotten, not to be both made of the same Substance.

A third Reason they assigned against this word *Homoousion* was this, That to be *Consubstantial*, or of *One Substance*, in the strict and proper acceptation of these words, signifies, that the generation of the Son, is by the division of the Father's Substance, as if he were

cut

cut out of him, and One Substance divided into Two Persons, and so Father and Son are of One Substance, as a part cut out of the whole, is of the same nature with that from whence it is taken.

This was objected against the *Homoousion* in the time of the *Nicene Council*, while this word was under debate, which *Socrates* gives a more particular account of. The reason those Bishops, who refused to subscribe to the *Nicene Faith*, gave against the *Homoousion*, was this, That that only can be said to be *Consubstantial*, which is of another, either by division, or by efflux and emanation, or by prolation or eruption: by eruption, as the branches sprout out of the root; by efflux, according to the manner of human generations; by division, as the same mass of Gold may be divided into two or three golden Cups; but the Son is of the Father neither of these ways, and therefore they rejected this Faith, and ridiculed the *Homoousion*.

For this very reason *Eusebius* of *Cæsarea* was for some time in suspense about the *Homoousion*, which he afterwards readily received, when the Council had declared in what sense they understood it, and rejected all corporeal passions, all division and partition, change and diminution of the Divine Essence; which pure, simple, unbodied, eternal, unchangeable Mind is not capable of. Now all that I shall observe at present is, That this very Objection, which was thought so formidable, necessarily supposes that both they who made it, and they who were so much concerned to answer it, did acknowledge a *substantial generation of the Son*; for this whole Dispute is downright Nonsense without it: If God the Father in begetting his Son, does not

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔρασαν ὁμοούσιον ἔχον, ὃ ἐκ πνύος ὄντων, ἢ χτ' μείσμεν, ἢ χτ' ῥάσιν, ἢ χτ' σπασσώμεν, ἢ χτ' σπασσώμεν μὴδ' ὡς ἐκ ῥίζων βλάστημα, χτ' ὃ ῥάσιν, ὡς οἱ πατρικοὶ πύδες, χτ' μείσμεν ὃ, ὡς βόλε χυσιδὲς ἀπὸ ἡ βέης. κατ' ἕδρην ὃ τέτων ἔστιν ὁ υἱός. διὰ τῶτο ἡ συγκατατίθεας, τῇ πύς ἔλεγον. πολλὰ ἔν τῇ λέξει ὁμοούσιον σκώψατες — *Socrates* H. E. lib. 1. c. 8.

*Eusebius*  
*Epist. ad*  
*Cæsariensis*  
*apud So-*  
*crates. Ibid.*

so communicate his own Nature and Substance to him, as to make him a true substantial Son, of the same Substance indeed, but yet as distinct in Substance from the Father, as he is in Person, How ridiculous is all this Dispute, how the Father communicates his own Nature to his Son? for according to these men, he does not communicate or propagate his own Nature and Substance at all, there being but one singular solitary Divine Nature and Substance, with a Trinity of Names, Modes, or Offices, and therefore no danger of any division or partition of the Divine Substance.

The Dispute between the *Catholicks* and the *Arians* about the generation of the Son was this: They both owned against the *Sabellians*, that the Son is a real, substantial, subsisting Person; but the Question was, whence he had his Nature? whether he was created out of Nothing, and consequently had a beginning of Being, as the *Arians* affirmed; or was ἐξ ὅλης, of the Substance of his Father, and so coeternal with his Father, as the *Nicene Council* affirmed, That the Substance of the Son was of the Substance of the Father, *God of God, Light of Light*. Against this the *Arians* objected, That the Son could not be of the Substance of the Father, without the division of the Father's Substance, which is impossible in an infinite uncreated Spirit, as God is; which Argument is only against a substantial generation. The *Nicene Fathers* allow this Objection to be good as to corporeal generations, but deny that it is thus as to the Eternal Generation of the Son of God; for an Eternal, Uncreated, Immutable Mind, if it can communicate its own Nature at all, (and we learn from Scripture, that God has a Son) must do it without division of parts; for the Divine Nature and Substance has no parts, and is capable of no division: And it is very absurd to reason from corporeal Passions, to the Affections and Operations of Spirits, much more of an infinite eternal Spirit.

Had.

Had not the *Arians* understood the Catholick Fathers, of the substantial Generation of the Son, they had more wit than to urge an Argument to no purpose ; for where there is no communication of Substance, it is certain there can be no division of it : And had not the Catholick Fathers owned this substantial Generation, they would have rejected the Argument with scorn, as nothing to the purpose, and not have distinguished between corporeal generations, and the Generation of Eternal and Infinite Mind. That though Bodies cannot communicate their own Nature and Substance without division, yet an Eternal Mind can ; so that from these perverse Interpretations of the *Homoouison*, which the Catholick Fathers rejected, we may learn what they meant by it : for if Father and Son are not *Consubstantial* in the sense of the *Sabellians* and *Modalists* ; that is, that Father and Son are not One Person with Two Names, nor One singular solitary Substance common to them both, then the Father must be a substantial Father, and the Son a substantial Son, and these Two substantial Persons are *Consubstantial*, as having the same One Divine Nature and Substance intirely, perfectly and distinctly in themselves, without any division, diminution, or separation of Substance, by a complete and perfect Generation, whereby the Father communicates his whole intire Nature to the Son without any change or alteration in himself.

## S E C T. II.

*Some Rules for expounding the Homooouſion; and in what Senſe the Fathers underſtood it.*

**S**Econdly, Let us now examine what account the *Nicene* and *Post-Nicene* Fathers give of the *Homooouſion*, and in what ſenſe they underſtood it. But before I tell you what they expreſſly ſay of this matter, I ſhall obſerve by the way two or three Rules they give us for expounding the *Homooouſion*, which are of great uſe in this Enquiry.

I. The firſt is, To give the *Homooouſion* the right place in our Creed, as the *Nicene* Fathers have done. They do not tell us abruptly, in the firſt place, That the Son is conſubſtantial, or of one Subſtance with the Father. They firſt tell us, That Jeſus Chriſt our Lord is the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father, that is, of the Subſtance of his Father, before all Worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten, not made; and then they add, Of One Subſtance with the Father.

*In his igitur tot tamque gravibus fidei periculis, verborum brevitatis temperanda eſt, ne impie dici exiſtimetur, quod pie intelligitur: ne ſecura atque innocente conſcientia, per occaſionem hæreticorum reus ſermo ſit, dicturus unam ſubſtantiam Catholicis Patris & Filii, non inde incipiat; neque hoc quaſi maximum teneat, tanquam ſine hoc vera fides nulla ſit. Hilary, de Synodis.*

This St. *Hilary* lays great ſtreſs on, and his Reason is very conſiderable; be-  
 cauſe if in the firſt place we ſay, Father and Son are conſubſtantial, or of One Subſtance, this is capable of an Heretical as well as Orthodox Senſe, as we have already heard; for they may be One Subſtance in the *Sabellian* Notion, as that ſignifies One Perſon; or One by the Diviſion or Partition of the ſame Subſtance,

Substance, of which each has a part; for all these perverse Senses may be affix'd to it, when this word *Consubstantial*, or *One Substance*, stands singly by it self, or is put in the first place, without any thing to limit or determine its signification. And therefore a true Catholick Christian must not begin his Creed with saying, That Father and Son are of One Substance; but then he may safely say *One Substance*, when he has first said, The Father is unbegotten, the Son is born, and subsists of his Father, like to his Father in all Perfections, Honour, and Nature; not of nothing, but born; not unborn, but coæval; not the Father, but the Son of the Father; not a Part of the Father, but All that the Father is; not the Author, but the Image, the Image of God, begotten of God, and born God; not a Creature, but God; not Another God, of a different Kind and Substance, but One God, as having the same Essence and Nature, which differs in nothing from the Substance of the Father; that God is One, not in Person, but Nature, Father and Son having nothing unlike, or of a different kind in them: And after this we may safely add, That Father and Son are One Substance, and cannot deny it without Sin.

This is as plain as words can make it, and needs no Comment, but fixes and determines the Catholick Sense of the *Homoousion*. For if we must acknowledge the Son to be consubstantial, or of one Substance with the Father, in no other sense than as a True and Real Son is consubstantial, a Son, not created out of Nothing, but begotten of his Father's Substance; the Son of God, who in his own proper Person is true and perfect God; not a part of God, but all that

*Unam substantiam dices, cum ante dixerit, pater ingenuitus est, filius natus est, subsistit ex Patre, Patri similis est, virtute, honore, natura, &c.*

*Et post hæc unam substantiam patris & filii dicendo, non errat, at unam substantiam negando, jam peccat.*

*Nemo unam substantiam brevi & nudo sermone putet prædicandam: ut possit religiose dici, una esse substantia.*

*Nihil solitarium ex divinis sacramentis ad suspicionem audientium, & ad occasionem blasphemantium proferamus. Ante nativitas filii, ante subjectionis, ante similitudo natura prædicanda est, ut non impie unius & Patris & Filii substantie prædicetur. Ibid.]*

that



that God is; not One God, as One Person with the Father, but as having the true Divine Nature distinctly in his own Person. This is a Demonstration that the *Nicene Consubstantiality*, is the *Consubstantiality* of Two real substantial Persons, who have the same Nature distinctly subsisting in each of them.

2. Another Rule for expounding the *Homoousion* is, that ὁμοούσιον & ἡ πάντα ὁμοούσιον, are equipollent terms; that to be of one Substance, and to be in all things alike to each other, signify the same thing. I know the Fathers condemned the *Arian Homoioussion*; for they asserted, That the Son was like the Father, in opposition to his being of the same Nature with the Father, and therefore this was an imperfect likeness and resemblance, or indeed no likeness at all; for a created and uncreated Nature are at such an infinite distance, as to have no true and real likeness to each other; to be sure not such a likeness as there must be between a Son and a Father: Nay sometimes they would not allow, that likeness can be properly applied to two individual Natures of the same *species*, as to two individual human Natures, which are not like to each other, but are the same. But yet whether it was proper or improper, ἡ πάντα & ἀπαρβαλλάτως ὁμοούσιον, to be upon all accounts, and every way perfectly alike, was allowed to be very Orthodox; and therefore *St. Hilary* in his Book *de Synodis*, approves several Oriental Creeds as very Orthodox, though they left out the *Homoousion*, because they in

Si ergo naturam neque aliam, neque dissimilem ei, quem impassibiliter generabat, dedit, non potest aliam dedisse, nisi propriam; ita similitudo proprietatis est, proprietatis aequalitas est, & aequalitas nihil differt; qui autem nihil differunt, unum sunt; non unione personae, sed aequalitate naturae. Hil. de Synod.

the most express terms confessed the perfect likeness and similitude of Nature between Father and Son; which they guarded with the utmost Caution, against the perverse Interpretations both of the *Sabellian* and *Arian* Hereticks. And he disputes at large, That perfect similitude is a sameness and equality of Nature,

Nature; and calls God to witness, that before he ever heard of those words *Homoousion*, and *Homoiousion*, he always thought that what is signified by both these words, is the same: that perfect likeness of Nature is the sameness of Nature; for nothing can be perfectly alike, which has not the same Nature. And this he says he learnt from the Evangelists and Apostles, before ever he heard of the *Nicene Faith*, which he had not heard of till a little before he was banished for that Faith. This observation is of great use, as St. *Hilary* notes, to confute *Sabellianism*, and to fix the true sense of the *Homoousion*: for if to be Consubstantial, or of one Nature, signifies a perfect likeness, similitude, and equality of Nature, Consubstantiality must at least signify Two, who are thus consubstantial, as likeness, similitude and equality does; and these Two must have One and the same Nature, not in the sense of Singularity, and *Sabellian* Unity, but of likeness and similitude: that Father and Son are One Substance, not as One Person is One with himself, but as Two Persons are One by a perfect likeness and similitude of Nature, which must be the true meaning of Consubstantial, if Consubstantiality and likeness of Nature be the same.

3. I observe farther, That the Catholick Fathers did not make the *Homoousion* the Rule of Faith, that whatever sense some critical Wits can put on it, must therefore be owned for the Catholick Faith; but they chose it as the most comprehensive word, to comprize the true Catholick

Y

Faith,

*Testor Dominum celi atque terræ me cum neutrum audissem, semper tamen utrumque sensitse, quod per homœusion homouision oporteret intelligi; id est, nihil simile sibi secundum naturam esse posse, nisi quod esset ex eadem natura.*

*Fidem Nicanam nunquam nisi exulaturus audivi, sed mihi homœusii & homœusii intelligentiam Evangelia & Apostoli intimaverunt. Ib. in fine.*

*Religiore unam substantiam prædicamus, dummodo unam substantiam proprietatis similitudinem intelligamus, ut quod unum sunt, non singularem significet, sed æquales. Equalitatem dico, id est, indifferentiam similitudinis, ut similitudo habeatur æqualitas. Æqualitas verò unum idcirco dicitur esse, quod par sit, unum verò in quo par significatur, non ad unicum vindicetur.*

*Credamus & dicamus esse unam substantiam, sed per naturæ proprietatem, non ad significationem impie unionis. Una sit ex similitudine non ex solitudine. Hilar. de Synod.*

*Ita similitudinis æqualitas nec solitudinem habet, nec diversitatem, quia omnis æqualitas nec diversa nec sola sit. Idem l. 7. de Trin.*

Faith, and to detect the Frauds of Hereticks. They taught no new Faith by this word, but what the Catholick Church had always taught, but secured the Faith by it against the shifts and evasions of Hereticks. This is the defence they made to the *Arian* Objection, That it was an unscriptural word; they confessed the word *Homoousios* was not to be found in Scripture,

but the Faith expressed by that word was: Thus St. *Austin* answers *Pascencius*, and tells us, That Christ himself has taught us the *Homoousion*, where he says, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*; and *I and my Father are One*; and expounds this of the Unity, Dignity, and Equality of Nature: And adds, That it is not the word, but the thing signified by that word, which is so terrible to Hereticks; and if they would dispute to purpose, they must not reject the word, but the doctrine it contains. And thus *Laurentius*, who presided in that Dispute, gives judgment in this Controversy, That the *Homoousion* was not the Name of the Christian Faith, but signified the Equality of the Trinity; and that though this word be not in Scripture, yet the thing signified by it is true; and we must believe honourably of the Unity, lest we injure the Trinity.

*Deus quod est genuit, ejusdem substantia, ejusdem essentia, sine tempore, sibi coeternum genuit.—Hanc Dei Trinitatis substantiam unam homusion verbo Græci complexi breviter maluerunt. Non enim nomen est, sed res terribilis est in verbo hujusmodi sonans. Quod verbum apertè ipse Filius declarat, cum dicit, ego & Pater unum sumus. In isto uno consistit substantia una.—Contra hoc pugnetur, quod possidet, quod habet, quod docet verbum Græcum, non contra ipsum verbum, quod auribus retinuit syllabis articulatam. Contra divitias, contra aequalitatem naturæ, quod possidet verbum, &c. Altercatio inter Aug. & Pascencium. To. 2.*

*Nec esse nomen fidei homusion, sed aequalitatem magis ipsius Trinitatis.—Laurentius vir clarissimus dixit, sic ergo & homusion quod in dubium veniebat te proponente, & si scriptum non est, res ipsa tamen, quæ latet in verbo, vera est. Creditur honorificè Unitati, ne fiat injuria Trinitati. Ibid.*

We may find enough to this purpose in *Athanasius*, *De Decret. Syn. Nic.* and elsewhere, of which more presently. And therefore St. *Hilary*, in his Book *de Synodis*, which he wrote to some Catholick Bishops, who were very Orthodox in the Faith, and yet doubted of this word *Homoousion*,

*homouſion*, tells them, That they are to conſider what the Synod intended by that word, and not reject the word, unleſs they rejected the Faith taught by it, and would profeſs thoſe *Arian* Doctrines, which the Council condemned in it.

*Difficilis cuiquam in Synodo Nicæna homouſion eſſe ſuſceptum? Hoc ſi cui difficilis, neceſſe eſt placeat quod ab Arianiſtis eſt negatum. Negatum enim idcirco eſt homouſion, ne ex ſubſtantia Dei Patris Deus Filius natus, ſed ſecundum Creaturas ex nihilo conditus predicaretur.*  
Hilar. de Synod. prope finem.

This is the conſtant language of the *Nicene* and *Poſt Nicene* Fathers, when the Diſpute is concerning the uſe of this word, which gives us this certain Rule for expounding the *Homouſion*, that we muſt underſtand it in no other ſenſe than what the *Nicene* Fathers intended by it; for if we do, we may acknowledge the *Homouſion*, and yet deny the *Nicene* Faith. What they taught by this word, that we muſt own; and what they rejected by it, we muſt reject. And though we may fancy that this word ſignifies more than what the *Nicene* Fathers underſtood by it, (as we have heard what perverſe Senſes the Hereticks fixt on it) yet it being not a Scriptural, but an Eccleſiaſtical word, it muſt be expounded to that Senſe, and no other, which placed it in the Creed.

### SECTION III.

*What the Nicene Fathers meant by the Homouſion.*

AND this brings me to a more particular Account of the *Homouſion*, and what the *Nicene* Fathers underſtood by it.

*Eusebius Pamphili*, who at firſt doubted about the *τὸ εἶς ὑποστάς* and the *τὸ ὁμοούσιον*, that Chriſt was of the ſubſtance of the Father, and conſubſtantial, or of One Subſtance with him; gives an account to his *Cæſareans* of the Reaſons which

moved him afterwards to subscribe to that Form of Faith; as appears by his Letter to them, recorded in *Socrates* his Ecclesiastical History. He tells them, That he did not admit these words without due examination; but when he found there was nothing meant by them, but what was

Τὸ ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸς ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήτο  
πρὸς αὐτοὺς, δηλωτικὸν ὅτι ἐκ  
μὲν τῆς πατρὸς ἐστίν, ὡς μὴ ὡς μὴ  
ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς πατρὸς. *Socr.*  
H. E. l. i. c. 8.

“Οὕτως ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήτο  
ἐστὶν ὅτι πατρὸς καὶ ἑνὸς ὁμοουσι-  
οντος ὁ λόγος συνίστησιν ὡς καὶ  
τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὅσον, ὡς καὶ τοῖς  
θνητοῖς ζώοις παραπλησίως: ὅτι  
καὶ καὶ διαίρεσιν τῆς ὑπὸς, ὡς  
καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν τῆς  
πατρὸς ὑπὸς τε καὶ διωρέμεως,  
τέτων καὶ πάντων ἀλλορίαν ἐστὶν  
πῶς ἀγύνητον φύσιν καὶ πατρὸς.  
δηλωτικὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν τῆς σαφείας τὸ  
ὁμοούσιον, τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐμφέρειαν  
πρὸς τὰ θνητὰ κτίσματα καὶ  
ἑνὸς τῆς Θεοῦ ἐμφαίνειν. μόνον ὅτι  
τῆς σαφείας τῆς γνησιότητος καὶ πάντα  
τῶν ἀφομοιωμάτων, καὶ μὴ ἐστὶν  
ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ ὑπὸς, ἀλλ’  
ἐκ τῆς πατρὸς. *Ibid.*

Τὰς μὲν τῆς Ἀριανῶν τῆς  
ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελάν. *Ath.*  
*de Decr. Syn. Nicænæ.* p.  
267.

truly Catholick and Orthodox, he com-  
plied for Peace sake. For by the Son’s  
being of his Father’s Substance, they  
meant no more than that he was of the  
Father, not as a part of the Father, or  
of his Substance; and when the Son is  
said to be consubstantial with the Fa-  
ther, they did not understand this after  
the manner of Bodies by division, ab-  
scission, or any change of the Father’s  
Substance; but the only meaning is,  
That the Son has nothing like a crea-  
ted Nature, but is in every respect per-  
fectly like his Father, as not being of  
any other Substance or Nature, but of  
the Father.

*Athanasius* gives us a very particular  
account what it was that forced the *Ni-  
cene* Fathers to add those two words to  
their Creed, ἐκ ὑπὸς καὶ ὁμοούσιον, that  
the Son is of the Substance of the Fa-  
ther, and Consubstantial, or of One  
Substance with the Father; which was  
to cut off all Evasions and Subterfuges  
from the *Arian* Hereticks, and to force  
them to confess the Truth, or to confess  
their Herefy, which they endeavoured  
to palliate and conceal under ambigu-  
ous words.

When

When the *Nicene* Fathers taught, That the Son is of the Father, the *Arians* were contented to allow this, but meant no more by it, but that the Son is of the Father, as all other Creatures are of God; and therefore they added, That the Son is of the Substance of God, to distinguish him from all Creatures; and this is the true interpretation of that Phrase, That the Son is of the Substance of the Father, that he is no Creature.

Thus when the Fathers taught, That the Word was the true Power and Image of the Father in all things, and invariably like the Father, ὁμοιον τε καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον αὐτὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ πατρὶ, the *Arians* owned this also in a qualified sense, because Creatures are said to be the Power, the Image, the Likeness of God, and therefore they were forced to express the sense of Scripture, and what sense they understood the Scripture in, concerning the Son's being the Likeness and Image of God, by adding, that the Son is *Consubstantial*, or of *One Substance* with the Father, to declare that the Son is not so of the Father as meerly to be like him, but to be the very same in likeness and similitude to the Father; and to be inseparably united to his Father's Substance, and that he and the Father are One, as he himself hath said. The Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word,

Ἐξέλοντο τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ὃν ἦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, μηδὲν ἢ ἐν τέτρῳ διαφέρειν ἡμῶν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν, εἰς Θεὸς ὧς ἔ τὰ πάντα. — Ἀλλ' οἱ πατέρες θεωρήσαντες ἐκείνων τὴν παρεργίαν, καὶ τὴν ἢ ἀσθενεῖαν ἐκκοτεχνίαν, ὡς ἀσθενεῖς λοιπὸν λαλόντες ἐπέειν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκειν, ἐκ τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸς τὸ Θεὸς ἦν ἢ ἢ ὅν; ὑπερ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ὃν καὶ ἴσον τὰ ἢ υἱὸς καὶ ὅν ἡγοῦντο νομίζοντες.

Ὁ ὅς λόγος ἐστὶ μὴ κτίσμα ὄν, ἔργον καὶ ὅτι μόνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ ὅτι ποιούσης διανοίας γινώσκον τὸ ἦν ἢ υἱὸν ἐκ τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸς τὸ πατρὸς. Ibid.

Ἡνασθέντες καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς σωμασιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ γινώσκον τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς, ταῦτα πάλιν λαλόντες ἐπέειν καὶ γινώσκειν, ὁμοῖον ἦν καὶ πατεὶ τὸν υἱόν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὁμοιον τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ τ' αὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ἐκ πατρὸς ἦν σημαίνοντι. Ibid. p. 269.

Καὶ ὁ μόνον ὁμοιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐσθίας καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, ὡς αὐτὸς ἑρμηνεύει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῷ πατεὶ ὄντι ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὡς ὅτι τὸ ἀπολύτῳ πρὸς τὸ φῶς, τὸ πρὸς καὶ ὁ λέγει σημαίνει. Ibid.

like



like the light and its splendor ; and this the word *Homocofios* fignifies, and was used by the Council to this very end, to diftinguifh and feparate the *Word* from all created Nature, as appears from the *Anathema* they immediately

Ταύτα ὅ ἐρηκώτες ἐδύλωσεν  
 φανερώς, ὅτι τὸ ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸς καὶ  
 τὸ ὁμοούσιον, ἀναρεττικὸν ἦν τῆς  
 αἰσεύσεως λογείων εἶναι. ἄφ' οὗ,  
 κτίσμα καὶ πλάσμα καὶ κτηνικὸν καὶ  
 σκεπτικόν, καὶ ἄν ᾤσιν κτηνικόν.  
 Ibid.

denounce against those who said, That the Son of God was produced out of nothing, was a Creature, of a mutable Nature, the Workmanship of God, or of any other Substance but the Substance of the Father : And therefore he adds, That those that dislike these words, ought to consider the sense in

which the Synod uses them, and to anathematize what the Synod anathematizes ; and then if they can, let them quarrel with the words ; though he is very confident that no man who owns the sense of the Council, and understands the words in their sense, can dislike the words. From whence it appears, that *Athanasius* would have allowed those for Orthodox Christians ( as I observed before *St. Hilary* did ) who should confess the Eternal Generation of the Son, that there was no time before he was, and that he had no beginning of Being ; that he is no Creature, nor of any other Substance, but only of the Father, and that he always was inseparably united to him, and one with him, though they should have boggled at those words, That the Son is *of the Substance* of the Father, and consubstantial with him. But the true reason why the *Nicene* Fathers did so earnestly contend for these words, *of the Substance of the Father*, and *Consubstantial*, was because they found by experience, that no other words would hold the *Arian* Hereticks, who concealed their Poyson under any other form of words, though in appearance very Orthodox ; as the Catholick Bishops found to their cost in the Council of *Ariminum*, and upon several other occasions ; which is the account the Synod of *Paris* gives the *Eastern*

Bishops

Bishops of this matter : But though they desired that all would agree in the use of this word, as most expressive of the true Catholick Faith, yet they never rejected the Communion of any Bishops merely upon this account, while they professed the true Catholick Faith, which the *Nicene* Council intended to signify by this word, and condemned those *Arian* Blasphemies which they intended to condemn by it.

Before this Council had taken the *Homousion* into their Creed, and made it the Test of the Catholick Faith, *Dionysius* Bishop of *Alexandria*, in his Book against the *Sabelians*, had let drop some Expressions, for which he was charged with denying the *Homousion*, and accused for it to his Name-sake *Dionysius*, then Bishop of *Rome*, which occasioned his Apology to the *Roman* Bishop, which *Athanasius* gives us an account of.

He owns, That he did say that the word *Homousion* was not to be found in Scripture, yet what he taught of Christ did plainly signify what is meant by the *Homousion*, that he is no Creature, but homogeneous, or of the same Nature with his Father, which he explained by *Human Births*, which are manifestly of the same kind ; there being no difference of Nature between Parents and Children, who differ only in this, That Parents are not their own Children ; whereby he signified that God the Father and God the Son had but one and the same Nature, though the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father. The same, he says, he represented by other similitudes of *Homogeneous Productions* ; as a Root and its Branches,

— Γεγραπὲς περὶς τὸν ὁμώνυμον αὐτῷ Διονύσιον τὸν ἐπίσκοπον Ῥώμης ὑπολοβόμενον συκοφαντίαν ἰδὲ ταύτῃ κατ' αὐτὸ. μήτε γὰρ ποιῶν ἐκκλησίαν τὸν υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοούσιον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν διατέλειώσατο. — Δι' ἄλλης ἐπιστολῆς ἔγραψα, ἐν οἷς ἠλεῖσα καὶ τὸ περιέτευσεν ἔγκλημα κατ' ἐμὲ ψεύδομαι ὅν, ὡς ἔλεγον τὸν καὶ οὐκ ὁμοούσιον ἰδὲ τὸν Θεόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸτο φησὶ μὴ ἐκκλησίαν παρ' αὐτῷ ἄριον γεγραπὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα μὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἃ σιωπῇ καὶ τῆς διαβολῆς ταύτης ἐκ ἀπείρου. καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γένος παρ' ἐξέδωκεν, ὅλον ὡς ἔπαν ὁμογενῆ. φήσας πάντως τὸς γονεὺς μόνον ἐπείκει ἰδὲ τὸν τέκνον,

the

ἐπὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ εἶεν τὰ τέκνα, ἢ  
μήτε γονεὺς ἀναρχοὶν ὑπάραχιν  
ἰδ'. Ath. Syn. Nic. decret.  
P. 274.

Ἰδὲ δὲ καὶ μὴ μνησθῆναι πλείονα  
προσθεὶς ἢ συγγενῶν ὁμοιωμά-  
τα; καὶ γὰρ οὐτὲν εἶπον ἀπὸ πα-  
τρὸς ἢ ἀπὸ ρίζης ἀνέλθον,  
ἔπεσον ἰδ' οὗ ὅταν ἐκλάσῃσι, καὶ  
πάντως εἰκένω κατέσκηκαν ὁμο-  
φυεῖς. καὶ πατρῶν εἶπον ἀπὸ πα-  
τρὸς γένοντα, ἔπεσον ὀνομα μνησ-  
ληφέναι, &c. Ibid.

the Fountain and Rivers, which are  
not the same with each other, but  
have the same Nature. These are  
true Catholick Representations of the  
*Homousion*, and this *Dionysius* thought  
a sufficient Justification of his Faith,  
and *Athanasius* thought so too, with-  
out using that term; especially if we  
add what he discourses more at  
large, *de Sent. Dionysii contra Aria-  
nos*.

I shall only observe farther, That the Learned Dr. *Bull*  
takes this very way to prove that the *Ante Nicene* Fathers  
did own the Faith of the *Homousion*, or that the Son is  
consubstantial to the Father, though we seldom meet with  
the word it self in their Writings; because they teach the  
same things which the *Nicene* Fathers intended by that  
word: As 1. When they affirm the Son of God is not only  
of the Father, but that he proceeds from, and is begotten of  
the Father. 2. That the Son is the True, Genuine, Pro-  
per, Natural Son of God. 3. When they explain the Ge-  
neration of the Son, by the Root and its Branches, the Sun  
and its Rays, the Fountain and River, which are of the  
same Nature, and therefore represent the Father and Son  
to be of the same Substance. 4. When they except the  
Son of God out of the number of Creatures, and deny  
him to be a Creature. 5. When they ascribe such things  
to the Son, as are proper and peculiar only to the True  
God. 6. When they affirm the Son of God not only to be  
God, but expressly own him to be true God, God by Na-  
ture, and One God with the Father.

This is the true Notion of the *Homousion*; and now let  
any man judge, Whether a Consubstantial Trinity be a Tri-  
nity of Personal Characters, Relations, or Names, or of  
Real,

Defens.

Fidei Nice-  
ne. p. 66.

Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons. If we will allow either the *Nicene* Fathers, or the *Arian* Bishops to be well in their wits, can we think that there would have been any such Disputes between them, as whether the Son be Co-eternal with the Father, or had a Beginning? whether there were any time, the least conceivable moment before the Son was? whether he was made *ἔξ ἐκ τινος*, created out of nothing, as all other Creatures are, or begotten of the Substance of the Father, and is the true, genuine, natural Son of God, or a Son only by Adoption? whether he be true perfect God, in opposition to the most perfect created Nature, or be only a made and Creature-God? whether he be Consubstantial with the Father, or have only a Nature like the Fathers, but not the same? and whether he be like his Father in all things, in Substance and Essence, or only in Will and Affection. I say, Could any men in their wits dispute such matters as these, unless both sides were agreed, that the Son is a Real, Substantial Son, as human Sons are, who are begotten of the Substance of their Parents; that he has a Subsistence of his own, distinct from his Father's Subsistence; that he has a Substance of his own, eternally begotten of his Father's Substance, and therefore the same, but proper and peculiar to his own Person, which makes him the Son, and not the Father. For till these things are agreed, there is no foundation for the other Disputes; for if the Son have no real Subsistence of his own, who would dispute whether he began to subsist in time, or did subsist from all Eternity? If he have no Substance of his own, is it not ludicrous to dispute whether he be of the Father, that is, have his Substance of his Father's Substance, or be a new created Substance, as like his Father's Substance as a created Substance can be, but not the same? For if he have no distinct Substance of his own, neither of these can be true. To what purpose is it to dispute, whether he be a begotten

or created God, if he be not as true and perfect a Person, and as true and perfect God ( upon the Catholick Hypothesis ) in his own Person, as the Father himself is?

In short, to conclude this Argument, If the *Homoousion* signifies, that the Son of God, who is Consubstantial to his Father, is no Creature, was not made out of Nothing, had no Beginning of Being, is of his Father's Substance, begotten of his Substance from all Eternity, a true and perfect Son of a true and perfect Father, and upon all accounts the very same that the Father is, excepting that he is the Son and not the Father, it is impossible the *Nicene* Fathers should have been either *Sabellians* or *Modalists*.

#### S E C T. IV.

*A more particular Inquiry into the full Signification of the Homousion, with respect to the Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature.*

**T**HAT the *Nicene* Fathers did by the *Homoousion*, or *One Substance* of the Godhead, understand something like what we call a *Specifick Sameness* and *Unity of Nature*, might be proved by numerous Quotations, had it not been sufficiently done already by *Petavius*, *Curcellæus*, *Dr. Cudworth*, and others; whoever will be pleased to read the Testimonies they produce in this Cause, will never be able to make any other tolerable Sense of them.

They apply this word *Homoousion* to things, which are specifically One, or which have the same Specifick Nature, as a Tree and its Branches, a Fountain and River, as they call God the Father the *ρίζα καὶ πηγή τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*, the Root and Fountain of the Son, and Holy Spirit; the

the Sun and its Rays and Splendor ; as Christ is called *ἀπαύλας*, the brightness and refulgency of his Father's Glory. They prove that Christ has the same Nature with his Father, because all true, natural, genuine Sons have so ; and therefore if he be as truly and properly the Son of God, as *Isaac* was the son of *Abraham*, he must be Consubstantial to God the Father, as *Isaac* was to *Abraham*, which we know is a *Specifick Unity of Nature*. And the Council of *Chalcedon* expressly affirms, That Christ is Consubstantial to his Father, as to his Godhead, or Divine Nature ; and Consubstantial to us as to his Manhood, or Human Nature ; and if the *Homoousion* signifies the same, or something analogous in both, we know what this sameness of Nature means ; for it is impossible to reconcile this to one singular Nature and Unity. Christ is not Consubstantial to us upon account of the same singular human Nature in him, and in all Mankind ; for every Man has a particular human Nature of his own, and so had Christ ; but the Nature is specifically the same in Christ, and in us, that is, it is a true human Nature, and this makes Christ and us Consubstantial. And if there be any thing like this, though in a more perfect degree, in the Consubstantiality of Father and Son, it must signify not one singular Nature ; which cannot be said to be Consubstantial to it self, but the Consubstantiality of Two Persons really and substantially distinct, but united in the same common Nature, or the same Divinity : And therefore nothing is more common, than to render the *ὁμοῖον* by *ὁμογενές, ὁμοειδές, ὁμοφυές, unius generis*, and by such like words, as every one knows signify a *Specifick Unity*. That the *μία θεότης, & μία ἔσσις*, the One Divinity, and One Divine Essence, is a common Nature, the same in all Three Persons communicated by the Father to the Son, and by Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, is so universally acknowledged, that it needs no proof ; the *τὸ κοινὸν & κοινότης & κοινότης φύσεως*, frequently

*Basil. Hom.  
27. c. 50.  
628.*



Basil. Ep.  
43.

quently occur in the writings of the *Nicene* Fathers, which signify the One Divinity to be a common Nature to the Three Divine Persons. This is the very account St. *Basil* gives of the difference between *Bois & Substance*, Essence and Person; that Essence signifies a common Nature, which is in more than One, and may be spoken of more than One, as a *species* is predicated of its Individuals. Man is a common Name for all Men, because Humanity is a common Nature, which is alike in *Peter*, and *John*, and *James*, and all the Men in the World: But Hypostasis or Person, though it signifies the Nature also, yet not in that general Notion, as common to all of the same kind, but as actually subsisting in Particulars, which are distinguished from each other by their distinct Subsistence, or by such other Properties and characteristical Marks as are peculiar to each of them, and not common to the whole kind, as the persons of *Peter*, and *James*, and *John*, though they have the same common Nature, are yet distinguished from each other. Now if the One Divine Nature be in this sense a common Nature, that it is really and actually communicated by the Father to the Son, and Holy Spirit, and does distinctly subsist whole and entire, and perfect, in all Three Divine Persons, it cannot be One singular solitary Nature, which cannot subsist distinctly in Three; for in perfect singularity there can be no distinction: nor can One singular Nature be Three Subsistences, when there is but One which subsists.

*Athanasius*, or whoever was the Author of that Treatise of the common Essence of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, proves that all Three Persons have the same common Nature from the same Names, and Attributes, and Works, Dominion, and Power, ascribed distinctly to them all; and gives this account, why, though the Father be God, and the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet we must not say that there are Three Gods, but One God in Three Persons; because

because a common Nature has a common Name, as he shews, that all Mankind in Scripture are called one Man, upon account of their common Nature; and if this be allowable among men, to unite all Mankind in one Name, and to speak of them as one Man, notwithstanding all that diversity which is between them in external form, strength, will, affections, opinions, &c. how much more reasonable is it to call the Three Divine Persons One God, who are distinguished and separated from the whole Creation by One undivided Dignity, One Kingdom, One Power, One Will and Energy.

And that we may not suspect that by One common Nature they meant One singular Substance and Nature, common to Father and Son (which it is impossible to form any Notion of) St. Basil tells us what he meant by a common Nature, such a Nature as has the same Notion and Definition, that is, which is common, as a *Genus* or *Species* is common: As for example; If the Father, τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, as to his *Suppositum*, or Substance, be Light, we must acknowledge τῷ μονογενῆς εἶαν, the Essence and Substance of the Son to be Light also; and whatever other Notion we form of the Being and Essence of the Father, the same we must apply to the Son. And herein he places the Unity of the Godhead, or the One Divinity; that though the Divine Persons differ in Number,

Ὅπου καὶ τὰ τ' εὐσεβίης, κρινὼν καὶ ὄνομα τ' αἰτίας. Athan. de communi Essentia. Vol. 1. p. 213.

Ὅπου ἀμείβετο ἡ αἰτία, μία βασιλεία, μία δυνάμις καὶ βουλὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἐνδιαιτῶσα τῷ τετακται ἀπὸ τ' κοίτης. Ibid. p. 214.

Ἐἰ δ' ὅπου τῆς λαμβάνου τοῦ εἶναι κοινόν, ὥς τ' οὗ ἐν λόγον ἓνα, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ἀμφοῖν διαρρέει, ὥστε καὶ εἰ καὶ ὑποθέσιν φῶς ὁ πατὴρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ νοοῖτο, φῶς καὶ τῷ τῷ μονογενῆς εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ ὅθεν τῆς ἀποδοῦ ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ τὸν τῷ ἐν λόγον, τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ ὑφ' ἐφαρμόζον, εἰ ὅπου τὸ κοινόν τῆς εἰσας λαμβάνονται, διχόνοια, καὶ ἡμέτερον ἐν τῷ δόγμα φησιν. καὶ τῷ τῷ καὶ θεότης μία, δηλονότι καὶ τὸν τῆς εἰσας λόγον τῆς ἐνότητος νομίζοντες. ὥστε ἀειδμεν μὲν τῷ διαφορῶν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ὅτι ἰδιότης καὶ χαρακτηριστικὸς ἐκείνων, ἐν δ' τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐνότητος καὶ ἐνότητος διαρρέει. Basil adv. Eunom. T. 1. l. 1. p. 719.

and

and in their peculiar Characters, yet that Divine Nature which subsists distinctly in each of them, has but one and the same Notion and Definition, and therefore is but one and the same in all. If this be not a specifick Sameness and Unity, all our Logicks deceive us: I'm sure the Unity of an *Individuum* or singular Nature was never thought to consist in a common Notion or Definition of its Nature; and yet this is the account which the Fathers unanimously give of the One common Divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

No man who understands any thing of this Controversy, can be ignorant of that famous Dispute *de Ingenito & Genito*, concerning the *Unbegotten* and the *begotten Nature*. By this Sophism the *Arians* endeavoured to prove, That the Son could not be *Homoousios*, consubstantial, or of the same Nature with the Father, because an *Unbegotten Nature* cannot be the same with a *Begotten Nature*.

Now had the Catholick Fathers believed the singularity of the Divine Nature in the modern Notion of it, this Objection had been unanswerable; for it is absolutely impossible that the same singular Nature should be both begotten and unbegotten, as much as it is that the same single Person should be both begotten and unbegotten. I desire to know, how any *Sabellianist*, who acknowledges but One singular solitary Substance of the Deity, would answer this Objection; I know no possible way they have, but to deny that the Divine Nature of the Son is begotten; that though the Son be begotten, his Divine Nature is not begotten, but only his Personality, or Mode of Subsistence, without a begotten subsisting Nature: And this, indeed, would effectually answer the Objection; for if there be not a begotten and unbegotten Nature, the foundation of the Objection is lost. And this is so obvious an Answer upon the Hypothesis of Singularity, that it is sufficient to satisfy any thinking man, that the Catholick  
Fathers

Fathers did not believe this Singularity of the Divine Essence, since none of them ever gave this Answer to the Objection.

But we need not guess at their meaning ; for they themselves expressly reject this Answer, which is the only proper and pertinent Answer upon this Hypothesis ; and give such other Answers as contradict the Notion of the Singularity of the Divine Essence. As strange as some think it, the Catholick Fathers, from the very beginning of Christianity, owned the Divine Nature and Substance of the Son to be begotten ; nothing is more familiar in all their Writings, than *ἐκ τῆς γεννῆς*, *Natura genita, Deus genitus, unigenitus Deus*. St. Gregory Nyssen agrees this matter with *Eunomius*, that the Divine Nature of the Son is *ἐκ τῆς γεννῆς*, a Begotten Substance ; so does St. Basil, so do the other Fathers. When *Eunomius* objected, That God being unbegotten, cannot admit of Generation, St. Basil allows this to be true in one sense, viz. That he who is unbegotten cannot in his own proper Nature be begotten, because it is impossible that an unbegotten Nature should it self be begotten : But the other sense of the words, That he who is unbegotten himself can't beget, so as to communicate by a substantial Generation his own Nature to the Son, he rejects as Blasphemy both against Father and Son ; which is a plain demonstration what St. Basil's Judgment was about an unbegotten and begotten Nature.

*Eunomius* urged, That *unbegotten*, and *begotten*, are both Names of Nature, and therefore must signify two Natures as different from each other, as *unbegotten* and *begotten* are. Now to prove that *begotten* is not the Name of Nature and Substance, St. Basil uses this Argument, That if *γεννημα* and *οὐσία* be the same, if *begotten* and *substance* signify the same thing, then as he who is begotten is the begotten of him who begets, so we may in like manner

Ὁτι  
τῇ ἰδίᾳ  
φύσει ὡς  
ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας  
γεννημα,  
ἀδελφός  
τῷ πατρί  
καὶ ὡς  
ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας  
γεννημα  
ἐστίν ὁ  
ἀδελφός  
αὐτοῦ.  
Basil  
adv. Eu-  
nom. T.  
i. l. i.  
717.

Ἐἰ τὸ ἡνίκμα ἰδίῳ λόγῳ  
 ἡνίκμα — τ' αὐτὸ ὃ πᾶν καὶ ὁπ  
 τ' οὐδ' ὅσας σημαίνει καὶ τὸν τέ-  
 των λόγον, ἐκείνους ἔσας ὅσας καὶ  
 ἡνίκμα λόγῳ. ἔσας τοίνυν ἐκ  
 τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης, ἡλικία τ'  
 μονοῦ καὶ πάλιν ὅσας ἢ τὴν ἡνί-  
 μα] τ' ἀποστολὴν σημαίνουσα, ὁ-  
 ποῦ ἔτοι βιάζον, ἀλλὰ τ' Οὐδ'  
 ὅλῳ. — εἰ τὸ Οὐδ' ὃ ἐκ  
 ἡνίκμα ὁ υἱός, τὸ Οὐδ' ἔσας  
 ὅσας; εἴ πο τὸ ἡνίκμα τ' ὅσας  
 διλοῖ; καὶ ἔτω τὸ ἡνίκμα ὅσας  
 τ' ἀφ' ἡνίκμα καὶ τὸν τέτοιον λόγον  
 ἀναφανήσῃ. εἰ τ' γελῶν τὸ  
 ὑμῶν. — Ibid. lib. 2. p.  
 734.

Δεῖ μὲν ἔν ὁμολογεῖν ὁμοῦσιν  
 τὸν υἱὸν πρὸ πατρὸς, καὶ οὕτως γέ-  
 γασθαι; ὁμολογεῖν ὃ ἐν ἰδίῳ μὲν  
 ὕποστασι τὸν πατέρα, ἐν ἰδίῳ δ'  
 τὸν υἱόν, καὶ ἐν ἰδίῳ τὸ πνεῦμα  
 τὸ ἄγιον. καὶ οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐρῶς  
 ἐκδηλώσαν; αὐτάρ πως καὶ κα-  
 ρῶς ἐκδηλώσαν εἰπόντες, ὡς ἐκ  
 φωνῆς. ὅτι ἔπειτα μὲν τὸ ἡνίκμα  
 φῶς, ἔπειτα δ' ὃ τὸ ἡνίκμα. ὡς  
 μὲντοι καὶ φῶς. ὥστε ἕνα καὶ τὸν  
 αὐτὸν ὃ τὸν τῆς ὅσας λόγον.  
 Basil Ep. 78.

say, that he who is begotten is the Sub-  
 stance of him who begets, and then the  
 Name *begotten* will not signify the Sub-  
 stance of the only begotten Son, but  
 the Substance of the God of all: that  
 as the Son is the begotten of God, so  
 he is the Substance of God; and thus  
 the *begotten* is the Substance of the *un-*  
*begotten*, which, he says, is ridiculous.  
 And yet as ridiculous as St. Basil thought  
 this, those must of necessity own it, who  
 assert but One singular Substance of the  
 Deity; for if there be but One Sub-  
 stance in the sense of Singularity, the  
 Son (if he have any Substance) must  
 be the Substance of the Father; he who  
 is begotten, must be the Substance of  
 him who is unbegotten. Thus much I  
 think is certain, That if St. Basil was  
 in his wits, he would never have used  
 this Argument, had he believed that  
 Father and Son are but One singular  
 Substance; and yet elsewhere he ex-  
 pressly tells us, That the *Nicene* Fathers  
 distinguished the Hypostases of Father  
 and Son, when they called the Son  
*Light of Light*; for the Light which

begets, is not the Light which is begotten, though their  
 Nature is the same, they being Light and Light.

Once more, to prevent if it be possible all manner  
 of Evasions, since some Moderns distinguish between  
 the generation of the Son, and of his Substance,  
 and will allow that the Son is begotten, but not his  
 Substance. I observe that St. Basil rejects this distinction  
 between



between the Son and his Substance. *Eunomius* durst not say that the Son was ἐξ ἐν τῶν, made or created out of nothing, this being so expressly condemned by the *Nicene Council*, which the generality of Christians received as the Rule of their Faith, and therefore he endeavoured to cheat them into it before they were aware, by a new form of speech: He says, That the Substance of the Son was begotten, having no Being before its own proper subsistence, and was begotten before all things by the Will of

Τὸν υἱὸν τὸν υἱὸν γεννηθῆναι  
ἐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ τῆς ἰσῆς οὐσίας,  
ἵνα ὁ ἀγεννητὸς πατήρ γενέ-  
ται τῷ πατρὶ. Ibid. p. 734

God. This was very craftily expressed, to insinuate that there was a time when the Substance of the Son did not exist; for it could not be before it was begotten, and had a proper subsistence of its own. *St. Basil* exposes this Sophistry at large, and shews, that by the same Argument they might prove, that there was a time when the Father's Substance was not; for that could not be older than its own subsistence: But if the Father be Eternal, though his Substance could not be before its subsistence, so may the Son be also, by an Eternal generation and subsistence. But that which I would take notice of is, that *St. Basil* observes the vain Sophistry of this way of speaking, that when he durst not say that the Son was of nothing, or that there was a time when he was not, he insinuates the same thing concerning the

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀντὶς ἐκείνῳ παρὰ  
μὲν τὸν υἱὸν τὸν υἱὸν ἡμῶν  
πατρί, ὡς δὴν ἔπρεπε λέγειν  
παρὰ αὐτὸν τὸν υἱόν. Ibid.

Substance of the Son, as if the Son and the Substance of the Son were two things. Now if the Son and the Substance of the Son be the same, then if the Son is begotten, the Substance of the Son is begotten; if the Son be not the Father, the Substance of the Son is not the Substance of the Father. And yet all the Philosophy of the ancient Fathers, not excepting *St. Austin* himself, would not allow of any difference between the Per-



son of the Father, and his Being, Essence, Substance, Subsistence, Nature, nor between the Person of the Son, and his Being, Subsistence, Nature, &c. and therefore the Son is as distinct from the Father in Nature, Being, Life, Substance, as in Person and Subsistence.

But to proceed: There was no dispute between the *Catholicks* and the *Arians* about the singularity of the Divine Substance, they both rejected that as *Sabellianism*, and asserted Father and Son to be as distinct in Nature and Substance, as they are in Person; and therefore this Objection *de ingenito & genito*, concerning the unbegotten and the begotten Nature, was intended not to prove a numerical distinction, (which it effectually does) but a specifick difference and diversity of Nature between Father and Son; that the Son is no more consubstantial to the Father, than to be unbegotten and to be begotten are the same. The whole Controversy turned upon this one Point, Whether *unbegotten* and *begotten*, were Names of Nature; and consequently, whether to be unbegotten, and to be begotten, made a specifick difference of Natures. This the Catholic Fathers unanimously denied; and not to take notice of all they say on this Argument, there is one Answer which they all give, very observable to my present purpose, and that is this: That to be unbegotten or begotten, makes no specifick difference in created Natures, and therefore there is no reason to say that it makes any such diversity in the Divine Nature; and they all give the Example of *Adam*,

*Seth*, and *Eve*, who all had the same human Nature; and yet *Adam* was unbegotten, as being immediately formed by God. *Seth* was begotten, as being *Adam's* Son; *Eve* was not begotten, but made of one of *Adam's* Ribs: But this makes no diversity of Nature, but only distinguishes them by their manner of Existence,

\* Η τις (ἀφυσία) ἡ σημαίνει  
ἰσὺς διαφορῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀξίαμα,  
ἀλλὰ ἔπον ἰσχυρῶς ὡς  
καὶ ὁ Ἀδάμ ἡ φωνήεντων ὦν  
(πλάσμα δὲ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ) καὶ ὁ  
Σὴθ φωνήεντων (υἱὸς δὲ καὶ τῷ  
Ἀδάμ) καὶ ὁ Ἔβα ἐκ τῆς  
Ἀδαμ πλάσσει ἐκπορεύσας, (ἡ

Existence, or coming into Being, and there is no imaginable reason why the same specifick Nature considered in its Individuals, may not have very different Beginnings, without any alteration of Nature. Nay, as *Damascen* observes, thus it is in all the several species of Creatures ; for the first in every kind is unbegotten : And though the Divine Nature in all Three Divine Persons is Eternal, without any Beginning ; yet if to be unbegotten, or to be begotten, make no diversity of Nature in Creatures, there is no reason to say that it makes any such difference in the Divine Nature. This is so plain and exprefs, that I need add nothing to shew how this overthrows the Opinion of Singularity, and owns a Specifick Unity and Sameness of the Divine Nature : That though the Father be unbegotten, and the Son begotten, yet they are Consubstantial, or of the same Nature ; not with the Sameness of Singularity, which is impossible, but with such a Sameness of Nature as is between two of the same kind and species, as the Example of *Adam* and *Seth* proves. And I need not prove, that a Specifick Sameness of Nature, supposes a real distinction of Persons, who agree in this One same Nature.

ἡ ἐκφυγὴ αὐτῆς) ἡ εὐσὴ δια-  
φύσει ἀλλήλων, ἀνθρώπου καὶ εἰ-  
σιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ᾧ ἀφ' ἧς ἐ-  
στίν. *Damasc. orth. nd. l. 1.*  
c. 9.

Πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς ζῶντες ἡ ἀφ' ἧς  
τῆς φύσεως ἀφύμνησιν ἐστίν, ἀλλ'  
ὅτι ἀφύμνησιν, ἐκτίσθη καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς  
ἐκφυγῆς, τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ ἀφ' ἧς  
διῆλθεν εἰς ἡμῶν. ἡ μετὰ ἐκφυ-  
γῆς, καὶ ἀποὑπαρξεν ἐπὶ τοῦ  
ἀποὑπαρξῆς, καὶ ἐκφυγῆς. *Ibid.*

## S E C T. V.

*That by the Homououſion, or One Substance, the Nicene Fathers did not meerly underſtand a Specifick, but a Natural Unity and Sameneſs of Substance between Father and Son.*

**B**UT yet after all this, the Catholick Fathers did not allow the Divine Nature in a ſtri& and proper Notion to be a *ſpecies*, which is only a notional and logical Unity and Sameneſs of Nature; for the Divine Nature, which is perfect & Eſſence, is not logically, but eſſentially One, though it ſubſiſts diſtinctly in Three Perſons, and this was the Faith of the Catholick Fathers. On this one Point the whole Controverſy turns, concerning the Singularity of the Divine Nature, or the Plurality of Divine Natures multiplied with the Perſons, and conſequently that great Controverſy of all, whether a Trinity of true, real, ſubſtantial Perſons, be eſſentially One, or Three Gods.

To repreſent this as plainly as poſſibly I can, we muſt

Χρὲς ἢ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἑπεὶ ἐν  
τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας διωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄλλο  
τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὁμοιότητι. ἐπὶ μὲν ἐν  
πάντων ἡ ἐκκοινωνία, ἡ μὲν  
ἡ ἐκκοινωνία διὰ τὴν οὐσίαν  
καὶ διωρεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν  
ἐν τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ  
διωρεῖσθαι; ἡ ἢ κοινότης καὶ ἡ συ-  
νάφεια καὶ τὸ ἐν, λόγῳ καὶ ὁμο-  
ιότητι διωρεῖσθαι; νοῦ μὲν καὶ τῷ  
ἐν τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ Παύλῳ ἡ  
αὐτῆς εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ κοινῶς μίαν  
ἔχουσαν οὐσίαν.

conſider the difference between a *Specifick* and a *Natural Unity*, between being One in Notion, and One in Nature. The firſt is, when from that agreement which we obſerve in the Natures of ſeveral Individuals, we form a Notion of one common Nature which belongs to them all; as the Notion of Humanity, or Human Nature, which belongs to all men, and affords a common Name, and a common definition to them: But this is only the work of the mind, for there is no ſuch one common Human Nature actually

actually existing in all Mankind; but every man is a man by himself, and has a particular Human Nature, as he has a Soul and Body of his own, which is not the Soul and Body of any other man in the world. And thus *Damascen* owns,

Ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρίσῃ, καὶ ὑπερῷᾳ,  
καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα, καὶ ἀλήθει-  
πειδαιῶ, τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ  
τὸ μὲν κοινὸν καὶ ἐν περὶ φύσιν  
διωριμῇ — *Damasc.* de orth.  
fide. l. i. c. 11.

it is with all Creatures of the same kind, who in truth and reality are distinct separate Beings, who subsist apart by themselves, as *Peter* and *Paul*, and all other men do, and are united only in a common Notion, not in a common subsisting Nature, which is one and the same in all.

But then he tells us, that it is quite otherwise in the Divine Nature, which is a common Nature, and yet but One; not ἑπινοία, but περὶ φύσιν; not meerly in our notion and conception, but in truth and reality; the same One Divine Nature, without the least diversity or separation, actually and distinctly subsisting in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which being perfectly the same is but One, and really and substantially subsisting in Three is a common Nature, which is equally and perfectly in them all. Thus *Damascen* has declared his Opinion fully against the notional and specifick Unity of the Divine Nature, that the Divine Nature is One, only as Human Nature is One, because it has one common Name and Definition, which belongs to all of the same kind; whereas there is no one common Human Nature in Subsistence, but only in Notion: But the same One Divine Nature actually subsists in Three, and is the same One Divinity in Three. And that this was the true Sense of all the Catholick Fathers will appear, from considering some Notions which were common to them all.

1. They all agree, That there is but μία θεότης, and εἰς θεός, but One Divinity, and One God; and One God, because but One Divinity; and for this very reason nothing is more familiar with them, than to call the Holy Trinity

Trinity One God. *Μία Θεότης ἐν τρεῖσι πλάσι ὑποστά-  
σει*, One Divinity in Three perfect Hypostases. Now will  
any man say, That the One Divinity, or One Divine Na-  
ture, and One God, is a meer Notion? Is not the Unity of  
God the fundamental Article of Natural Religion? And  
if this One Divinity does really, immutably, inseparably  
subsist in Three Divine Persons, as it must do, if these  
Three Divine Persons with respect to this One Divinity,  
are naturally and inseparably One God, Can this One com-  
mon subsisting Divinity be a meer Notion, which has no  
Hypostatical Subsistence, but only subsists in Thought?  
Can the Specifick Notional Unity of Human Nature,  
make three men one man, as the One common Divine  
Nature makes Three Persons One God? If the Unity of  
the Divine Nature be but a Notion, the Unity of God, the  
Unity of the Trinity, which is this One God, must be a  
meer Notion also? And so, in truth and reality, there is no  
more One God, than there is but one man.

I readily grant, That the Father may be, and often is,

in a peculiar manner called God, and  
the One God, as distinguished from the  
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Spi-  
rit; but I deny, that he is called the  
One God, as considered without them,  
or so much as in thought separated from  
them: If we do not include the Son  
and the Holy Ghost in the Unity of the  
Godhead, we must deny their Godhead  
also; unless we will say, that there is  
One God, and besides him two Divine  
Persons, each of which is God, but not  
the One God: Which must introduce  
a Plurality of separate Gods: For if  
they be not One, they are more than  
One; and if One Person be the One  
God

“Α γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖον μίχαι τῷ  
νοῦ καὶ διαδοχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλη-  
σίαις ἀνασινώσκει, πάντων τῶν  
φωνῶν ἐπερίχει τῶν λόγων, οἷ  
περὶ τὸν ἡ βαπτίζουσιν εἰς τὸ ἕνα καὶ  
μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν — ἀλλ’  
εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ,  
καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. —  
ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν ἐστὶ πατέρα σημαίνον  
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ υἱὸν τοῦ πα-  
τρὸς (καταδείκνυται). — ὁ γὰρ  
ἀληθὺς εἰς τὸν ἕνα περὶ τὸν  
βλέπει ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸν διὰ πάν-  
των αὐτῷ ἡνωμένον, ἐν ἀληθείᾳ  
τῇ, καὶ διότι, καὶ ὁσίᾳ, καὶ ζωῇ,  
καὶ σοφίᾳ. Greg. Nyssenus  
cont. Eunomium. Orat. 1. p.  
78. Parisiis. 1615.



God without the other, they cannot be One God. This shews, what necessity there is of owning the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity to be the One God, and One Divinity, naturally and essentially One; and then the necessary Conse-

quence is, That this One Divine Nature, which actually and substantially subsists in Three distinct Divine Persons, who for that reason are naturally and essentially One God, cannot be a mere Common Specifick Nature, but One Common Subsisting Nature.

But what possible Sense can we make of this? *One Common Subsisting Nature*, which is really, actually, indivisibly, *One*, and yet is *Common*, that is, does really and distinctly subsist in more than one. To be τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐν ὁμοθυμαῖν, to be Common, and to be One, not in Notion, as a Species is common to all the Individuals, but in the truth and reality of Nature. sounds very like a Contradiction. When we say the Divine Nature is common to Three Persons, and subsists distinctly in three, we deny it to be One singular solitary Nature, which can subsist but in one, and constitute but One Person, which was the *Sabellian* Notion of the Divine Unity, which the Catholic Church condemned, as destroying a Real Trinity, as I have shewn at large: But how then can this Common Nature, which is not singular, but subsists perfectly and distinctly in Three, be actually and essentially One; for a Natural Unity is a Numerical Unity, is one in number, which, one would think, should signify a singular Nature, for so it does in all Creatures: And when we speak of the Unity of the Divine Nature, it cannot be one by composition, which the absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature cannot admit. This is the great difficulty, which we must not expect perfectly to understand, because a Finite Mind can never comprehend, that is, can never have an adequate

notion

*Tres enim Deos dicit, qui divinitatem separat Trinitatis, cum Dominus dicendo; Ite, baptizate Gentes in Nomine Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, unius esse Trinitatem posuistis ostenderit. Ambr. de Fide. l. i. c. 2.*



notion of what is infinite: But I shall give some account, what the Catholick Fathers have said of this matter, which will satisfy us, that it is a natural, not a mere Specifick Unity, which they intended; and will give us such a notion of this Venerable Mystery, as will deliver it from all inconsistency, and contradiction.

2. I observe therefore, That the Catholick Fathers lay the foundation of this Sameness and *Homousiotes* of Nature in the Eternal Generation of the Son, of the Substance of the Father. Ἐξ οὐκ in the *Nicene Creed* is opposed to Ἐκ οὐτῶν. That the Son is not of nothing, as all Creatures are, but receives his whole Substance of the Substance of his Father: St. *Basil* in express words makes Generation essential to the notion of the *Homousion*: For such Beings as upon account of likeness of Nature may be call'd Brothers to each other, are not therefore *Homousious*; but when the Cause, and that which actually subsists from, or out of

Ὁν γὰρ τὰ ἀδελφὰ ἀλλήλοις  
ὁμώουσα ἀλλήλοις λέγει, ὅτε π-  
νὲς ὑπελήφασιν. ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ τὸ  
ἀδελφόν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλὴν  
ὑπαρξεν ἔχον, τὸ αὐτὸς ὑπαρχῶν  
φύσως, ὁμώουσα λέγει.

Ἀναγινῶντι δὲ ἐκ τῆς βλασφη-  
μίας ταύτης, καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν πατέρα  
καὶ υἱὸν πίστις. ἀδελφὰ γὰρ ἀλ-  
λήλοις τὰ ἔξ ἑνὸς ὑφαστά. Ba-  
sil Ep. 300.

Τίς δὲ ἀληθινὸς φύσις γνήσιος  
ἐστὶν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἰδίᾳ τὸ ὑπόστασις ἐκείνη,  
συνεὶα μονοφυσίτης, καὶ λόγῳ ἀλη-  
θινὸς καὶ μόνος τοῦ Θεοῦ ὅστις ἐστίν;  
ἐκ δὲ ἐκείνου ἔστι πνεῦμα, ἀλλ'  
γόνος τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπόστασις ἡ αὐτή.

that Cause, have the same Nature, then they are *Homousious* to each other: And in opposition to that Perverse and Heretical Sense, which some affixed to the word *Homousion*, that it signified two made of the same Substance by the division and partition of it, as two Shillings cut out of the same piece of Silver; besides all other Blasphemies, the same Father tells us, That this destroys the Faith both of Father and Son; for in this Sense, to be of one Substance, can make them no more than Brothers: And I need not observe, that all the Fathers prove the Son to be Consubstantial to the Father, because he was not made, nor created, but begotten of his Father's Substance; which does not refer merely

to a specifick Sameness of Nature, but to the substantial Communication of the same Nature from Father to Son; which is therefore not in meer Notion and Idea, but substantially the same in both: for they would not allow that a mere specifick Sameness of Nature made Two Persons Consubstantial, unless one of them received his Nature and Substance from the other.

And this seems no improbable account why the *Nicene* Fathers in their *Anathema's*, added *ὁμοουσιος* to *ὅμοιος*: when they teach that the Son is *ἐξ ὁμοίας*, of the Substance of his Father, in opposition to his being *ἐξ οὐ ὧν*, of nothing, they must, by the Substance of the Father, mean that Divine Nature and Substance which is the Person of the Father; for there is no other Notion of begetting a Son of his Father's Substance: nor is any other sense of the words directly and immediately opposed to his being made of nothing. But then since *Ousia* does often signify a specifick Nature, which the Philosophers call a second Substance, to prevent this mistake, they added *Hypostasis*, which signifies a first Substance, or a subsisting Nature; and condemn those who say the Son is *ἐξ ἐτέρας ὁμοίας*, of another Nature, specifically different from the Nature of the Father, as the *Arians* taught; or that he was *ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως*, of any other Substance than that which is the Substance of the Father, and consequently not begotten of the Father: for both these are essential to the Notion of the *Homouision*, to have the same Nature for kind, or the true perfect Divine Nature, and to receive this Nature from the Father by a substantial Generation; and the Council condemns those who deny both or either of these. I must add one thing more to make this Notion complete; that as the Son is begotten of the Substance of the Father, so

μα· διὸ Θεὸς ὁμοῖν ἀληθινότες, ἀλη-  
θινῷ πατρὶς ὁμοούσιος ἱσάρεχων.  
Ath. cont. Arianos. Orat. 2.  
p. 314.

Ὁυ γὰρ ἐκ τίνος ἀρχῆς προ-  
παρήσσης ὁ πατήρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἐ-  
ξηυνήθη, ἵνα καὶ ἀδύνατοι νομισ-  
θῶσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ υἱῆ  
καὶ ἐξηυήτους ἐστίν. Ibid. p. 320.

ΔΗΛΑΝΕΙ ΔΑΘ' ΕΝ ΔΑΘ, ΕΤΕ ΤΩ  
ΠΑΤΡΙ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΥΙΩ ΘΕΩΠΙΔΟΥΣΘ,  
ΕΤΕ ΤΩ ΥΙΩ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΠΑΤΡΙ ΛΕΙΠΟΥΣΘ.  
Gr. Nyss. c. Eun. or. 1. p. 9.

Quasi aliud sit Homousion  
quàm quod dicit, ego de Patre exiui,  
ego & Pater unum sumus; —  
Hæc est autem nominis ratio, ut in  
Patre & Filio unitatem substantia  
credas, licet rem ipsam (qua est in-  
enarrabilis) describere non posses. Am-  
br. de Fide cont. Arian. c. 5.

Cum autem ego Patrem & Filium  
statuo, unitatem generis assigno; &  
si illam in personis divido, discretio-  
nes tamen personarum rursus eadem  
nomina in unitatem sui naturalis legis  
fœdere consignant, unde & tacitus est  
Filius, quantus videbitur Pater, to-  
tus de toto, integer de integro, per-  
fectus de perfecta consummataque  
virtute. Ibid. c. 7.

Habet utique in natura, habet in  
substantia, & habet non per gratiam  
temporalem, sed per sempiternam Di-  
vinitatem; habet non ex dono quasi  
servus, sed ex generationis proprie-  
tate, quasi Filius coæternus. Et ha-  
bet sicut Pater. Sicut enim Pater ha-  
bet vitam in semetipso, ita & Filio  
dedit vitam habere in semetipso. Sic  
habet, inquit, sic dedit. Didicisti  
supra quemadmodum dederit, ne pu-  
tares esse gratia largitatem, ubi ge-  
nerationis arcum est. Ambr. de  
Fide. l. 5. c. 1.

Τὸ δὲ ἰδὲ τὸλον ὁ ἰσίας ἤ πα-  
τερ ἰδιον ῥόνημα ἀρρῶν, ὡς  
μὴ διωαμὲν τὴν τῇ χρεὶς ὁ  
ἐκ μερῶν ἢ διαφύκτων ἁπορίας  
Ath. cont. Arian. or. 2. p. 321.

he receives his whole Substance from  
the whole Substance of the Father. This  
is the constant Doctrine of the Fathers,  
That the Son is *Totus ex Toto*, Whole of  
Whole; That the Divine Generation is  
not like Human Generations, by corpo-  
real Passions, by a division of the Fa-  
ther's Substance, by a partial efflux or  
emanation; but the Father, without  
any division, diminution, or alteration  
of his own Substance, communicates  
his whole Divine Nature to the Son;  
That the Son is perfectly and entirely  
all and the same that the Father is. Thus  
they expound those sayings of our Sa-  
viour, *All that the Father hath, is mine.*  
*All things are delivered unto me of my*  
*Father. As the Father hath life in him-*  
*self, so hath he given to the Son also to*  
*have life in himself.* Not to signify an  
external arbitrary Gift and Donation,  
but the Eternal Communication of his  
whole Divine Nature to the Son; that  
he is Life of Life, Light of Light, God  
of God, Very God of Very God. For  
this Reason the *Arians* rejected the  
*Homousion*, because they thought it  
absolutely impossible that the Father  
should beget a Son of his own Sub-  
stance, without a division of his Sub-  
stance; that he should communicate  
the whole Divine Nature to his Son, and  
have the same whole Divine Nature

himself. And the Fathers allow, that this is above Hu-  
man Comprehension, as the Divine Nature it self is; but  
think

think those men little consider the true measure of Human Understanding, who will not believe that God has a Son, because they cannot comprehend the ineffable Mystery of the Eternal Generation.

The Scripture assures us that God has a Son, that Eternal Word, which was in the Beginning, was with God, and was God.

The very Notion of a Son, signifies that he has the same Nature with his Father, and receives his Being and Nature from his Father, is Substance of his Father's Substance; for thus all other Sons receive their nature and substance from their Parents.

The absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature, which has no Corporeity, no Composition, no Parts, and therefore can be divided into none, proves that the Divine Generation can have nothing like to Human Generations, no more than God is like a man; and therefore must be as much above Human Comprehension, as the Divine Nature

is. We certainly know what it is not, That it is not by any separation or division of Substance; for the Divine Nature is a pure, simple, indivisible Monade; but how this Monade can communicate it self, we cannot tell: But this we know, That if a Monade does generate, it must generate a perfect whole; for when the whole is a simple, indivisible, un compounded Monade, it must generate its whole, or nothing.

Thus much is evident, That to communicate a whole, perfect, undivided Nature and Substance, is the most perfect Generation. He is the most per-

B b 2

Τὸ δὲ υἱὸς, ἐστὶν ἑπὶ τὸν πατέρα, ὅτι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ γεννηθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγειται. Ibid.

Χαρακτὴρ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἑσώτατος, καὶ οὗτος ἐκ πατρὸς, καὶ διὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑκὼν ἀλλοθι. Ibid.

314. Πῶς δὲ ἐσώτατος ἡ γενεὰ καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον τὸ σωματικόν ἐνδυθῆναι, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τὴν ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου τὸ φύσις ἰδιὸν τοῦ πατρὸς. Ibid. p. 321.

Διλονότι καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ ὧν ἀνθρώποι γεννῶσιν, γεννᾷ ἄλλοις ὡς Θεοῖς. ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἀνθρώπων μὴ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι

fect

ποι, διὰ τὸ τὸν Θεὸν κυεῖν καὶ  
μὴ ὄντα ἀληθῶς ὄντα πατέρα τὸ  
ἑαυτοῦ υἱῆς, καὶ αὐτοὶ πατέρες  
ὁνομάζονται ὅτι ἰδίων τέκνων.  
Ibid. p. 330.

*Verbi enim appellatio in Dei Filio  
de Sacramento Nativitatis est, sicut  
sapientia & virtutis est nomen, qua  
cum in Dei Filium cum substantia  
vera Nativitatis extiterint, Deo ta-  
men ut sua propria, quamvis ex Deo  
in Deum sint nata, non desunt. —  
Earum rerum unigenito Deo aptata  
cognomina sunt, quae cum eum sub-  
sistentem ex Nativitate consumment,  
tamen Patri non desint exinde mu-  
tabilis virtute naturae. Hilar. de  
Trin. l. 7.*

*Non enim sicut frequenter dictum  
a nobis est, divisionis in Filio, sed  
Nativitatis Sacramentum predica-  
mus; nec separatio fuit imperfecta  
sed progenies perfecta, quia Nativi-  
tas non habet detrimentum genera-  
di, cum profectum teneat nascendi.  
Ibid.*

fore Father and Son are not One Substance, though the Father communicates the same specifick Nature with part of his Substance to his Son.

Now though we cannot conceive how a whole begets a whole, yet we must grant that this is the most perfect Generation; for to generate, is to communicate Nature

and Substance, to beget ἄλλον ἑαυτον, another self, as the Ancients speak of the Divine Generation; and then the more perfectly the Son is the Father's self, the more perfect the Generation is; and therefore thus God must beget a Son, if he begets at all; for he must beget in the most perfect manner. And thus the Son must be begotten, if he be begot-

*Quid est enim Filius de eo quod  
Pater est? alius idem.*

*Et hoc est quod Graeci Homoo-  
sion appellant, cum uno aliud ipsum.  
Ambr. de Fide cont. Arianos. c.  
6, 7.*

*Ἄλλον ἑαυτὸν ἐγέννησεν ὁ πα-  
τήρ, ὅτι ἑαυτὸν ἐξισπόμενος, καὶ  
ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλον φαινόμενος.  
Gr. Nyss. cont. Eunom. p. 19.*

begotten at all ; for if he be a Son, he must be of his Father's Substance, and that not a part, but the whole ; for the Divine Substance must be a perfect indivisible Inseparable Monade.

This Eternal Generation of the Son is a great and unconceivable Mystery, and has always been owned to be so by the Catholick Church ; we have no Notion or Idea of it, but no more have we of the Eternal Existence of the Divine Nature it self, without any Cause or Beginning, or of the Creation of all things out of nothing, or of the Natural Production and Propagation of Created Beings ; our present Inquiry is not concerning the Mystery of the Eternal Generation, but concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature in Father and Son, in what sense they are *ὁμοούσιον* of the same Substance, and that the Eternal Generation gives an account of : For if the Father communicate his whole Nature and Substance to the Son, without division and separation ( which is the Catholick Faith ) the Son must of necessity have the same one Substance with the Father ; for a whole same of a whole same, cannot be another, and therefore must be the same One Substance, whole of whole.

Sr. *Athanasius* reasons very subtilly against the *Arians* upon this Point : They taught that the Son was ἐξ ἑνός, made of nothing, as other Creatures are. Then, says he, he must be the Son of God by participation ; what is it then he partakes of ? Other Creatures are the Sons of God by the participation of the Holy Spirit ; but the Holy Spirit is given by the Son, not the Son, as the Eternal Son of God, sanctified by the Spirit ; for the Spirit receives all from Father and Son, not the Son from the Spirit.

He must then partake of the Father : But what is that, and whence is it ? If that he partakes of be something Extra-essential to the Father, which is not the

Οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ Παῖδος μετέχειν, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λείπειν, καὶ ἀνάγκη εἰπεῖν, καὶ τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ πόθεν εἶναι,

Father's



οὐ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἐστὶν ἐκγονοῦν  
 ὡς τὸ Παῦς, ὅκαπ πάλιν τὸ  
 Παῦς μετέχων ἀν εἶη, ἀλλὰ  
 τὸ ἔξωθεν γονοῦν, καὶ ἐκείν  
 τὸς, ἐν δὲ δάπτει· ἔσται μὲν τὸν  
 πατέρα, ἔχων παρὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκείνο,  
 καὶ καὶ μετέχων υἱὸς καὶ Θεὸς ἐκ  
 αὐτοῦ: εἰ δὲ τὸτο ἀποποι καὶ ἀπο-  
 κρίν, λέγουσι· μὲν τὸ Παῦς,  
 καὶ ἐστὶ υἱὸς μὲν ὁ ἀγαπητός,  
 λέγουσι· καὶ καὶ τὸ υἱὸς πατέρα  
 ἴδιον ἢ τὸν Θεὸν, δηλονότι ἐκ  
 ἔξωθεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑπόκει τὸ Παῦς  
 ἐστὶ τὸ μαχόμενον. τὸτο δὲ πα-  
 λιν, ἐὰν ἔτερον ἢ παρὰ τὴν ἐστί-  
 ας τὸ υἱὸς, τὸ ἴσον ἀποποι ἀπαν-  
 τήσῃ, μίση πάλιν εὐεικομένη  
 τέτα, ἐκ τὸ Παῦς καὶ τὸ ὑπόκει τὸ  
 καὶ ἵππε ποτὶ ἐστὶ. ποιέτων δὲ ἔν  
 ἀποποι καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν  
 ἀναφανομύων λογιζόμεν, ἀνδρῶν  
 λέγειν τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐσίας τὸ Πα-  
 ῦς ἴδιον ἀπὸ σύμπτει ἢ τὸν  
 καὶ. τὸ δὲ ὅλως μετέχον τὸν  
 Θεὸν, ἴσον ἐστὶ λέγειν, ὅτι καὶ  
 γονοῦ, τὸ δὲ γονοῦ, πὶ σημαίνει, ἢ  
 καὶ. Ath. contr. Arian. O-  
 rat. 2. p. 322.

Father's Nature and Essence, then he does not partake of the Father, but of that Extra-essential Being, whatever it is; and then he is not second to the Father, that whereof he partakes being before him; nor is he the Son of the Father, but of that Extra-essential Being or Nature, by the participation of which he obtains the Title and Character of *Son*, and *God*. But this is very absurd, since the Father calls him his Beloved Son, and the Son calls God his own Father; and therefore is not a Son by Extra-essential Participations, but *Son* is the name of him who participates in the Nature and Substance of the Father. But then again, If that which is participated of the Father, be not the Nature and Essence of the Son, the same Absurdity returns, there being some middle Term between these two, *To be of the Father, and the Nature of the Son*, whatever that Nature be; which proves that the Nature of the Son is not of the Father, and therefore he is not the Son of the Father, for Nature makes a Son.

All this being so absurd, it is necessary to own, That the true genuine Son of God is all that He is, of the Essence and Substance of the Father: For when God is thus wholly and perfectly participated, it is the same thing as to say, that God begets; and to beget, signifies, that he begets a Son.

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And therefore, though all things by the Grace of God partake of the Son, he will not allow us to say, That the Son partakes of any thing, which implies, that the Son is one thing, and that which he partakes of, is another ; *But that which is the participation of the Father, that is the Son.*

This is the most Natural and Essential Unity that is possible to be conceived, That the whole Son is nothing else, but the whole, entire, immediate participation of the Father's Substance, and therefore must be as perfectly One with the Father, as the Father is One; for there is but one and the same Substance, which is the Substance of the Father, and by an Eternal and Ineffable Generation, the Substance also of the Son. Though Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are Three Real distinct Persons, and each of them have the whole entire Divine Nature in himself, yet there is but One Divine Nature, One Divinity in them all, and therefore they are but One God.

This is the Account St. *Hilary* gives, why we may say God is One, and One, and One, but not Three Gods: Because the Divine Nature is not multiplied with the Persons.

Thus speaking of the Father and Son, he tells us, That the Son is One of One, and therefore they are both One: For between One and One, that is One of One; there is no Second Nature of the Eternal Divinity.

For as he adds elsewhere, The Nature of the Father is born in the Nativity of the Son, and for this Reason, the Father and Son are One God, because the Son is God of the Nature of God: But their being thus One, does not destroy the

Ἄυτὸ γὰρ τὸ ὕψι μετέχει τὰ πάντα καὶ τὴν πατρὸς τῆ Πατρὸς γαμοφύλλου παρ' αὐτῆς χεῖν, καὶ παρ' ἐξ αὐτῆς δεικνύον, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ ὕψις ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς μετέχει, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆ Πατρὸς μετεχόμενον, τὸτο ἐστὶν ὁ ὕψις. Ibid.

*Unus ab uno——ac sic uterque Deus unus, cum inter unum & unum, id est, ex uno unum Divinitatis aeterna non est secunda natura. Hil. de Trin. l. 4.*

*Nemo ambigat naturam Autoris in Filii nativitate commisci. Id. l. 5.*

*Et per id unus est Deus, quia ex natura Dei Deus fit.——Unam autem illud non subsistentem naturam perimat in Filio, sed in Deo & Deo naturam Dei conservet unus.*

subsist-

subsisting Nature of the Son, but in God, and God preserves the Nature of One God. And therefore the true,

*Verum & absolutum & perfectum fidei nostræ Sacramentum est, Deum ex Deo, & Deum in Deo consisteri: non corporalibus modis, sed divinis virtutibus, nec natura in naturam transfusione, sed mysterio & potestate natura: non enim per dissectionem, vel protensionem, vel derivationem, ex Deo Deus est, sed ex virtute natura in eandem naturam nativitate subsistit. Eandem autem naturam inde ita, non ut natus sit ipse qui genuit, (nam quomodo erit ipse, cum genitus sit) sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est, in quibus totus est ipse, qui genuit: quia non ex alia genitus, neque aliud quam Deus est, quia non est aliunde quod genitus est. Hil. libid.*

absolute, and perfect Profession of our Faith is, To confess God of God, and God in God, not after the manner of Bodies, but by Divine Powers; not by transfusion of Nature into Nature, but by the Mystery and Power of the Divine Nature: For God is of God, not by dissection, protension, or derivation, but by the Power of the Divine Nature subsists by his Birth in the same Nature.

— Not so the same Nature, that he who is born, is he himself who begets; (for how is that possible, since he is begotten) but he who is begotten subsists in the same whole entire Nature, which is his whole entire Nature who begets.

And this Perfect Unity, Sameness, Identity of Nature, he resolves into the Mystery of the Divine Generation, *Virtute Naturæ, & Mysterio & potestate Naturæ*, for since he is not begotten of any other Substance or Nature, but of his Father's Substance, and that not after the manner of Bodies, by dissection, protension, or derivation, but by the Mystrious Power of the Divinity, which communicates it self whole and perfect, there must be the same One Divinity in

*Unius cujusque intelligentiam consulo, quid existimet in eo quod dictum sit, ex ipso. Utrumne ex altero intelligendum sit, an ex nullo, an ipse ille censendus sit. Ex altero non est, quia ex ipso est; id est, ne aliunde præterquam ex Deo Deus sit. Ex nihilo non est, quia ex ipso est; demonstratur enim natura unde nativitas est. Ipse non est, quia ubi ex ipso est, nativitas Filii refertur ex Patre. Hilar. de Trin. l. 6.*

both. And he appeals to every man's Understanding, what the natural Interpretation of these words are, That the Son is of the Father; for can of the Father signify, that he is of any other than the Father, or that he is of nothing, or that he is the Father himself? He is not of another, because he is of the Father; for a Son cannot be God, if he have any

any other Father but God, and therefore is God of God. He cannot be of nothing, because he is of the Father; and whoever is begotten, must be begotten of the Nature of him who begets. He is not the Father himself, because he is of the Father, and the Birth of the Son speaks a necessary relation to the Father.

Now a Son, who is so of the substance of the Father, as to be nothing but what he is from the Father, and to be all that the Father is, whole of whole, must have the same One Nature, Substance and Divinity with the Father; for whole of whole must be the same whole. And yet if he be so of the Father, as not to be the Father, but the Son, he must be distinct in substance from the Father. He is true and perfect God, but he receives his Divinity by his Birth; he is God of God, not God who begets, but God, who is begotten, not of nothing, but of his Father's substance, who is unbegotten.

And therefore though St. Hilary, and all the Catholick Fathers with him, reject all Corporeal Passions in the Divine Generation, all Corporeal Defection, Division, Efflux, or Emanation of the Divine Substance, which is incorporeal and indivisible, yet they all assert a true and proper generation of the Son, and an impassible production and prolation of him, whole of whole. And St. Hilary tells us, that for this reason the Arians, under a specious Pretence of condemning Valentinus his Emanations and Æons, denied the prolation of the Son from the Father, only to deny his generation; whereas some kind of pro-

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*Nescit enim in Deo portionem, sed scit Deum totum ex Deo toto; scit ex uno unum, non desectum, sed natum: scit nativitatem Dei, nec diminutionem esse gignentis, nec infirmitatem esse nascentis. Ibid.*

*Quod Deus est, Deus totum est—Deus ut est Deus, quid est permanet, & permanens Deum genuit. Ibid.*

*Deus qui ex Deo natus est, non utique natus ex nihilo est, neque de non extantibus natus est, sed nativitatis sua viventem habuit naturam, nec idem Deus, qui erat, sed Deus ex Deo qui erat natus est. Ibid.*

*Sed quia ex Deo Deus, neque per nativitatem suam Deo ademit, quod Deus est, neque ipsi in nativitate non Deus est, & quod Deus est non capit esse, sed natus ex Deo Deus est, & quod nascitur, id ipsum secundum humanam naturam sensum videtur esse prolatum, & ita ut prolatio ipsa nativ-*

lation

tas esse existimatur ; ideoque tentatum est per Valentini heresim prolationis nomen excludi, ne nativitatis veritas permaneret, quia prolationis intelligentia opinione terrena non multum esset à natura terrena nativitatis aliena. Ibid.

lation is essential to the very Notion of a Birth, which cannot be conceived without it ; and therefore we must not wholly reject all Prolation and Production of the Son from the Father, but only reject all Corporeal Emanations,

which are very imperfect Images of Divine Mysteries, and have nothing like the eternal generation of the Son, but only that the Son is truly begotten of his Father's Substance.

This is that adorable and unsearchable Mystery of the Divine Generation : The Son is truly and properly begotten, receives his whole Being and Nature from his Father, is substance of his Father's substance, whole of whole, and therefore one and the same substance with the Father ; not that substance, which is the Person of the Father, nor a new or another separate substance, as it is in human generations, but the nature and substance of the Father, born and repeated in the Nativity of the Son, as St. Hilary speaks : The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but One Divinity, One Infinite, Eternal nature and substance ; but they are thrice this One substance, and as perfectly and distinctly Three in this One substance, as any other Three are Three substances.

St. Austin was certainly in the right, when he asserted, That the Divine Nature and Essence must not be considered either as a *Genus* or *Species*, nor the Divine Persons as Individuals, and shews particularly the impropriety of each ; though he knows not under what Notion to conceive them, but inclines most to some common matter or substance, which is the same in all, as carrying the nearest resemblance and analogy

De quâ Pater substantia, & ipse substantia Filius, spiritusque substantia, sed ter ipsa substantia. Marius Victorinus Afer. hym. 3. Bl. Patr. Vol. 4. p. 258.

Filium non similem, sed eundem dicimus, quippe ex eadem substantia. Id. adv. Arium. l. 1. p. 183.

Non itaque secundum genus & speciem ipsa dicimus, sed quasi secundum communem eandemque materiam. Aug. de Trin. l. 7.

analogy in it : though this he does not very well like neither, of which more presently. It will be of great use briefly to consider this matter; for the difficulty consists more in want of words to express this Unity and Distinction by, than in the Notion it self.

The *singularity* of the Divine Essence and Substance in the *Sabellian* Notion of One Substance, the *Nicene* Fathers universally rejected, as irreconcilable with a real distinction of Persons, which destroys the Faith of a Real Trinity. A mere specifick Unity of Nature and Substance, which is a meer Logical Notion, falls short of the Natural and Essential Unity of the Godhead; and yet we have no word to serve as a middle Term between the Unity of singularity, and a specifick Unity of Nature. For there is no such Unity as this in Created Nature, and therefore no name for it; and yet the Unity of the Divine Nature in a Trinity of Persons, is neither of these, but bears some resemblance and Analogy to both. As to shew this briefly. The Unity of the Divine Nature is not a meer specifick Unity. A Species is only an Idea, or Pattern of Nature, according to which particular Creatures are formed; and such Creatures as are made according to the same Pattern, are specifically the same; and as far as we can observe this Correspondence and Ideal Sameness of Nature, so we rank them under the same Species. So that there can be no Species but among created Beings; for they must be all made, and made according to the same Original Pattern. But an Eternal and Necessary Nature was not made, and therefore not made according to any Pattern, nor can any other be made according to its Pattern; for what is made cannot be Necessary and Eternal. So that the Divine Nature can be but One, and One Numerical Nature is no Species; it can communicate its own Substance by an Eternal Generation and Procession, but it can't be a Pattern and Idea for any other Beings of the same kind, which are not its own Substance.



Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam & unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quadam subsistant, quamquam quicquid illud est, in his tribus explicatum sit; non enim aliquid aliud ejus essentia est præter istam Trinitatem; tamen tres personas ejusdem essentia, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus, tres personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus. — Cum dicuntur tres homines una natura, vel tres homines ejusdem natura, possunt etiam dici tres homines ex eadem natura, quia ex eadem natura & alii tres homines possunt existere. In illa vero essentia Trinitatis, nullo modo alia qualibet persona ex eadem essentia potest existere. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 6.

For this reason St. *Austin* rejects this specifick Unity; he distinguishes between saying, That the Divine Persons are *Una Essentia*, & *Unius Essentia*, One Essence or Substance; and that they are *ex Una Essentia*, of One Essence. The first may signify a natural Unity, and must do so when applied to the Trinity. The second signifies only a common specifick Nature and Unity. When we speak of men we may use either expression, that they are *One Essence*, or that they are *of One Essence*, because in both Cases, when applied to Creatures, *One Essence* signifies specifically as a common pattern of Nature, according to which

not only Three, but many Threes may be made: But the whole Divine Essence is in the Trinity, and cannot subsist in any other Person, and therefore is not a common specifick Nature.

But then there is something in the Divine Nature, as substantially communicated to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, which bears some analogy to a *Species*, and to a Specifick Unity; and for this reason the Catholick Fathers in their Disputes both with the *Sabellians* and *Arians*, frequently express the Unity of the Nature, as subsisting in Three Distinct Persons, by a Specifick Unity.

The Notion and Idea of a Common Nature, which subsists in many Individuals, is called a *Species*; the same common notion and definition belonging to all the Individuals of the same kind: Now if we believe the Doctrine of a Real Trinity, we must acknowledge, That the same One Divine Nature, which is originally in the Father, is communicated to the Son and Holy Spirit, and does subsist distinctly and substantially in all Three; and therefore has this resemblance

semblance to a *Species*, that it is a common Nature, which has the same Notion and Definition, and is the same in Three, but not merely by a Notional Identity and Sameness, but by the Real Identity of Substance; there being but One Divine Substance, unmade, uncreated, unbegotten, but communicated whole and entire to the Son by an eternal generation, and to the Holy Spirit by an eternal Procession: so that the Divine Nature is so far a *Species*, as by its actual communication to the Son and Holy Spirit, and its distinct subsistence in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it is in truth and reality a common Nature and Substance, which a *Species* is only in Notion and Idea. The Notion and Definition of human Nature in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, is the very same, and therefore there is a specifick Sameness and Unity of Nature between them. The Divine Nature in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the same, not merely in Notion and Idea, but Substantially the same; and therefore all the names of a Specifick Sameness and Unity, do in a more perfect and excellent manner belong to the Sameness and Unity of the Divine Nature, as Subsisting Perfectly, Indivisibly, and yet Distinctly, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: And when we speak of the Sameness of the Divine Nature, as subsisting distinctly in Three Divine Persons, we have no other words to express it by, but such as signify a Specifick Unity; and we must use such words as we have, and qualify their sense as well as we can.

As for instance: Those words, whereby we signify a common specifick Nature, which is One and the Same in all the Individuals of the same Species, are the best we have to express the Unity of the Divine Nature, as common to Three Persons, and thus the Catholick Fathers use them without scruple, and speak of the Unity of the Divine Nature, and of its being common to all the Three Divine Persons, in the same Words and Phrases, as they use concerning a common specifick Nature: Which leads some into.

into a great mistake, as if they meant no more by it but a specifick Sameness, and Unity of the Divine Nature; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one Substance no otherwise, than as *Peter, James, and John*, have one and the same Humane Nature: For the Divine Nature is not One merely *ἐν ὁμοιότητι*, but *ἐν ἀχώριστοι*, not in mere Notion and Idea, but actually, indivisibly, inseparably, One; nor is it a common Nature, merely as it has a common Name and Definition, but by an actual Inexistence in Three.

For the same reason it is very difficult what Three to call Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, so as to avoid the Heresies of both Extreams; for there is no Example of such Three in Nature: They are certainly Three, for the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, nor the Son the Father, or the Holy Ghost, and each of the Three is perfect God, and therefore an Infinite Mind, an Infinite Spirit, and the most Perfect Essence and Substance: And that Substance which is the Person of the Son, is not that Substance which is the Person of the Father, no more than the Person of the Son is the Person of the Father, or an unbegotten is a begotten Nature and Substance; and therefore in opposition to *Sabellius*, they asserted Three Substantial Persons, *τρία ἐννοήματα*, Three Hypostases, or Personal Substances, as *Hypostasis* signifies; *tria in substantia, tres substantias, tres res, τρία ἀχώριστα* and yet at the same time did assert, That there is but One Divine Nature and Substance, which indivisibly and inseparably, though distinctly, subsists in all Three.

For the understanding of which we must observe, That as the Divine Nature, which is common to Three, is not a mere Species, but is really and actually One and the same in all; so these Three Divine Persons, which have one and the same common Nature, are not in a strict and proper notion Individuals of the same common Nature: Though we  
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have no Names for these Three, but such as signify Individuals, as Persons, Hypostases, Subsistences, &c. and there being no Created Person, Hypostasis, or Subsistence, but what is an Individual.

To shew you the difference, with respect to the notion of an Individual, between the Three Divine Persons, and three individual Humane Persons, I observe, That every Humane Person is such an Individual as has a particular Humane Nature of his own, which is not the particular Nature of any other Person; the notion and definition of Humane Nature is the same in all men; but the same Numerical Humane Nature does not subsist in all, but every particular individual man has one particular individual Humane Nature appropriated to himself, that is, which is his particular Person; and as many particular Persons as there are, so many particular Humane Natures, and particular men there are.

But now the Divine Persons are not Three such Individuals as these; because they have not three individual Divine Natures, but the same One Divine Nature common to them all, originally in the Father, and communicated whole and entire to the Son by an Eternal Generation, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit by an Eternal Procession.

How impossible soever it is, for our finite Understandings, to comprehend these Mysteries of the eternal Generation and Procession, it is not so hard to conceive the difference between Three Persons who have One individual Nature common to them all, but subsisting so distinctly in each of them, as to make them Three distinct Persons; and Three Persons who have Three Individual Natures of the same Kind and Species.

As for Instance; Three Human Persons, which have Three individual Human Natures, are by the confession of all Mankind Three Men: But could we conceive One individual

dividual Human Nature, which originally constitutes but One Person, to Communicate it self Whole and Entire, without Division or Separation to Two other Persons, we must acknowledge Three Human Persons, each of which Persons is distinctly and by himself, True and Perfect Man, but not Three Men; for Man is a name of Nature, and if Persons can be multiplied without multiplying the Nature, (as we at present suppose) there must be Three Human Persons in One individual Human Nature, that is, Three Persons and One Man; but not Three Men, no more than Three Human Natures.

Thus it is with respect to the Divine Nature: Were there Three individual Divine Natures Self-originated and Independent on each other, though perfectly the same in their Notion and Definition; Three such Persons would be as Perfectly Three Gods, as Three Human Persons, that have Three individual Human Natures, are Three Men. But whereas the Scripture teaches, and the Catholick Church has always believed, there is but One Infinite, Self-originated, Divine Nature, Originally in the Father, and by Communication in the Son, and Holy Spirit; these Three Divine Persons are each of them True and Perfect God, but not Three Gods; because they have not Three Individual Divine Natures, but One Divine Nature subsisting distinctly, but Whole and Perfect in them all.

This, I think, may give us some Notion of One Numerical Common Nature, which is no Species, and of Persons, which are no Individuals. Sr.

*Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt; omisso illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellare tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantias vel personas, sicut appellantur tres equi, eodemque animalia tria, cum sit species equus, animal genus; neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta*

*Austin* shews particularly, how improper it is to call the One Divine Essence a Genus, and the Three Divine Persons Species; or to call the Divine Essence a Species, and the Divine Persons Individuals; for in both these cases we must multiply the name of Essence with the Species



*Species* and Individuals, as we not only say three Horses, but three Animals; and as *Abraham*, *Isaac* and *Jacob*, are three Individuals, so they are three Men; in consequence of which, we must not only say Three Divine Persons, but Three Divine Essences, not One Essence. But besides this, *One Essence* can't be a *Genus*, because what is but *One* can have no *Species*: nor can it for the same reason be a *Species*, because what is *One* can't be subdivided into Individuals, as though *Man*, considered as a *Species*, is divided into *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, yet *One Man* can't be subdivided into Three Men; for *One Man* is *One* single *Man*. Why then do we say, *One Essence*, and *Three Substances or Persons*; (which are *St. Austin's* words, who always renders the *Greek Hypostases* by *Substances*, and makes *Substances* and *Persons* equivalent) for if *Essence* be a *Species*, as *Man* is, there can be but *One Essence* in the Sense and Notion of *One Man*: which, by the way, he objects as a great Absurdity, for it is the *Sabellian Heresy*.

Thus far *St. Austin* was certainly in the right; but here I think, with all submission, this great *Man* missed the true Notion which he had so happily started. *One Essence* can't be a *Species*, because what is but *One*, can have no proper Individuals under it, as *One Man* can't be subdivided into Three Men: But then he might have applied *Individual* to *Essence*,

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est, & genus singulariter, tanquam diceretur tres equi unum animal, sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine. Quod si dicunt substantia vel persona nomine non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum, ut substantia & persona non ita dicatur, sicut dicitur homo, quod commune est omnibus hominibus, sed quomodo dicitur hic homo, velus Abraham, velus Isaac, velus Jacob, vel si quis alius qui etiam digito præsens demonstrari possit; sic quoque illos eadem ratio consequetur; sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac, & Jacob, tria individua, ita tres homines, & tres anima; cur ergo & Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus, si secundum genus & speciem & individuum etiam ista differimus, non ita dicuntur tres essentia, vel tres substantia & persona. Sed hæc, ut dixi, omitto, si essentia genus est, una essentia jam non habet species. Non sunt ergo tres species unius essentia pater & filius & spiritus sanctus. Si autem species est essentia, sicut species est homo, tres verò illa quas appellamus substantias sive personas, sic eandem speciem communiter habent, quemadmodum Abraham, Isaac, & Jacob, speciem qua homo dicitur communiter habent, non autem sicut homo subdividitur in Abraham, Isaac, & Jacob, ita unus homo & in aliquos singulos homines subdividi potest, omnino enim non potest, quia unus homo jam singularis homo est: cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias vel personas subdividitur? Nam si essentia species est, sicut homo, sic est una essentia sicut unus homo. Aug de Tr. l. 7. c. 6.



which *One Essence* naturally led to ; and have found Three Persons in *One Individual Essence*, which would not indeed be Three Individuals of *One Species*, but Three Singulars of *One Individual Nature*. And though *One Man*, who is but *One Individual of Human Nature*, can't be subdivided into Three proper Individuals, yet to conceive *One Individual Human Nature* to be communicated whole and entire, without division or separation to Two others, is the truest Image of Three distinct Persons in *One Individual Essence*, and the only possible Explication of *totus ex toto*, whole of whole, which is the true Catholick Faith. Such an *One Essence* is no *Species*, but yet is a common Nature ; and such Persons are not what we call Individuals, as not having each of them a particular individual Nature to himself, but yet they have a particular singular Subsistence as other Individuals have, and are each of them by himself as true and perfect God, though all but *One God*, as every individual Man is true and perfect Man.

It seems plain to me, that this is the very Notion St. Austin intended, in what he immediately adds, the *communis eademque materia*, that *One common Matter* which he prefers before either a generical or specifick Unity. That the same *One Divine Essence* is common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; not as if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, had their Subsistence out of the same common Essence, as three golden Statues are made of the same Gold ; this perverse Exposition of the *Homoousion* was rejected with abhorrence by the Catholick Fathers, as I shewed before ; and St. Austin expressly rejects it here, and therefore though these Three Persons are *One Essence*, *una essentia* & *unius essentia*, he will not allow us to say, that they are *ex una essentia*, out of *One Essence*, as golden Statues are of, or cut out of the same Gold ; nay, nor as Three Men are of the same Nature, that is, which is specifically, not identically the same, as I observed a little above. Now remove these

these two Notions of One common Essence, and there remains only a third, which is that very Notion I now insist on, One and the same Essence common to Three, by a perfect communication of the same One whole undivided Essence.

And this answers exactly to that Notion of *St. Austin*, which he could find no Image of in Nature ; that the Essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is

not more or greater all together, than the Father alone, or the Son alone : but these Three Substances or Persons, if they may be so called, all together are equal to each single Person, which a carnal Man cannot apprehend. But now

*Non enim major essentia est pater & filius & spiritus sanctus simul, quam solus pater aut solus filius ; sed tres simul illa substantia sive persona, si ita dicenda sunt, aequales sunt singulis, quod animalis homo non percipit. Ibid.*

if we believe a whole of a whole, we must confess that it is impossible it should be otherwise ; for if the Son have the same whole Essence with the Father, if the Father be the whole Divine Essence, if the Son be the same whole Divine Essence, and so the Holy Ghost ; the same whole, though subsisting distinctly in Three, can never be greater nor less than it self : Three Persons are more in number than One, but One and the same whole undivided Essence can be but one whole.

This is the true Notion (and there can be no other Catholick Sense made of it) of what the Fathers so universally teach, That there is in the Trinity *Una Substantia*, but not *unus subsistens*, One Substance, but not one only who subsists ; when yet at the same time they as universally acknowledge, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, the Holy Ghost Substance ; and neither of them each other : That the Person of the Father is the Essence and Substance of the Father, the Person of the Son the Substance of the Son ; that the Person is not one thing, and the Essence and Substance another, as *St. Austin* upon all occasions teaches : Now that there should be but One

Substance, and Three substantial Subsisting Persons, can never be reconciled any other way, than by the perfect Communication of the same whole undivided Essence and Substance of the Father to the Son and Holy Spirit.

For the same reason they tell us, That the Father is Wisdom, the Son Wisdom of Wisdom, and yet but One Wisdom; the Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Holy Ghost Spirit, and yet not Three Spirits, but One Spirit; and the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, yet there are not Three Gods, but One God: For εἰς Θεός is μία ἔσις, One God is the One Divine Essence; and One Divine Essence, though distinctly subsisting in Three, is but One God, though every Divine Person having the whole Divine Essence in himself, is True and Perfect God. Three Divine Natures, though specifically the same, and perfectly alike, would unavoidably be Three Gods, as three particular Humane Natures are three men; but τριουπρόσωπον μόνον, a thrice subsisting *Monade*, as *Dionysius the Areopagite*, calls the Divine Essence, is but One in Three, and therefore but One God in Three, because but one Divine Essence.

In this Sense we are so often told, That in the Trinity there is *alius & alius*, another and another, that is, distinct Subsisting Persons, who are not each other, but not *aliud* in the Neuter Gender; not another Essence or Nature, not only not specifically another, as the *Arians* asserted, but not another Nature, though of the same *Species*, but the same One Individual Nature communicated whole and undivided to more than One.

Upon the same account, the *Father* is acknowledged by all Catholick Writers to be the *One only God*, and they answer the Objection of *Tritheism*, by this very Principle, That they own but One Eternal, Self-originated, Unbegotten Father, and therefore but One God; They grant, That Three Fathers would be Three Gods; but when there

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is but One Eternal Father, though he have an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, there can be but One God.

Now what is the meaning of this? Is it because none is, or can be God, True and Perfect God, but he, who is God of himself, Self-originated and Unbegotten? This would destroy the Perfect Godhead of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and answer the Objection of Tritheism by denying the Trinity. And it is certain this could not be their meaning, because they owned the Sameness and Equality of Nature, of Majesty and Glory, of Wisdom and Power in Father, Son and Holy Ghost, only allowed the Prerogative of the Father *ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ὑψίστος*, in the name and relation of Father: And when the *Arians* would prove the diversity of Nature between Father and Son, by this Argument, That the Father is unbegotten, and the Son begotten, they denied that this inferred the least difference or inequality of Nature.

*Tertunda est hac regula, quā non minor est filius, sed de patre esse intrinatur, quibus verbis non inaequalitas, sed nativitas ejus ostenditur.*  
Aug. de Trin. l. 2. c. 2.

Now if the Divine Essence be God, and there be a perfect equality of Nature between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though the Father be unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from both; I desire to know, Why Three Persons, each of which is True and Perfect God, though one be unbegotten, another begotten, and a third proceeds, be not as much Three Gods, as Three that are unbegotten, are Three Gods.

The natural Notion of God is an Eternal, Unmade, Uncreated Essence, which gives being to all Creatures; but neither Begotten, nor Unbegotten, belongs to the natural Notion of God, but is matter of pure Revelation; and therefore Three that are Eternal, as to the natural Notion of God, are as much Three Gods, as Three that are Unbegotten.

The true Account of it then is this, That One Father, who is unbegotten himself, but begets a Son, is but One eternal Divine Essence, which he eternally communicates whole and undivided to the Son, and therefore is but One Divine Essence still, and therefore but One God: whereas Three Unbegottens, who do not communicate in each other, and neither give to, nor receive from any other, must be Three absolute independent Divine Essences, and therefore Three Gods. And therefore they do not call the Father the One God, merely because he is ἀγέννητος, unbegotten, but as he is πηγή δέσπτης, the Fountain of the Deity, who communicates his own

ὅτι ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἀγέννητῳ καὶ  
μὲν πᾶσι θεότητι, διὰ τοῦτο  
πάντες αὐτὸν εἰ μὴν θεόν,  
ἀλλ' ὡς ἄρμονον ἡν, καὶ ἀκαρπον  
ζώντῳ λόγῳ, καὶ σεβίας ἀληθι-  
νῆς. Ath. contr. Gregal. Sa-  
bell. Vol. 1. p. 651.

whole Divine Nature and Essence to the Son and Holy Spirit: For this reason *Athanasius* condemns *Sabellius*, for saying that there is but One only God in the Jewish Notion of One God; not meaning thereby, that there is but One only who is unbegotten, and who only

is the Fountain of the Deity; but that there is but One God, as having no Son, nor living Word or true Wisdom.

It were easy to enlarge here, and to improve this Observation for the Explication of several difficult Passages in the Fathers; but this may satisfy us, that the Catholick Fathers by *One Substance* did not mean a meer specifick, but a natural and essential Unity.

S E C T. VI.

*A more particular Inquiry what the Catholick Fathers meant by the ταυτότης ἑσίας, the Sameness and Identity of Substance in the Holy Trinity.*

**W**HAT I have discoursed in the last *Section* concerning the *Homoousion*, and *One Substance* of the God-head, will receive a new Light, if we consider what the Catholick Fathers meant by the ταυτότης ἑσίας, and the τὸ ἀδιαιρέτον, the Sameness, Identity, and Inseparability of Essence and Substance, whereby they explain the Unity of the Divine Substance, and the Unity of the God-head.

The Learned Jesuit *Petavius* has two large *Chapters*, to prove that both the *Greek* and *Latin* Fathers did assert the Singularity and Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature and Substance. And I freely grant, That as Singularity is opposed to a mere specifick Unity, he has unanswerably proved it; but why he or the Schools should chuse a word to represent the Sense of the Catholick Fathers by, concerning the Unity of the Divine Substance, which they themselves rejected as *Sabellianism*, I can't account for; for *singularis* & *solitarius*, μονῆς, μονοῦς, ταυτοῦς, that is, the Singularity of Nature and Substance, were rejected as suspected terms at least, though they allowed the ταυτότης ἑσίας, the Sameness and Identity of Nature; the *Unitas*, but not *Unio*; the Unity, but not Union; which *St. Hilary* so often calls *impia Unio*, a wicked Union, as destroying the real distinction of Persons, and consequently the true Faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

And



Quoniam in ejusmodi nominum usu, cum singularem & individuum Dei esse naturam dicimus, proprietas est observanda significationis: ne sic singularis credatur esse natura, ut communis esse nequeat: & sic individua, ut in una tantum existat persona, vel hypostasi, qui fuit Sabellianorum ac similium hæreticorum error, ob quem nonnulli Patres istis repudiatis vocibus, ita divinitatem unam esse docuerunt, quomodo natura qualibet communis pluribus una dicitur. Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 14. sect. 11. p. 443.

And to do *Petavius* right, he rejects such a notion of singularity, as denies the Divinity to be a Common Nature; as if it could subsist only in One Person or *Hypostasis*, which he owns to be *Sabellianism*; and that for this reason some of the Fathers (he might have said, most, if not all the Ancient Fathers) did reject the use of such words, and taught, That the Divine Nature is One, as any other Nature is, which is common to more than

one: And acknowledges, that *St. Hilary*, *St. Ambrose*, *St. Austin*, and others, do expressly deny that God is a singular Being, and reject the Notion of singularity from the Divine Essence.

Now such a singularity as this, as admits of a real and substantial Communication of the Divine Nature, whole of whole, to the Son and Holy Spirit, is certainly the Doctrine of the Catholick Fathers, and what they meant by the *τὴν ἑνότητα* the Sameness or Identity of Nature in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which they placed the Unity of the Godhead.

That there must be this Sameness and Identity of Nature in all Three Divine Persons, is evident from the last Section; for a whole of a whole, must be identically the same Whole; not so the same, as one singular Whole is the same with it self, but as the same Whole, which thrice subsists, without the least conceivable difference, is the same with it self in Three. And that this is what the Fathers meant by that Sameness of Nature, wherein they placed the Unity of the Godhead, it were easy to prove by numerous Authorities; but some few may serve in so plain a Case.

One St. Hilary will furnish us with Testimonies enough of this nature: He places the Sameness of Nature between Father and Son in this, That the Son has by his Eternal Nativity the Nature of the Father, without the least dissimilitude or diversity; *indifferens, indissimilis, indiscreta Natura*; and this makes the Father and Son One God: But then at the same time he carefully and expressly rejects the Notion of Singularity, Solitude, and Union.

Petavius quotes several Passages out of St. Hilary, to prove this Singularity of the Divine Essence; but all that they amount to, and all that he pretends to prove by them, is, That the Unity between Father and Son is greater than a Specifick Unity, or a Communion in the same Specifick Nature; and this I readily grant; and he might, if he had pleased, have transcribed half St. Hilary de Trinitate & de Synodis, to the same purpose: And this is so universally the Doctrine of all the Greek and Latin Fathers, that there was no difficulty in multiplying Authorities to this purpose.

And I dare appeal to any man who is competently skill'd in these Matters, and will impartially examine the Testimonies Petavius has produced for the Singularity of the Divine Essence, Whether the most pertinent of them all prove any more than this, That the Nature of the Father, without the least alteration or diversity, is communicated whole and perfect, without any division or separation of Substance, to the Son, (of which more presently); not that the same singular Nature and Substance which is the Person of the Father, is also the Person of the Son; which makes the Father and

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Son.

*Nec sit dissimilis in genere, quia diversitatem substantie geniti ex substantia Patris Filii similitudo non recipit, & omnem in se Divinitatis Paterna, qualis & quanta est, formam inuolubiliter Dei Filius & imago completitur. Et hoc verum esse Filium, Paterna scilicet forma veritatem, coimaginata in se natura perfecta similitudine revolvit. Hilary de Syn.*

*Retinetur itaque in Patre & Filio natura indifferentio similitudo per essentia: naturam, non tamen damnum Persona affert, ut unus sit missus & mittens, similitudo Natura — quia cum gignens & genitus unus esse non possit, non tamen diversa Natura sint natus & generans. Ibid.*

*In Natura Dei Deus unus est, ita tamen ut & Filius Deus sit, quia in eo Natura non differens sit; & cum Deus ex Deo sit, non potest non uterque Deus esse, quorum per generis indifferensiam — non discernatur essentia. Ibid.*

Son to be but One Person, as well as One Nature and Substance ; but so One, that the One Nature, Substance, and Divinity, which is the Father, is wholly and perfectly the same in the Son, excepting this, That one is the Father, and the other the Son : Which is not the Unity of Singularity, which is properly the Unity of a Person ; but the Unity of Identity and Sameness, which is the Unity of One Individual Nature, which is common to more than one. I don't intend to transcribe all the Quotations of *Petavius*, which he has alledged to this purpose ; but yet I will give such a general View of them, as may satisfy any impartial Reader as to this Point ; not to confute *Petavius*, who, as I have already observed, rejects the *Sabellian* Singularity ; but to undeceive those who mistake *Petavius* and the Schools too, as will appear more hereafter.

I shall only premise, That it had become the Learning and Acuteness of *Petavius* to have reconciled the Fathers with themselves ; for they were Wise Men, and true Reasoners, and knew very well what a Contradiction meant ; and therefore we ought not easily to believe that they perpetually contradicted themselves.

*Petav. de  
Trin. l. 4.  
c. 13.*

He acknowledges and proves, That the Catholick Fathers did teach a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature ; That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have One Divinity, as *Peter*, *James*, and *John* have one Human Nature ; and he alledges the Authorities of the same Fathers, to prove the Singularity of the Divine Nature, That it is an exact, perfect, indivisible Monad : And this also they do plainly teach : But then he should have considered how to have reconciled these two ; for it is certain, that if the Divine Nature be an indivisible Monad, it can't be a Species in the common Notion of a Species ; and if it have any thing anolagous to a Species, it can't be a singular Monad, because it must be a common Nature, which subsists in more than one ; and Singularity is properly the Unity of a Person, not of a com-  
mon

mon Nature. *Petavius* was very sensible how inconsistent these two kinds of Unity are; and yet that the Fathers did most commonly explain the Unity of the Divine Nature by a Specifick Unity, and did more cautiously mention the Unity of Singularity; he might have said, did absolutely reject it, as *St. Hilary* does in a hundred places. And was not this a much better reason, so to qualify the Notions of a Specifick Unity and Singularity of Nature, as to reconcile them to each other, than to make the Fathers contradict themselves; which destroys three parts of their Reasoning about the Unity of the Godhead, and very much weakens the Authority of all the rest?

The Apology which *Petavius* makes for the Fathers will by no means save this matter. He tells us, That if we speak of God according to the exact Rules of Philosophy; the Three Divine Persons are not so of One Substance or Homoussion, as *Peter, Paul, and John*; and so far he is in the Right, as I have already shewn: But then what he adds is a very heavy Charge upon the Catholick Fathers; That they taught this almost in every Dispute they had with the *Arians*. Now if this be true, what Apology can be made for them? for, it seems, they confuted the *Arians* upon false and dangerous Principles, and were either ignorant themselves of the true Catholick Faith, or did prevaricate in it.

But let us hear what Excuse he makes for them: He says, They are not to be blamed for this, nor accused of Ignorance, as if they understood nothing of the Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence, and owned no other Unity but what is like the Unity of Human Nature; for they did know the first, but very prudently used the Specifick Unity, as an Example whereby to repre-

*Si ad exactam Philosophiæ regulam qui de Deo habetur Sermo dirigatur, non sic ejusdem Substantiæ, id est, οὐκ ὁμοῦτοι, sunt Tres Personæ, uti Petrus, Paulus, & Joannes; quod nomen antiqui in omni fere sua disputatione ponunt, quam contra Arianos institunt. Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 425.*

*Neque verò culpandi ob id illi erunt, aut inficitia dammandi, tanquam numeralem Unitatem Divinæ Essentiæ funditus ignorarint ac solam ejus, quæ in natura inest humana, similem agnoverint. Nam & priorem illam intellexerunt, ut mox ostendam; & prudenter nihilominus hæc sunt in-*

exemplum uti posteriore, Specificque propriâ. Etenim sic illi adversus Arianos obtinendum sibi esse meminerant, ut scirent Sabellianam quoque pestem esse vitandam; in quam ab illa fugienti præcepti lapsus erat, ac labricus. Itaque modum hunc adhibendum orationi suæ putarunt; ut summam illam conjunctionem, & ut Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur, æqualem providam, parcius inducerent, ne Sabelliana solitudini & singularitatis locus dari videretur; alteram verò quæ speciei convenit, libentius usurparent: Quæ cum ad Arianorum retinendam insaniam satis illis erat, tum ab Sabelliani suspitionis dogmatis, & calumniæ longe eos absesse monstrabat. Ibid.

sent the Divine Unity: But if there be nothing in the Divine Nature, which is analogous to this Specifick Unity, and may be truly and properly represented by it, as the best Image we have in Nature, I cannot understand either the Prudence or Honesty of this. Yes, he says, they were to take Care so to oppose *Arianism* as to avoid *Sabellianism*, which otherwise they might easily slip into: And therefore so tempered their Style as to speak more sparingly of that highest Unity and Conjunction, which Gregory Nyssen calls a *Perfect Monad*, lest

they should seem to favour a *Sabellian* Solitude and Singularity, but did more freely use the Examples of a Specifick Unity, which was sufficient to confute the *Arians*; who asserted the Diversity and Dissimilitude of Nature between Father and Son, which cannot be between those of the same Kind and Species; and yet at the same time shewed how far they were from *Sabellianism*.

That this is a very false account of the matter appears from the former Sections of this Chapter, and will appear more fully from what is to follow; but if it were true, it would be a very scandalous account; for the sum of it is this, That to oppose *Sabellianism* and *Arianism*, the ancient Fathers advanced a false Notion of the Divine Unity, and dissembled the true one: Which is no great commendation of the Catholick Faith, that it needs such Arts, nor of the Catholick Fathers to use them; when both these sorts of Hereticks, as I have often observed, charged the Catholick Faith with Tritheism, and made that the very Reason of their Heresies. Can any man think it prudent in these Fathers to conceal or very cautiously mention the true Notion of the Divine Unity, and to insist on a Specifick Unity,



Unity, which, if we believe *Petavius*, is no better than Tritheism; which would rather have confirmed them in their Heresies than have confuted them?

These two Heresies being in two extremes, the Catholick Faith must be in the middle, and the only true Medium between them, is a real distinction of Persons, without the least diversity of Nature; and this is what they meant both by their Monad, and Specifick Unity, the perfect Sameness and Identity of Essence, actually, indivisibly, inseparably subsisting in Three, a thrice subsisting Monad, or Individual Essence or Substance, but not one Singular and Solitary Substance. And if this be all that *Petavius* means, as he seems to own, we are agreed in this Point: But because some think that he means more, and sometimes he says what seems to imply more, I shall shew that he has proved no more.

He begins with *Athanasius*; who tells us, That the Father gives all to the Son; and yet that the Father hath the same All himself; for the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father.

*Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 13. p. 427.*

Which only proves, That the Father communicates his own Whole Nature to the Son; that he gives the Whole to the Son, and has the whole himself; which

ἐν ᾧ ὁ πατήρ ὁλοκλήρως ὁ πατήρ  
τὸ ὕψος, πᾶντα πᾶν ὁ πατήρ,  
πᾶντα ἔχει: ὁ γὰρ τὸ ὕψος διότις,  
τὸ πατρὸς διότις ἐστίν. *Ath. Or.*  
4. p. 489.

is the Same, but not One Singular Solitary Godhead, for it is the Whole in Two: But yet it is the Godhead of the Son, and the Godhead of the Father.

*Ath. or. 5.*

And the Father and Son are Two, but yet the Godhead an inseparable, indivisible Monad. And therefore this Wonderful Divine Monad must not be divided into Three Godheads. And having quoted some other Passages of that Father to the same purpose, he concludes with a very remarkable one out of his Exposition of Faith. That we must not conceive Three Divided and Separate Hypostases

ὅτι τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μνημονεύουσιν  
ὡς καὶ ἑαυτὰς, ὅσως συνιστάται  
in



οὐτως ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔστι λόγι-  
 σασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐαν ὡς τὰ  
 ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν. ἀλλ' ὡς πατὴρ  
 ἐκ πατρὸς ποταμὸς γηγενήσεται,  
 ὃ διηρέθη καὶ τὰ δύο ὁρίματα, καὶ  
 δύο ὀνόματα πυρᾶν οὐται. ὥστε  
 ὃς ὁ πατὴρ ὡς ἐστίν, ὥστε ὁ ὡς  
 πατὴρ ἐστίν; ὁ ὃς πατὴρ ὡς πατὴρ  
 ὢν, καὶ ὁ ὡς πατὴρ ὡς ὢν. ὡς  
 ὃς ἕκ ἐστίν ἢ πατρὸς ποταμὸς, ὡς  
 ὁ ποταμὸς πατρὸς, ἀμρότητα ἢ ἔν,  
 καὶ τ' αὐτὸν ἐστίν ὡς ὡς τὸ ἐκ τῆς  
 πατρὸς εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν μεταστρεφ-  
 ῆσθαι. ὥτως ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰς τὸν  
 ὡς θεότης, ἀρρεύσας καὶ ἀδιαίρε-  
 τος πυρᾶν. Ath. in exposf.  
 fidci.

in the Godhead, after the manner of  
 Bodies, as it is among men; which, like  
 the Pagans, would introduce a plurality  
 of Gods: But as the River, which pro-  
 ceeds from the Fountain, is not divided  
 from it, though they have Two Forms  
 and Two Names; for the Father is not  
 the Son, nor the Son the Father; but  
 the Father is the Father of the Son,  
 and the Son the Son of the Father.  
 For as the Fountain is not the River,  
 nor the River the Fountain, but both are  
 One; and the self-same Water (τ' αὐτὸν  
 ὡς) flows out of the Fountain into the  
 River (and so is the very same in both)  
 so is that Divinity, which is communi-

cated from the Father to the Son, without any Efflux,  
 Emanation or Division. This *Petavius* lays great Strefs on,  
 and it is a most exprefs Testimony against such a meer Spec-  
 ifick Unity in the Godhead, as there is between Three In-  
 dividuals of the same Species, as between Three Men.  
 But then it is as exprefs and positive a Testimony against a  
 Singular and Solitary Divinity, and confirms the Notion of  
 the perfect Communication of the same Individual Nature  
 and Godhead from the Father to the Son, which is as per-  
 fectly One and the Same in both as the Water is, which  
 flows out of the Fountain into the River: But with this  
 difference, That the manner of Communication is not the  
 same, not by Efflux and Emanation after the manner of  
 Bodies (ἀρρεύσας, which I wonder *Petavius* should translate  
*peremitter*) not as Waters flow out of the Fountain,  
 which the Catholick Fathers always disowned; but by the  
 Ineffable Mystery of the Eternal Generation, as I have  
 shewn above.

The next Father he appeals to is Gregory Nazianzen, whom at other times he has much ado to excuse from Tritheism. And he tells us, *That there is but One God, because there is but One Divinity, and those who are of him (ἐξ αὐτοῦ of this One God, that is, the Son and Holy Spirit) are reduced to One, tho' we believe them to be Three: viz. by that One Divinity, which perfectly subsists in each of them: And adds, If we may express this in short, it is One Undivided Divinity in Three Distinct Persons* (for so μεμερισμένοι must here signifie, not Divided or Separate, but Distinct) *like the Union of Three Suns, which would give but One Undistinguished Light.* One would wonder how this should prove One Singular Divinity, which it expressly rejects, unless Three Suns are One Single Solitary Sun, and give but One Single Solitary Light. Such Expressions as these prove no more than One Undivided Divinity in Three, not One Singular Divinity.

But the same Father starts an Objection; That since the wisest Philosophers owned but One Divinity in all their Gods, as we acknowledge but One Humanity in all Mankind, and yet they believed Many Gods, as we acknowledge, there are Many Men, though but One Common Humanity: Why must not we confess, That Father, Son and Holy Ghost are Three Gods also, though they have but One Common Divinity? This Petavius says, *Causæ jugulum petit*; and it is indeed an unanswerable Objection against a meer Specifick Unity of Nature, which is Multiplied in Individuals, and therefore must Multiply Gods as well as Men; but the Perfect Communication of the Same Whole Individual Nature does not Multiply Natures or Divinities, though it Multiplies Persons. And this is the very

ἡμῶν εἰς θεός, ὅτι μία θεότης,  
καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀναφο-  
ρῶν ἔχει, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τὴν. Greg.  
Naz. Orat. 37.

ἅλλ' ἀμείβεσθαι ἐν μεμερισμένοις,  
εἰ δὲ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ἡ θεότης,  
καὶ οἷον ἐν ἡλλοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἐχρηστούς  
ἀλλήλων, μία τῇ αὐτῆς σύγκρασις.  
Ibid.

very Answer *Greg. Naz.* gives, which I had observed before from *Damascen*, the distinction between *ὑποστάσις* & *οὐσία*. That there is not One Common Subsisting Human Nature in all Men, and therefore Human Nature is One, only in Notion, not in Reality, every Particular-Man's having a Particular Human Nature of his own; and therefore there are as many Men, as there are Subsisting Human Natures; but the Divine Nature is One and Common, not in meer Notion and Idea, but by an Actual Communication without Division or Separation: This proves it to be One Individual, but not a Singular Nature; for it is *ἀμείωτος* & but *ἡ μεμελόμενος*; and One Undivided Divinity, though in a Wonderful and Ineffable manner it Actually Subsists in Three, can be but One God.

His other Quotations out of the *Greek Fathers* are all to the same purpose, and are resolved into the force of such words as *ἓνας*, & *μὸνός*, *μία φύσις*, *μία θεότης*, *τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, & *ἑστῆς* & *ἑκῆς*, and their rejecting not only Three Gods, but Three Natures, Three Essences, Three Divinities; and that not *ἑτεροειδής*, which specifically differ from each other, but even *ὁμογενής*, and *ὁμοειδής*, those which are specifically the same, as *Sophronius* speaks; which are unanswerable Testimonies against a mere Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature; but confirms what I have all along asserted, That the same One Undivided Divinity Subsists actually and inseparably, but distinctly in Three, and therefore is One common Individual, but not a Singular Nature: And the *Latin Fathers*, to whom he appeals in *Chap. 14* speak all to the same purpose, and one Answer serves them all.

To give an Account of the Meaning and Reason of these Expressions, which *Petavius* insists on to prove the Singularity of the Divine Essence, will be much more instructing and satisfactory, than to comment upon every particular Quotation: And therefore I shall, 1. Enquire what the Fathers

thers meant by this *ἑνότης*, Sameness and Identity of Nature. 2. How they proved the Unity of the Godhead from this Sameness of Nature. 3. How they distinguish'd the Divine Persons in this Sameness of Nature.

1. As for the first, That the Fathers by this Sameness and Identity of Nature did not mean One singular, solitary, Personal Nature, is abundantly evident from what I have already discours'd : The Fathers, in opposition to *Sabellius*, universally rejected One singular, solitary Nature and Substance, as destroying a Trinity of Real Persons ; for in their Philosophy, One singular Substance is but One Person ; and therefore Three Persons, each of which is by himself True and Perfect Substance, can't be One singular Substance ; which is Proof enough, that when they explain the Unity of the Divine Substance by its Sameness and Identity, they could not by this Sameness and Identity mean Singularity ; but such a Sameness as is between Real, Distinct, Subsisting, Substantial Persons, who are every way alike, without the least Change or Variation : Which the *Greek* Fathers commonly call *ἑνότητα* & *ὁμοιότης* ; the *Latin* Fathers, as *St. Hilary* especially, *Indifferens* & *Indissimilis Natura*.

That this is the True Notion of this Sameness and Identity of Nature appears from those Representations which the Catholick Fathers make of it, *viz.* That it is such a Sameness and Identity, as there is between a Perfect, Living, Subsisting Word, and that Perfect Mind, whose Word it is ; such a Sameness as is between Father and Son, between the Prototype and the Image, between the Seal and the Impression ; between Life of Life, Wisdom of Wisdom, Power of Power, &c. neither of which is the other, and yet both are the same.

That God hath an Eternal Word, which was in the Beginning, was with God, and was God ; that this Eternal Word was the Son of God, and this Son the Perfect Like-

ness and Image of his Father, the Brightness of his Glory, and the Express Character of his Substance, is the known Doctrine of the Scripture and Fathers.

That this Word is not like the Word of a Man, but the Substantial, Essential, Living, Subsisting, Omnipotent Word; and this Son a True, Natural, Genuine Son, and this Image a Substantial, Living Image, and a Living, Substantial Character of the Father; that this Word is *ὁ λόγος*, a Distinct Person from him, whose Word he is; that the Son is not the Father, nor the Father the Son, but that they are *alius & alius*; that the Image is not the Prototype, nor the Prototype the Image, nor the Character and Impression, that whose Character it is; I have already proved to be the Received Doctrine of the Catholic Fathers against the *Sabellians*, and were there any occasion for it, I could confirm it with innumerable Testimonies: The only Question then is, What this Sameness and Identity of Nature is. And if we will allow for that difference there is between God and Creatures, we may learn, as the Fathers teach us, what this Sameness of Nature between the Divine Persons is, from the Sameness and Identity between a Mind and its Word, between Father and Son, between the Prototype and the Image, the Seal and its Character and Impression.

Now what this Sameness and Identity is, is so visible, that a few words will explain it.

It is not the Sameness of Singularity; for the Mind and its Word, a Father and Son, the Prototype and its Image, the Seal and its Impression, are visibly Two: Nor is it the Sameness of meer Likeness and Similitude, how Exact and Perfect soever we conceive that Likeness to be; for every one must confess, that there is a vast difference between the Perfect Likeness of Two Minds, Two Men, Two Originals, and Two Seals, and that Sameness, which is between a Mind and its own Word, a Father and his own Son, a Proto-



Prototype and its own Natural Image, and the Seal and the Impression which is made by it ; just as much difference as there is between Similitude and Nature, or between a perfect Likeness of Nature and Identity.

And therefore the complete and adequate Notion of Simeness and Identity between Two, who are really distinct in Subsistence and Personality, and are not each other, must be this, That an Eternal Unproduced Person produces another in his own Nature, Whole, Perfect, Entire, without the least Conceivable or Possible Difference or Diversity ; excepting this, That One Produces, and the Other is Produced : For Two such, who distinctly subsist, are really Two Persons in One and the Same Individual Nature.

Thus it is with a Perfect Mind and its Perfect Living, Subsisting Word, which is perfectly it self, as its own Perfect, Natural Image ; Two in Number, but One *in Re*, in Nature. Thus it is with a Father and such a Son, as is Whole of Whole, they are Two and the Same, the Son the Natural Living Image of the Father, in whom the Father sees Himself, and is seen in Him, as Christ tells us, *He that hath seen me hath seen the Father* : Which is agreeable to the common Forms of Speech, to call the King's Picture or Image, the King, as the Catholick Writers frequently observe ; which would be exactly and philosophically true, were it a Perfect, Natural, Living, Inseparable Image : And this is what the Catholick Fathers call *τ' αὐτότητα εἰσας*, the Sameness or Identity of Nature ; as might easily be proved by numerous Citations : But I will content my self with a few.

The *Nicene* Fathers taught, That the Father and the Son were *ἐμῆσοι*, of the same Nature and Substance : This, as I observed before, they explain by *ἁπαράλλαντος ὁμοιοι*, and *χ' πάντα*, a Perfect Invariable Likeness and Similitude, without the least Difference and Diversity ; and



this is what they call τ'αὐτότητα τῆς οὐσίας, the Sameness and Identity of Nature, which cannot be the Sameness of Singularity, but the Sameness of Indifference and Indiversity; such a Sameness as is between Two, which are perfectly alike, and differ in nothing from each other.

Athanasius gives this account, why the Nicene Fathers taught, That the Son was *Homoousios*, of the same Substance with the Father, that they might signifie that the Son was

\*Ομοούσιον ἢ καὶ πατεῖ τὸ ὕδν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὁμοιον τὸ ὕδν, ἀλλὰ τ'αὐτὴν τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ τῇ πατρὶς ἢ σημαίνουσι. Ath. Decr. Syn. N. p. 269.

Τὴν τ'αὐτήν καὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πατέρα σὺν — ἢ καὶ πατέρα τὸ γνήσιον, λόγος τὴν καὶ τὸν ἰδιότητα, καὶ τὴν ἀπαράλλακτον ὁμοιότητα τῇ ἀπαυράσματι καὶ τῇ φωτί. Ibid. p. 272. Τὴν ἐνότητα τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὴν τ'αὐτότητα τῇ φωτί. p. 273. Τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ διότητι καὶ εἶδος. Cont. Arian. Or. 1. p. 300. Τοῦτον ἢ τὸ λόγον, οἷον ἐστὶν ὁ γνήσιος αὐτὸν. Or. 2. p. 338. Ἡ ἀναλλοίωτος αὐτῆς πατερικὴ οὐσία. p. 346. Κατὰ τὴν πατερικὴν ἰδιότητα. p. 365. Κατὰ τὴν πατερικὴν αὐτῆς διότητα. p. 352. Τῆς οὐσίας τὴν ἰδιότητα. 365. Τῇ τῇ πατρὶς διότητι διαφέρουσα, διὸ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος. 367.

\*Εἰκὼν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ὁμοούσιος τῇ πατρὶς. \*Εἰκὼν ἢ ὡς αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰς τὴν γέννησιν καὶ τὴν πάντων. \*Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν,

not only like the Father, but so of the Father, as to be the same in Likeness: Now the Sameness and Identity of Likeness cannot be the Sameness of Singularity; and yet this he calls the Sameness and Identity with his Father; That the Son is the Natural Genuine Son of the Father, and the Word God's own proper Word; and the invariable Likeness between the Light and it's Splendor; the Unity of Nature and the Identity of Light: With several Expressions, noted in the Margin, which signifie the most perfect Sameness in Nature.

Thus the Son is the Image of God, the Character of his Substance, Nature and Essence; which is the Language of Scripture, and the constant Doctrine of the Fathers: And from hence they conclude the ἰδιότης and τ'αὐτότης, the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature between Father and Son, or a perfect Likeness and Similitude. By which Argument they prove, That he is no Creature, but that he is Eternal and Omnipotent, and all that his Father is; because

cause this is the Nature of a Perfect Living Image, to be perfectly all and the same that the Prototype is.

Thus St. Basil tells us, That the Seal is seen in the Impression, and the Prototype is known by its Image, from that Sameness and Identity which is in both: Which he calls also *ὡς αὐτῇ τῇ εἰσά απανταλλακτον*, & τῇ θείας εἰσας τῇ ιδιότητι.

This sufficiently proves what the Catholick Fathers meant by this Sameness and Identity of Nature; not the Sameness of singularity, which they always rejected as *Sabellianism*, but such a Sameness as is between Two, who have the same Individual Nature, subsisting so distinctly in each of them, as to make them Two, but without the least conceivable or possible Change or Alteration; such a Sameness as is a perfect likeness and similitude, which cannot be in singularity. But because *Petavius* lays great stress upon these Expressions, it will not be amiss to give two or three direct and positive Proofs of this matter.

*Athanasius* expressly cautions us against this, That when we hear that the Son hath all that the Father has, this invariable likeness and sameness of what the Son has, may not mislead us into *Sabellianism*, to say, That the Son is the Father himself: And tells us, That the Father gave all to the Son, and that the Father hath all again in the Son; and the Son having all, the Father again has the same all; for the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father.

τίτν εἰ τῷ ιδιότητι εἰ τῷ ὁμοίωσι ἔχει. Ath. Decr. Syn. Nic. p. 280.

Ὅτως ἐν μέτρῳ τοῦ ἀποσφραγίσματος, ὁ οὗ πυπώσις χαρὰς καθεστῶ. δι' οὐκ ἔστι ἡ γνώσις τοῦ ἀρχιτύπου γίνεσθαι συγκειμένων ἡμῶν διανοήσι τῶν ἐν ἐστέρῳ ταυτότητα. Bas. ad Eunom. c. 1. p. 718. Tom. 1. Par. 1638.

Ἵνα ἔν μὴ τίς βλέπων τὸ ὕδρ ἔχοντα πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατήρ, ἐν τῷ ἀπαλλάκτι ὁμοιωθῇ εἰ τῷ αὐτότῳ ὡς ἔχει, πλαυνθεῖς χεῖρ Σαββίλου ἀσέβησι νομῶσαι αὐτὸν ὡς τὸ πατήρ — Ath. C. Ar. O. 4. p. 488.

Καὶ γὰρ πάντα διδοὺς ὁ πατήρ τῷ υἱῷ, πάντα πάλιν ὁ πατήρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ἔχει· εἰ τῷ υἱῷ ἔχει, καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἔχει τὸ, πάλιν ὁ πατήρ ταῦτα ἔχει· ἢ γὰρ τῷ υἱῷ διδοὺς τὸ πᾶν διδοὺς ἐστὶν. Ibid. p. 489.

Πάλιν εἰκόνα φησὶν — ἵνα  
 δείχθῃ ὅτι τ' αὐτὸν πρὸς πατρὸς  
 ὅτι, καὶ ἑτερον ἦ; — βλέπων  
 διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἐκείνου, ὃ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν  
 οἶον πατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἀπεικονισμῷ  
 βλέπων, ἢ ὃ δ' αὖ δόλου τ' αὐτὸν  
 ὡς, καὶ ἑτερον. Basil. Ep. 43.  
 Gr. Nyss. d. ediffer. Essent. &  
 Hypost.

then he would be upon all accounts the same, and not another, which destroys the Nature and Character of an Image.

Exclusa est assertio volentium nominibus tantum Patrem & Filium predicare, cum imago omnis ejus ad quem coimaginatur, species indifferens sit. Neque enim ipse sibi quisquam imago est, sed eum cujus imago est, necesse est ut imago demonstret. Imago est itaque rei ad rem coequanda imaginata & indiscreta similitudo. Est ergo Pater, est & Filius, quia imago Patris est Filius. Et qui imago est ut vere imago sit, speciem necesse est & naturam & essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habere Auctoris. Hil. de Synod.

Gregory Nyssen, or St. Basil, for the same Treatise is ascribed to them both, proves both the τ' αὐτὸν and the ἑτερον, from the nature of an Image; That the Son is both the same with the Father, and another; for so an Image is both the same with its Prototype, and yet another; not the Prototype it self. And adds, that we may see the Father in the Son, not considered as unbegotten, for

The same account St. Hilary gives of an Image, That it signifies a perfect likeness and similitude of Nature between Two; for no Man is his own Image, but the Image represents the Prototype: And therefore there is a Father, and there is a Son, if the Son be the Image of the Father; and being an Image, the Son must necessarily have in himself the Nature and Essence of his Father. Which he urges as a direct Confutation of the Sabellian Singularity. But there is no need of multiplying Authorities in this

Case, since it is so very obvious to every one, who ever look'd into the Fathers, That the τ' αὐτότης, & κοινότης φύσεως, the Sameness and Identity, and the Community of Nature, though they differ in their formal Notions, yet both equally belong to the same Divine Nature; and the same Identical Nature, which is also a common Nature, can't be One in the Notion of Singularity.

2dly. Having thus shewn what the Catholick Fathers meant by the Sameness and Identity of Nature in Father and

and Son, I proceed to shew, That herein they placed the Unity of the Godhead, the *μία θεότης*, the One Divinity, and what account they give of this matter.

The Defence they generally make for the Unity of God in a Trinity of Divine Persons, is reducible to two Heads; this Sameness and Identity of Nature, and the *τὸ ἀδιαίρετον*, or inseparable Unity; which Two make up the compleat Notion of the Divine Unity; but I must now consider them apart.

That the Catholick Fathers did resolve the Unity of God into this Sameness and Identity of Nature, That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they are Three Real, Proper, Distinct Persons, yet have the same One Divine Nature, which subsists whole, and perfect, and distinct, without any Change or Variation in all Three; and that therefore they are not Three Gods, but One God, is so very plain, that there is no need of multiplying words about it. The One God in the Catholick Language is One Divine Nature in Three Persons; and this *μία εἰσα*, or *θεότης*, this One Essence, and One Divinity, is *ἐνότης*, *ἰδιότης*, *τ' αὐτότης εἰσας*, which are often used as equivalent terms, the Unity, Identity, Propriety, and Sameness of Nature; as *τὸ ἐν καὶ τ' αὐτόν*, one and the same. All those Passages quoted by *Petavius*, though they do not prove the Singularity of the Divine Nature, yet prove the Unity of the Godhead, by the perfect and invariable Sameness of Nature, in the sense now explained.

*Pet. de  
Tri. l. 4. c.  
13, & 14.*

But the Testimony of *St. Basil* against the *Sabellians* is so full and express to this purpose, that I shall represent this matter in his Words, wherein he agrees with all the other Catholick Fathers.

Though ( Father and Son ) are Two in Number, yet are they not divided in Nature; nor does he who says Two Persons, alienate them from each other.

*Ἔστι θεός, ἐν ᾧ πάντες. Ἔστι  
θεός ὃ καὶ ὁ υἱός, καὶ ὁ λόγος,  
ἐπειδὴ τ' αὐτὴντα ἔχει ὁ υἱός ὡς  
ὁ πατήρ· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐν πατρὶ*

There

αὐτοῦ διότι, καὶ ἄλλω ἐν ᾧ,  
ὡς ἐτέραν φύσιν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐτέ-  
ραν ταύτῳ. Basil cont. Sabel-  
lianos. p. 521.

there is not One Divinity in the Father, and Another in the Son; nor One Nature of the Father, and another of the Son. When therefore you would distinguish the Persons, number them distinctly, the Father by himself, and the Son by himself; but if you would avoid *Polytheism*, confess but One Nature in them both, which rejects both the *Sabellian* and *Anomæan* Heresy. But when I say One Na-

Ὅταν ὃ εἴπω μίαν, μὴ δύο εἶ-  
ναι μεριδιῖντα νόε, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ  
ἀρχῇ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ ὕδν ὑποτά-  
τα· ἢ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐν μιᾷ  
ἐσῆς ὑπερκειμένης· ἢ ὃ ἀδελφὰ  
ἀδελφῶν, ἀλλὰ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν  
ὁμολογῶν, τὸ ὃ τὸ ἐσῆς τ' αὐ-  
τῶν. Ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός,  
ἢ ἀετάρματι ποιεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ  
φύσιν ἡμεῖς· ἐν ἀπομειδιῖς  
τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλὰ ἑβρόσι π-  
λαίς τέλει· ἀπολάμψας. Ibid.

ture, you must not imagine that Two Persons are made of One Nature, as it were by a division of it into two Parts; but only conceive the Son subsisting of the Father, as his Principle and Original: Nor must you conceive that Father and Son are so of One Nature, as partaking of some One Same Nature and Substance antecedent to them both; for we do not call them Brethren, but Father and Son, which signifies the Sameness and Identity of Nature. For the Son is

of the Father, not made by his Command, but begotten of his Nature; not by Division of the Father's Substance; but the Son shines forth whole and perfect from a perfect Father, without any diminution of him. And therefore, as he proceeds, do not charge us with Preaching Two Gods, or *Polytheism*; for we Preach not Two Fathers, or Two Principles, and therefore not Two Gods, which was the Impiety of *Marcion*: Nor do we make the Father and Son of a different Nature, unlike to each other, as the *Anomæans* do. — But where there is but One Principle, and One Begotten of it, One Prototype, and One Image, the Unity is preserved: Because the Son who is begotten of the Father, and



and imprints his Father's Nature and Essence on himself, as an Image, he has an invariable Likeness, as a Son he retains the same Nature and Substance. Now as a man who calls the King's Image or Picture the King, does not make Two Kings, nor deny him whose Image it is, to be the King, much less reason is there for such an Imputation in this Case. For here, when we hear of the Image of God, we must conceive nothing less than the Brightness of his Glory. But what is this Brightness, and what is this Glory? That the Apostle adds, The perfect Impression or Character of his Substance. And therefore Substance is the same with Glory, and Character with Brightness: So that the Divine Glory remaining perfect and undiminished, emits a perfect Splendor and Brightness: And thus the very Nature of an Image expounded as it becomes God, confirms the Faith of One Divinity. For the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; because such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such as the Son is, such is the Father: And thus Two are One, because the Son in nothing differs, as receiving no other Form or Character, but that of his Father. And therefore I say again, One and One, but an undivided Nature, and never-failing Perfection. And therefore there is One God, because by both the same perfect Divine Form and Nature is seen wholly and perfectly subsisting in both.

Ὅτι ἢ μία μὲν ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἢ ὃ τὸ εἶς αὐτῆς, καὶ ἢ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ, μία καὶ ἡ εἰκων, ὁ μὲν ἐνὸς τῷ λόγῳ ἡ διαφύειρε. Διότι ἡμνηθεὶς ὑπάρχων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, καὶ φυσικῶς ἐκ τῶν ὡν ἐκ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶντα, ὡς μὲν εἰκὼν τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ἡμίσημα τὸ ὁμοούσιον διασώζει. Ibid. p. 522.

Ἐκεῖ δὲ ὅταν ἀκούσῃς εἰκόνα, ἀπαύγασμα νοεῖ καὶ δόξης. καὶ ὃ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα; καὶ τῆς ἡ δόξα, αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν δόξης ὁ Ἀπόστολος λέγων, καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν ὡν ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν ἡ ὑπόστασις, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὁ χαρακτὴρ. ὡς παλαιὰς μανύσκει καὶ μὴ δὲν μειωμένης καὶ δόξης, τέλειον περιέχει τὸ ἀπαύγασμα. καὶ ὥτως ὁ τῆς εἰκὼν λόγος διότι πᾶσι περὶ αὐτοῦ, πᾶσι ἐνὸς ἡμῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ τῆς διότητος. ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐκ τῶν τῶν ὅτι καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ, οἷον ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐκείνῳ οἷον ὅτι. ὡς τὸ ἐν ἡμῶν, τὸ μὴ διαλλακτικόν, μὴ δὲ καὶ ἔπειτα ὅτι καὶ ἔξινον χαρακτὴρα νοεῖ καὶ ὡς πάλιν ἐν λόγῳ, ὡς καὶ εἶς, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἀμείβεσθαι, καὶ ἡ τελειότης ἀνταλλάττει; εἶς ἐν διότι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἐν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ὁλοκλήρως δὲ ἀμφοτέρων διὰ τοῦτο. Ibid.



This I think is as plain as words can make it, both what St. Basil meant by the Sameness and Identity of Nature, and that herein he placed the Unity of the Godhead; and were there any occasion for it, it were easy to confirm this by the concurrent Suffrages of *Athanasius*, *Gregory Nyssen*, and *Gregory Nazianzen*, *St. Cyril*, and other Greek Fathers, almost in the same words.

St. Hilary and St. Ambrose, to name no more of the Latin Fathers, are so express in placing the Unity of the Godhead in this perfect Sameness, Indifference, Indiversity of Nature between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that there is no need of any other Art, but barely to represent their Words; and therefore I shall only refer my Readers to some

*Hæc est vera nati-  
vitas in-  
telligentia,  
& fidei nostra, quæ ex natura divina unitate, unius indifferentisque divinitatis veritatem in patre  
& filio conficitur, absolutissimum sacramentum. Hil de Trin. l. 7. p. 86. Bas. 1570.*

*Ex æquata virtus est per naturæ indissimilis unitatem. P. 87.*

*Omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens, neque natiuitas aliquid possit habere, nisi datum sit.*

*Neque aliter potuit aut debuit filius à patre distingui, quam quod natus sit, nec tamen differe-  
rens decerneretur. Ibid.*

*Non confunditur itaque aut aboletur natura, ne filius sit, nec tamen rursus adimitur natura, ne  
Deus sit, nec discernuntur diuersitate, ne unum sint, neque quod unum sunt id potest præstare, ne  
uterque sit. P. 88.*

*Ego & Pater unum sumus: Ut quod unum sunt, nec diuersum nec solitarium crederetur, non alia  
in utroque per natiuitatis & generationis proprietatem existente natura. Confessionem unius in  
utroque & consimili natura. 89.*

*Quia non differt, nec degenerat natiuitas, dum Dei filius, non aliud quam Deus est.*

*Unum dixit, ne fiat discretio potestatis; sumus addidit, ut patrem filiumque cognoscas, quo per-  
fectus pater perfectum filium genuisse credatur. Et pater & filius unum sint, non confusione, sed  
unitate natura. Ambr. de fide, l. 1. initio.*

*Non enim pater ipse qui filius, sed inter patrem & filium generationis expressa distinctio est; ut  
ex Deo Deus, ex manente manens, ex pleno plenus sit. Est enim plenitudo divinitatis in patre,  
est plenitudo divinitatis in filio, sed non discrepans, sed una divinitas. Nec confusio quod unum  
est, nec multiplex quod indifferens. Quanto magis pater & filius unum sunt, ubi nec substantia  
nec voluntatis ulla est differentia. In te igitur est Deus per unitatem natura, & non est Deus  
præter te per proprietatem substantiæ, repulsam differentia. Ibid.*

It cannot be denied, but that all the Fathers unanimously agree in this Account of the Unity of the Divine Nature in Three Distinct Persons: Which should make modest men

men very cautious of charging it with a direct Contradiction to all Reason and Philosophy: But Modesty and Reverence to the Catholick Fathers, are none of the prevailing Virtues of this Age.

But is it indeed such a Contradiction to say, That the same Nature, which is perfectly and in every thing the same in Three, is but One Nature in Three, and that such Three have not Three Natures, but One Nature? Is it such a direct Contradiction to Sense and Reason, to say, That there is *alius*, & *alius*, & *alius*, in the Trinity, but not *aliud*? That there is Another, and Another, and Another Person in the Holy Trinity; but that there is nothing in any One of these Persons, which can be called Another thing from what is in the other Two? This is so far from a Contradiction, that it seems plain Sense, nay, plain Demonstration to me, That Three Persons who have nothing in themselves but what each of them have, without the least conceivable Variation, are in Nature but one and the same; and though each of them be Another Person, yet not Another Thing, or Another Nature.

There are several Examples in Nature which justify this distinction between *alius* & *aliud*, and must make all thinking men confess that they cannot speak properly without it. I would not be mistaken in this matter, and therefore desire the Reader carefully to observe, That I do not alledge these Instances which follow, as Resemblances of the Trinity, but only as Examples of a perfect Sameness and Unity in Nature; where we must confess, That the thing is but One and the same, and yet that there is Another and Another: And if there be any Images of this in Nature, there is no reason to call this a Contradiction in the Faith of the Trinity.

Let me then ask this plain Question: When Five hundred Men hear the same Man speak, do they all hear one and the same Voice, or Five hundred Voices? It will, I think, be

granted, that it is but one and the same Voice which they all hear, and yet it is heard five hundred times, and is distinctly in five hundred Ears: The Voice is essentially one and the same in all, and yet no man dares deny that the Voice in *Peter's* Ear is another from that Voice which is in *John's* Ear; and therefore is Another and Another, but not Another Thing: And were a Voice Essence and Substance, there would be One Nature, Essence, and Substance, in a Plurality of *Hypostases*.

Thus Sight furnishes us with as many Examples of this as Hearing: When five hundred Men see the same thing, the Object is one and the same, and yet is Another and Another, according to the number of the Persons who see it: Is one and the same in Nature, and subsists the same, and yet distinctly in each eye.

Sight and Hearing approach nearest to an Incorporeal Nature, and therefore give us the nearest Resemblances of a Spiritual Sameness, Unity, and Distinction: But we have still more perfect Images of this, in what is more perfectly Spiritual.

The same Notion and Idea, though it subsist in Ten thousand Minds, is perfectly the same in all. A perfect true Idea of any thing, is and can be but One; and therefore how many Minds soever it subsist in, it must be one and the same in all; but yet the Idea in the Mind of *Peter* is not the same in Subsistence with the Idea in the Mind of *Paul*: It is Another and Another, and yet the same Idea in Nature and Essence: As suppose the perfect Idea of Humanity, or Human Nature, and the perfect Idea of the Divine Nature; if they be true and perfect, they are perfectly the same in all the Minds in the World; and nothing but the different Notions men have of things, can multiply such Ideas.

Now if we advance but one step higher, we shall plainly see what this Unity of Sameness is; what the true Notion  
of

of it is, and how far it reaches : For though this be absolutely essential to the Divine Unity, yet as I have already noted, and will appear more hereafter, this is not the compleat and adequate Notion of it.

Let us suppose then that Human Nature, for instance, did subsist as perfectly the same in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, as the true and perfect Idea of Human Nature is one and the same in all ; that a Man were nothing else but the living subsisting Idea of Human Nature, without the least change or variation in Nature to distinguish one from another : I say, in such a Case as this, would not Three such Persons be perfectly one and the same, ἐν λόγῳ ἑότητος & ταυτότητι ἑότητος, in the Sameness and Identity of Nature, which would be as perfectly and invariably the same, as the common Notion and Idea of Nature ? Would not Human Nature be as perfectly the same in Three Persons or Subsistences, as the Idea of Human Nature is one and the same in Three Minds ? Or could we in proper speaking, with reference to this Sameness of Nature, any more say that there are Three Men, than that there are Three Humanities, when a Man is nothing else but the subsisting Idea of Humanity ? Would not, as far as this Sameness and Identity reaches, Human Nature be a μία, and a κοινὴ φύσις ; not merely ὡς ἁπλοῦς, but ~~καθ' ἑαυτήν~~, both One and a Common Nature, not merely by a Logical and Notional Unity and Community, but by an actual Subsistence in all, without the least difference or diversity ? As the Idea of Human Nature is both One, and Common to the whole Kind.

This indeed is but an imaginary Case, as to Finite Creatures, who never were, and never can be so perfectly One and the same, as their Idea is ; but yet it is the properest and most sensible representation we can make of the Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature, which has really and actually all that Sameness and Identity which we only suppose in Creatures to help our Conceptions of the Divine Unity ;

Unity ; how different Hypostases may be One in Nature by this Sameness and Identity of Nature.

The Divine Nature and Essence is more perfectly simple and uncompounded than any Notion and Idea which we can frame of it ; and therefore must subsist as simply as the simplest Idea, and consequently must be as perfectly one and the same in all Three Persons of the Trinity, as the same Idea is one and the same with it self : And though this be not the whole notion of the Sameness and Identity of Nature, which requires not only two perfect Sames, but that one be of the other without division or Separation ; yet this is essential to this Notion, and there can be no Identity of Nature without it : This is what the Catholick Fathers intended in many Passages, which some Modern Writers have so miserably mistaken and misrepresented, as to charge those Wise men, and Learned Philosophers, with the most wild and absurd Conceits, and those great Advocates of the Catholick Faith with the worst of Heresies, even Tritheism it self. I can't do right to my Cause, without doing right to these great Lights of the Church, in giving a plain account of this matter.

And to explain what they meant by this Sameness and Identity of Nature, and to shew how groundless this Imputation of Tritheism is, I shall begin with their natural Proof and Demonstration of the Unity of God against the Pagan Polytheism, which they unanimously resolve into *this Sameness and Identity of Nature*. They prove, that there can be but One God, and One Divinity, because the Divine Nature is not capable of the least conceivable change and diversity, which is necessary to make a Number : For what is, and always must be the same with it self, cannot be another, or a Second Nature ; and One Divinity is but One God.

This they prove from all the Notions which we have of God, especially that comprehensive One of an Absolute and Perfect

Perfect Being; for Absolute Perfection is, and can be but One, without any possibility of change; for all change and diversity must be either for the better or for the worse, and Absolute Perfection can admit of neither; and without diversity and alterity there can be but One. An Infinite Nature, which nothing can distinguish from it self, can be but One; and could we imagine any thing to be added to, or taken from it, to make this distinction, it would destroy, not only its Unity, but its Infinity too; it would indeed make a Number, but not of absolute perfect Beings.

If we consider the Divine Perfections by themselves, it is impossible to conceive any difference or diversity, and consequently any number in them: Is not Eternal Truth, and Infinite Wisdom, and Omnipotent Power, always one and the same? Can Eternal Truth, and Infinite Wisdom in any thing vary from it self, to make two Eternal Truths, and Infinite Wisdoms? Now remove all possible diversity, and you necessarily destroy a plurality of Gods; for a Perfect Sameness and Identity must reduce us to the belief of One God: For what is perfectly the same, is not many, but one.

τὸ ἓν τὸ δῶμα πῶς πῶς (forte τῆς πίστεως) περὶ ἑαυτοῦ.

Ἀλλ' εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς διό-  
τητος λόγος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἰδιότη-  
τι ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ διλογον εἰς κα-  
μῶν, ἀνάγκη πῶς καὶ εἰς  
διότητος ὁμολογίαν συμβαλεῖται  
πῶς πανταπόρου καὶ τὸ πᾶν  
τῶν διῶν φαντασίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀ-  
γαθὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, τέτε σφῶν  
καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀσώτως λέγουται,  
ἢτε ἀφαιρεσία καὶ αἰδιότης, καὶ πᾶ-  
σα εὐσεβὴς διάνοια, καὶ τὸν ὁμο-  
λογεῖτο ἔσπον, πίστες καὶ πάντες  
λέγον διαφορεῖς ὑφαιρέσεις, συ-  
ναιρεῖται κατ' ἀνάγκην τὸ καὶ  
διῶν πᾶν ὁπὸ τοῦ δῶματος,  
τῆς διὰ πάντων ταυτέτης, εἰς  
Greg. Nyss. Catech. Or. Praef.

Well! But can't there be more than one of these Eternal, infinitely Wise, infinitely Good, and Omnipotent Natures? No: For if this Nature must of necessity be always the same, and is unmade and self-originated, it can be but one: For though in Created Natures several of the same kind may be made according to the same Pattern, there being nothing in the Idea of any Created Nature which hinders the multiplication of its Individuals, yet a Nature which subsists of



it self; and is absolutely uncapable of any diversity, and consequently of number, can be but One; for a Self-sub-sisting Nature must subsist according to its own Essential Idea, that is, according to its own Nature, and that is but One; for as far as we can judge of these Matters, what we cannot possibly conceive should ever be Two, we must conclude to be One.

But besides this, these Fathers observed, That if there were more than one Self-originated Divinity, or more Divine Natures than one, they must be divided and separated from each other; for if to the Sameness and Identity of Nature you add an inseparable and indivisible Union too, it is impossible they should be more than One. And yet two or more such divided and separated Natures are inconsistent with the Notion of a Divine Nature and Essence, which is *ἀπερίγραστα*, Uncircumscribed, and Omnipresent; whereas two Divided and Separated Natures, which are not where each other is, must be Circumscribed, and not Omnipresent, and this destroys the absolute Perfection of both; for a confined and limited Presence, as it is an imperfection it self, so confines and limits all other Perfections, as it confines Wisdom, Power and Goodness within a certain limited Sphere of Action.

And now it may be, some may think that these Arguments conclude as strongly against a Trinity of Divine Persons, each of which is by himself True and Perfect God, as against a plurality of Divided and Separate Divinities; and upon second thoughts, I suspect this may be what our *Considerer* intended in those surprizing Arguments, of the Unity of Idea, and the Unity of Position and Place, to prove, that there can be but one single Person, in the true and proper notion of a Person, for *an Intelligent Person*, in the Trinity; this to be sure is the Argument which a *Socinian* Writer alledges with so much triumph out of *Athenagoras* to disprove the Trinity, though that very Ancient and  
 Learned

Learned Writer understood very well the difference between Polytheism and the Trinity, and at the same time confutes the one, and professes the other ; which might have made that Author suspect, that he did not understand the true force of this Argument, since not only *Athenagoras*, but all the other Fathers, thought it a good Argument against Polytheism, and at the same time a Confutation of the Charge of Polytheism against the Faith of the Trinity.

*Gregory Nyssen*, and *Damascen*, and many others, having confuted the Pagan Polytheism, or plurality of Gods from the Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature, which can admit of no change or diversity, and therefore not of number ; they immediately proceed to consider the distinction of Persons and Hypostases in the perfect Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature, in opposition to the *Jewish* Notion of One God, for One Single and Solitary Divine Person.

And here they undertake to prove by Natural Arguments (of which possibly more hereafter) that the τὸ θεῖον, or Divinity, must have an Eternal Subsisting Word, which is Life, Wisdom, Power, all the same in his own Person that God is, but yet another Person : For the τὸ θεῖον is not ἄλογον, the Divinity is not without its Coeternal Word, and Coessential Reason and Wisdom ; and the same they teach and prove concerning the Eternal Spirit ; so that they make Father, Son, and Spirit, to be essential to One Divinity, not as parts, but as perfectly whole, and the same in Three distinct Hypostases, which they think necessarily included in the Perfection of One Divinity, as Reason and Word is essential to a Created Mind. This is what they mean by the μία θεότης ἐν τρεῖσι τελείαις ὑποστάσεσι, One Divinity in Three Perfect Hypostases ; not that Three Hypostases are united, as it were *ex post facto*, into One Divinity ; but that One Divinity does subsist Eternally, Essentially, and Inseparably, in Three Hypostases, which are necessary

Gr. Nyss.  
cat. or. c. i.

to compleat the Notion and Definition of One Divinity. Thus it is certain *Melanchton* understood it; and therefore rejects the Definition which *Plato* gives of God, That he is an Eternal Mind, the Cause of all Good in the World; for though he owns it to be True and Learned, when rightly explained, yet he says it is defective, and must be supplied by the Gospel Revelation. That God is a

*Deus est essentia Spiritualis, intelligent, verax, bona, pura, iusta, misericors, liberrima, immensa potentia & sapientia, Pater aternus, qui Filium imaginem suam ab aeterno genuit, & Filius imago Patris coeterna, & Spiritus Sanctus procedens à Patre & Filio, &c. Melanct. loci Theol. de Deo.*

*Spiritual Intelligent Essence, Eternal, True, Good, Just, Merciful, most free, of Infinite Power and Wisdom, the Eternal Father, who from Eternity begat a Son, his own Image, and the Son, the Coeternal Image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, proceeding from Father and Son.*

So that the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity is but One Eternal Coessential Divinity; that were there more Divinities than One, there must of necessity be more Trinities also, according to the Doctrine of these Fathers; which is evidence enough, that this Argument against a plurality of Divinities from the perfect Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature, which can't be multiplied, can't concern a Trinity of Real Subsisting Persons in the same One Eternal Undivided Divinity: For the same One Divinity is not multiplied by a Trinity of Persons Coeternal and Coessential; if this be the Nature and Unity of the Deity, to subsist whole and perfectly in Three, which was the constant Doctrine of the Fathers, and which this Argument don't oppose; nay so far from it, that it as evidently proves the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons, as it confutes a Plurality of Godheads and Divinities; for if the Sameness and Identity of Nature will not admit of a Plurality of Divinities, then if Three are perfectly One and the same in Nature, they are but One Divinity, One God. Thus the Incircumscribibility or Omnipresence of the Divine Nature is a good Argument against a Plurality of God's, or Divinities, which must

must be separated, if they be more than One, and therefore circumscribed, or of a limited and confined presence; but it is no Argument against a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of Essence, which are all mutually in each other, and therefore equally Unconfined and Omnipresent, and perfectly One by an Essential and Inseparable Union. And are not these Fathers now like to prove very notable Tritheites, who prove the impossibility, that there should be more Divinities than One, and the perfect Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Divine Persons, from that perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature which is between them?

But yet for all this Tritheites they are and must be, if they acknowledge Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be One God, in no other sense than *Peter, James, and John*, are one Man; that is, because they agree in the same common Nature, which has the same notion and definition, and is upon that account One and the same in all. This is what they are charged with, and I should not have wondered at it, had only some Careless and Unskilful Readers charged them with it, for they do say something which at first view may look like it; but then such Sayings as manifestly contradict their avowed Doctrine, not only in other places of their Writings, but in those very Places where these Sayings are found, ought in all Reason and Justice to be expounded only by way of Analogy and accommodation, as containing some imperfect Image and Resemblance of that, which Nature has no proper and adequate Example of. This must be allowed in all the Natural Representations which are made by the Catholick Fathers of the Unity and Distinction of the Ever-blessed Trinity; or there is not one of them, but what literally and Philosophically applied, would furnish out some new Heresy: This I have already shewn in the Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature, which the *Nicene* Fathers did teach in a qualified Sense; though it appears from all I have said in the last, and this present Section, how far they

were from thinking the Divine Nature to be a meer Species, or Logical Notion, though it has this resemblance to a Species, that it is One and Common, but not merely ἐν ὁμοιοῖα but πρὸς ἕνα, not in meer Notion and Idea, but by an actual Subsistence and Inexistence in all Three, being as perfectly, wholly, indivisibly the same in all, and in each of the Divine Persons, as a Specifick Nature is Notionally and Ideally one and the same in every individual of the same kind, which, as I have made appear, is that ταυτότης, Sameness and Identity of Nature, wherein they place the Unity of the Godhead. And yet this is the only foundation of the present Charge, that they make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be One God only by a Specifick Unity, as Three Individuals of the same kind and Species, suppose *Peter, James, and John* are one Man. That all this is a mistake, is evident, because these Fathers do not resolve the Unity of the Godhead into a meer Specifick Unity of Nature; and the occasion of this mistake is great Inadvertency, as will appear in a very few words.

*Gregory Nyssen* is principally charged with this Paradox, and in vindicating him, I shall vindicate all the rest.

Πέτρος, καὶ Ἰάκωβος, καὶ Ἰωάννης ἐν μιᾷ ὄντες τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι, τρεῖς ἀνθρώποι λέγονται, καὶ ἐδὲν ἀποποι τοῦ σωτημίου καὶ τῷ φύσιν, εἰ πλείους ἔιν ἐν τῷ τῆς φύσεως ὀνόματι, πληθυντικῶς ἀειδμενός, — πῶς ὅτι οὗ μυστικῶν δειμάτων τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογῶντες, καὶ ἐδεικνύοντες αὐτὸν τῷ καὶ φύσιν διαφορῶν ἐνοῶντες, μαχόμεθα τρέπον πνα τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ, μίαν μὲν τῷ δεόμῃ τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τῷ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, λέγοντες; τρεῖς ὃς θεὸς λέγουσιν ἀποροῦντες. *Greg. Nyss. ad Ab- labium, Vol.2. p.448.*

The Question which *Ablabius* desired him to resolve, was this, That since *Peter, James, and John*, though they have but one common Humanity, are yet called three Men; and no man denies, but that the name of Nature may be multiplied, when there are more who are united in the same Nature, how comes it to pass that we contradict this in the Mystery of the Trinity? that we acknowledge Three Hypostases, who have the very same Nature, without the least difference or diversity, and yet teach, that the Divinity of Father, Son, and Holy

Holy Ghost, is but One, and forbid saying, that there are Three Gods?

Now the better to understand the Father's Answer, we must observe that this was an *Arian* Objection against the *Homoousion*, or the perfect Sameness, Indifference, and Equality of Nature between Father and Son: For the design of it was, as St. Gregory himself observes,

*to reduce them to this dangerous Dilemma, either to assert Three Gods, which is unlawful; or to deny the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost, which is impious and absurd.* If they denied the Sameness and Equality of Nature, then the Son and Holy Ghost are not True and Perfect God, consubstantial with the Father; or if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost

have the same One Common Nature, and are perfectly consubstantial, then they are Three Gods; as *Peter, James, and John*, who have the same One Common Humanity, are Three Men; and there is the very same reason for calling Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Gods, that there is for calling *Peter, James, and John*, Three Men; that is, the same Nature common to them all.

This was the Objection St. Gregory was to answer; and therefore his business was to prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not, and ought not to be called Three Gods, as *Peter, James, and John*, are and may be called Three Men; and therefore he must prove, That they are neither Three nor One, in the same sense that Three Men are Three and One; for if they were, they would be as truly and properly Three Gods, as *Peter, James, and John*, are Three Men; and no more One God, than they are One Man; which had been to give up the Cause to the *Arians*, instead of answering their Objection.

Ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βίας τοῦ διαζήματος ἐν παντός εἶναι ἀπεμ-  
φανόντων συνεχθῆναι καὶ τὸν πα-  
τέρα νῦν, καὶ ἡ πρῶτος λέγειν δεῖς,  
ὅτις ἀδελφὸν, ἢ μὴ ἀδελφὸν τῶν  
ἐστὶν τῷ ἵπῳ καὶ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι τὸν  
διδότω, ὅτις ἀδελφὸς τῷ ὁ ἀπο-  
τῶν. Ibid.

This



This may satisfy any man, that those Learned Persons are very much mistaken, who charge such a sense upon this Father, as is directly contrary to his design; for he understood the Laws of Reasoning better. Neither he, nor any other Father I ever yet met with, asserted that *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, were but One Man; or that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God no otherwise than *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are One Man; which yet is what has been charged upon them.

ὅτι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ θεῶτον κατὰ χρε-  
σιν πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ τοῦ (μὴ)  
διανοηθέντος τῇ φύσει κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ  
πρὸς φύσιν ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνο-  
μαζέειν, καὶ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀν-  
θρώποι —

“Οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἀκελεύετον λό-  
γον καὶ ἀνθρώπου εἰς κυρίας ἀν-  
θρώπων, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ  
αὐτῇ θεοῦ, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ

Gr. Nyfl. Ibid.

But does not *Greg. Nyssen* say, That it is a catachrestical way of speaking, tho become common and familiar, to multiply the name of Nature with the Individuals of the same Nature? As to say, That there are many Men, because there are many who have the same Human Nature. —But if we would speak accurately and properly, we should say that there is but one Man, how many soever have the same Nature: And does not he apply this to the Unity of God?

And can this have any other sense, than that the same Divine Nature makes Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One God, as the same Human Nature makes all the Men in the World but one Man? The Interpretation of which seems to be, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are as much Three Gods, as *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are Three Men; but that it is very improper to call either the one or the other Three, for they are but *One*, by One Common Nature.

Now this Father does indeed say, and so many others of them say, That the name of Nature ought not to be multiplied with the Individuals; but he was far enough either from saying or thinking what he is charged with, That *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are not Three Men, but One Man; or

or that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God in no other sense, but as Three Men are One : And a due attendance to the Series of the Argument, would have discovered the Falseness and Absurdity of this Imputation ; which therefore I shall briefly explain.

The *Arian* Objection which St. *Gregory* undertook to answer, as I observed before, was this ; That since the Catholic Church owned the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be consubstantial, and to have the same undiversified Nature, they must for that reason be Three Gods ; as *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, upon account of the same common Humanity, are acknowledged to be Three Men : That is, that whether in God or Man, the same Nature in Three must make Three Individuals of the same Kind and Species ; and therefore as the same Human Nature in Three makes Three Men, so the same Divine Nature Three Gods.

In answer to this, St. *Gregory* first observes, That it is not the same common Nature which distinguishes and multiplies Individuals, no, not in Men : *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are not Three Individuals in the Species of Humanity, merely by having the same Nature ( which is the force of the *Arian* Objection ) ; for what is perfectly the same in all, can't distinguish or multiply them. And this is plainly all that he means, when he says, That the name of Nature ought not to be used plurally ; and therefore *Man* being the name of Nature, and signifying the same with Humanity, we ought no more, if we speak properly and Philosophically, to say Three Men, than Three Humanities, or Three Human Natures ; for he proves, that the name *Man* does not distinguish one Man from another, nor can we single any particular Man out of a Crowd by that Compellation ; for there is but One Man, or One Humanity in them all ; that name not, belonging primarily and immediately to the Individuals as such, but to the common Nature.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν ταῖς τρεῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀποστολῇ, καὶ δόξῃ, καὶ τῷ κατ' ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ οὐ κοινῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρώπου.

Well ;

Well; but are there not Individual Men then, as well as a Common Nature? Yes, without doubt; but they are distinguished and multiplied, not by the Common Nature,

Αὐτὸ ὁ μὲν ἁποδείκνυται λόγῳ διὰ τὰς ἐνδεσφύμους ἰδιότητας ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν διὰ μερισμὸν ἐκείνης, καὶ καὶ συνίστην ἐν ἀειμῶν διαστάσει. ὁ δὲ ὅτις μὴ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνδεσφύμῳ, καὶ ἀδιάτμητον ἀνεκὸς μόνον. Ioid.

which is the same in all, but by such peculiar Properties as diversify and distinguish Common Nature, as it subsists separately in particular Persons, and that makes the Number, though Nature be one and the same, a perfect indivisible Monad.

This is not merely to criticize upon Words, or to dispute against the common Forms of Speech, but to give a true Philosophical Reason of their different Use, when applied to God and Creatures. We commonly call *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, Three Men, and right enough; but then they are not Three Men merely upon account of the same Common Humanity in them all, (which was the *Arian* Objection); for Humanity is but One in all, and what is perfectly One can't be numbred. To say there are Three Humanities, all Men grant to be absurd; and yet it is to the full as absurd, to say that *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are Three Men, merely upon account of the same Humanity, strictly and precisely taken, as to say that there are Three Humanities: So that though *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, could not be, nor be called Three Men, without the same Common Nature, yet some peculiar, distinguishing, diversifying Properties make them Three Men. Could Human Nature subsist as perfectly and indivisibly the same in Three, as the perfect Idea of Humanity, their Persons might be distinguished, but their Nature would be as perfectly One, as the Idea of Humanity is one and the same in distinct Minds; and in this Case (as far as this perfect Sameness of Nature can make them one, which, as I have observed, is not the compleat Notion of the Divine Unity, though it be essential to it) they might be called Three Human Persons, but  
not

not Three Men : But such peculiar Properties as diversify and thereby distinguish the same common Nature into Particulars, make the Number : Which is one reason why we must not say Three Gods, as we do Three Men, though the same Divinity be common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; because this same One Divinity subsists whole and perfect, without the least Change, Diversity, or Alteration in Three : That though their Persons are distinct, the Divinity is perfectly One and the Same in All, and therefore they are but One God.

So that these Fathers do not insist on a mere Specifick Unity, but on the Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature in Three, as the reason why we must not say that there are Three Gods ; for the same One undiversified Divinity can be but One God. And therefore having answered that Popular Objection, That *Peter, James, and John*, are allowed to be called Three Men, upon account of the same common Nature, by shewing that it is a great Popular Mistake, that merely the same One Common Nature makes them Three Men, or will justify their being called so ; this Father proceeds to shew, That there is such an Unity between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as is not, and cannot be between any Three Creatures, though they partake of the same Common Nature : Such an Unity as makes Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, essentially One God, though *Peter, James, and John*, are Three Men. Nay, such an Unity, as even a perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature cannot make between Creatures who have an absolute and separate Subsistence.

This gives a reasonable Account of this whole Argument, and vindicates it from those Absurdities which are charged on it. It was necessary to lay the Foundation of the Divine Unity in the perfect and invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature : For if the Divine Nature in Three is not perfectly the same, it cannot be One ; for Diversity and Alte-

rity makes a Number ; But if it subsist as perfectly the same in Three, as its Idea is the same, it must be as perfectly one as its Idea is one. No, say these *Arians*, the same Nature subsisting in Three, becomes Three Individual Natures of the same Species ; and the name of Nature must be multiplied with the Individuals, as all allow it must be as to Men, who partake of the same Common Nature : For *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, are acknowledged to be Three Men, though they have but one common Humanity ; and by the same reason, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be Three Gods, if they have the same common Divinity.

To which *St. Gregory Nyssen* answers, That it is not the common Humanity which makes them Three Men ; for that which is but one and the same in all, can't distinguish or multiply them ; and therefore in strict and accurate speaking, as *Man* signifies pure and abstracted Humanity, we cannot properly say Three Men, because there are not Three Humanities ; and accordingly, the name *Man* does not and cannot distinguish one Man from another, nor is ever used to that purpose ; but that which multiplies Nature, and the name of Nature, are those peculiar Properties which distinguish and diversify Nature, as well as Persons ; and thus the common Nature, with diversifying Properties, *καὶ συνθεῖται ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται*, is distinguish'd and multiplied by a kind of Composition ; for the same Nature with one peculiar diversifying Property, is distinguish'd from the same Nature with other Properties ; and thus the same Nature divided and distinguish'd with these Properties, makes a Number, and gives the name of Nature to each Individual Person, and thus it is in all Creatures : But where the same Nature subsists in Three, without any thing to distinguish or diversify Nature, as it is in the Blessed Trinity, though the Persons may be distinguish'd, the Nature and the name of Nature can be but One : Which is the reason why Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but One God,



God, because they have but One undistinguish'd, undiverted Nature, though their Persons are distinct.

This is the true Account of this Matter; which is so far from such a mere Specifick Unity of Nature as is between Three Men, that it is that very Sameness and Identity of Nature, which the Catholick Fathers make essential to the Unity of the Godhead.

And the better to understand this, we must consider their Philosophy about Numbers; for according to them, nothing properly but Alterity and Diversity makes a Number: What is perfectly the same, is but One, as *Boetius* tells us; not by a Singularity, but by a perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature.

*Diversitas plures facit, unitas potestatis excludit numeri quantitatem, quia unitas numerus non est, sed hanc omnium ipsa principium est. Ambr. de fide, c. 1.*

In this sense it is, that *Greg. Nazianzen*, *St. Basil*, and others, teach, That God is One, *ἐκ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ φύσει*, not in Number, but Nature; whereby they do not mean that there are more Gods in Number than One; but that the Unity of the Godhead does not consist in the Unity of Number, but of Nature; and that the Unity of Nature consists in the invariable Sameness and Identity of it; and therefore where the Divinity is perfectly the same, there is but One God. Thus *Greg. Nyssen* tells

us, That the same Divinity may be numbred, and yet rejects all Number; that is, the Divinity may be numbred with the Persons, as when we say the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; but the Divine Nature being perfectly the same in all, that can't be numbred; that we must not say there are Three Gods, or Three Divinities.

*Πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀριθμῶνται ὁμοίως, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ ἑξαριθμῶνται.*  
*Greg. Nyss. Catech. Or. cap. 3.*

*Boetius* has given the best Account of this, according to the Philosophy of the Ancients, by distinguishing between Numbers; for he says, Number is twofold, that by which we number, and that which is in the things numbred: As



to the first, the repetition of Units makes a Number, for One, and One, and One, are Three; and both the Catholick Fathers and Schools reject this kind of Number, which is a Species of Quantity, from the Divinity; for God is under no Predicament, and therefore the Unity of God not reducible to the Predicament of Quantity; for God is before and above all Unity, as he is above Substance, above Essence, above every thing which we have any Notion or Conception of; as *Dionysius the Areopagite* speaks.

*Numerus enim duplex est, unus quidem, quo numeramus, alter vero, qui in rebus numerabilibus constat; ergo in numero quo numeramus, repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum vero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio. Boet. de duabus in Christo Naturis.*

But as to the things numbred, the Repetition of Units does not multiply, or make a Number in things, where the Nature is perfectly the same; for it is not a Repetition of Units, but Alterity and Diversity, which multiplies Natures: To say God, and God, and God, does not make Three Gods, because

there is but one and the same Divinity in Three: And this is what they mean by the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature; not that Unity or Unit which is the beginning of Number, but the Unity of Sameness and Identity; which *Tho. Aquinas* calls *unum non numero, sed re numerata*; One, not in the numbring Number, but in the thing numbred; or as the Fathers speak, not in Number, but Nature.

The better to understand this matter, we must consider what *St. Basil* discourses about the Unity of God, in answer

Πεὶς δὲ τὸ ἐπεσφάζοντες ἡμᾶς  
τὸ θεῖον ἐκείνο λεγόμεν, ὅτι φη  
ἡμεῖς ἕνα θεόν ἢ τὸ ἀειμονῶν ἀλ-  
λά τῇ φύσει ὁμολογούμεν. πᾶν  
δὲ ὅ ἐν ἀειμονῶν λέγει, τὸ τοῦ ἕως  
ἐν ὅντως ἐστὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως θεῶν.  
ὅ ἐστις ἀπλῆς καὶ ἀσυνδιετός πα-  
ρὰ πάντων ὁμολογῶν. ἐκ ἀρχῆς ὅς

to those who charged the Doctrine of the Trinity with *Tritheism*; viz. That they acknowledged One God, but not in Number (the numbring Number) but in Nature: For that which is One in Number, is not truly One, nor perfectly Simple in Nature; but all men acknowledge God to be the most Simple

ple Uncompounded Being, and therefore he is not One in the Notion of this numbring Number.

This he proves by an induction of particulars; we say, the World is one in number, but not one in nature; for it is compounded of great variety of Creatures; and we say, one Man, but Man is compounded of Body and Soul; and even any Angel is not perfectly pure and simple, but is compounded of Essence and Qualities, such as Holiness, which is not pure and simple Nature, for it may be separated. He adds, that Number is a Species of quantity, and answers to the Question, How many, which properly belongs to a Corporeal Nature: — And indeed all Number denotes such things as have a material, or at least a circumscribed and limited Nature, but *Monad and Unity* denote the Simple, Uncompounded, Uncircumscribed Infinite Essence: And when he says, That Number must belong to things of a Circumscribed Nature, thereby he tells us, he means, not merely such things as are circumscribed by Place, which properly belongs to Bodies; but all such Natures as have a limited and confined

Idea, as all Created Natures, whether Body or Spirit, have, whose Natures are limited, circumscribed, fixt and determined by that Infinite Mind, which gives being to them.

The meaning of all which is this, That to make a Number, there must be Alterity and Diversity in Nature, or a separate Existence: But a Perfect, Simple, Uncompounded Nature,

αειδμῷ ὅτι ὁ διός. Basil. Apolog. ad Cæsar. Ep. 141. p. 164. T. 3.

Ὁ δὲ λόγος πῶς ἐστιν ὁ αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοῦ ἐστὶν φανερὸν, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ἕνα τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔσ' ἀπλὴν πᾶσα τὴν ὁμοῦ τῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀντὶν, εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται τοιαῦτα. — ἕνα δὲ ἀνθρώπων πολλὰς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ἀπλὴς τῆς ἑστ' ὅτι, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄγγελον, ἕνα αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ἕνα τῇ φύσει, ὅτι ἀπλὴν. ὅταν δὲ μετ' ἀμασίου πῶς τὸ ἀγγέλου ὁμοῦται ἐννοῦμεν. —

Ὁ δὲ αὐτοῦ ὅτι τὸ πῶς, τὸ δὲ πῶς τῇ σωματικῇ φύσει συνίσταται. — διὸ καὶ πᾶς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνα σημαίνει τὰ ἐνυλὸν καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἔχειν λαρόντα πῶς ἐστὶν. ἢ δὲ μόνος καὶ ἐνός τ' ἀπλῆς καὶ ἀπεριόριστος ὡς ἐστὶ σημασιμὸν.

Περὶ αὐτῆς δὲ λόγος, ὁ μόνος πῶς περὶ αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ πῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἐμπεριέληφεν ὁ μέλλων αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν μετ' ἐντὸς εἰς τὸ ἔξω περιεχέν, ὡς καὶ ὁπότε περὶ αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ πῶς. Ibid.

Nature, can admit of no possible alteration and diversity ; for the same Nature can never differ from it self, without some kind of composition ; and where there is no difference and diversity, there can be no number, and an Infinite Uncircumscribed Nature can never be divided and separated, or subsist a-part, and therefore can't be numbred : So that Number can belong only to Created Natures, which are compounded and finite, and therefore by some diversifying Qualities or Affections, and a separate Existence may be distinguished into Individuals, which may be numbred ; but the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is a Perfect Indivisible, Uncompounded, Infinite Monad, is not the Unity of Number, but a Perfect Invariable Sameness and Identity, and an Indivisible, inseparable Union.

Now some Men, who do not duly attend to the nature and design of these Reasonings, apply all this to prove the Perfect Singularity of the Divine Essence, in the most strict and proper notion of Singularity, as that signifies One in Number ; which contradicts the whole Intention of this Hypothesis, which is to prove, that the Unity of God does not consist in the Unity of Number, but of Nature ; and that the Unity of the Divine Nature is not a Unity of Number, but a Unity of Sameness, Identity, and Inseparability. This is a Matter of great consequence, and therefore let us consider it over again.

This distinction between the Unity of Number, and the Unity of Nature, was alledged by the Catholick Fathers to avoid the Charge of Tritheism : The *Sabellians* and *Arians* asserted the Unity of God to be a Unity of Number ; that One Divinity is not One, unless it be One in Number, One Single Solitary Divine Nature : And this, say they, is inconsistent with the Trinity of Divine Persons, each of which is in his own Person True and Perfect God : For Three such Divine Persons must be Three Gods, Three Divinities, if each Divine Person have the True Perfect Divine Nature in himself ;

himself; and it is impossible to understand what a Divine Person is, without the Divine Nature: So that if the Father be God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be Three, they must be Three Gods.

This was the great Difficulty, and it is the only material Difficulty to this day. To have asserted but One Singular Divine Nature, which is but One in Number, had given up the Cause to the *Sabellians* or *Arians*: For then either Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names or Offices of the same One Divine Person, who is the One God, as the *Sabellians* taught: Or Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not a Consubstantial Trinity, but the Father alone is God, and the Son and Holy Ghost but mere Creatures, how Excellent Creatures soever they are.

On the other hand, should they have denied that Three Ones make Three, this had been false counting, as the *Socinians* tell us now; and therefore to avoid both these Extremes, they distinguish between the Number by which we reckon, and the thing which is numbred; and thus they find a Real Trinity in Perfect Unity: As *Greg. Nyssen* tells us, That τὸ αὐτὸ, the very same thing, the same Divinity, is both numbred, and not subject to Number: It may so far be numbred with the Persons, as each Divine Person has the whole and perfect Divinity in himself, but yet the Divinity can't be numbred; not because it is One Single Solitary Divinity, for it really subsists in Three; but by reason of that perfect Sameness and Identity, which admits of no Number; for that which is perfectly one and the same in Three, can't be numbred.

Had they thought of such a Singularity of the Divine Nature, as is but One in Number, they must have disputed at another rate against *Sabellians* and *Arians*: Would they have taught, That the Divinity may be numbred, and yet is without Number? Which is impossible to be true of the same singular Divinity, which is but One in Number, and there-

therefore can never be more than One in Number; that is, in that Father's sense, cannot be numbred, much less can the same Singular Nature be numbred, and incapable of Number, that is, be One, and More than One.

Would they have taken so much pains to prove, That Sameness and Identity of Nature excludes all Number; if by this they had meant the Sameness and Identity of Singularity, as the same thing is one and the same thing with it self, which is no great Mystery? And is it not evident, that this whole Dispute is concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature in Three distinct Persons, and consequently, concerning that Sameness and Identity of Nature which is between Three who have the same Nature, and therefore not One in the Notion of Singularity, which is One in Number, not in the Sameness and Identity of Nature?

Would they have insisted on that distinction of Units in Number, and Units in Nature; that the first multiplies, the second does not, had they believed that there are no Units in the Divinity; not One, and One, and One, but only One Singular Divinity? At least, could *Boetius*, who so particularly explains and urges this distinction, intend to prove by it the Singularity of the Divine Essence, when at the same time he defines a Person to be the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature; and assigns this distinction as the Reason why though we number Three in the same Divinity, yet there are not Three Divinities, or Three Divine Natures or Essences; because the Repetition of Units in the thing to be numbred, where there is a perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature, makes no Number?

In this sense it was, that the Schools asserted the Singularity of the Divine Substance; because the Divine Substance, by reason of its perfect Sameness and Identity can't be numbred, and what can't be numbred, they call a Singular Substance: But they expressly reject (as the Catholic Fathers did) Singularity in the sense of Solitude, as it signifies

signifies one alone by himself, without any Communion or Fellowship (*consortium*) with any other in the same Divine Essence. And therefore the Master of the Sentences expressly distinguishes between Diversity, Singularity or Solitude, and Unity and Trinity, Distinction and Identity. Now let any man judge, what that Unity is, which is not Singularity or Solitude, but a Unity in Trinity; and what that Distinction is, which is perfect Identity without any Diversity: For my part I can make nothing of it, but this perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature in Three, which numbers Persons, but not Natures.

Peter  
Lomb.  
lib. 1.  
dist. 23.

*Estius* takes notice of that Objection against the Trinity, That the Father is God, and the Son is God, therefore the Father is the Son; which Consequence is resolved into that Maxim, *Quæcunque eadem sunt uni tertio, eadem sunt inter se*, whatever things are the same with the same Third, are the same with each other: To which he answers, That this Rule holds true only where the *Third* is a perfect Singular: *Deus autem non prorsus singulare nomen est*, but *God* is not upon all Accounts a name of Singularity, that is, does not signify One only who is God; but signifies such a Singular Nature as is communicable to Three, *Significat enim Naturam Singularem, sed quæ communicari possit tribus suppositis*: That is, It is not a Singular Nature, with the Singularity of solitude, because it is communicable, and can subsist distinctly in Three, but only with the Singularity of Identity, as he explains it from *St. Hilary, Dist. 23. Sect. 4.* to which he refers his Reader. So that though the Schools did use this Phrase of a *Singular Nature and Substance*, which the Catholic Fathers rejected as *Sabellianism*, yet they did not use it in that Sense, which the Fathers rejected, for One Solitary Nature, which can be but One Person; and therefore *Estius* observes, that *Aquinas* uses this name of *Singularity*, when applied to the Divinity, *non simpliciter, sed cum cautela*, not simply and absolutely, but with caution, and qualifies it with

Estius,  
lib. 1.  
dist. 2.  
sect. 5.



*ut sic liceat loqui*, if I may have leave so to speak: And he imitates this Caution himself, *Dist. 23. Sect. 1.* when he tells us, That the Divine Essence may *quodam sensu* in a certain sense be said to be individual, as it neither is a Genus nor Species, but *res una numero*, & *ut ita dicamus singularis*, numerically One, and if we may say so, Singular; though it be not *individual*, in the sense that *Boetius* defines a Person to be an *Individual Substance*, because it is not incommunicable.

This shews, That though the Schools have in this Question changed the Ancient Catholick Language, by teaching, That the Divine Essence is *Una Numero*, & *Singularis*, One in Number, and Singular; whereas the Catholick Fathers denied that God was One in Number, but only in Nature, and denied the Singularity of the Divine Nature (which Confusion, and appearing Contradiction of Terms occasions great Mistakes) yet they meant the very same thing, and their Philosophy about Singularity and Number was the same: For they taught a Communicable Singularity of Nature, which is opposed to a *Sabellian* Solitude, and rejected the numbring Number from the Divinity. They universally deny, That God is One in that sense of Unity, which is the beginning of Number: For Number is a Species of Quantity, & *nascitur ex divisione continui*, is made by Division; and to assert God to be One in this Sense, is to ascribe Quantity to him; for nothing can be thus One, but what has Magnitude and Figure, that is, nothing but Body; for Number, as it is a Species of Quantity, can belong to nothing, but Body, which has divisible Parts, and Extensions, and Magnitude, which may be One or more. This is certainly true, as to that kind of Number, which is a Species of Quantity; for that can measure only such things as have Quantity: But then they were sensible, that other Beings are numbred besides Bodies, even Incorporeal Spirits, who have no Quantity, Parts, or Divisibility, and yet these

these we number, when we say, a Hundred, or Thousands, or Millions of Angels. This they own, and call it a Transcendental Number, that is, such a Number as is not reduced to the Predicament of Quantity: But that is little to the purpose; if Spirits, which have no Quantity may be numbered, what is it that makes a Number in them? And why may not Number then belong to the Divinity, though it be not *quantum*, have no Predicamental, that is, Corporeal Quantity? To this they answer, *That this Transcendental Unity adds no form to the thing, but only signifies the thing it self, as undivided from it self*: Well! But if this be all, then God, who is thus indivisible from himself, may as properly be called One, as One Angel is said to be One: No, say they, For to entitle any thing even to this Transcendental Numerical Unity, *ratione rei subjectæ Naturam ejus designat ut limitatam, atque extra res alias positam*, it must be considered to have a Finite and Limited Nature, and to subsist separately from all other Beings, and to be diversified from each other in Nature or Qualities. *Res una ab alia, Natura vel qualitatibus discreta intelligitur*. But now Unity in God, though it resemble this Transcendental Unity, as adding no Form to God; that is, not supposing him to be Corporeal, as the Predicamental Unity does, yet it does not signify any thing limited and finite in God; but only his Undivided Inseparable Being: As Number in God (that is, the Trinity) does signify the real distinction of Three, *Non ita tamen, ut ea plura Natura vel Qualitatibus discreta intelligantur, & singula suis velut limitibus circumscripta*. But not so, as if these Three were distinguished and separated by Nature and Qualities, or as if each of them had their own Separate and Circumscribed Bounds and Limits.

This is the Account *Estius* gives us of Unity and Number in God, *dist. 24. sect. 1.* which perfectly agrees with that Account I have already given of this matter from *St. Basil*: That an Infinite, Undiversified, Indivisible Nature (as the

Eternal Divinity is) is neither One nor Three, in the same Sense, and for the same Reasons, which give these Denominations to any Created Beings. And therefore there are no Arguments in Nature to confute the Unity of the Godhead from a Trinity of proper Subsisting Persons, nor a Trinity of Persons from the Unity of the Godhead, because Three and One in God do not signify what they do in Creatures.

Lib. I.  
dist. 23.

This appeared a great difficulty to the Master of the Sentences, That since we neither allow of Diversity nor Singularity, Multiplicity nor Solitude in the Trinity, what should be the meaning of One, and Two, and Three, of Trinity and Plurality, and Distinction, as when we say, One God, Two Persons, Three Persons, more Persons, distinct Persons; or a distinction of Persons, Plurality of Persons, a Trinity of Persons, which seems to ascribe a Numerical Quantity, a Multitude and Multiplicity to God. To this the Master answers, That these words, when applied to God, are rather intended to remove every thing from God, which is inconsistent with the Perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature, than positively to affirm any thing of him: This Answer does not please *Estius*, because it seems to imply, that God is not in a true and proper Sense One and Three; but this is his own Mistake: For *Peter Lombard* meant no more but this, That though God be in the most perfect sense One and Three, yet those positive Ideas, which we have of One, or Two, or Three, of Distinction, and Trinity, when applied to Creatures, do not belong to the Divine Nature; and therefore we must conceive of them in God, rather by way of Negation, than by any positive Ideas, by denying such things of God, as are inconsistent with the Perfect Simplicity of his Nature; which is true of most other Divine Perfections, that we have rather a negative than positive conception of them, as attributed to God; for Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness in God, are no more reducible

ducible under the Predicament of Quality, as they are in Creatures, than the Unity of God is reducible to the Predicament of Quantity.

Thus he tells us, when we say *One God*, we thereby exclude more Gods, but do not attribute the quantity of Number to God; that is, we do not mean that there is One God, in that Notion of One as it is the beginning of Number, which is a Species of Quantity, for so nothing can be One, but what has Quantity, which God has not: Thus when we say, *One Father*, and *One Son*, the meaning is, that there are not many Fathers, nor many Sons. When we say there are more Persons, we exclude Singularity and Solitude, but do not introduce Diversity or Multiplicity into the Divine Nature. Thus *Three Persons* does not signify the Quantity of Number, or any Diversity (as it is in Creatures) but only determines our Thoughts to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that each of these Persons is in the Godhead, and none else. *Distinct Persons*, or *Distinction of Persons*, excludes Confusion and Mixture; signifies that they are Another and Another, without any Diversity, or *Sabelian* Confusion. The meaning of which is, That we must not form such a Notion of One God, as we have of One Man, nor of Three Persons, as of Three Men; but must acknowledge One God, in opposition to more Gods, or more Divinities; and Three Persons, in opposition to Singularity and Solitude in the Divinity: All which resolves it self into the Unity of Identity, which excludes both all manner of Diversity, and Singularity and Solitude.

## S E C T. VII.

*Concerning the Distinction of Persons in the Unity and Identity of the Divine Essence.*

**T**HIS fairly brings me to the Third Enquiry I proposed, concerning the Real Distinction of the Divine Persons, in the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature; how we can distinguish Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, when their Nature is perfectly One, by the Unity of Identity and Sameness. This is the Seat of most of those nice distinctions which we meet with both in the Fathers and Schools, and therefore it deserves to be carefully examined; for a sensible Account of this Matter would answer many great Difficulties in the Doctrine of the Trinity: And to this purpose I shall first give a general Account of it, according to those Principles which I have now laid down; and then more particularly explain what the Fathers and Schools say of it; which will appear to be no such Mysterious Nonsense, as the Adversaries of our Holy Faith would represent it to be.

I. The general Account of this is very short: The Catholick Fathers universally teach, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each of them by himself in his own proper Person, True and Perfect God: That the same One Whole Undivided Divinity subsists distinctly in each of them: That the Person of the Father, as he is True and Perfect God, is the whole Divinity; That the Person of the Son, as True and Perfect God, is also the same One Whole Divinity; and so of the Holy Ghost: That this Divinity is One and the Same, not by an Unity of Singularity

riety and Solitude, which is irreconcilable with the Notion of a Real Trinity ; for One Singular Divinity can be but One Single Divine Person ; but by the Unity of Sameness and Identity, which admits of a Trinity of subsisting Persons in the same undiversified Nature : That whatever the Father is, That the Son is, and that the Holy Ghost is.

That a Divine Person is nothing but the Divine Nature and Essence ; for the perfect absolute Simplicity of God admits of no imaginable Composition, not so much as of Nature and *Suppositum*, or that which is the subject of all Natural Powers, as it is in Created Beings.

This makes it very evident that these Divine Persons are not distinguished by Nature ; for there is nothing in Nature to distinguish them, it being perfectly and invariably the same in all ; and where there is no distinction, there can be no Number ; for which reason they will not allow that the Divine Essence is multiplied with the Persons, there being but *μία θεότης*, one and the same Divinity in them all.

They agree farther, That the Divine Persons are incommunicable : That the Person of the Father is not, and can never be the Person of the Son ; nor the Person of the Son, the Person of the Father ; nor the Person of the Holy Ghost, the Person either of Father or Son.

But then this seems to make the difficulty insuperable ; That if a Divine Person be nothing else but the Divine Nature, how there should be Three such distinct incommunicable Persons in the same undivided, undistinguished Divinity ? Why we may not call Three Divine Persons, who have each of them the whole Divine Nature distinctly and incommunicably, Three Divinities, as well as Three Divine Persons, when a Divine Person is nothing else but the Divinity ? And then Three distinct Persons must be Three distinct Divinities.

This Unity and Distinction in the Godhead has always been acknowledged by the Catholick Fathers to be a Great  
and



and Inexplicable Mystery, a wonderful Union, and wonderful Distinction. *Damascen*, as I observed above, tells us, That the Divine Nature, though subsisting in Three Persons, is ἐν ὁμοῦσι, really and actually One, not merely notionally One, as Human Nature is, which subsists only in Individuals, and has a particular, distinct, separate Subsistence in every particular Man, and therefore can be One in its Individuals in no other sense, but only as the same common Notion and Definition of Humanity belongs to them all; that is, Human Nature is One in all the Men in the World, not by a Real Subsisting, but by a Specifick Notional Unity: But the Divine Nature is One with a Real Subsisting Unity, being perfectly the same in Three, without any Division or Separation: And an indivisible, inseparable, undiversified Same, is really and actually One, according to the most simple Notions we can form of Unity.

But what room then does this leave for a Real Trinity of Persons, in this One, Simple, Uncompounded, Indivisible, Inseparable Nature?

To this he answers, That this Real Distinction of Persons in the perfect Unity and Simplicity of Nature, may be known and understood by Reason, though there be nothing

in Nature to distinguish them. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are upon all accounts perfectly One, excepting this, That one is Unbegotten, the other Begotten, and the third Proceeds. We acknowledge One God, distinguished only by these Personal Properties of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, as a Cause, and that which is caused; and as each of them has a compleat perfect Hypostasis, distinguish'd only by these different Modes of Subsistence.

*Damascen.*  
*de Orthod.*  
*fide l. i. c.*  
11.

Κατὰ πάντα ἐν εἰσὶν ὁ πατήρ  
καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα,  
πλὴν τὸ ἀγεννησίας, καὶ τὸ ἡγνησίας,  
καὶ τὸ ἐκπορεύσεως· ὁ πατήρ  
καὶ τὸ διηρημένον· ἕνα δὲ θεὸν  
γνωσκόμεν, ἐν μόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἰδιό-  
της τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ τὸ υἱό-  
τητα, καὶ τὴν ἐκπορεύσεως, καὶ τὴν  
τὸ αἶπον καὶ τὸ αἰπατέν, καὶ τὸ τέ-  
λειον τῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἥτοι τὸ τῆς  
ὑπερβείας ὕπνου, πλὴν διαφερόν  
ἐννοῦμεν. *Damasc. de Orth.*  
*Fide. l. i. c. 11.*

This

This proves a Real Distinction, without any Diversity, Division, or Separation, and therefore a Real Distinction in perfect Unity.

The Divine Nature is Infinite and Uncircumscribed, and therefore the Divine Persons cannot be divided and separated from each other, but are perfectly in each other, without Confusion. The Divine Nature is perfectly One in Three, by the Unity of Sameness and Identity, and therefore there can be no diversity or division of Will, or Counsel, or Operation, or Power: Now a Nature which is perfectly the same, and undivided,

must be perfectly One. But then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are certainly Three; for He who begets, is not He who is begotten, for nothing begets it self: To beget, and to be begotten, and to proceed, are the Characters of Persons, and can belong only to True, Real, Substantial Persons: He who begets, must be a Person, and so must He who is begotten, and He who proceeds; they have each of them τὸ τέλειον τῆς ὑποστάσεως, whatever makes a complete and perfect Person; but then these Three can never meet in the same Person, and consequently must distinguish Persons; for the same Person can't be unbegotten, begotten, and proceed; can't be the Cause, and that which is caused.

This is demonstratively certain, That a begotten and unbegotten Person, and consequently a begotten and unbegotten Nature (a Divine Person being nothing else but the Divine Nature) are and must be Two, and never can be each other; and therefore this distinguishes Persons, though it makes no distinction or diversity in the Divine Essence; as the Catholick Fathers proved against the *Arians*, that to be unbegotten, and to be begotten, does not. But to be unbegotten, to be begotten, and to proceed, whatever

οὐτε γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν, ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῶν, διωάμεθα ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπειροχρηστῇ λέγειν διότι· ἐν ἀλλήλοις γὰρ αἱ ὑποστάσεις εἰσιν, ὅχι ὡς συγχέουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἕχουσιν ὅτι διελίμεθα διαφορὰν, ἢ γνώμης, ἢ ἐνεργείας, ἢ πνεύματος ἑτέρου, πάντα τὴν ὑποστατικῶς, καὶ διόλου ἐν ἡμῶν ἡμεῶν διαίρεσιν —  
Ibid.

you will call them, whether Personal Properties, or Modes of Subsistence, though they do not make the Persons, that is, are not the formal Notion of a Person, yet they certainly distinguish them, or prove them to be as distinct and incommunicable, as Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding; for if these Terms or Characters can never signify each other, then the Persons characterized by them can never be each other: And this is all the distinction that can be in an undistinguished, undiversified, undivided Essence.

Well; but still the difficulty remains, how to distinguish between Essence and Person in God; for if Person be Nature and Essence, and each Person distinctly in himself be the whole Divine Essence, or the whole Divinity, how can we avoid acknowledging Three Essences, and Three Divinities, as well as Three Persons in the Trinity? Now the account of this must be taken from the nature of that Distinction and Unity which is in God; for such a Distinction as does not destroy the Unity, can't multiply Natures, though it distinguishes Persons. Each Person is the Divine Nature, but without any diversity, division, or separation of the Divinity; and what is Identically and Indivisibly the same, is but One. The Divine Nature, as self-originated and unbegotten, is the Person of the Father; as communicated by Generation, is the Person of the Son; as proceeding, is the Person of the Holy Ghost, and these are Three; but the Son is begotten of the Substance of his Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, without any diversity, division, or separation of Substance, and therefore the Divinity is but One. The Divine Nature subsists distinctly and incommunicably in Three, according to their distinct Characters of Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding; and these we call Persons, because they bear some Analogy to Individuals in created Beings, which in an Intelligent Nature are called Persons; but they are not Three Divinities, because the Divine Nature, though it be distinct, yet is undiversified,

diversified, and undivided in Three, and therefore is but One in Three.

This seems to me a very intelligible Account of a Trinity in Unity, and the difference between Person and Essence, though a Divine Person is the Divine Essence. When we distinguish between Person and Essence, and say there are Three Persons and One Essence, by Essence we mean an undistinguished, undivided Divinity, which is but One; by Three Persons we mean the Divine Essence, unbegotten, and communicated by Generation, and Procession, which are really distinct Persons, and subsist distinctly, but in the Unity of an undistinguished and undivided Divinity; which makes them really and actually Three and One; the same without diversity, and distinct without division. And this seems to be the reason why the Catholick Fathers, tho they called the Divine Persons *Tres Res*, and *τρεῖς πρὸς ὅσα*, and *Tres Subsistentes*, Three Things, and Three that subsist, yet were more cautious in calling them Three Natures, or Essences, or Substances (though there are some Examples of this kind), because though the Divine Essence subsists distinctly in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which makes them Three Distinct, Real, Subsisting Persons, yet the Divine Nature is not distinguished nor separated, but is perfectly One, Same, Undivided Essence; and therefore *Una Substantia*, though not *Unus Subsistens*; One Substance, though not One, but Three, that subsist.

What I have thus briefly represented, I hope I have proved in the First Chapter, from the Authority of Scripture, and Reason founded on Scripture: And from what I have already discoursed of the Doctrine of the Fathers, it may appear to careful and intelligent Readers, who use such Application as this Argument deserves and requires, that this is their Unanimous Sense also. But yet as far as it is possible, to clear this Matter more fully, and vindicate the Fathers and Schools from those Obscurities, Inconsistencies,

and Contradictions which are generally charged on them in so concerning an Article, I shall reassume this Matter, and particularly shew,

1. That what they call a Divine Person, is the Divine Essence and Substance, and nothing else.

2. That this Divine Essence and Substance, as constituting these Divine Persons, is proper and peculiar to each, and incommunicable to one another ; and therefore that this Divine Essence and Substance, as subsisting distinctly in Three, is no more numerically One, than their Persons are One.

3. What difference they made between Nature and Essence, and Hypostasis and Person.

4. Whether the Catholick Faith of a Real and Substantial Trinity, can be as reasonably and intelligibly explained by the Notion of One Singular Substance in the Divinity, as by asserting Three Personal Substances or *Suppositums* : And whether the Singularity of the Divine Essence in this Notion, deliver the Asserters of it from any Inconveniences and Objections which the contrary Opinion is thought liable to.

1. As for the first, That a Divine Person is the Divine Essence, it is and must be in some sense acknowledged by all who profess the Faith of a Real Trinity ; for there cannot be a Real Trinity of Divine Persons, if each Person be not True and Perfect God, that is, the whole Divinity, or Divine Nature and Essence. And therefore those who assert in the strictest sense the Singularity of the Divine Essence, yet assert, That this One Singular Essence subsists distinctly in each Divine Person ; which, whether it be to be understood or not, yet is an acknowledgment that there is no conceiving a Divine Person without the Divine Essence : But we need not be beholden to any man for this Concession, for the thing is plain and evident in all Catholick Writers.

*Petavius*

*Petavius* has very critically observed the different use of Words in Catholick Writers, relating to this Venerable Mystery; such as Essence, Nature, Substance, Hypostasis, Subsistence, Person, &c. which sometimes occasioned great Misunderstandings between them, and is to this day made a pretence of charging the Fathers with great Uncertainty and Obscurity, and with contradicting each other, and themselves.

This of late has been much insisted on, in order to disparage the Authority of the Fathers, as Zealous, Contentious Bigots, who neither understood one another, nor themselves, nor the Catholick Faith, but so confounded Terms, that we can never certainly know what they meant; or used such dangerous Terms, that if we rely too much upon them, we may easily mistake Heresy for the Catholick Faith. Were this true, our Case would be very bad; but two or three Observations will set this matter in a clear light.

1. That very Ambiguity which the Fathers are charged with in the use of Words, does certainly prove, that by a Divine Person, they meant the Divine Essence, Nature, and Substance.

The plain Case is this. The Catholick Fathers did universally own and profess a Trinity in Unity, Three Persons, and One God; So that there was no difference in their Faith, how different soever their words were: The most common Terms, whereby they express the Unity of the Godhead, were *μία ἐστία*, *μία φύσις*, *Una Essentia*, *Una Natura*, *Una Substantia*; One Essence, One Nature, One Substance; and a Trinity, they called *τρεις ὑποστάσεις*, Three Hypostases; and the *Latins* Three Persons; but sometimes we meet in undoubted Catholick Writers with the direct contrary Expressions, such as *τρεις ἐστίαι*, *τρεις φύσεις*, *Tres Substantia*, & *μία ὑπόστασις*, Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, and One Hypostasis: The usual way of reconciling this seeming Contradiction



tradition is by saying, That when these Fathers use such Expressions, as Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, they do not understand this of Three divers, or specifically different, Essences, Natures, Substances, which is *Arianism*, but of Three Persons; and when they affirm, that there is but One Hypostasis, they do not by One Hypostasis mean One Person, which is *Sabellianism*, but One Nature, Essence, or Substance: As we know this very Controversy about One or Three Hypostases, was thus composed in the *Alexandrian Synod*, where *Athanasius* presided: And no doubt but this is the true Solution, since those, who were neither *Arians*, nor *Sabellians*, could not understand such Expressions in any other sense.

But then the Question still remains, How this Ambiguity should happen, or how it comes to pass, that such contradictory Terms, as One Essence, and Three Essences, One Substance, and Three Substances, One Hypostasis, and Three Hypostases, should both be Orthodox and Catholick.

Now the only Account I can give of this matter, is this; That these Terms, Essence, Nature, Substance, Hypostasis (which originally signifies Substance, of which more presently) may signify, as the Philosopher speaks, either the First or Second Substance; either the common Nature, which has the same notion and definition, common to the whole Kind, as Humanity, which is the same in all Men; or a Singular Subsisting Nature, and Substance, which in Creatures we call Individuals, and in reasonable Creatures, Persons: Now in analogy to this common Specifick Nature, which is one and the same in all its Individuals, the Catholick Fathers taught but One Essence, Nature, Substance, and in this sense but One Hypostasis in the Godhead, that is, a Consubstantial Trinity, in analogy to the several Individuals of the same Species, in whom only this common Nature did really and actually subsist; they ordinarily asserted

ed Three Hypostases, sometimes, as we see, Three Natures, and Essences, and Substances, in the Trinity, that is, Three Real, Substantial, subsisting Persons; and in this sense, Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, was accounted Catholick Doctrine. St. Hilary allows *Tria in Substantia*, or *Tres Substantias*, Three in Substance, or Three Substances, for *Tres Subsistentium Personas*, Three Subsisting Persons. And St. Greg. Nyssen, in answer to Eunomius, who asserted *τρεῖς εἰδές*, Three Essences, or Substances, says, That if he understood this distinction of Substances only in opposition to Sabellius, who gave three Names to one *Suppositum*, or Substance, that not only he, but all Catholick Christians, assented to it: His only fault being in this Case, that he uses improper words, Three Essences, for Three Hypostases.

Contra  
Eunom.  
l. 12.

Now that which I observe from hence is this, That had they not believed each Divine Person to be distinctly by himself the Divine Nature, Essence, and Substance, there could never have been any occasion for this Dispute about One Essence, Nature, Substance, Hypostasis, and Three Essences, Natures, Substances, Hypostases; nor for that known Distinction, by which they reconciled this difference between Essence and Hypostasis, that the first signifies something analogous to a Common Specifick Nature, the second to Individuals. If the Divine Nature subsisted in Singularity, or were but One Singular Subsisting Nature, Essence and Hypostasis must signify the same thing; for *εἷς*, Essence is Substance, and so is Hypostasis, and in this sense, they must both signify a first Substance, and then one singular Subsisting Nature or Substance; and three singular Subsisting Natures and Substances, is an irreconcilable Contradiction. Had the Singularity of the Divine Nature been the Catholick Faith, we should never have heard of the *ἡμὴν εἷς, & ἡμὴν τρεις*, of the Common Nature and Essence of the Divinity; for Singular and Common are express Contradictions, and a Singular Subsisting Nature can have nothing.

thing analogous in it to a Common Specifick Nature : If each Divine Person be not the Divine Nature, Essence, Substance, there can be no Pretence, that Essence and Substance should ever signify a Person, nor can any Interpretation make Three Essences and Substances Catholick Doctrine, if there be no sense, wherein Three Persons may Orthodoxly be called Three Essences and Substances; as there can't be, if a Person, as a Person, be not Essence and Substance: And on the other hand, if Hypostasis, which is the peculiar and appropriate Name whereby the *Greek* Fathers denote a Person, do not signify Essence and Substance, it could never be Orthodox to say, that there is but One Hypostasis, no more than it is to say, that there is but One Person in the Trinity.

2. But to set aside this Dispute concerning Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, and One Hypostasis in the Trinity, which though allowed to be Catholick, yet were sparingly and cautiously used, because they were liable to Heretical Senses; I observe farther, That these words, Essence, Nature, Substance, are distinctly applied to each Person of the Holy Trinity, which could not be Orthodox, were not each Person distinctly in himself, Essence, Nature, Substance.

What I have already discoursed with relation to *Sabellianism*, and upon several other occasions, sufficiently proves this, and I shall not trouble my Readers with a needless Repetition: *Petavius* owns it, and has given several Instances of it, That *εἰς*, *φύσις*, *Essentia*, *Natura*, *Substantia*, do not always signify the common Essence of the Divinity, but the Divine Persons; that the *εἰς πατέρα*, is the Person of the Father, and the *εἰς υἱόν* the Person of the Son, which is undoubtedly true; but still Essence signifies Essence, and Nature Nature, and Substance Substance; and the only reason he has to say, That in this construction the Words signify a Person, is because they are used singularly, and con-

construed with the name of a Person, as the Essence and Substance of the Father, or of the Son: But this is no reason, if the Essence be not the Person; if the Essence of the Father do not signify that Essence which is the Person of the Father; and the Essence of the Son, that Essence which is the Person of the Son: For if a Divine Person be not the Divine Essence, Essence can never signify Person: And yet if they do believe that each Divine Person is by himself in his own Person Essence and Substance, the whole undivided Divinity, I cannot imagine the reason of this Criticism, why they should be more afraid to say the Essence and Substance of the Father, than the Person of the Father, unless it be, that this does not so well agree with their Notion of the singularity of the Divine Essence, as I doubt indeed it will not, especially if we add, the *ἀγέννητος* and *γεννητός*, the Unbegotten and begotten Substance, the one the Person of the Father, the other of the Son; of which more hereafter; but this is not to learn our Faith from the Fathers, but to expound them by our preconceived Opinions.

3dly, I observe farther, That all those words, which are more peculiarly appropriated to signify the Divine Persons, were always used by Catholick Writers in the notion of Substance, and were never thought Catholick in any other sense.

Hypostasis is the most received word among the Greek Fathers, to signify a Person; and One Essence and Three Hypostases was the Catholick Language. Now it is agreed on all hands, That Hypostasis literally signifies Substance; and as I have already observed, the only dispute about it was, that some by Hypostasis understood the Common Nature and Substance in the notion of Essence, and for that reason asserted, That there is but One Hypostasis, as there is but One Essence in the Trinity; others understood a singular Subsisting Nature and Substance, and in this sense asserted Three Hypostases; but none of them ever understood Hypostasis in any other

notion, but that of Substance, either a Common, or Individual Substance: And to prevent this Ambiguity, as far as they could, which might conceal very different Heresies, *Sabellianism* on one hand, and *Arianism* on the other, and many times occasioned the Orthodox to suspect each other of these opposite Heresies, though Essence and Hypostasis signified much the same thing, yet they appropriated the name Essence to signify a Common Nature and Substance, and Hypostasis to signify Individuals: As we learn from *St. Basil*, *Greg. Nyssen*, *Damascen*, and many other Catholick Writers, who assign this difference between Essence and Hypostasis.

But yet this did not wholly silence this Dispute among the *Greeks*, much less did it satisfy the *Latin* Fathers, who knew no difference between *Essentia* & *Substantia*, but translated the *Homoousion* by *Unius Substantiæ*; and therefore it was as great Heresy to them to say Three Substances (as they translated the *Greek* Hypostases) as to say Three Essences in the Trinity: *St. Austin* professes, That he knew not what the *Greeks* meant by One Essence, and Three Substances; and for the same reason, it is well known, *St. Jerom* rejected Three Substances, for both by Essence and Substance they understood a Common Nature, which made it Heresy indeed to assert Three Substances, which in this acceptation of the word must signify Three divers Substances, which specifically differ: And therefore tho they did not reject the *Greek* Faith, but did believe as heartily as they, that each Person by himself was perfect Hypostasis and Substance, and rejected the Sabellian *One Hypostasis*, and *One Substance*; yet they did not like the Phrase of *Three Hypostases*, and *Three Substances*; for they knew no difference between Three Substances and Three Essences, and by both understood Three different Kinds and Species of Beings. And for this Reason, both to secure the Catholick Faith from such a diversity and dissimilitude of Nature, as Three Essences  
and

and Substances may signify, and from a *Sabellian* Unity and Singularity, they chose such words, as signified a Real Perfect Subsisting Being, but did not immediatly and formally signify Essence and Substance, tho they did necessarily suppose and connote it. Such among the *Greeks* are ὑπαρξίς, χρῆμα, πρᾶγμα, ὑποκείμενον, among the *Latins*, *subsistentia*, *suppositum*, *res*, *ens*: Existence, Subsistence, Subject, *Suppositum*, Thing, Being, which every one sees, must signify something as real, as Essence, and Substance, and must necessarily include Essence and Substance in their very notion; and that thus they were used by the Catholic Fathers, *Petavius* proves by numerous Quotations, which the Reader may consult at his leisure. And though some of these words are sometimes used singularly of all Three Divine Persons in the notion of a Common Essence and Substance, as ὑπαρξίς, πρᾶγμα, χρῆμα, *res*, in which sense *St. Austin* called the Trinity *unam summam rem*, yet both Fathers and Schoolmen did without any scruple use them in the plural number, τρεῖς ὑπαρξίς, τρία πρᾶγματα, τρία ὑποκείμενα, *tres subsistentiæ*, *tres res*, *tria supposita*, *tria entia realia*, that the Divine Persons were Three Existences, Three Subsistencies, Three *Suppositums*, Three Things, Three Real Beings; and why not then Three Essences, and Three Substances, since every *suppositum*, every Thing, every Real Being, is Essence and Substance; the reason of which is plainly this, That Essence and Substance, unless qualified with some limiting Adjuncts, signify the formal Reasons of things, and can't be multiplied without diversity; whereas the other Terms signify nothing but Real and Actual Existence, which does not diversify, and therefore not multiply, the Essence; for Three *Suppositums*, Three Subjects, Three Things, Three Real Beings, may have One Essence, Nature, and Substance, formally, identically, and invariably the same.

Pet. de Tr.  
l. 4 c. 1,  
2, 3.



Petav. de  
Tr. l. 4. c. 3.  
f. 6.

But there is some dispute about the use of those words, *Existence and Subsistence*. Petavius observes a great difference between the Ancient and Modern use of them: That the Ancients used them in a Concrete Sense for Person and Substance, that which does really exist and subsist, as he proves by several Quotations; but that the Schoolmen use them in an abstract Sense, for the modifications of Substance, which they call Modes, which together with the Substance constitute what we call Persons (of which more hereafter) and this may be true as to some later Schoolmen; but the more Ancient, and many Modern Schoolmen, retained the Old Catholick use of the words; and Suarez could trace the Doctrine of Modes no higher than Durandus.

L. 1. dist.  
25.

Peter Lombard is express in it, That Three Persons are *tres subsistentiæ, tres entes*, Three Subsistencies, Three Beings, and *tres subsistentiæ vel entes*, & *subsistentiæ vel subsistentes*, Subsistencies or Beings, Subsistencies or those that subsist.

Parte pri-  
ma. q. 30.  
Art. 1.

Thus Tho. Aquinas tells us, That Persons are *res subsistentes*, subsisting things: And in answer to that Objection against a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, that a Person, according to Boetius, being *rationalis naturæ individua substantia*, the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature; if there be a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, there must consequently be a plurality of Substances; he tells us, That Substance either signifies the Essence, or the *Suppositum*; that in this last sense it is used in the definition of a Person, as appears by the addition of *Individual*, which is what the Greeks call *Hypostasis*, and therefore assert Three Hypostases (Individual Substances) as we do Three Persons; but we don't use to say *Three Substances*, by reason of the equivocal use of the word, lest we should be thought to assert *Three Essences* in the Godhead. From whence

it

it is plain, that by Three Subsistencies, *Tho. Aquinas* understood Three that subsist; *Three Individual Substances*, in the Notion of Three distinct *Suppositums*, though not of Three different Essences; for this is the true distinction he makes between *Suppositum* and Essence, that they both signify Substance, but the one signifies as Matter, and the other as Form; and therefore the Plurality of *Suppositums* or Subsistencies does not multiply the Essence or Form, for Three may be perfectly One in Nature and Essence; but to multiply Essences, to say there are Three Natures, or Three Essences, is to diversify them, and to make Three Gods specifically and essentially different.

*Sicut nos dicimus in divinis pluraliter tres personas, & tres subsistentias, ita Græci dicunt tres hypostases. Sed quia nomen substantia, quod secundum proprietatem significationis respondet hypostasi, equivocatur apud nos, cum quandoque significet essentiam, quandoque hypostasim, ne possit esse erroris occasio, maluerunt pro hypostasi transferre subsistentiam, quam substantiam. Ibid. q. 29. art. 2. ad secundum.*

After this, I need not add much concerning the Notion of *Person*. The *Ciceronian* sense of this word (too much in use of late), wherein the same Man may be said to sustain several Persons, according to his different Relations, Offices, and Quality, has (as I have observed before) been rejected by all Catholick Writers, as *Sabellianism*.

*St. Austin*, generally speaking, is the Text to the Master of the Sentences, and He to the Schoolmen; and that Father is express in it, that *Person is Essence* and Substance; that the Person of the Father is the Essence and Substance of the Father: From whose Authority *P. Lombard* concludes, That Person is used in the Notion of Substance; That when we say the Father is a Person, the sense is, the Father is the Divine Essence. He observes from the same Father, that the *Latins* used Person in the same sense that the *Greeks* used Hypostasis, which in *Latin* literally sig-

*Ecce expresse dicitur, quodd Personam secundum substantiam dicitur, ut cum dicitur, Pater est Persona, hoc fit sensus, Pater est divina essentia; similiter cum dicitur, Filius est Persona, Spiritus Sanctus est Persona, id est, divina essentia. Lomb. dist. 23.*

nifies

nifies Substance; but yet they were very cautious of saying Three Substances, as the *Greeks* did Three Hypostases; because though the *Greeks* distinguished between Essence and Substance, that Essence expressed the formal Nature of things, Substance what in Creatures we call the Matter or *Suppositum*, yet the *Latins* knew no such distinction; and therefore Three Substances to them was the same with Three Essences, which would assert a diversity in the Divine Nature: And this he shews was the only Objection *St. Hierom* had against Three Substances, or Three Hypostases, which he allowed in the Notion of *Tres Personae subsistentes*, Three subsisting Persons, but not of Three Natures or Essences; and this Solution he acquiesces in, That

*Idem, Dist.*  
26.

*Dist. 25.*

*Tres Personae sunt Tres Substantiae, scilicet, Tres Entes, pro quo Graeci dicunt Tres Hypostases*; That Three Persons are Three Substances, that is, Three Real Beings, which the *Greeks* call Three Hypostases. And though he observes

that *Person* may sometimes signify that Personal Property whereby one Divine Person is distinguished from another, yet he will not allow us to call Three Persons Three Properties, but Three Subsistencies, or Three Hypostases; for the Property is not the Person, but only distinguishes Persons; of which more hereafter. And he reduces the several acceptations of *Person*, as used in the Doctrine of the Trinity, to these three.

1. That it sometimes signifies the Divine Essence, as it does when we speak singularly of any One Person; for the Person of the Father is the Divine Es-

*Hoc etiam modo sanè potest accipi persona in praemissis locutionibus, cum dicitur alia est persona Patris, alia filii, id est, alia est proprietas, quâ pater est pater, alia, quâ filius est filius, alia, quâ spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus. Ita etiam nomine persona quidam proprietates intelligere volunt, cum dicuntur tres persona; sed melius est ut subsistentias vel hypostases intelligamus, cum dicimus tres personas. Ex praedictis colligitur, quod nomen persona in Trinitate triplicem tenet intelligentiam; est enim ubi facit intelligentiam essentia, & est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis, & est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis.*

*Dist. 25.*

sence, and so of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 2. Subsistencies and Hypostases, as when we speak in the Plural Number, Three Persons are Three Subsistencies, Three Hypo-

Hypostases, but *unius Essentiae*, of one and the same Essence. 3. A Property, as when we distinguish the Persons by their Personal Properties.

*Thomas Aquinas*, and generally the Schools, receive and vindicate that Definition which *Boetius* gives of a Person, That it is the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature, as I have already observed, whereby they expressly tell us, that they understand *Aristotle's Substantia Prima*, or a Subsisting Individual.

St. *Austin* thought that the *Greeks* might as well have used *Prosopon* as *Hypostasis*, for what the *Latins* called Person; and why they rather said *Hypostasis*, he could not tell, unless perhaps the Propriety of their Language required it; and this was the truth of the Case; for *πρόσωπον* was a very ambiguous word, taken originally from the Stage, as *Persona* also was, and signified that Vizard which was put over the Face, to represent the Person whom they intended to act, and so was used to signify a mere Appearance and Representation, not a Real Subsisting Person; and therefore St. *Basil* tells us, That the *Sabellians* who owned but One Essence and *Hypostasis* in God, yet *προσωποποιεῖς ἑνὸς ἡγεαφῆς διαφόρους*, that the Scripture represented God under different Personal Appearances, sometimes as the Father, sometimes as the Son, or Holy Spirit; and adds, That therefore those who affirm that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are but *ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ*, One in Subject, *Hypostasis*, or *Suppositum*, but *τρεῖς πρόσωπα τέλεια*, Three perfect Persons, or *Prosopa*, or Appearances, justify the Charge of *Sabellianism* imputed by the *Arians* to the *Catholicks*. And in another place he tells us, That those who say that Essence and *Hypostasis* are the same, are forced to acknowledge *πρόσωπα μόνον διάφορα*, only different *Prosopa*, or Appearances; and while they are afraid to own *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, Three *Hypostases*, they relapse into the *Sabellian* Heresy. And therefore *Petavius* truly observes, That though the

De Tr. l. 7.  
c. 6.

Basil. Ep.  
349.

Ep. 391.

the Catholick Fathers did not scruple the use of this term *Prosoπον*; yet they used it in the sense of Hypostasis; and the Notion of Hypostasis joined with *Prosoπον*, makes up the true Catholick Notion of a Person, as ἐνπίστα & ὑφιστά πρόσωπα, τρία πρόσωπα καὶ ἑσάσωον αὐθιγῶν, & προσωπεῖ ἑσάσεις, which, as he says, proves that these Persons have not one simple ὑποκείμενον, or *Suppositum*, nor are merely different Functions and Energies of the same Individual Being, but that the Diversity and Multiplicity is in the Subject it self, and that there are Three

*Quæ legendi rationes indicant, Personas illas, — non unum & simplex habere τὸ ὑποκείμενον, neque diversas solum ejusdem individui functiones & ἐνέργειας, quibus appellationes varia competant — sed diversitatem illam & multiplicationem in subiecto esse veram, ac tria omnino ex se distincta, & subsistentibus proprietatibus separata consistere. Petav. l. 4. c. 2. p. 324.*

truly and really distinct, and that subsist distinctly.

This I hope is a sufficient Proof of the first thing proposed, That a Divine Person is the Divine Essence and Substance; but I added also, That it is nothing else; and I must speak something briefly to this.

The absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature, which admits of no kind of Composition, neither of Parts, nor of Substance and Accident, nor of Nature and *Suppositum*, that which has, and that which is had, is the universal Doctrine both of the Catholick Fathers and Schools, as I need not prove; and the necessary Consequence of this is, That a Divine Person can be nothing else but the Divine Nature, Essence, and Substance; for were a Divine Person the Divine Nature and something else, there must be a Composition in the Divine Nature, something superadded to it, to make it a Person.

The Unity of the Divine Nature in a Trinity of Persons, as I have shewn at large, is resolved into the perfect invariable Simeness and Identity of Nature (the τὴν αὐτῆς οὐσίας) in Three; and therefore each Divine Person must be the whole Divine Nature and Essence, and nothing else; for otherwise the Divine Essence could not be perfectly one

one and the same in Three, but would be distinguished and multiplied by some new Accidents and Modifications, as Human Nature is in distinct Human Persons.

A Trinity of Persons is a known Objection against the absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature; and the Answer to it is as well known, That those Relations which distinguish Persons, make no Composition in the Divine Nature; and then a Person can be nothing else but the Divine Nature, if there be no Composition to make a Person: But of this more presently.

2dly. The next thing I proposed was this, That according to the Doctrine both of Fathers and Schools, the Divine Essence and Substance, as subsisting distinctly in Three, is proper and peculiar to each, and incommunicable to one another.

This is so universally acknowledged by all who own real and substantial Persons, that I need say little of it. I have produced several express Testimonies already out of the Fathers to this purpose; and indeed to say, That the Substance of each Person is proper and incommunicable, is no more than to say that their Persons are incommunicable; that the Father is not, and never can be the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son; which is what they meant by *κρείως πατρός* & *κρείως υἱός*, properly and appropriately Father and Son; that the Father never was nor can be a Son, nor the Son a Father. Thus their different Characters prove an incommunicable distinction between them: The Son is the Image of God, *εἰκὼν ἐκείνου* & *ἑωρα*, a Living Substantial Image; but the Image, tho by an Identity of Nature it is the same with the Prototype, yet it is not and never can be the Prototype; not *imaginale*, but *imaginalis imago*, as *Victorinus Afer* speaks; not the Person, nor Personal Substance of the Father, but the express Image of his Person and Substance.



In *Boetius's* Definition of a Person by *individua substantia*, the Schools, as far as I have observed, universally understand *incommunicabilis substantia*, an incommunicable Substance; and therefore, as I observed before, though they assert the Divine Essence to be *singularis*, yet it is *singularis communicabilis*, a communicable Singular; but a Person is *substantia individua*, or *singularis incommunicabilis*, a singular incommunicable Substance.

Now this started a great Difficulty; How the Essence and Substance of the Father, which is but One, can be both communicable and incommunicable. The Person of the Father, which is his Divine Essence, is incommunicable, and yet the Father communicates his own Divine Nature and Essence to the Son and Holy Spirit, without communicating his Person.

Of the same Nature is what the Schools teach concerning the Divine Generation and Procession. They allow that the Father does truly and properly, not metaphorically, beget the Son, and that the Son is truly and properly begotten; and that the Father by Divine Generation communicates the Divine Essence to the Son; and that the Son has all that he has from the Father, and is all that the Father is, excepting that he is not the Father, but the Son: And yet they will not allow that the Divine Essence either begets, or is begotten, or proceeds.

They have a great Authority against them in this, as they all own; for the Fathers made no scruple to say, That God begat God, Essence Essence, Wisdom Wisdom, Life Life; and that the Son is begotten, and only begotten God, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, and begotten Wisdom. Upon these Authorities *Richardus Victorinus* contends earnestly, that we ought in plain terms to own, That Substance begets Substance, and that those who deny it, reject the Doctrine of all the Catholick Fathers: But *Peter Lombard*, and most other Schoolmen, especially since

since the Council of *Lateran*, justify themselves in this matter, by saying, That the Fathers intended no more in such expressions, than what they themselves own, though they reject that way of speaking. When the Fathers taught, That God begat God, Essence Essence, Substance Substance, Wisdom Wisdom, Life Life, they meant no more, than that the Father, who is God, Essence, Substance, Wisdom, Life, begat his Son, who is also truly and really God, Essence, Substance, Wisdom, Life; and the reason why they rather chose to say, That the Father, who is God, and Essence, and Wisdom, begets the Son, who is God, and Essence, and Wisdom, &c. than to say, That God begets God, Essence Essence, Wisdom Wisdom, is this, Because God, and Essence, and Wisdom, &c. signify absolutely, and so may multiply Gods, Essences, Wisdoms; as when we say Man begets a Man, the begotten Man is as absolutely a Man, as he who begets; and he who begets, and he who is begotten, notwithstanding their relation, are two absolute Men: And therefore, to prevent all such mistakes, and to secure the Catholick Faith of the Real Distinction of Persons and *Suppositums* in perfect Unity, without the least diversity or multiplication of Essence, they attributed Active Generation to the Person of the Father, and Passive Generation to the Person of the Son; which proves a Real Distinction of Persons and *Suppositums* (for he who begets cannot be he who is begotten), and yet preserves the Unity and Identity of the Divine Nature.

But how can this be, if Person and Essence, *Suppositum* and Nature be the same, as it is in God? For then if the Person be begotten, the Essence, which is that Person, must be begotten also; and if the Person begets, the Essence must beget. Now this is in some sense true; and therefore the Catholick Fathers promiscuously used these terms; That the Father begets a Son, or God begets God, or Essence begets Essence; and the Schools themselves own,

That the Father, who is God, begets the Son *deitatem habentem*, who has the Divinity, the Divine Nature and Essence, and has it by his Generation and Birth ; which in reality is the same, though they thought the expression less liable to mistake. For the truth of the Case is this ; The Schools, that asserted the perfect Singularity of the Divine Essence, fenced against all Expressions of an absolute signification, which multiplied Natures ; for Two absolute Natures cannot be singularly One ; and therefore would not say, that Nature and Essence begets, or is begotten ; for in these Propositions, the terms Nature and Essence, unless qualified and restrained, signify absolutely, and so infer Two absolute Natures and Essences, that which begets, and that which is begotten ; and therefore they rather call this a Communication than a Generation of Nature, because this last signifies relatively : That which is communicated, may be a Singular Nature, which subsists distinctly in more than one, but with a necessary relation to its Original, and such a Communication does not multiply Natures, but only Essential Relations. And this is the difference they made between *Deus & Deitatem habens*, God, and one who has the Divinity ; that God signifies absolutely, an Absolute Independent Divinity, which has no relation or communication with any other ; but One who has the Divinity, may signify One, who has it, not originally and absolutely, but by communication from another, and in an Essential Relation to him, as the Son and the Holy Spirit have, which is the same Divinity in Three, and but One in Three. And therefore I think the Schools were very much in the right, for rejecting *Tres Dii*, Three Gods, when at the same time they owned *Tres Deitatem habentes*, Three who have the Divinity, for these do not signify the same thing : The first, unless qualified, is Polytheism ; the second, the Christian Trinity in Unity ; though I confess, I should not chuse to call the Father, One who has

has the Divinity, but simply God, because he is absolutely and originally so, and not by communication; and for that reason is both in Scripture, and in the Fathers, eminently called God, and the One God, whereas the other Divine Persons are the Son of God, and the Spirit of God; and as *Tertullian* observes, never called God, when joined with the Father, though they are, when spoken of distinctly by themselves.

See Dr. Payn's Letter to the Bishop of Rochester.

For the same Reason the Schools forbid the use of Abstract or Substantive Terms in the Plural Number, when we speak of the Divine Persons, but allow of Plural Adjectives, because Substantives signify absolutely, and multiply Natures, as well as Persons or *Suppositums*, but Adjectives may signify relatively, and multiply Persons without multiplying Natures; as Three Eternals, Three Omnipotents, Three Infinites, in a Substantive sense, signify Three Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite, Natures, as well as Persons; but Three, who are Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite, signify a Trinity of Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite, Persons, but do not necessarily signify a Trinity of Natures, since these Three may subsist in the same Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite Nature, and each of them have this Eternal Infinite Nature, and all the same. But still the difficulty remains, if Person or *Suppositum* and Nature be perfectly the same, How the Father can communicate his Nature, and not his Person? How there can be Three Incommunicable Persons, and *Suppositums*, and but One Nature, and that communicable to more than One?

That thus it is, and how it may be, is better explained by an Example, than by any words without it: And I shall instance in a living substantial Image: This is the true Character of the Second Person of the Trinity, that he is so the Son, as to be the Living Perfect Image of God, as has been explained at large elsewhere, as you may find in the Margin. Now every man must confess, that the Prototype and the Image

See the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of a Trinity in Unity, p. 19. &c.

Image are two distinct Incommunicable *Suppositums*, the Prototype is not the Image, nor the Image the Prototype; and yet we must confess, that there is, and must be, but one and the same Nature in both, not Specifically, but Identically the same, for a perfect Image is, and can be nothing but the same that the Prototype is, the same Eternity, the same Life, the same Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, but all this not Personally the same, for their Persons are not, and cannot be the same; but identically and invariably the same, or else it can't be a true and perfect Image. And this makes it evident, that though Person and Nature be perfectly the same in God, yet when he begets a Son, he neither begets his own Person, nor Nature, which would be to beget himself, which St. *Austin*, and the Schools after him, reject as absurd; for an Image of God is neither the Person, nor the Personal Nature of God, but of the same Nature with him, and perfectly the same, there being no other difference between them, but that one is the Prototype, the other the Image; one the Father, the other the Son. So that when God of his own whole perfect Substance begets a whole, perfect, living, substantial Image, he does not beget himself, but another; he does not beget his own Nature, nor another Nature like his own, but his own Image, of the same Nature with himself: He begets another Person, who is as truly and perfectly God, as the true, perfect, living, Image of God must be perfect God, but he does not in an absolute sense beget God, neither *se Deum*, nor *alium Deum*, as the Schools rightly determine, neither himself God, nor another God; for he neither begets his own Essence and Divinity, nor another Divinity, but another, who is the perfect Image of his own Divine Essence: And what is here said of the Generation of the Son, as the living subsisting Image of God, must be applied to the Procession of the Holy Spirit, who is the Eternal Spirit of God, as the Son is his Image.

This



This is what the Catholick Fathers call the *μία θεότης*, which is *ἡ θεότης*, that One Divinity, in which they place the Unity of God: That there is but One Absolute Divinity, or Divine Nature, which is the Person of the Father, who is therefore eminently acknowledged to be the One God, as *πηγὴ θεότητος*, the Fountain of the Divinity, that is, of the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, which are not two other Absolute Divinities, for then they would be two more Gods, besides the Father; but the Divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit is the same One Divinity of the Father, as an Eternal, Perfect, Begotten, Living Image, and an Eternal Proceeding Spirit, each of which is in himself true and perfect God, and all Three but One God, or One Divinity, not merely because they receive their Divinity from God by an Eternal Generation and Procession, nor as they have a Divinity, or Divine Nature specifically the same with the Father, which alone can no more render them One God, than Father and Son are One Man; but as the singular individual Divinity of the Father is in the Son and Holy Spirit; as it is manifest the singular individual Nature of the Prototype is, and must be in its living substantial Image, without which it is not a Natural Image, though it may have a perfect likeness of Nature, if it have an absolute Nature of its own: This is what *Tertullian* tells us, That there is *unus Deus cum œconomia*, One God with his Economy; and what *St. Hilary* and others so often tell us, That the Father does not cease to be the One God by having a Son, since the Son is God by Nativity and Birth, and *Authoritate Paternæ Naturæ*, by having his Father's Nature, who is the One God.

And this is all that the Schools mean by the Singularity of the Divine Nature and Essence; and it is impossible they should mean any thing else, when they teach, that this singular Nature is communicable.

They



They allow, as I have already shewn, that Nature and Person is the same, that each Person is *Suppositum* and Substance, a singular incommunicable Substance, and therefore that there were Three *Suppositums*, and in that sense Three Substances in the Trinity; but not Three Natures and Essences, though each Person be distinctly by himself, the Divine Nature and Essence. Now since what is strictly singular, is Numerically One; and what is Numerically One, and never can be more, can't be multiplied, as that seems to be, which is communicated, what sense can there possibly be in a *singular communicable*, which seem to be contradictory Terms?

But this is very good sense, and very Catholick Doctrine, if we understand this *Singular Communicable*, as the Schools did, of One absolute Divinity, or Divine Nature, which is so singular, that it can be but One, as is demonstrable by Reason: But yet may beget its own essential Image, which is not another Divinity, or another Nature, but its own singular Nature in its Image, which is another *Suppositum* and Person, but not another Nature.

That this is the Sense of the Schools, and all that they meant by the Singularity of the Divine Essence, is evident from the whole Doctrine of Relations. A Trinity of Proper, Real Persons, each of which is Nature, Essence, and Substance, was made an Argument against the perfect Unity, as well as against the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature,, for Plurality and Unity are opposed to each other. To this the Schools answer, That a Plurality and Unity of the same kind, are indeed opposite to each other, and cannot be reconciled; as a Plurality of Natures cannot be reconciled with the Unity of Nature, nor a Plurality of Persons with the Unity of a Person; but a Plurality of Persons and Unity of Nature may be reconciled, and thus it is with the Trinity in Unity; for though each Divine Person be the Divine Nature and Essence, yet Three Divine Persons

Sons are not Three Absolute Natures and Essences, but Three Relations in One Singular Absolute Nature.

*Alia prop-  
ter sum-  
mam uni-  
tatem &*

*simplicitatem excluditur omnis pluralitas absolute dictorum, non autem pluralitas relationum. Quae relationes predicantur de aliquo ut ad alterum, & sic compositionem in ipso de quo dicuntur non impo-  
sant. Aquin. 1. q. 30. art. 1, ad 3.*

## S E C T. VIII.

### *Concerning the Divine Relations.*

**B**UT it will be of great use more particularly to consider this Doctrine of Relations, without which it is impossible rightly to understand what the Schools teach, about a Trinity in Unity: And to reduce it into as narrow a compass as I can, I shall 1. shew, What the Schools mean by Relations in the Divine Nature. 2. Why they insist so much upon Relations.

1. What they mean by Divine Relations. Now they tells us, That they are real Relations, not made by the Mind from some external Respects and Habitues which it observes between things, but antecedent to all the Acts of Reason in the things themselves: That they are not inherent Accidents, but Substance, and subsisting Relations; not relative Names and Appellations, but the Relatives themselves; the Persons related being the Relations, and the Relation the Person; which are therefore by some called *Substantiæ Relativæ*, and *Entia Realia Relativa*, Relative Substances, and Real Beings, but Relative; that is, not Absolute Substances, and Absolute Beings, with a Relation, as it is in Creatures, where the Son is as Absolute a Man, and as Absolute a Person as the Father is, though they are related to each other as Father and Son; but the very Substance and Person is the Relation.

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Before I shew, That this is the Doctrine of the Schools, the better to understand what they say, and the Reasons of it, it will be necessary to give as plain and intelligible an Idea of this as I can; especially since I find some Learned Men boggle very much at the Notion of Relative Substances, which are not merely the Subjects of Relations, but the Relations themselves.

What their Objection is against this, I can't tell, unless they think that a Relative Substance is not True and Perfect Substance; which is very far from the Notion of the Schools, who attribute compleat and perfect Subsistence to these Divine Relations or Persons, not as Accidents in their Subjects, nor as Parts in a Whole, which is their Notion of Substance and compleat Subsistence; but a Relative Substance only signifies such a Substance as is not the Original, but is all that it is from another, which they call the *Relatio Originis*, not merely such a Relation as is between the Cause and the Effect, which is seldom a substantial subsisting Relation, but the Relation between Substance and Substance, when one Substance, in the notion of *Suppositum*, is wholly and perfectly derived and expressed from the other.

The easiest Representation of this, is the relation between the Prototype or Original, and its Image; which is not a mere Relation of Likeness and Similitude, but of Origination, that the Image is taken from the Original, which is the foundation of the Relation. Though Two Eggs were never so perfectly alike, yet One is not the Image of the Other, because it is not of the Other, nor its natural Representation, though perfectly like it; but the Image is that which results from the Object, like a Face in the Glass, or the Impression of a Seal; and the whole Essence of such an Image, as

*Imago enim est similitudo non quacunque, sed ex eo, cujus imago dicitur expressa; respondent enim sibi invicem imago & exemplar. Proinde non quacunque sibi mutuo sunt multum similia, ut ovum ovo, sunt ejusmodi, ut alterum sit imago alterius; non enim in his omnibus, verbi gratia in ovis, alterum de altero expressam gerit figuram, sed quod ex re objecta resultat in speculo, & similitudo sigilli cera impressa, & alia hujusmodi propriae imagines dicuntur. Estius dist. 27. S. 8. & Aquin. 1. q. 35. in corpore.*

an Image is relative. And it is the same case as to a living substantial Image of that Life and Substance from whence it proceeds; it is as perfect Life and Substance it self, as its Original, or else it could not be a natural Image of Life and Substance; but yet it is Relative Life and Substance, Life of Life, the Prototype begetting its own Image in a perfect Identity and Simeness of Nature, Whole of Whole. And this is the Notion of the Schools concerning Relative Substances, which is intelligible enough.

And that this is what they mean by Relations in the God-head or Divine Nature, is as plain.

The Master of the Sentences tells us, That these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify the Properties of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession; for they are Relatives, which speak a mutual respect, and denote Relations, which are not Accidents in God, but immutably in the Persons themselves; so that they are not mere relative Appellations, but are Relations or Notions in the things themselves, that is, in the Persons.

And by this Argument *Tho. Aquinas* proves, That these are real Relations, and are really in God, because the Father is so called from the Relation of Paternity, and the Son from Filiation; that were not Paternity and Filiation *realiter in Deo*, real subsisting Relations in the Divinity, it would follow, That God is not really Father or Son, but only according to different Conceptions, which is the *Sabellian* Heresy. And proves, That these Relations in God are real, because they are Divine Processions in the

*Has proprietates designant nomina personarum, scilicet Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus; quæ relativæ sunt, & ad se invicem dicuntur. Quia notant relationes, quæ non sunt Deo accidentales, sed in ipsis Personis ab æterno sunt immutabiliter, ut non modo appellaciones sunt relativæ, sed etiam relationes, sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in Personis suis. Lomb. l. 1. dist. 26.*

*Pater non dicitur nisi à Paternitate, & Filius à filiatione; si igitur paternitas & filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur, quod Deus non sit realiter Pater aut Filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiæ tantum, quæ est hæresis Sabelliana. Aqu. 1. q. 28. art. 1.*

*Relationes in divinis, cum sint secundum processiones in identitate naturæ, reales quasdam in divinis esse relationes necessarium est. Ibid.*

Identity of Nature ; that is the Son, who proceeds from the Father in the Identity of the same Nature ; and the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Father and Son in the Identity of the same Nature : For they called both the Generation of the Son, and the Spiration of the Holy Ghost, *Processions*, as the *Greeks* did *γενεολαῖς*; the one *processio intellectus*, the other *amoris*. Now these real Processions are Respects in

*Respectus in natura rerum sunt relationes reales, cum aliquid procedit à principio ejusdem naturæ, necesse est quod ambo, scilicet procedens, & id à quo procedit in eodem ordine conveniant, & sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem. Ib.*

the nature of things, and such Respects are real Relations; for when any thing proceeds from a Principle of the same Nature, both that which proceeds, and that from which it proceeds, must necessarily be of the same Order, and therefore have a real respect to each other.

Divine Processions in the Identity of Nature must be related to each other in the Unity of the same Nature, and must be substantial subsisting Relations; for they are no other than the Persons themselves, who thus proceed.

*Relatio realiter in Deo existens, idem est essentia secundum rem. Aq. 1. q. 28. art. 2.*

*Relationes personales nec à Personis, nec ab essentia reipsa distinguuntur. Estius dist. 33. S. 2. l. 1.*

It is a received Conclusion in the Schools, That a Relation in God is the same with the Divine Essence: That Personal Relations are not *reipsa* distinguished either from the Persons or the Essence.

And *Gilbertus Porretanus*, who taught the contrary, was forced to recant in the Council of *Rhemes*. The real Distinction of these Relations in the Unity of the Divine Nature, is another avowed Doctrine of the Schools; and by a real Distinction they mean a Distinction *in re*, in the Subject and *Suppositum*: And this they prove from the real Distinction of Persons, which are distinguished only by Relations: From a real Trinity, which is One in Substance, but multiplied by Relations, (*relatio multiplicat Trinitatem*;) and therefore unless these Relations be really distinguished from each other, there can't be a Real, but only a Notional Trinity, which is *Sabellianism*. That these Relations

tions which constitute the Trinity, are opposite Relations, which require distinct Subjects, as Paternity and Filiation, for no man can be Father and Son to himself: That these Divine Relations are real Relations, and therefore must be really distinct, or else they are not all real, unless they be really opposed to each other, which makes a real distinction; and therefore there must be a real distinction in God, not as to any thing absolute (*secundum rem absolutam*), which is the Divine Essence, which has the most perfect and simple Unity, but *secundum rem relativam*, with respect to a Relative Being and Subsistence: So that these Relations are Relative Beings, Relative Subsistences, and, as they are sometimes called, Relative Substances, which are really distinct, though not in Nature, yet in their *Suppositums*; not as Three Absolute Beings, which makes a distinction in Nature, but as Three Real Subsisting Relations, in the Unity of the same Nature.

*Aquinas & Estius, ibid.*

But not to multiply words in so plain a Case, I shall observe but one thing more to this purpose, and that concerns the Dispute concerning the Number of the Divine Persons. The Catholick Faith owns a Trinity, or only Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and it is the known Doctrine of the Schools, That the Relation is the Person; How comes it to pass then, that when there are Four Relations in the Godhead, Paternity, Filiation, Active Spiration, and Procession, there should be but Three Persons?

Now the Answer, which *Aquinas* and others give to this Difficulty, is this. That it is not every Relation, but only opposite Relations, which constitute and distinguish Persons; for more Persons are more subsisting Relations really distinct from each other; but there can be no real distinction between the Divine Relations, but upon account of their relative opposition: And therefore two opposite Relations must belong to two Persons, but such Relations as are not

*Aqui. 1. q. 30. Ar. 2.*



not opposite to each other, must belong to the same Person; and therefore Paternity and Filiation must belong to two Persons, as being relatively opposed; and therefore a subsisting Paternity is the Person of the Father, and a subsisting Filiation the Person of the Son: Which can never be one Person, as requiring distinct *Suppositums* for such opposite Relations: But now the other two Relations, Spiration and Procession are not opposed to either of these, but only to each other: And therefore Spiration does not constitute another Person, as not being opposed either to Paternity or Filiation, and therefore may and does belong both to Father and Son; but Procession must constitute a Third Person, as opposed to Spiration, and so necessarily distinguished from Father and Son.

And therefore, though there are Four Relations, yet one of them, *Spiration*, is not separated from the Person of the Father, and the Son, but belongs to them both; nor is it a Property, as not being proper and peculiar to any one Person; nor is it a Personal Relation, or that which constitutes a Person, and therefore there are but Three Relations, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, which are Personal Properties, which constitute Persons, and therefore but Three Persons.

Now this Answer evidently proves, That by Relations they did not mean meer *Habitudes*, *Respects*, and *External Denominations*; for then every Relation must of necessity be a Person, and there must be as many Persons, as there are Relations; but they mean relative Beings, and Subsistencies, and therefore allow no Relations to constitute distinct Persons, but such as necessarily require distinct Subjects; that is, such opposite Relations, as can never meet in the same Subject; and therefore their *Suppositums* must be really distinct, as Paternity and Filiation, for no one can be Father and Son to himself. There is no imaginable Account, why only opposite Relations constitute Persons, but  
because

because they distinguish their Subjects; for when opposite Relations meet in the same Subject, but not in opposition, they do not distinguish and multiply Persons, as the same man may be Father and Son, and but One Person; but when opposite Relations distinguish their Subjects, as the Divine Relations necessarily do, they multiply Persons too: And no Relations, Properties, Notions, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, constitute a Person, but such as distinguish their Subjects, that Three Persons, and Three Relations, are not Three Respects and Denominations of the same Singular Subject, but Three real distinct Relative Beings, and Subsistencies.

2. Let us now consider, why they insist so much upon the notion of Relations, that when they allow every Divine Relation to be the Divine Essence, Substance, an incommunicable Subsistence and Substance, yet they will not allow us absolutely to say *Three Substances*, but *Three Relations*, or *Three Relative Beings*, *Subsistencies*, or *Substances*. And the plain and short account of it is this; That this is essential to the Unity of God, and gives us the truest and most perfect conception of a Trinity in Unity. As to shew this particularly;

1. These Divine Relations (though each of them be incommunicably in his own Person, Essence, and Substance) secure the perfect Unity of the Divine Essence. For Three Relative Substances are essentially but One Substance, which Three Absolute Substances can never be, though they never so perfectly agree in the same Specifick Notion and Idea.

By an *absolute Substance*, I mean one intire, perfect, individual, whole, which is compleat in it self, and subsists compleatly by it self, without any Internal, Essential Union to, or necessary dependence on, any Being of the same kind: By *Relative Substances*, I mean, such Substances as are internal subsisting Relations in the same One whole individual

vidual Nature : Of Absolute Substances we have as many Instances, as there are particular Creatures in the World ; of Relative Substances we have no instance in Created Nature, but some such Images and Resemblances, as may help us to form an intelligible notion of them. Now it is evident, without any need to prove it, that every compleat absolute Substance, how many soever they are, multiplies the Individuals of the same kind ; Three absolute Human Substances are Three Men, and Three Absolute Divine Substances would for the same reason be Three Gods ; but it is otherwise as to Relative Substances, which are subsisting Personal Relations in the same One individual Nature ; and it is demonstrable, that the Relations of the same One individual Nature and Substance, can't multiply Natures and Substances, for then they would not be Relations in the same individual Substance, but would be Absolute, not Relative Substances.

As to explain this by a familiar Example. The Fathers, and after them the Schoolmen, find some Images of the Trinity in Human Souls, as *Memory, Understanding, Will* ; or which they think a nearer resemblance, *Mind, Knowledge, Love* : And a late Socinian is very fond of such a Trinity, as *Original Mind, Reflex Wisdom, and Love*.

Lomb.

l. 1. d. 3.

*Peter Lombard* explains this particularly from the Doctrine of *St. Austin* ; and it is evident that all these are very distinct, and never can be each other ; but all have a mutual and necessary relation to each other ; are in each other, and equal to each other, but are but One, One Mind, One Life, One Essence, and One Substance ; because they substantially exist in the same Soul and Mind, not as Accidents in their Subjects, which may be parted, but as Essential Properties and Powers.

This our Socinian Adversaries like well enough ; for these distinct Properties and Powers do not multiply Persons, and therefore though they grant something like such distinct Powers in the Divine Nature, yet still there is but  
One

One Divine Person, and therefore according to their own Notion, but One God.

But this is not the Question, Whether such distinct Faculties, Properties, and Powers, multiply Persons, which we grant they do not, because they do not multiply Natures, and One Individual Human Nature is but One Man, or One Human Person; but the Question is, Whether, if instead of these distinct Powers and Faculties, there were real subsisting Persons, as essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, they would any more divide or multiply Nature, than such distinct Powers and Faculties do? And I am pretty confident, no man can give me any good reason, why Relative Subsistencies, or Personal Relations should any more divide or multiply the Divine Nature, than Relative Powers and Properties divide or multiply Human Nature: For if these Divine Persons are as essentially related to each other in the Divine Nature, as such distinct Powers and Faculties are in Human Nature, a Trinity of Persons must be as essentially One in the same One Individual Divinity, as a Trinity of Powers and Faculties are in the same single Human Nature. It is certain, Three such Divine Persons, though each of them be by himself true and perfect God, are not Three Absolute Divinities, and therefore not Three Gods, but Three Divine Relative Subsistencies in the same One Individual Godhead, and therefore but One God; as Memory, Understanding and Will, are all that a Mind is, and each of them all that the other is, and yet not Three Minds, but One Mind.

This shews the difference between Absolute and Relative Substances; Three Absolute Substances are always distinctly and separately Three, and can never be any otherwise than specifically One; but Relative Substances may be essentially One in the same One Individual Nature; and this is the Account both the Fathers and Schools give of a Trinity in Unity, Three Relations, or Three Relative Sub-

stances, or Subsistencies, essentially related to each other in the Unity of the same One Individual Essence.

Ὁυδὲ γὰρ τοῖς ἔξω τῷ πατρὶ  
 ἡμᾶς ἐγγυαλίθη, ἀλορον ἦ) το  
 δεῖον ὑπέστηλθαι. Τὸτο δὲ παρ'  
 ἐκείνων ὁμολογούμενον ἰκανῶς δι-  
 ἀρθρῶσαι ἢ ἡμέτερον λόγον. Νῦν.  
 Orat. Cat. cap. i.

ciple, That the Divinity is not *ἄλογον*, which I translate (not, irrational, without Reason, or Understanding, but)

Ὁ γὰρ ὁμολογῶν μὴ ἄλλορον  
 εἶναι τὸ θεῶν, πάντως λόγον ἔχειν  
 τὸ μὴ ἄλλορον συγκατατίθεσθαι.  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀντιτάττει ὁμοονύμως  
 λέγειν λόγον, ἔκταν εἰ λέγει καὶ  
 ὁμοιότητα οὗτο παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ οὐ  
 θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, ὅσα μεταχθίσαι  
 καὶ πάλιν ὑψολογέειν ὑποληψιν.

Ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάντα κατὰλλιλον  
 74) πείθειν τῇ φύσει τὸ λόγον,  
 ὥς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα.

Ἄλλ' ἄσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις  
ἐπικηρὸς ἔσται καὶ ἐπικηρὸν τ' λόγον  
ἔχει; ὥτως ἡ ἀφωρητὴ καὶ ἀει-  
κλῆτος φύσις ἀτίδων ἔχει καὶ ὁφεί-  
σεται τ' λόγον.

Ἀγαπᾷ πᾶσα ἐν ζωῇ τὴ λό-  
 γη τῶν ἡρώων ἐν ὁμολογῇ  
 ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὁμοιωμένη τῇ λίσσῃ  
 ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβαίνει τὸ λόγον, διὰ τὸ  
 εἶναι ὑπερβαίνει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβαίνει  
 τὸ ἡρώον καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐν, τῇ  
 πᾶσι, ἐν τῇ τῇ καὶ καὶ καὶ  
 ἐν τῇ ἡρώων πᾶσι ἐν.

St. Gregory Nyssen has given the most particular Account of this matter in his Catechetical Oration. To convince the Heathens of the Eternal Subsistence of the Divine Word in the Unity of the same Godhead, he lays the foundation of all in that universally received Principle, is not *ἀλογον*, which I translate without Reason, or Understanding, but) not without *its Word*; which is not the Personal Wisdom of the Father, whereby the Father is wise, as I have already shewn (*Chap. 3.*) but a Personal, Living, Subsisting, Word: Which answers to that Word which we feel in our own Minds, and which is essential to all Minds, that no Mind can be without its Word; but is not a vanishing Notion and Idea, or a transient sound, as Human words, but answers to the perfection of the Divine Nature. And therefore as our Mortal Nature has a Vanishing, Perishing Word, so the Incorruptible, and Eternally Permanent, Immutable Nature, has an Eternal Subsisting Word. And (as he proceeds) if this Divine Word subsists, it lives; for it does not subsist like stupid inanimate Stones, but as Mind, and Spirit, which must live, if it subsists; and if it lives, the absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature, which admits of no composition, proves that he lives, not by a participation

tion of Life, but as Life it self. And if the Word lives, as being Life it self, it must have *θεραπευτικὴ δύναμις*, a power to do, what it freely wills and chuses. For that which cannot will and chuse (*ἀθεράπευτον*) does not live; and an Impotent Will is a contradiction to the Nature of God; and therefore its Power must be equal to its Will: But this Divine Word can will nothing but what is good, and wills whatever is good; and being able to effect whatever it wills, is not unactive (*ἀνενέργητον*) without doing any thing, but does the good it wills: And since we must acknowledge the World, and all things in it, which are wisely and artificially made, to be good; all things are the Works of this Living Subsisting Word. This is his Proof, That God has a Subsisting, Living, Almighty, Creating Word, which is another distinct Person from him, whose Word he is. For *the Word* is a Relative Term, and signifies a Relative Subsistence, and necessarily supposes the Father; for he is not the *Word*, but with relation to him, whose Word he is. And by this means he tells us, we may escape both the Polytheism of the *Gentiles*, and the Singularity of the *Jews*, by acknowledging the Living, Energetical, Operative Word, which the *Jews* deny, and the Unity and Identity of Nature, between the Word, and Him, whose Word he is. For as our Word proceeds out of our Mind, and is neither every way the same with the Mind, nor yet upon all accounts another. For that it

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδείχθη ὅτι τὸ θεῖον λόγον ἀνυπόστατον ἴδιον.

Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ὅτι ἀπόστη-  
ται ὁμολοῦσθαι, ἀντιζῶν ἴδιον  
ὅτι λόγον οὐκ ἔχει, ὁ ζῶν μετὰ τὴν.

Ὁ δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἑπὶ τὸν πατέρα. τὸν δὲ ἐστὶν λόγος, τὸν ποιεῖ τὴν λειτουργίαν καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν. Ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντως τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν πατέρα συνυπακούουσιν, ὁ δὲ εἶναι λόγος, μὴ πνός ἐν λόγῳ. Ἐπεὶ ἔν διακρίσει τὸν καὶ τὸν σημασίας ἡ ἑστὶν ἀκρόντων διάνοια, αὐτὸν τε τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν, ὡς αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κινῶνται τὸ μυστήριον τοῖς ἐκκλησιάζουσιν μαχόμενον ὑπολήψεις, τοῖς τε Ἰουδαίων ἀποσβεσθῆναι σωρευχόμενα, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐκπύρουν πᾶσι ἀποπᾶν ἐκφύ-  
ζεῖ, τὸ τε ζῶντα τὸ θεῖον λόγον, καὶ ἑνῆραν, καὶ ποιητικὸν ὁμο-  
λογῶν, ὅτι Ἰουδαῖοι ὁ δὲ καὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ διαφέρειν καὶ πᾶσι ἐν-  
σιν αὐτὸν τε τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐστὶν. Ὡς περὶ τὸν καὶ τὸν  
εἶναι παρ' ἡμῶν φαμέν ἴδιον τὸν λό-  
γον, ὅτι δι' ὅλου τὸν αὐτὸν ἴδιον  
τὸν νῦν, ὅτι πᾶσι πᾶσι ἐπὶ τὸν.



Τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ π  
 καὶ ἐκ ἐκείνου ἐστίν. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸν πὺν  
 γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς εἶναι, ἐκείν  
 οὐκ ἔπεσον παρ' ἐκείνου ὑπονοήτου,  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς εὐσιν ἐν ὅν, ἔπεσον  
 πρὸς ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. "Ουτος καὶ  
 ὁ τὸ θεὸν λέγει, καὶ πῶς ὑποστατικῶς  
 καὶ ἐκείνου διήρητο, καὶ ἐκείνου  
 παρ' ὃ πῶς ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, καὶ ὃ  
 ταῦτα δεκτικὸν ἐν ἐαυτῷ, αὐτὸς  
 πὺν διὰ καὶ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν  
 καὶ πῶς εὐσιν ἐκείνου πρὸς διὰ ὅτι  
 αὐτῷ γνωσεσθῶτων δεισνομένῳ.  
 Ibid.

is of the Mind, proves that is is another, and not the Mind it self; but as it perfectly expresses and represents the Mind, it cannot be another Nature, but one and the same Nature, though a kind of different subsistence. So the Word of God, by a distinct subsistence of its own, is distinguished from him, from whom he receives his Subsistence and Hypostasis; but inasmuch as he is all, and the same that God is, he is perfectly one and the same in Nature.

This is the Doctrine of all the other Catholick Fathers, as well as of *Gregory Nyssen*, who resolve the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons, into Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Nature, which no more multiplies Natures and Divinities, to make Two or Three Gods, than the Mind, its Word, and Love, make Three Minds.

This is the true and compleat notion of the *Homoousion*, which (as I have already shewn) does not signify a meer Specifick Unity, but the Unity of One Individual, not Singular, Nature in Three; that Three Real, Distinct, Subsisting Persons are as intimately and essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, as a Human Mind and its Word are; which are not, and never can be two Minds, but one Mind. Two compleat and perfect Minds can never in a proper notion be Consubstantial, or one Substance, though they have the same specifick Nature; for their Substance is not one and the same, but naturally two, and naturally separable, how closely soever they may be united; but Three Divine Persons, who are essentially related to each other in the same Divinity, as the Mind and its Word are, are in the strictest notion Consubstantial, or One Sub-

Substance, being essentially related to each other in the same One Individual Nature and Essence.

And here I must take notice of a great mistake, which some Learned Men run into, concerning the *μερικαὶ εἰσας*, singular and particular Natures, Substances, and Essences, by which they understand, what some others call Personal Substances; and conclude, That since *Philoponus*, and others, who asserted *τρεις μερικαὶ εἰσας*, Three particular Natures and Essences, or Substances in the Godhead, were charged with Tritheism (as they deserved, if their Opinions be truly represented) those who assert Three Substantial Persons, or Three distinct Personal Subsistencies or Substances, are liable also to the same Charge. This is a material Objection, and a fair Answer to it will set this whole matter in a clear light.

Now the Answer in short is this, That those who rejected the *μερικαὶ εἰσας*, and charged it with Tritheism, did not thereby understand particular, personal, relative, Subsistencies or Substances, but compleat, absolute, particular Natures and Substances; not Three Real, Substantial, Subsisting Relations in One Individual Nature, as a Mind, its Internal, Essential, Word, and Spirit, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three; but Three absolute particular Natures, as Three Men, each of whom has a compleat, absolute, personal Nature of his own, are Three. Now if this be the true Account, every one sees the difference between Three personal, relative, Substances or Subsistencies of the same Nature, and Three absolute particular Natures; the first is a real Substantial Trinity, Three Subsisting Infinite Persons in the Unity of the same Godhead, Three Persons, and One God; the other is down-right Tritheism.

And that this is all they meant by particular Individual Natures, I have many Arguments to prove.

For

For 1<sup>st</sup>. Had they herein condemned distinct, personal, relative Substances, they had condemned the Faith of the Catholick Church, and relapsed into *Sabellianism*, as abundantly appears from what I have already proved at large.

2. Those very Persons, who charge *Philoponus* with Trithemism for asserting Three Individual Natures and Essences, do themselves own a Personal Substance. *Leontius*, as *Nicephorus* tells us, wrote a large Book against *Philoponus*, and yet he tells us, That the Fathers by *εἶσα* & *φύσις*, Essence or Substance, and Nature, understood the same thing, and so they did by Hypostasis and Person. That by Essence and Substance, they meant what the Philosophers call a Species; by Hypostasis and Person, what they call *ἄτομον εἶσαν*, an Individual Substance: And in this sense he tells us, They acknowledged One Divinity in Three Hypostases, or Three Personal Subsistencies. That there is One Hypostasis (that is, *μία ἄτομη εἶσα*) of the Father, One Hypostasis of the Son, and One Hypostasis of the Holy Ghost; that these Three (*ταῦτα τὰ τετρα*) in nothing differ from each other, but only in their Personal Properties, (*καὶ τὰ ἰδιώματα*) that one is the Father, the other the Son, the other the Holy Ghost: So that *Leontius* owns Three true proper Persons, each of which is *ἄτομη εἶσα*, an Individual Substance, which he asserts to be the true Catholick Ecclesiastical Notion of a Person, and each Person as distinct from each other, as he that begets is from him who is begotten; and therefore when he condemned *Philoponus* for his Individual Natures and Essences, he could not by that mean relative, Personal Subsistencies or Substances.

*Leontius*  
*de scitis*  
*Aff. 1. B.P.*  
*Gr. L. T. 1.*  
*p. 493.*

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις μὲν ἐστὶν, καὶ  
ἐκείνους νομίζοντες, ὡς ἄνθρωποι  
ἀνθρώπων πάντα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν  
πατέρα, καὶ τὸν υἱόν, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα  
τὸ ἅγιον ὡς εἰς μὲν αὐτὸς ἀείδ-

*Theodorus Abucara* (if he be the Author of that Treatise against the Severians, *Explanatio vocum, quibus Philosophi utuntur*, which I have sometimes suspected to belong to *Theodorus Presbyter Raithensis*, who promises such an Explication of Philo-

Philosophical Terms at the end of his Treatise *de Incarnatione*, I say, this *Theodorus*, whoever he is) expressly charges these μερικῆς εἰσας, Individual Natures and Essences with Tritheism; and yet throughout that Treatise teaches, That Hypostasis is ἄτομον, a singular Individual Nature; and so does *Anastafius Sinaita* in his *Hodegos*; and indeed all the Writers of that Age, who asserted against the *Severians* the Union of Two Natures in One Person in Christ.

3dly, But we shall soon be satisfied in this matter, if we consider the occasion of this Dispute. The *Severians*, as they had learnt from their Master *Severus*, and he from *Eutyches*, taught, that there was but *One Nature*, as well as *One Person* in Christ, and that for this reason, That to assert Two Natures, is consequently to assert Two Persons in Christ, which is *Nestorianism*; for every Nature is a Person, that it is impossible there should be εἰς αὐτοῦ ἑκαστος, a Nature without a Personality of its own, for εἰς αὐτὸν ἑκαστος, Nature and Person, or Hypostasis, are the same. In opposition to this the Catholics urged, That if Nature and Hypostasis were so the same, that One Hypostasis is One Nature, and One Nature but One Hypostasis; then as we assert Three Hypostases in the Trinity, we must also allow τρεῖς μερικῆς εἰσας, Three Individual Natures and Essences in the Trinity. *Philoponus* saw that this was an unavoidable Consequence, and therefore rather than own Two Natures in One Person in Christ, he chose to assert Three Individual Natures in the Trinity: And for this, he and his Followers were very justly charged with Tritheism.

And this shews us, what these Individual Natures were, not Three Relative Personal Subsistencies and Substances in the same One Individual Nature, which is but μία θεότης, One Divinity; but Three Compleat Absolute Divinities,

μεῖδς εἰσας, καὶ τρεῖς ὁμολογεῖται θεοὶ, καὶ τρεῖς θεότητες, ὅ δὲ βλασφημιῶν εἰσὶν ἀπόστολον ἀκροτάτη, μᾶλλον ὅ τὸ χριστιανισμὸν παντὸς ἀρνήσις. Theod. Abuc. Op. 2. B. P. Gr. L. p. 382.

τρεῖς θεότητες, Three such Divine Natures, as there are Three Individual Human Natures in Three Men : Each of which is by himself, and alone, without communication with any other in the same Individual Nature, One compleat intire Humane Nature, and One Human Person : For this was the rise of the Dispute, concerning the Humanity of Christ. The Catholicks owned the Personality of the *Word*, but taught that Christ's Humane Nature was so united to his Divinity, as not to be a distinct Human Person, but to subsist in the Person of the *Word*, which is the true Faith of the *Word's* being Incarnate, or made Flesh, which could not be true, if the Person of the *Word* were not Incarnate, and that could not be true, if the Human Nature in Christ, were a distinct Human Person, as other Men are. On the other hand, the *Severians* denied the Union of Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, because an Individual Human Nature must be a Person, and then Christ must be two Persons, as well as two Natures : So that this *μερὴν λόγος* is a compleat absolute Individual Nature, such as an Individual Human Nature is, and three such Individual Natures make three Men, or Three Gods, and to assert Three such Absolute Divinities, is Tritheism ; but this concerns not Personal, Relative, Subsistencies or Substances in the same Individual Nature and Essence ; and therefore the Condemnation of *Philoponus*, or *Valentinus Gentilis*, and such kind of Hereticks (if they did really teach what they are charged with) cannot affect those, who assert Three real, distinct, substantial, Persons, each of whom is by himself, in his own Person, the whole Divine Nature, Essence, Substance, but are essentially and inseparably related to each other in the Unity of the same Individual Essence. The very asserting three relative, personal Subsistencies, or Substances, in One Individual Nature, is a direct opposition to the Doctrine of *Philoponus*, and the *Severians*, that Nature and Person is the same, so the same, that

that One Nature can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature, which necessarily overthrows a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence, and the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature in the One Person of Christ; but Three Relative Persons and Subsistencies in One Nature, and One Nature and One Person are direct Contradictions, as One Individual Substance, and Three Individual Substances are.

Indeed those who deny Three Relative Personal Subsistencies, that is, Three Real, Proper, Substantial Persons, in the Unity of the Divine Nature, go upon the same Principle with *Philoponus* and the *Severians*, that One Nature is but One True and Proper Person, or Hypostasis, and therefore there cannot be Three Proper Subsisting Persons in the Unity of One Individual Substance; which, as *Anastatius Sinaita*, and the other Catholick Writers of that Age frequently observe, is that fundamental Error, which gave birth to *Sabellianism*, *Arianism*, *Nestorianism*, and *Eutychanism*; for as different as these Heresies are, the fundamental Principle is the same, that One Individual Nature is, and can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature: For this reason *Sabellius*, who acknowledged the Unity of the Divine Nature, rejected a Trinity of proper Subsisting Persons; *Arius*, who owned a Trinity of Persons, denied their Consubstantiality, or Sameness and Identity of Nature; *Nestorius*, who owned Two Natures in Christ, asserted also Two Persons; and *Eutyches* made Christ but One Nature, as well as One Person; and in consequence of this *Philoponus* (if he was not mistaken) taught Three Individual Natures, as well as Three Persons in the Godhead. So that to make Nature and Person in the true and proper notion of Person, commensurate and convertible Terms; that a Nature is a Person, and a Person an Individual Nature; that One Nature is but One Person, and One Person but One Nature; and that Individual Natures



and Persons must always be multiplied with each other, is the fundamental Principle of all the Heresies relating to the Trinity and Incarnation, and then one would think, that those Doctrines which expressly contradict this Principle, and all these Heresies which result from it, should be the true Catholick Faith: And then Three Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons, or Three Relative Personal Subsistencies, or Substances, in the Unity of the same Individual Essence, or one Godhead, is the True Catholick Faith; and to reject it upon pretence, that this must multiply Natures with Persons, and so make Three Divinities, and Three Gods, is to return to that condemned Heretical Principle, That One Nature can be but One True and Proper Person; which, if Men understand the true Consequences of what they say, must inevitably betray them to *Sabellianism*, *Arianism*, or *Tritheism*. And thus much for the *μὴ ἐκ γὰρ ἑνός*, which, I hope, we shall hear no more of. The Doctrine of Relations demonstrates the Individual Unity of the Divine Essence; for if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though each of them in his own Person be True and Perfect God, yet are not Three Absolute Divinities, but Three Eternal Subsisting Relations, in the same One Divinity, they must be One Individual Essence and Substance, for else they cannot be the Relations of the same One Essence and Substance.

2. As these Divine Relations prove the Individual Unity of Nature and Essence, so they prove the Sameness and Identity of Nature, wherein, as I have shewn at large, the Catholick Fathers place the Unity of the Godhead. That *μία θεότης* is *ὡς θεός*. One Divinity is One God. A few words will serve to explain this, after what I have already discoursed on this Argument.

The *ταυτότης ἑοίας*, as I have already shewn, does not signify the Singularity, but the perfect invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; not such a Sameness, as every single Person is the same with himself, but such a Same-  
ness

ness as is between distinct Persons of the same Nature. Now the Doctrine of Relations necessarily infers this perfect Sameness and Identity, and this Relative Sameness and Identity proves a perfect Unity.

As for the first, there needs no other proof, but barely to represent it, for it is self-evident : For is it possible, that a Perfect, Living, Subsisting *Word* should not be perfectly the same with that Infinite Mind, whose *Word* it is, and from whom it proceeds? That a Perfect, Living, Subsisting Image, should not be perfectly the same with its Prototype, from whom it receives its Being and Nature? For if the *Word* be not perfectly the same with the Mind, nor the Image with its Prototype, it is not a true and perfect *Word*, not a perfect Image : By these Relations of Father and Son, of a Mind and its *Word*, a Prototype and its Image, the Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the perfect, invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; for the thing proves it self. The Relation indeed of Father and Son, considered in general, proves no more than a specifick Sameness of Nature, which may admit of great changes and variety within the same Species ; but when God is the Father, and begets a Son of his own Substance, his Nature being absolutely and immutably perfect, he must communicate the same perfect invariable Nature to his Son ; especially when this Son is his own perfect living *Word*, and his perfect Image. But this is not all : A perfect Sameness between Two Absolute Natures, without the least conceivable difference or variation, would not be a *ταυτότης*, a Sameness of Identity ; for though they could subsist as perfectly the same, as their Idea is, yet they would be Two Absolute Natures, not One Nature : But a perfect Sameness in Essential Relations, or Relative Subsistencies, proves a perfect Identity of Nature, that they are perfectly the same in the same One Individual Nature : As a living substantial *Word* must receive its substance and being,

whole of whole, from that Mind, whose Word it is; for if it be not the same Substance, it can't be the substantial Word of that Mind, whose Substance it is not; nor can a living substantial Image be any other Substance, than that of the Prototype; for if it were, it might be its likeness, but not its natural Image. And thus this Sameness and Identity of Nature proves each Person by himself to be true and perfect God, and all Three but One God; for each Person, according to this Doctrine, has, and must have, the whole perfect Divinity in himself, and all Three but one and the same Divinity.

3. These Subsisting Relations in the Unity of Nature, give us an intelligible Notion of the τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, of the inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, and their mutual περιχώρησις, Inexistence, Inbeing, in each other. That all the Catholick Fathers asserted the ἀδιαίρετον, or inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, as essential to the Unity of the Godhead, is so well known, that I need not multiply Quotations to prove it, after what I have already observed to that purpose. But the Question is, What they mean by this ἀδιαίρετον, wherein the Essential Unity of the Godhead consists.

Now it is certain this relates to the inseparable Union of the Persons; for it is opposed to μεμερισμένην ὑπόστασιν, divided and separate Hypostases and Persons, which the Fathers charge with *Tritheism*. The Son is ἀδιαίρετος ἃ τὸ πατρὸς ὅτις, inseparable from the Essence and Substance of the Father, and ἐν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετος, is inseparably in the Father; that he is begotten of the Father without any division of Substance, within the Father, and inseparable from him; so that this does not relate immediately to the Unity of Nature, but the Union of Persons, and therefore cannot signify the Singularity of the Divine Nature, but the Inseparable Union of real distinct Persons in the Unity of Nature. That the ἀδιαίρετον, this Inseparable Union and Inbeing

Inbeing of Persons, does as necessarily prove the real Distinction of Persons as the Unity of Nature, as St. *Hilary*, and *Athanasius*, and the other Fathers, frequently observe, and that proves that the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is the Inseparable Union of Three proper subsisting Persons, is not the Unity of Singularity: Which shews by the way, how improperly the *αδιαιρετον* is made use of to prove the Singularity of the Divine Essence, for it proves quite the contrary; it is the Unity of Three which is a Trinity in Unity; not the Unity of One, which is Singularity and Solitude.

In the next place I observe, That by the *αδιαιρετον* all the Catholick Fathers understand in this Mystery the inseparable Union of Relatives in the same Individual Nature, not the Union of compleat, absolute Natures, how close and inseparable soever it may be. There is by Nature no Inseparable Union, but in the same Individual Nature. Three compleat Individuals, though of the same Kind and Species, how closely and intimately soever they be united, are not by Nature inseparable nor essentially One, for they may be parted by that Power which united them, and when they are parted, can subsist apart; as Three compleat Minds, how intimately soever they should be united by God, yet can never be essentially and inseparably One, for they are not essential to each other; they might have subsisted apart, and may be parted again, and an External Union cannot so make them One, as to be naturally inseparable. Which I think is a Demonstration that a Natural Inseparability, which is an Essential Unity, can be only in One Individual Nature between such Relatives as are Essential to each other, and can neither be, nor be conceived, divided, or separated: And therefore the Catholick Fathers represented the *αδιαιρετον* by Examples of Natural Unions between things Essentially related to each other in One Individual Nature, which either cannot be

be conceived, or at least cannot subsist apart. Of this last Kind are a Fountain and its Streams, a Tree and its Branches, whereby they not only represent the *Homoeousion*, but the Inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, as every one knows; for there cannot be a Fountain but its Waters must flow out, nor Streams without a Fountain from whence they flow; and though Branches may be separated from the Tree, yet they live no longer than they are united, and are Branches of that Tree no longer: But these are very imperfect Images, and without great caution will corrupt our Ideas of the Divine Unity. Of all Corporeal Unions the nearest resemblance we have of this, and which the Fathers most insist on, is the Sun, and its natural Splendor, for we cannot conceive the Sun without its Splendor, nor the Splendor without the Sun; they never were, never can be parted, and therefore, though two, are essentially one. This Representation the Scripture makes of it, which calls the Son, ἀπαύλασμα τῆς δόξης, the Brightness of his Father's Glory, and in this Sense they teach that he is φῶς ἐκ φωτός, *Light of Light*, as it is in the *Nicene Creed*, whereby they do not mean two distinct independent Lights, which either are or may be

*Sed nec sicut Hierachas lucernam dixit de lucerna, vel lampadem in duas partes. Hilar. de Tr. c. 6.*

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρόμοιον τῷ φω-  
τός ἐστι τὸ ἀπαύλασμα τοῦ φωτός  
ἔχει τὸν νῦν. ἡ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὑψίστου  
μῶρον ἐκ τῆς δόξης τῷ ἡλίῳ  
πῦρ, ὅπερ καὶ σβέννυται πάλιν  
αἰῶνας, εἰρήνευσαν οἱ ἄγγελοι ἰδὲ τὸν  
λόγον πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Τῷ γὰρ  
ἔργον ἔξωθεν, καὶ κτίσμα τῷ ποι-  
ῶντι τὸ ὡς ἀλλ' ἀπαύλασμα αὐ-

parted, though one be lighted at the other (this was the Heresy of *Hierachas*, as *St. Hilary* tells us, who represented this Mystery by two Candles, one of which is lighted at the other, or by one and the same Lamp, which is divided and burns in two Sockets); but that Light and Splendor which is essential to the same Sun, and can never be divided from it, as *Athanasius* teaches. But the truest Images we have of this in Nature, is the Inseparable Union which is between a Mind and its own  
Internal

Internal Word, which are so essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, that they can never be parted, nor conceived apart; the Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind: It

is evident, That two compleat, absolute Minds can never be thus united; for they are not Essential to each other; not naturally one, and therefore not naturally inseparable; but a Mind and its Word, though two, are essentially One, and therefore can never be parted but must subsist together; and these are the Characters the Scripture gives us of God the Father and his Son; the Father Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Mind; the Son his Eternal Infinite, Living, Subsisting Word. And if Father and Son, this Eternal Mind and Eternal Word, be as essentially One, as a mans Mind and his Word are One, this is a Demonstration of their Inseparable Union, and gives us a sensible Notion and Idea of it.

τὸν ἐκδηλοῦνται πάντες, ἵνα  
τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας Ἰσθιον καὶ ἀδιαίρε-  
τον, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν τὸν πατέρα  
ἐν ὁμοιότητι διηλώσωσι. Ath. Syn.  
Nic. decr. p. 271.

This is the account *Athanasius* every where gives of the ἀδιαίρετον, that the Father and Son are inseparably One; the Father being in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Light in the Sun. To separate the Divine Persons, so as not to be in each other, whatever other Union we own between them, *Dionysius* of *Alexandria* charges with *Tritheism*; for the Divine Word must of necessity be one with God, and the Holy Spirit be and subsist in him. And this *Athanasius* resolves into such a Sameness and Unity of Nature, as must be between two Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Na-

Οἱ ὅ τρεῖς θεοὶ ὕπὸν πνῶ  
κηρύττουσιν, εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις  
ἔχοντας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασιν κα-  
τοιχωμένους, διακρινόμενοι τῷ ἀρίσ-  
τον μόνον. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνάγκη τὸ  
θεῖον καὶ ὅλον τὸν θεὸν λόγον,  
ἐμφιλοχεύειν ὅ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἐν-  
διακρινόμενοι δεῖν τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.  
Dionys. Alex. ap. Athan.  
Syn. Nicen. decr. T. I. p.  
275.

ture.



ture. That the Son is in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Splendor in the Sun; that he is a genuine proper natural Son in the Father's Essence and Substance, not

ἐξωθεν ἢ ὅσκι πατρὸς, not subsisting out of his Father's Substance, as other Creature Sons do. That the true Notion of the Sons being in the Father, is that the whole Being of a Son, is ἢ τῷ πατρὸς ὅσκι ἰδίον, the Genuine Natural Birth of the Father's Substance, the ἰδίον ῥένημα, as the Splendor is of the Sun: That the very Being of the Son is the Form or Species, and Divinity of the Father. That as the Sun and its Splendor are two, but not two Lights, but one Light from the Sun enlightening all things with its Splendor and Brightness; so the Divinity of the Son is the Divinity of the Father, and therefore inseparable; and thus there is but one God, and none else besides him.

All this plainly refers to the Inseparable Union and Inbeing of Relatives of the same Individual Substance, which are really distinct, but essentially in each other, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, that Thought it self cannot part them; which is such an Union as can never be between compleat absolute Substances, which are not naturally Inseparable, nor essentially One. Herein *Athanasius* places the adequate Notion of the *Homousion*, the Sameness, Identity, and Unity of Nature. He tells us, That for this reason the *Nicene* Fathers taught the *Homousion*, or

that

Ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἀσχωμένῳ ἔξωθεν, ἐπειδὴ σύμπτω τὸ ἢ τῷ υἱῷ. ὅσοιο ἢ τῷ πατρὸς ὅσκι ἰδίον ἐστὶν ὡς ἐν φωτὶ ἀπαύσασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς πῦλα μὲν, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν υἱὸν, ἰρᾶν τὸ τῷ πατρὶ ἰδίον, καὶ νοεῖν, ὅτι τῷ υἱῷ τὸ ἢ ἐκ τῷ πατρὸς ἐν, ὅσοιο ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶ. Ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τῷ πατρὸς ἰδίον, ὅσοιο ὁ υἱὸς ψυχάνει αὐν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαύσασμα ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς. *Ath. cont. Arian. Or.* 4. p. 456.

Τὸ γὰρ εἶδος, καὶ ἢ θεότης τῷ πατρὶ ὅσκι τὸ ἢ τῷ υἱῷ, ἀκολύτως ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ. *Ibid.*

Καὶ ἐκ αὐτῶν πῶς δύο φῶτα εἶναι πάντα, ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύσασμα, ἐν ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἥλιος φῶς ἐν τῷ ἀπαύσασμα φανήζον τὰ πᾶσι καὶ ὅσκι ἢ τῷ υἱῷ θεότης τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶν, ὅθεν καὶ ἀδιείρητοι ἐστὶ. Καὶ ὅσκι εἶς θεός, καὶ ἐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι αὐτοῖς. *Ibid.* p. 457.

that the Son is Consubstantial, or of one Substance with the Father, to signify that the Son is not only like the Father, but to be so of the Father, as to be the same in likeness; not after the manner of Bodies, which are like each other, but subsist apart by themselves, as Human Sons subsist separately from their Parents; but the Generation of the Son of the Substance of the Father is of a different Kind and Nature from Human Generations, for he is not only like, but inseparable from his Father's Substance. He and the Father are One, as he himself says; The Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word, as it is with Light and its Splendor, and this is what the *Homousion* signifies; and in like manner he resolves the Sameness, Identity, and Unity of Nature, into this Internal, Inseparable Union and Inbeing of Three, essentially related to each other in One Individual Divinity.

4thly, That Mutual Inbeing of the Divine Persons, which is their Inseparable and Essential Union, that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, which the *Greeks* call *περιχώρησις*, and the *Latins* *Circuminsessio*, can be understood only between the Relatives of the same Individual Essence and Substance. The true compleat Notion of this Inbeing or *Perichoreosis*, is not merely a Mutual Presence, or the same *Ubi*, that wherever one is, there the other is; or a kind of Immeation and Penetration of each other, which is a Corporeal Notion, and rejected as such by the Catholick Fathers, when

Ὁμοούσιον ἦν τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱόν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὁμοίον τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ τ' αὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιούσῃ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἦν σημαίνωσι.

Τὰ μὲν ἦν σωματίων ὁμοία πρὸς ἑαυτὰ πνεύματων δυνάμετον πῶς διέσταθ' ἡ μακρὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων γίνεσθ', οἷοι εἰσιν οἱ ἦν ἀνθρώπων υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν γυνήσωντας — ἐπειδὴ ὅτι ἢ ἐκ πατρὸς τὸ ἦν ἡμῖν ἄλλη παρὰ τῷ ἀνθρώπων φύσιν ἐστὶ· ἡ ὁ μόνον ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶς, ἡ ἐν μὲν εἶσιν αὐτὸς ἡ πατὴρ, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν. Ἀεὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἡ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπαύρασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς, τὸτο γὰρ ἡ ὁ λήξις σημαίνει. Ath. Syn. Nic. decret. p. 269.

Ἐι γὰρ ἡ ἔπειτα ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ὁμοία ὁ υἱός, ἀλλὰ τ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν ὡς θεός· ἡ ἐν εἶσιν αὐτὸς ἡ πατὴρ τῇ ιδιότητι ἡ οἰκειότητι τὸ φύσις, ἡ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μᾶς θεότητος. Ath. Or. 4. c. Ar. p. 456.

Hil. C. 7. de Tr.

Ἡρξαντο λοιπὸν διασῶμεν τὸ  
ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου λεγόμενον, ἐγὼ ἐν  
τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί.  
Λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται ὁ θεὸς ἐν  
ἐμῷ, καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ; ἢ  
πῶς ἔλας δύναται ὁ πα-  
τὴρ μέγας αὖν, ἐν τῷ ὑπο ἐλάτ-  
τονι ὅτι γαρρὶν; καὶ τὸ πῶς  
μαστὶν εἰ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὅ-  
πως καὶ αὖτὴ ἡ φύσις γέγραπται, ἐν  
αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ  
ἐταῦτόν; Πάχυστι δὲ τὸτο ἀπολύτως  
τῇ χακοροία αὐτοῦ, σῶμα νομί-  
ζοντες ἢ) τὸ θεόν· καὶ μὴ νοῶν-  
τες τίς ἐστιν ἀληθινὸς πατὴρ, καὶ  
ἀληθινὸς υἱός. Μήτε τίς ἐστὶ φῶς  
ἀόρατον, καὶ αἶδιον, καὶ ἀπώρασ-  
μα αὐτοῦ ἀόρατον· μὴτε τίς ἐστιν  
ἀόρατος, καὶ χακοροὶ ἀ-  
σώματος, καὶ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ. Ath.  
Or. 4. c. Ar. p. 454.

they speak of this Divine Inbeing, as  
St. Hilary expressly does, *inesse autem  
non aliud in alio, ut corpus in corpore*;  
that they are not in each other, as  
one Body is in another Body. And  
when the Arians objected against our  
Saviour's saying, *I am in the Father,*  
and *the Father in me*; How can this  
be in that, and that in this? Or how  
can the Father, who is greater, be at  
all in the Son, who is less? Or what  
wonder is it, that the Son should  
be in the Father, when it is written of  
us all, *That in him we live, and move,*  
and *have our being*? Athanasius answers,  
That this is all owing to Corporeal  
Conceits, as if they apprehended  
God to be a Body, not considering  
the Nature of the True Father, and true  
Son, the Invisible and Eternal Light,  
and its Invisible Splendor; an Invisible  
Substance, and its unbodied Character  
and Image.

But the true Notion of this Inbeing and *Perichoresis* is  
the Perfect Unity of the same Individual Nature in

Διὰ τὸτο καὶ ἐικότως εἰρηκώς  
περίεσαν, ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐσ-  
μῷ, ἐπήρασε τὸ, ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πα-  
τρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί, ἵνα πᾶς  
μὲν τ' αὐτόπῃσιν αὐτῷ, πᾶς  
δὲ ἐνόηται τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῷ  
εἶσιν, ὅτι αἰς ἑνὸς πάλιν εἰς δύο  
μέρη διαμετέλλεται, καὶ μὴδὲν ὄν-  
των πάλιν ἑνός. — Ἀλλὰ δύο καὶ  
εἰσιν, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ, πατὴρ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ  
ὁ αὐτοῦ υἱός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ υἱός, υἱός

of the Father is in the Son, that the Son  
is *πατρὸν ἐνδόν, πατρὸς νῆς, πατρὸς  
δεῖντος*, the Character, Image, Mind,  
Divinity of the Father. Here, as *Atha-  
nasia* observes, our Saviour himself lays  
the Reason and Foundation of this  
Mutual Inbeing: He first tells us, *I  
and my Father are One*; and then adds,  
*I am in the Father, and the Father in*

me, that he might shew the Sameness and Identity of the Godhead, and the Unity of Essence. For they are One, not One divided into two Parts, and nothing more than One; for they are Two, the Father is the Father, and not the Son; and the Son is the Son, and not the Father, but there is but One Nature; for he that is begotten, is not unlike in Nature to him that begets, but is his Image, and all that the Father hath is the Sons.

There is no need to multiply Quotations to this purpose, which may be met with every where. The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Nature of the Father is, lives and subsists in the Son, not a Nature like the Fathers, but the *τὸ ἴδιον τῷ πατρὶ*, the Father's own proper Nature and Essence; they are in each other, as being essentially One, not One merely as being in each other, as it is possible Three may be, and yet not be essentially One, but Three; as Three compleat absolute Minds would be Three still, though they should perfectly penetrate each other: Or as Three Candles in the same Room, are Three Lights though they are perfectly united in One. But Original Mind, its Word and Spirit are and must be in each other, as being Three in One Individual Essence; for the same undivided Essence can't be whole and entire in Three, but those Three must be in each other. If the Divinity of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; the Mind is in its Word, and the Word in the Mind: The Son is in the Father, as eternally begotten in the Substance of the Father, whole of whole, and essentially one and the same, as the Word is in the Mind, not by such an Union and Penetration as we may suppose between two Minds, but as conceived in the Mind, and essentially one and the same with it.

*ὅτι, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁ αὐτὸς πατὴρ ὅτι, μία ἡ ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ὁ ἀνάμοιον τὸ ἕν ἡμῶν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, εἰκὼν ὁ ὅτι αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ τῷ πατρὶ, τῷ υἱῷ ὅτι. Διὸ καὶ ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἔξωθεν ἐπινοήθη.*  
Ibid. p. 456.

Now according to this Representation, which all the Catholick Fathers make of this Mystery, we must of necessity acknowledge Number without Multiplication, Distinction without Division or Separation, a perfect Trinity in perfect Unity; Three Persons, each of which is by himself True and Perfect God, but not Three Gods, but One God: A Mind and its Word are two, and a living, subsisting Word is true and perfect Mind, Mind of Mind, and yet not two Minds, but one Mind; for the Mind and its Word are essentially One, as all Men must confess; the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, and therefore identically one and the same: for which reason the Fathers acknowledge that the Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Holy Ghost Spirit, and these are Three, but not Three Spirits, as essentially related to each other in the same individual Essence, essentially the same, and essentially in each other: And thus Will of Will, Wisdom of Wisdom, Life of Life, Power of Power, though they multiply and distinguish Persons, do not multiply Wills, Wisdoms, Lives, Powers, which are essentially One, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are One: They are not One Life, One Will, One Understanding, One Power, in the Sense of but One who Lives, who Wills, who Understands, and has Power; but as the same, identically the same Life, and Will, &c. is in each of them, and indivisibly and inseparably in them all.

And this gives an account of the Unity of Operation, wherein the Catholick Fathers unanimously place the Unity of God, for One Almighty Agent is but One God, and One Essential Will, Wisdom, and Power, can be but One Agent; and Infinite, Original Mind, and its Eternal subsisting Word can have but One Will, and Wisdom, and Power, for the Will and Wisdom of the Mind is in its Word; the same, not merely specifically the same, or the same by consent, as it may be between Two Minds, which

which Will perfectly the same thing, but the same One Individual Will; the Father Wills, and the Son Wills, and they both Will distinctly, but with one Individual Will; as it is impossible that the Word should Will with any other Will, but the Will of that Mind, whose Word it is. And therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though Three Eternal, Infinite, Living, Intelligent, Willing, Persons, which Subsist and Act distinctly, yet being that to each other in a more perfect and excellent manner, that Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Men, they must be as perfectly One Almighty Agent as a created Mind is, which Wills and Acts in its Word and Spirit.

The Distinction and Unity of Operation necessarily proves the Distinction and Unity of Essence; it being in our way of conceiving things a necessary effect of it; there must be some real Distinction in the same Nature and Essence, in which there are Three who Act distinctly; and there must be an Individual Unity of Essence, when in Three there is but One Individual Operation; and though these things may be distinguished in Creatures, where we distinguish the *Suppositum* and the Powers, and give a priority of Nature to the *Suppositum*, yet Essence and Energy being the same in God, who is a pure simple Act, there can be no priority nor posteriority between them, but the Demonstration proceeds equally upon Nature or Operation; but that is the best, which is the most intelligible Representation of this Distinction and Unity.

For this reason the Fathers chose to explain the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead by the Distinction and Unity of Operation, which I need not prove at large, as being universally owned, and therefore I shall only observe, how St. Gregory Nyssen represents this matter.



Ἀκεῖς πέντε ἢ ἡμῶν αὐτὸ τὸ  
ὄνομα τῆς δευτέρας Θεότητος,  
ὅπως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἐκκεννήσεως τῆ  
φωνῆ σημασίαν, ἡβόητο πρὸς τὴν  
γὰρ αὖτις πάλιν τὸ ἀκεννῆθαι σφ  
φύσιν. Nyss. ad Abl. Vol. 2.  
p. 450.

Δοκεῖ μὲν, ἂν τῆς πολλοῦς ἰδέας  
ζήτων καὶ τῆς εὐσεύας ἢ φωνῆ τῆς  
δευτέρας καὶ

Τῶν τὴν αὐτὴν πάλιν δεῖαν φύσιν  
νοημάτων ἐκκεννῆθαι ἢ λέγειν μὲν,  
ὅτι αὐτῆς ἢ τῆς εὐσεύας περιέχον  
πάλιν σημασίαν.

Ἡ τὸ μὲν δεῖαν ὅτι τῆς δεῖας  
εὐσεύας περιέχον ἀποφασίζοντα, ἢ  
τὸ δεῖαν διδασκοντα, αὐτῆς ἢ τῆς  
εὐσεύας ἐκκεννῆθαι ἢ περιέχοντα.

Εἰ ἢ τῆς συζωρεῖ τ' αὐτὸν εἶ  
τὸ δεῖαντα καὶ τὸ βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφο-  
ρῶντα πάντα δεῖαν, ἔφορον τὸ  
παντός καὶ εἶ καὶ λέγειντα, λογι-  
σάμεν πάλιν ἐκκεννῆθαι ταύτῃ, πό-  
τερον ἐνὶ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀγία  
τετράδι πνευματικῶν προσώπων,  
ἢ διὰ ἢ πρὸς πρὸς πρὸς ἢ  
δυνάμεις.

Οὐκ ἔστι ἂν ἀλόγως ἀποκλειθεῖν  
τὴν ἢ ἐν τῇ τετράδι προσώπων  
τῆς τοιαύτης περιεχομένης διὰ πάλιν  
ἐκκεννῆθαι τῇ φωνῇ σημασίαν.  
Τὸ γὰρ βλέπειν ὅτις μαρτυρεῖ ἢ  
γὰρ καὶ κατεῖ καὶ ἢ καὶ ἀνέφ  
πρόματι.

In his Answer to *Ablabius*, that there  
are not Three Gods, he tells us, That  
the best way to form the clearest and  
most perspicuous Notion of this, is to  
examine what this Name Θεότης, or  
Godhead, signifies. Now whereas some  
think this a proper Name to signify the  
Divine Nature and Essence, he asserts  
with the Scriptures (ὅτι ἢ γὰρ φωνῆς ἐκ-  
κεννῆθαι ἐκκεννῆθαι) that the Divine Nature  
and Essence is ἀκεννῆθαι καὶ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ,  
without a Name, and can't be signified  
by words; and that every Name which  
is given to God, signifies something es-  
sential to him, but not his Nature and  
Essence it self. This he shews particu-  
larly in some Names given to God, and  
affirms, That thus it is in all other Di-  
vine Names, that either they remove all  
Imperfections, or attribute all Divine  
Perfections to him, but do not declare  
his Nature: And thus he adds it is in  
the Name δεῖτης, which is ἐκ δεῖας, that  
δεῖς is δεῖτης, that is, God is a Seer,  
an Inspector, who beholds all things:  
Now if God signifies him, who sees and  
knows all things, we must inquire, whe-  
ther this All-seeing Power belongs only  
to one of the Divine Persons of the Tri-  
nity, or to all Three: For if this be the  
true interpretation of the Name δεῖτης,  
that it is an All-seeing Power, and  
that He that sees all, is God, we can-  
not reasonably deny this to any Person  
in the Holy Trinity, since the Scrip-  
ture

ture does equally attribute this Omniscience to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Well! suppose this, as he adds, it does not remove but encrease the difficulty; for though God be not a Name of Nature, but of Energy and Power, if the Name God signifies a Seer and Inspector, and there be Three, who thus see all things, Three must be Three Gods, as we number Persons of the same Profession, who all do the very same things, as well as those who have the same Nature; as we say many Orators, Mathematicians, and the like, as well as many Men. Now this he answers by the Unity of Energy and Power, which is in each of them, but is but One indivisible inseparable Power; not as it is in Men, who each of them acts separately by himself; and though they do the same thing for kind, yet what each of them does, is properly his own doing, and not anothers: They act separately, and produce distinct and separate Effects, and therefore are many Agents. But it is quite otherwise as to the Divine Nature: The Father does nothing by himself without the Son, nor the Son without the Holy Ghost; but each Divine Operation proceeds originally from the Father, is continued by the Son, and perfected in the Holy Spirit; and therefore the name of Energy is not divided into a number of Agents, because neither of them acts separately by himself.

Ὅτι ἀνεξαρτήτως αὐτοῦ, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείας οἱ πατέρες, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔχουσιν ὑποταγμένους ἐνεργεῖν τὸ θεοειδόμενον, ὅθεν ἀποκρίσιντες ἐν τῇ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν ὡς καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐκτελεῖν τὰς — ἰδίας λειτουργίας ὁ δὲ υἱός, καὶ ἰδίας ὁ ἅγιος — καὶ εἰς πολλοὺς ὁρμαζόντων, ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ εἰς ἰδίαν περιεργασίαν καὶ τὸ ἰδιότροπον τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὑποταγμένους αὐτῷ ἁπλῶς.

Ἐπὶ ᾧ τῆς θείας φύσεως, ἐκ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ ὁ πατήρ ποιεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν, ὃ μὴ συντελεσθέν ὁ υἱός, ἢ πάλιν ὁ υἱός ἰδιαζόμενος ἐνεργεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκτέλεσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἢ τελεῖται — ἐκ πατρὸς ἀπορρέουσα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ὡς ποιεῖται, καὶ ἐν τῇ συνδιακίᾳ τοῦ αἵματος τελεῖται. διὰ τοῦτο εἰς πολλοὺς ἐνεργούντων ὁ ὅρμος τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁ διακρίνεται, ὅτι ἐκ ἀποταξισμένης ἐκείνης, καὶ ἰδιόρυσσας ἐκείνην καὶ ἑαυτοῦ.

Διὰ τῶν Τειῶν καὶ γίνεῃ, ἢ  
καὶ Τεία ἐστὶ τὰ γινόμενα. —  
ἐξισταζόντες ἐν πόσει ἡμῶν γί-  
νησι τὸ τοῦτον ἀγαθόν (ζωὴν)  
θεϊσκόμην διὰ τῆς τοῦ γενομένου  
ὁδοῦ, ὅτι ἐκ πατέρων, καὶ υἱῶν,  
καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου. Ἀλλ' ἐκ  
ἐπειδὴ τεία ὑποτιθέμεθα ὡς ἴσου πα-  
τερι καὶ ὁνόματα, πρὸς καὶ ζωὰς  
ἰδίως μίαν παρ' ἐκείνων αὐτῶν δι-  
ακρίτως ἡμῶν λογιζόμεθα, ἀλλ'  
ἢ αὐτὰ ζωὴ πατρὸς τῶν πατέρων  
ἐκείνων, καὶ πᾶσι τῶν υἱῶν ἐπιμα-  
ρτυ, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος  
ἐξήγηται βουλῆς. — μία τῆς  
γίνεῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διλήματ' κινή-  
σις τὴν καὶ διακρίσεις ἐκ πατέρων  
διὰ τῶν υἱῶν πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα διέξα-  
ρομένη.

Ἀρχόντος καὶ ἀδιατάκτου ἐκ  
πλείωνον ἀγαθῶν, ἰδιωτικῶς παρ-  
τάκτως ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλῆμα-  
τ' κινήσει ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων, διὰ  
τῶν υἱῶν, ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα γινόμενης ἢ  
νομήσης.

And this he proves from the Unity of the Effect; that whatever good thing we receive from God, as suppose Life, is attributed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but though it be given by Three, that which is given, or done for us, is not Three; we do not receive three Lives, one from each Person of the Trinity, but we have but one Life, which we receive from them all. Now where there is but One Undivided Effect, there can be but One Natural Agent; for separate Agents will produce separate Effects; and therefore there can be but one motion of the Divine Will from the Father by the Son to the Holy Spirit, and that without distance and Succession. Now it is plain, that all this does not signify a mere Unity of Consent, as may be between Three Distinct and Separate Minds, but the Unity of Principle, which acts distinctly, but uniformly and inseparably in Three; the same Divine Will, which is originally in the Father, acting in the same manner, and with one indivisible motion (as they speak) in the Son, and Holy Spirit; which Unity of Operation, though it admits of distinct Acts, and consequently a real distinction of Persons, yet proves the individual Unity of Essence; for there can be no Unity of Principle or Operation, but in the same Individual Essence; where Three Persons are united in the same Individual Essence, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Man.

And

And here (had there not been enough already said about it) is a proper Place to vindicate that late Representation which has been made of the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead by the *self-consciousness*, and *mutual consciousness* of the Divine Persons.

See the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's Notion of a Trinity in Unity.

I have met with no body yet so hardy as to deny, that Self-consciousness is essential to the natural Unity of a Person, and that Three Persons cannot be naturally and essentially One without mutual Consciousness. But the great Objection against this Notion (and which I am amazed to find some Learned Men insist on) is the order of Nature, which requires, that a Person should be One by an Unity of Nature, before it can be self-conscious; and that Three Persons must be One by the Unity of Nature, before they can be mutually conscious: For the Unity of Nature, and the Union of Persons in the same Nature, must be before all Acts of Self-consciousness, and mutual Consciousness: And that which in the order of Nature comes after such a Distinction and Union cannot be the cause of it.

But who ever thought of causes of Distinction and Unity in an Eternal Nature, which has no cause? Did the Fathers philosophize thus concerning Priority and Posteriority in the Divine Nature, when they placed the Unity of the Godhead in the Unity of Energy and Operation? For does not the same Objection lie against the Unity of Energy and Operation, that does against *mutual consciousness*, (which is essential to this Unity of Energy) that the Divine Persons must first be One, before they can be One Energy and Power? and therefore that One Energy does not cause their Unity, because they must be One, before they are One Agent. And indeed such Men Gregory Nyssen intimates he had to deal with, who would not allow the Deity to be Energy and Power, but

Μαχόμενος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλήγοντας, μὴ δεῖν ἐνέργειαν νοεῖν τῷ θεότητι, ἢ πᾶν τὸ ὡς ἀναστρέφον μὲν δοκῶν, ὡς πρὸς τῷ παρῶν τῷ λόγῳ καταπεδίω· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀπει- λωπὸν ἢ θεῖαν φύσιν ἵδ' ἡ-

εἰδόντες, ἡ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκείνης  
 μὴ μελάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα  
 τὰ ἐκείνην ἐν ἀκρίβει νοεῖν καὶ φέ-  
 ρειν διελκόμεθα, πὺ δὲ καὶ δόξα  
 ἀκρίβειαν, ἡ πρὸς αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς, πρὸς  
 ὃ ἔχει. Ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐ-  
 κείνην ἐκφράζει καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀκρίβειαν.  
 Οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐκείνης ὅτι, ἡ δὲ ἐκεί-  
 νης πάντως οὐδεὶς. Ibid. p.  
 456.

he thought it not worth the while to dispute that Point with them; for the Divine Nature being Infinite and Incomprehensible, the pure and simple Nature of God is not the immediate Object of our Knowledge, can have no name and definition given it; and therefore we can know nothing of it immediately and directly, but by such Essential Attributes and Properties, as we can form some notion of.

The not considering this, how perfectly unknown and incomprehensible the Divine Nature it self is, occasioned a late Author to tell us, That *An Hypothesis in this Affair, which leaves out the very Nexus, the Natural and Eternal Union, and insists upon mutual consciousness, which at most is but the consequence thereof, wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the Unity of the Godhead.*

But this is to philosophize about the abstracted Natures and Essences of Things, even the Divine Substance and Essence, which I dare not presume to do. No doubt but God is the most real substantial Being in the World, even Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and there is as little doubt, but there is as real and substantial an Union between them: But I know nothing of the Substance of God, as distinguished from his Essential Attributes and Perfections, nor of such a Distinction and Unity of Substance in the Deity, as can help us to form any notion of a Trinity in Unity, and defend it from the Charge of Contradiction and Impossibility, when we have done. For we must have a care of conceiving any Extension, or Parts, or Composition in God, without which we can have no notion of a Distinction and Union of Substances, considered purely under the notion of Substance. And therefore we must be contented to be ignorant of the Substance and Substantial Unions of the Deity,

*How calm & sober inquiry  
 into the possibility of a Trinity, p. 456  
 12<sup>th</sup> 1694. Parkhill St London*

Deity, as we are of all other Substantial Unions. We know not what the Substance of a Spirit is, nor what the Substance of Matter is, nor what their substantial Unity is: And therefore when we inquire into their Distinction and Unity, we never meddle with the Essential Reasons and Causes of Unity, which are concealed from us, but consider as far as Sense, or Reason, or Observation will reach, wherein the Unity of any thing consists, and when a thing may be said to be One: As to instance at present only in the Unity of a Mind, and in the Union of Soul and Body.

Is there any thing else in the World which can make a Mind one with it self, and distinguish it from all other Minds, but a self-conscious Sensation, that it feels it self, and its whole self, and only it self? I suppose these Men will grant, that such a Mind is One, and but One, and distinct from all other Minds; but Self-consciousness is not the formal reason of the Unity of a Mind, or of a Person, because in order of Nature the Unity of a Mind or Person must go before Self-consciousness; that is, Self-consciousness is owing to the Unity of Essence, not the Unity of Essence to Self-consciousness. Well, but what is this Essence of a Mind, and this Unity of Essence, which makes a Mind One? Truly that no body can tell; and therefore to say a Mind is one by the Unity of its Essence, is to say, it is One, because it is so; for we know no more of the matter: But Self-consciousness is a sensible Unity, which we all feel in our selves, and know our selves from other Men by it.

This Unity of Essence we know nothing of, but by Self-consciousness; and I desire to know, whatever the Unity of Essence be, whether any but a Self-conscious Unity would make a Mind One, and distinguish it from all other Minds? which shews, that we have nothing to do with the naked Essences and Substances of Things, but with their immediate and essential Properties; and when we know them,



we know all that is to be known of Nature ; and therefore we can know no more of the Unity of a Mind than *Self-consciousness*.

The Substances of things are distinguished from each other by their Essential Properties, and therefore from them we must learn their Unity or Distinction. A Mind is a Substance, and Matter is Substance ; and the essential difference between them, as far as we can understand, is, that a Mind is a thinking Substance, and Matter extended Substance ; and therefore we must judge of a Mind by the properties of Thinking, and of Matter by extension : The Unity of a Thinking Substance must consist in the Unity of Thoughts and Sensations, that is, in one Consciousness ; and the Unity of an Extended Substance in the continuity of its extension ; and to ask farther, what is the cause or principle of Consciousness in a Mind, or of One Consciousness in One Mind, is to ask a reason of the natures of things ; why a Mind is a Thinking Being, and why One Thinking Being has one Center of Thoughts : Why do they not ask also, how Extension comes to be essential to Matter, and how Matter is extended ? I know no reason to be given of such matters, but the Will of God, who formed all things according to the Ideas of his own Infinite Wisdom.

This I hope is sufficient to be said concerning the order of Nature, and the priority and posteriority of our Conceptions ; for if we do not stop in our Inquiries at immediate and essential Properties, but demand an antecedent Reason for them, this is to demand a Reason of Nature, Why things are what God has made them : Those who are not contented to contemplate Nature in its immediate and Essential Properties, may philosophize by themselves for me ; for there is nothing more to be known without an intuitive knowledge of Nature it self, which none can have but the Author of Nature.

Thus

Thus should you inquire of me concerning the Union of Soul and Body ; all that I know of it is, That they are united in one Conscious Life ; That the Soul feels all the Impressions of the Body, and directs and governs it. No, will such Philosophers say, here wants the *Nexus*, the natural Union between Soul and Body ; for they must be One by a Natural Union before there can be this Conscious Life and Sympathy between them, which is not the Union, but the effect and consequent of this Union. Very true ! They must be vitally united to have One Life, 'and to receive impressions from each other ; But can they give any other notion of this Vital Union, than that the Body is animated by the Soul, and lives with it ? Could these Philosophers tell you, how a Soul, which is an Immaterial Being, could be fastened to a Body, what Union of Substances there is between them, (which is the thing they want to know) would they understand a Vital Union ever the better for it ? An Union of Substances seems to signify some kind of Contact, which is hard to conceive between Body and Spirit ; but however an Union of Contact, and an Union of Life, are two very different kinds of Union, and do not include or infer each other ; and therefore the true Answer to that Question, How Soul and Body are united, is not to say, That their Substances are united or fastened together, which gives us no notion of a Vital Union ; but that the Soul lives in the Body, and gives life to it ; receives impressions from it, and governs its motions. But to inquire farther, is to inquire into the Reasons of Natural and Essential Unions, which are as great Mysteries as Nature is : We may as well ask, How a Soul lives, as how it animates a Body ; and God alone knows both. So that to inquire after the Natural *Nexus*, or Cement of this Union, is nothing at all to the purpose, and is not the Object of Human Knowledge.

Now.

Now, though the Vital Union between Soul and Body, and the Union of mutual Consciousness, be of a very different Kind and Nature, yet the Dispute about the *Nexus*, or the Natural Union of Substances, is much the same.

Consciousness is the Unity of a Spirit; Self-consciousness is the Unity of a Person, and by the same reason mutual Consciousness is a Natural Union of Three distinct Self-conscious Persons in the Unity of the same Nature. And to reject this for want of a *Nexus*, or the Natural Union of Substances, is as if we should deny the Union of Soul and Body to be an Union of Life or Animation, because this don't explain the Natural *Nexus* between Soul and Body: If a Mutual Conscious Union be an Essential Union of Three distinct Persons in the same Nature, as a Vital Union is the Essential Union of Soul and Body, we have nothing to do in either Case with the Union of Substances which we can know nothing of, and if we could, should understand these Unions never the better for it. For whatever Union of Substance we may suppose between Soul and Body, and the Three Divine Persons in the Holy Trinity, it is the Kind and Species of Union which gives us the Notion and Idea of it. If you inquire, what Spirit, and what Matter is? It would not be thought a good Answer to these Questions, to say a Spirit is a Substance, and Matter is a Substance, without adding their Specifick Differences, that a Spirit is an intelligent thinking Substance, and Matter is an extended Substance; nor is it a better Answer to that Question, what Union there is between Soul and Body, or between the Three Divine Persons in the Trinity, To say, That their Substances are united, which gives us no distinct Notion of their Union; but a Vital Union, and a Mutual Conscious Union, contain distinct Ideas; and if these be Natural and Essential Unions, though we know no more of the Union of Substances

stances than we do, what Substance is, yet we know that the Soul and Body must be one Natural Person, and the Three Divine Persons must be naturally and essentially One God; for a Natural Union makes One according to the Nature of that Union.

It is visible enough what has occasioned this Mistake: Men consider Mutual Consciousness between Three Compleat, Absolute, Independent Minds, and rightly enough conclude, that how conscious soever they were to each other, this could not make them essentially One; for every compleat Mind is One by it self, and not naturally Conscious to any One but it self, and by whatever Power they should be so united, as to be mutually Conscious, this could not make them essentially One; they would be Three Mutually Conscious Minds, not essentially One Mind; for they are not by Nature One, nor mutually Conscious, and therefore may be parted again; and cease to be so. But then, in this way of stating it, the Objection equally lies against the *Perichoresis*, the inseparable Union and In-being of Minds, which can never make Three Compleat Absolute Minds essentially One: But if we apply this to the Union of Living, Subsisting, Intelligent Relatives of the same Individual Essence, to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Eternal, Self-originated Mind, its Eternal, Living, Subsisting, Word, and Eternal Spirit, this Mutual Consciousness gives us the most Intelligible Notion of the Essential and Inseparable Union and In-being of Three in One. I dare not say what other Men can do; but I have tried my self, and can form no Notion of an Unity in Trinity, but what either necessarily includes, or ultimately resolves it self into One Natural Essential Consciousness in Three.

The Divine Nature is indivisibly and inseparably One in Three; but we must not understand this Inseparability after the manner of Bodies, whose Parts may be divided and separated

separated from each other; God is not Body, and has no Parts; but in the Unity of the Godhead there is Eternal Original Mind, an Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, which are inseparable from each other, that is, can never be parted: What then can parting and separating signify in a Mind, which has no Parts to be torn and divided from each other? I can understand nothing by it, but that the Mind does no longer see, and know, and feel its Word in it self, nor the Word the Mind; for this would make a perfect Separation between the Mind and its Word; that Mind has no Word which does not see and feel it in it self; and were it possible that a living subsisting Word should lose all Conscious Sensation of the Mind, whose Word it is, it would cease to be a Word, and commence a perfect separate Mind it self: So that as far as we can conceive it, the Inseparable Union between Father and Son, between Original Infinite Mind, and its Eternal Word, is an inseparable Conscious Life and Sensation, which is such a Natural Demonstration of their Inseparable Union, as no other Notion can give us; for all Men feel that a Mind and its Word can never be parted; a Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind.

Thus what other possible Notion can we form of the *Perichoresis*, or Mutual In-being of Father and Son, as our Saviour tells us, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, which is their Natural and Essential Unity, *I and my Father are one*? We all feel how the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word; the Mind knows, and feels, and comprehends its own Word; and a perfect, living, subsisting Word knows and feels that whole Mind, whose Word it is, in it self; for the Word is nothing else but the whole Mind, living and subsisting in the Word, which is another Hypostasis, but perfectly One and the same Nature; and therefore as they know themselves, so they know

know and feel each other in themselves. *As the Father knoweth me, saith Christ, so know I the Father, 10 John 15.* And thus to see and know God by an Internal Sensation, and to be in him, are equivalent Expressions in Scripture, 1 John 18. *No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:* Where to see God, and to be in the Bosom of the Father, must signify the same thing; for to be *in the Bosom of the Father*, is put in the place of *seeing God*, that is, to see him within, to see him in his Bosom, as the Word sees the Mind, and this is to be in his Bosom, and thus the Son is in the Father.

The same Account we have of the Holy Spirits being in God, 1 Cor. 2. 11. *For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of man, which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God;* that is, the Spirit of God

is in God, as the Spirit of a Man is in Man, and therefore by this In-being, the Spirit of God knows all the Things of God by such an Internal Conscious Sensation, as the Spirit of Man knows what is in Man.

Thus what is the Unity of Energy and Operation, but the same Conscious Will and Power acting distinctly, but inseparably in Three? for without this Internal Consciousness, they must be Three separate Wills and separate Powers, and produce distinct and separate Effects; but when God, his Word and Spirit are in each other, and see, and know, and feel each other in themselves, as a Man's Mind, his Word, and Spirit, do, though in a more perfect and excellent manner, there can be but One undivided Motion of the Divine Will, as there is but One Conscious Life in Three; the Son lives, subsists, wills, understands, and acts, in and with the Father, and therefore is but One Eternal Life, One Almighty Will and Power.

Μανθάνειν ὃ ἐνὸν ἐστίν, ὅτι  
ἐχ' ἰδέσθαι ὡς τὸ πνεῦμα πατρὸς  
ἢ πατρὸς, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ τῷ ἀν-  
θρώπῳ ἰδέσθαι πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. Theo-  
phyl. in locum.



Now as Novel as some Men think this Notion of the *Unity of Mutual Consciousness* to be, we meet with it more than once in express words in *St. Hilary*, whose Authority I hope is sufficient to vindicate it from the charge of Novelty.

*Sed cum natura Dei in natura Dei subsisteret, id est, ex patre filius natus esset, per virtutis ac naturæ in se paternæ conscientiam, nihil ab se, nisi quod patrem facientem vidisset, filium facere posse testatus est. Et cum unigenitus Deus paternæ virtutis operationibus operaretur, tantum sibi ad faciendum præsumeret, quantum in Conscientia sua esset, inseparabilem à se Dei Patris, quam per legitimam natiuitatem obtinebat, posse naturam; non enim corporalibus modis videt, sed visus ei omnis in virtute Naturæ est.* Hil. de Trin. c. 7.

Et demonstratio operum non ignorantis instructio, sed nostræ fidei, quæ non filio scientiam ignorantium, sed nobis confessionem natiuitatis inuexit — ut demonstratio ipsa natiuitatis esse substantia doceretur, cui per dilectionem patris operum paternorum — esset cognata cognitio. Ibid.

Quod autem videt, conscientia in se natura significatur agnitio, & in eo nunc veram Dei cognosce naturam. Ibid. Unigenitus igitur Deus natura in se conscientia, &c.

Dicens enim se per loquentem loqui, & per operantem operari, & per iudicantem iudicare, & per visum videre, & per reconciliantem reconciliari, & manere se in eo, qui in se maneret, quæro quo alio ad intelligentiam nostræ sensum Expositionis suæ uti potueris aptiori sermone, ut unum esse intelligerentur quàm isto, quo per natiuitatis veritatem, & naturæ unitatem, quicquid filius egerit, &

Thus with reference to what our Saviour says, *No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him*, 11. Matth. 27. *St. Hilary* observes, (Hilar. de Trin. c. 2) *Illis scientia mutua est, illis vicissim cognitio perfecta*; That Father and Son have a mutual perfect Knowledge of each other. And this he asserts to be a Conscious Knowledge, connate with him, a Conscious Sensation of his Father's Nature in himself, which our Saviour himself signifies by his Unity of Nature and Operation with the Father; as the Reader may see in the Margin.

Thus *Tertullian* long before describ'd this mutual Consciousness between God and his Eternal Word and Wisdom by what we feel in our selves when we silently muse alone, our Word does as it were talk with us, and return our Thoughts to us, is present with us in every Turn, and Motion, and Pulse of Thought, and internal Sensation, as conscious to all within us.

Thus he tells us, That the Son alone knows the Father, and does not his own, but his Father's Will, which he knows

knows, *de proximo, imo de initio*; that is, by an immediate Intuitive Knowledge, not by External Communication, but by Internal Sensation. Thus the Son does nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do; *in sensu scilicet facientem*, in his own Mind and Will; *Pater enim sensu agit*, the Father does all things by disposing and ordering all things in his own Mind and Will; *Filius vero, qui in sensu Patris est, videns percipit*: The Son, who is in the Mind, and Sense, and Will of the Father, sees the Father's Will, and does it: Now let any Man tell me what else can be meant by the Sons being *in sensu Patris*, & *videns in sensu Patris*, but this Internal Conscious Sensation. St. Cyril of Alexandria calls it *συνεθέλκους & τ' αὐτοθελίας τῷ πατρὶ*, that the Son Wills together with the Father, and with the same Will. Dionysius the Areopagite, says, This Union does not only exceed all bodily Unions, but the Unions also of Souls and Minds, *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοοῖς*. And Fulgentius tells us, The Word was with God, *sicut in mente verbum, sicut in corde consilium*, as the Word is in the Mind, and Counsel in the Heart.

Marius Victorinus Afer tells us to the same purpose, That the Son being in the Bosom of the Father, signifies, that he is God; that he is in the Bosom and Womb of his Substance, and therefore they are Consubstantial, each of them being in each other, and knowing each other.

*diceret, id in filio, pater, & loqueretur & ageret? Non est hoc itaque natura à se aliene.*—Sed perfecta natiuitate in Deum perfectum genitæ diuinitatis, cujus hæc naturæ his conscientia fiducia est, ut dicat, ego in Patre, & Pater in me, & omnia, quæ Patris sunt, mea sunt. Id. l. 8.

*Vide cum tacitus tecum ipse congrederis, ratione hoc ipsum agi intrate, occurrente eâ tibi cum sermone, ad omnem cogitationis tui motum, & omnem sensus tui pulsus.* Tert. Cont. Prax. p. 503. Paris.

Tert. Contr. Prax. c. 13. p. 509.

Cyr. l. 4. in Joan.

Dion. de divin. nom.

Fulg. 3. ad Mon. c. 7.

*Unigenitus qui est in gremio Patris, quod est esse Deum, in gremio enim & in matris substantia; deo utroque in uterque, & substantia & diuinitate consistens, uterque in utroque, & cognoscit uterque utrumque.* Viâ. Afer. Bl. Patr. Vol. 4. p. 190.

*Id enim quod ait, Ego & Pater Unum sumus, tentant ad Unanimitatis referre consensum, ut voluntatis in his unitas sit, non natura; id est, ut non per id quod idem sunt, sed per id quod idem volunt, unum sint.*  
Hil. de Tr. l. 8.

sent was down right *Arianism*, as St. *Hilary* witnesses; and yet thus the famous *Lucian*, whom the *Arians* would have challenged as theirs, but whom the Catholick Church always owned, expresses it in his Creed; and thus

*Et quis dixit Unum, intelligant heretici quod non dixit Unus. Unum enim neutraliter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitatem personae sonat.* Novat. de Trin. c. 22.

*Quod autem dictum est, ut sint quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum, non habet calumniam, quia cognominato spiritu, id est, paracleto, consonantia potius quam essentia per similitudinem substantiae predicare convenit unitatem.*  
Hil. de Synod.

Διόν ἐστὶ βῆθ Διαφορῶ. τὸ ὕψ  
καὶ τὸ πλάτος ἐν δελήματι. Ἀλλὰ  
καὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τὸ ἀγαθόν  
καὶ τὸ, καὶ ἡ ἐκκλὴν βῆθ τὸ ἀγα  
θόν, καὶ ὁ πᾶς τὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐν  
κατόπιν βλέπει, &c. Gr. Nys.  
cont Eun. Or. 12. p 345.

But not to multiply Quotations; all those Catholick Fathers and Doctors, who placed the Unity of the Godhead in Consent, (and none of them rejected this in a Catholick Sense) could understand nothing less by it than this mutual natural Consciousness, for any other Con-

sent was down right *Arianism*, as St. *Hilary* witnesses; and yet thus the famous *Lucian*, whom the *Arians* would have challenged as theirs, but whom the Catholick Church always owned, expresses it in his Creed; and thus per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum: Three in Substance, but in Consent and Agreement One, is justified by St. *Hilary*, (*Hilar. de Synod.*) as very Catholick; but then he refers this to the Holy Spirit, who is the substantial Bond and Cement of this Union and Consent. But *Gregory Nyssen*, who allows of this Unity of Consent, more intelligibly represents it by the Consent and Uniformity of all the Motions between the Prototype and its Image, or a Man's Face in a Glass, which moves and acts with it. Thus Christ is the Image of the Invisible God, and is immediately and instantly affected together with his Father. Does the Father Will any thing? The Son also, who is

in the Father, knows the Fathers Will, or rather is the Father's Will.

But this I think is sufficient to be said about mutual Consciousness, which is so manifestly the Doctrine of the Fathers, of some in express Terms, and of all according to the true Interpretation of what they taught, that I cannot imagine the meaning

meaning of this furious Zeal against it, but a *Sabellian* Zeal against Three Conscious Persons, for one single Self-conscious Nature: As *St. Hilary* observes in the Dispute between the *Sabellians* and *Arians*. The *Arians* allowed Father and Son to be Two Distinct Persons, but denied their Consubstantiality, or Unity and Sameness of Nature: The *Sabellians*, who denied the distinction of Persons, but asserted the Sameness, Unity and Singularity of Nature, which they thought sufficiently proved One Person, as well as One Nature (as no doubt but it does) confuted the *Arian* Dissimilitude of Nature by what our Saviour says, *I and my*

*Non alia natura, quam quæ sui confessa est, diceret, ego & Pater Unum sumus.* Hil. de Trin. c. 7.

*Father are one*; which they said could be the Language of none, but of a Nature conscious to it self of its own Identity, and Sameness, which he allows to be a good Argument against the *Arians*, (which he could not have done, had he not allowed this Consciousness in the Trinity) but then observes, That the *Arians* did as effectually confute them, as to the distinction of Persons; and thus between them both the Catholick Faith, of a real distinction of Persons, in the Sameness and Conscious Unity of Nature, was vindicated. In short, If the whole Divine Nature is conscious to it

*Uterque hostis Ecclesie res Ecclesie agit; dum Sabellius Deum ex natura in operibus prædicat; hi verò ex sacramento fidei filium consueverunt.* Ibid.

self, as every Created Mind is conscious to all that is in it self; and the Three Divine Persons subsist in the Individual Unity of the same Nature, then these Divine Persons must be intimately and mutually conscious to each other, as a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are; and however Men please to philosophize about this, as to the *prius* & *posterius*, whether they will make the Unity of Nature the cause of this mutual Consciousness, and therefore in order of Nature prior to it; or make mutual Consciousness not the cause of this Unity, but the Essential Union of Three Distinct Subsisting Persons in the Unity of the same

same Individual Nature; I will not contend with any Man which of these speak most properly. Consciousness is the Unity of an Intelligent Nature, and the mutual Consciousness of Persons in the same Nature, and the Conscious Unity of Nature in Three Distinct Persons is the same thing. We cannot conceive the Unity of a Mind without Consciousness, nor any other kind of Unity of a Mind, but a Conscious Unity; nor can we conceive an Internal Essential Consciousness without an Essential Unity; and if the mutual Consciousness of Persons in the same Nature, is the Consciousness of Nature, I cannot see why we may not say, That it is at least One Notion of the Unity of Nature too.

But to return where I left off, (if this may be called a Digression) what I have now said, is sufficient to shew, how necessary this Doctrine of Relations is to give us a sensible notion of a Trinity in Unity.

To assert a Real Trinity, we must assert Three Real, Distinct, Subsisting, Substantial, Intelligent Persons, neither of which is each other, and each of which is by himself, in his own proper Person, True and Perfect God: But this, say *Sabellians*, *Arians*, and *Socinians*, is to assert Three Gods; which the Catholick Church always abhorred the thoughts of. Now how the Fathers answered this Charge, and vindicated the Divine Unity in a Trinity of Real Subsisting Persons, I have already particularly shown, as by the Consubstantiality, the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature, whole of whole, their Inseparability, and Unity of Operation; but we can form no distinct Idea of all this, but only among Personal Subsisting Relatives of the same Individual Nature. Whatever is not this, is a meer Specifick Consubstantiality and Identity of Nature, and an External Union, how inseparable soever it be, which must make a number of Individuals in the Divine, as well as Human Nature;

Nature: but now it is plain to a Demonstration, That if God hath an Eternal Subsisting Word, and an Eternal Subsisting Spirit, they can be but One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind, and Word, and Spirit, are One; and therefore all Three but One God, as a Man, with his Mind, and Word, and Spirit, is but One Man; which is an Intelligible Notion of the *μὴ διττός*, One Individual Essence and Godhead: For though the Word of God be a Person, which a Man's Word is not, yet if his true Nature and Character is the Word, he is the same to the Eternal Mind, which a Man's Word is to his Created Mind, and therefore God, and his Living, Subsisting Word, must be One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind and his Word are One; a Word must be conceived and begotten of the Mind, and can have no other Substance, if it be a Living, Substantial Word, but that of the Mind; and if it be a perfect Word, the perfect Image of the Mind, it must be whole of whole, all that the Mind is; for the whole Mind is in its perfect Word and Image, and lives and subsists in it, and the whole Word in the Mind. So that the Coeternity, the Coequality, the Consubstantiality, the Identity, the Inseparability, the Unity of Operation between God and his Word, is so far from being Jargon, Contradiction, Unintelligible Nonsense, that if God have an Eternal Word, it is self-evident that thus it must be: When we contemplate the Consubstantiality of Father and Son, under the notion of Substance, we can form no Idea of a whole, which is of a whole, that the Father should communicate his whole Essence, and Substance, to the Son, and be the whole himself; and this is no great wonder, since we can form no Idea at all of the Divine Substance; but we can very well understand, That the Whole Mind must be in its Word, that the Eternal Mind and its Word must be Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coequal, Two, but perfectly the same, inseparably in each other; for all this is included in the very Relation and Notion of a Mind,



Mind, and its Word. I'm sure, a Living, Subsisting Word, which is not Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coequal, with that Eternal Mind, whose Word it is ; that a Mind should be without its Word ; that an Infinite, Eternal Mind, which is perfect Life and Being, should have a vanishing, perishing Word, as Man has ; not a living, subsisting Word ; that a Mind and its Word should ever be parted ; that the Word should not be and subsist in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word ; I say, all this contradicts all the Notions we have of a Mind and its Word : We cannot immediately and directly contemplate the Divine Nature and Essence, which is so infinitely above us, and therefore we must contemplate it in such Ideas and Representations, as God himself makes of it ; and if they are such, as we can form an intelligible notion of, we have no reason to complain of unintelligible Mysteries and Contradictions, though when we reduce it into Terms of Art, we find our Minds confounded and perplexed, and unable to form any distinct and easy Ideas.

*Quod si de nomine substantia aut natura Divina voluerint dicere, facile revincuntur, quia Usiam Græcè & Latine Substantiam frequenter Scriptura memoravit—quod si ex aliâ substantiâ filium dicunt, ipsi se revincunt, & verbum substantia quod metuunt confrendo, & filium creaturæ, quibus præferre se simulant, conferendo. Ambr. de Fide, C. 1. Tom. 2. Bas. 1555. p. 51.*

The *Arians*, to avoid the Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, would not allow the Term Substance to be used of God ; the Catholick Fathers proved, that Substance is in Scripture used concerning God, and that the *Arians* could not reasonably reject it, because they used it themselves ; for though they would not own the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father ; they taught,

that he was of another Substance, which still is to own Substance in God.

But though God be in the most true and absolute sense, perfect Essence and Being, the τὸ ὄν, or according to  
St. Am-

St. *Ambrose* his derivation of the Word (which shews what he meant by it, whether it shews his skill in Greek or not) that Essence and Substance is that which always is, and that which always is, is God, and therefore God is Essence and Substance, and a Consubstantial Son is a true and real Son; for which reason, as he observes, the *Arians* would not allow the Son to be Consubstantial, because they would not allow him to be a true genuine Son; and for this very reason the *Nicene* Fathers inserted the *Homoousion* in their Creed: But yet if we would rightly conceive of God, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, of the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, we must not form our Notions by the Ideas of Substance and Consubstantiality, which we have no distinct conceptions of; but we must learn their Unity, Distinction, and Consubstantiality from those Characters the Scripture gives of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This Rule St. *Ambrose* expressly gives us with reference to the Son, and the Reason is the same, as to the other Divine Persons. If we would avoid Error, says that Father, let us attend to those Characters the Scripture gives us, to help us to understand what, and who the Son is: He is called the Word, the Son, the Power of God, the Wisdom of God; all this we can understand; and not only St. *Ambrose*, but all the other Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the Consubstantiality, Coeternity, Coequality, Unity and Distinction of Father and Son, from these Names and Characters, which they understood in a true and proper sense, for a Living, Subsisting Son,

*Aut quid est Ousia, aut unde dicta, nisi alogotis, quod semper maneat; cui enim esse est semper, Deus est, & ideo manens semper Ousia dicitur Divina. Ambr. Ibid. c. 3.*

*Non igitur verbum, sed vim verbi fugiunt, quis noluit, verum esse Dei filium. — sicut Autor ipsorum Eusebii Nicomedienensis Epistola sua prodidit, dicens, si verum, inquit, Dei filium & increatum dicimus, Homo-son cum patre incipimus confiteri. Hæc cum lecta esset Epistola in Concilio Nicæno, hoc verbum in Tractatu fidei posuerant Patres, quod id viderunt Adversariis esse formidini, ut tanquam evaginatis ab ipsis gladio ipsorum nefanda caput hæresis amputarent. Ibid. p. 75.*

*Certe ne quis possit errare, sequitur ea quibus scriptura sancta ut intelligere possimus Filium significat. Verbum dicitur, Filius dicitur, Dei virtus dicitur, dicitur Dei sapientia. Ib. c. 1. p. 40.*

and Word, and Power, and Wisdom; and there is no difficulty in conceiving all this, if we contemplate it in these Characters; nay it is impossible to conceive otherwise of it. As impossible as it is to form any notion at all of those Philosophical Terms, whereby this Mystery is commonly represented, when we abstract them from those sensible Characters and Ideas which the Scripture has given us, and begin our Inquiries with them. It will be of great use to represent this matter plainly, that every man may see what it is that obscures and perplexes the Doctrine of the Trinity, and confounds mens notions about it, to the great scandal of the Christian Religion, and the disturbance of the Christian Church.

The great difficulty concerns the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, that they are really and distinctly Three, and essentially One: And this is represented by One Nature, Essence, and Substance, and Three Hypostases; and yet Hypostasis signifies Substance, and every Divine Hypostasis is the whole Divine Essence and Substance. Now if we immediately contemplate this Mystery under the notion of Substance, it is impossible for us to conceive One Substance and Three Hypostases, that is, in some sense Three Substances, or which is all One as to the difficulty of conceiving it, though the form of Expression is more Catholick; Three, each of which is the whole Essence and Substance, and neither of them is each other; we may turn over our Minds as long as we please, and change Words and Phrases, but we can find no Idea to answer these, or any other words of this nature. But now if instead of Essence and Hypostasis, we put Mind and its Word, we can form a very intelligible notion of this Unity and Distinction, and prove that Unity of Substance, and Distinction of Hypostases, which we cannot immediately and directly form any notion of. For Eternal Original Mind, and its Living Subsisting Word, are certainly Two,  
and

and neither are, nor can be each other; the Mind cannot be its own Living Word, nor the Word the Mind, whose Word it is; and yet we must all grant, that Eternal Mind is the most Real Being, Essence, Substance, and that a Living Subsisting Word is Life, Being, Substance, and the very same Life and Substance that the Mind is, and all that the Mind is; for a perfect Living Word can have no other Life and Substance but that of the Mind, and must be all the same that the Mind is.

The Eternal Generation of the Son *Æ Solas*, of the Substance of the Father, Life of Life, Substance of Substance, Whole of Whole, is impossible to be conceived, as immediately applied to the notion of Substance; but the Generation of the Word, Whole of Whole, is very conceivable, for the Mind must beget its own Word, as we feel in our selves; and a Mind which is perfect Life and Substance, if it begets its Word, must beget a Living, Subsisting, Substantial Word, the perfect Image of its own Life and Substance. And as impossible as it is to conceive, much more to express in words, this Mystery of the Eternal Generation, yet the necessary relation between a Mind, and its Word, proves that thus it is; we feel it in our selves, though we are as perfectly ignorant, how our Mind begets its dying vanishing Word, as how the Eternal Mind begets an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word: And the Generation of the Word includes in it all the Properties of the Divine Generation; that it is Eternal; for an Eternal Mind can never be without its Word; that it is without any Corporeal Passions, or Efflux, or Division, begotten in the Mind, and inseparable from it.

De substantia autem, Imperator Angulæ, quid loquar vixit Filium cum Patre esse substantia, cum imaginem Paterna substantia Filium legerimus, ut in nullo secundum Divinitatem a Patre intelligas discrepare? Juxta hanc imaginem dixit, omnia quæ Pater habet, mea sunt; ergo nec substantiam in Deo possumus denegare. Ambr. de Fide. c. 3. p. 74.

Mihi enim impossibile est generatio-  
nis scire secretum. Mens deficit, non  
filii, non mea tantum, sed & Ange-  
lorum. Id. c. i. p. 45.

Now if we conceive after the same manner of the Eternal Procession of the Holy Spirit, can any man deny this to be an Intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity, though we can form no distinct Idea of One Essence and Substance, and Three Hypostases? For if we can conceive Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Eternal Original Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, to be Essentially One and Three, the Catholick Faith is secured, though we do not so well understand the distinction between those Abstract Metaphysical Terms of Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, especially when applied to the Unity and Distinction of the Eternal Godhead, which is above all Terms of Art. *The Catholick Faith is, That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; but yet there are not Three Gods, but One God;* and this the Doctrine of the Divine Relations gives us a very intelligible notion of; for we cannot conceive otherwise of the Eternal Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, but that each of them are True and Perfect God, and yet a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, can be but One, and therefore but One God.

But One Substance, and Three Hypostases, is but a secondary notion of a Trinity in Unity, to secure the Catholick Faith against the *Sabellian* and *Arian* Heresies: Against the *Sabellians* the Catholick Fathers asserted Three Hypostases, against the *Arians* One Substance; and the Essential Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove both the One Substance, and Three Hypostases; but though One Substance and Three Hypostases be the Catholick Language, yet those Men begin at the wrong end, who think to form an intelligible notion of a Trinity in Unity from these abstract Metaphysical Terms. This is not the Language of the Scripture, nor have we any Idea to answer these Terms, of One Substance in Three distinct Hypostases, when we consider them by themselves, without relation to the Divine Nature, to which



which alone these Terms can belong, for there is no such thing in created Nature, and therefore we can have no Idea of it. It is abundantly sufficient in this Case, that we have a clear and distinct Notion of One Substance, and Three Hypostases in the Essential Unity and Distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three subsisting Relations in One Individual Essence and Substance, though when we abstractedly consider these Terms of One Substance and Three Hypostases, we can form no consistent Notion or Idea of it. And now let our *Socinian* Adversaries, who talk so loud of Absurdities, Contradictions, Nonsense, false Counting and Tritheism, try their skill to make good these Charges against the Divine subsisting Relations in the Unity of the same Individual Essence.

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## S E C T.



## S E C T. IX.

*A more particular Inquiry into the Difference between  
~~being and persons~~, or Nature and Person, with an  
 Account of some Catholick Forms of Speech, relating  
 to the ever Blessed Trinity.*

**B**UT since one Nature and Essence, and Three Hypo-  
 stases or Persons, is the Catholick Language, and  
 necessary to guard the Faith from those Two Extremes of  
*Sabellianism* and *Arianism*, it will be necessary to consider  
 how to apply these Ecclesiastical Terms to the Three and  
 One in the ever Blessed Trinity. And here, were I so disposed,  
 I might enter into a very large and perplexed Dispute; but  
 my design, as far as possibly I can attain it, is only to  
 explain what the Catholick Fathers meant by these Terms,  
 and to give a plain and sensible Notion of them: And after  
 what I have already so largely discoursed concerning Na-  
 ture and Hypostasis, I have little more to do, than to  
 compare them together, and to shew in what the Catho-  
 lick Fathers placed this Distinction. And as nothing is of  
 greater consequence, than rightly to understand this mat-  
 ter, so nothing requires greater Caution, nor greater Ap-  
 plication of Mind.

Whosoever is conversant in the Writings of the Ancient  
 Fathers, must acknowledge it not only reasonable but ne-  
 cessary, to distinguish between their Faith, and their Phi-  
 losophy. Their Faith, which they received from the  
 Scriptures, and the Universal Tradition of the Catholick  
 Church, is plain and simple, and the same in all. That  
 there is but One God, who has an Eternal Son, and an  
 Eternal Spirit; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are  
 each

each of them by himself, True and Perfect God, and all but One God, which is a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity; that they are in a true and proper Sense, Three and One. This is the Catholick Faith, wherein they all agree; but then those Philosophical Terms, which the importunities of Hereticks, who corrupted either the Faith of the Unity or Trinity, forced them to use in the Explication of this Mystery, are of a different Consideration: These have not always been the same, nor have all agreed in them; and the wisest Men have owned great Improperities in them all, when applied to this Sacred Mystery; and indeed it is impossible to be otherwise; for that infinite Difference and Diversity there is between the Divine and Humane Nature, nay all created Nature, can never admit of any Common Terms proper to express both. The most perfect Creatures bear only some imperfect Analogy and Resemblance to what we conceive of God; and therefore when we apply such Words and Terms to the Divine Nature, as are borrowed from Creatures, (and we have no other) we must understand them only by way of Analogy and Accommodation; and when we expound such Terms as are used by the Catholick Fathers in such an accommodated Sense, we must apply them no further, than that particular Matter they intended to represent by them. I have already shewn this in several particular Passages relating to the *Homoousion*, but now I am more particularly to consider the difference between Essence and Hypostasis; and I shall only shew how the matter of fact stands, what has occasioned this difficulty, what the true state of the Controversy is, and how we may form some sensible notion of this Distinction; and if I should mistake in so nice a Point as this, I hope it will be a pardonable Mistake, while I make no change in the Catholick Faith, and intend it only as an Essay, if it be possible to silence or qualify the Dispute about words.

The

Ἄλλα τὸν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον τοῖς αἰ-  
ρετικοῖς τὴν πλάνην, τὴν αὐτὴν λέ-  
γειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.  
Damaſc. Orth. Fid. l. 3. c. 3.

The Greek Fathers attribute all the Heresies relating to the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, to this one Mistake, that Essence and Hypostasis are the same; for then if there be but One Essence in the Blessed Trinity, there must consequent-ly be but One Hypostasis, which is *Sabellianism*; or if there be Three Hypostases, there must be Three Natures and Essences, either in the *Arian* or *Tritheistick* Notion: Thus with reference to the Incarnation, two Natures must be two Persons, or Hypostases, as *Nestorius* taught, or One Person must be but One mixt and compounded Nature too, which was the Heresy of *Eutyches*.

This some Fathers thought a fundamental Error in Philosophy, introduced by *Aristotle*, who makes the first Sub-

Ὅσα δὲ ἔστιν, ἡ κυριώταται  
τι καὶ πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος λεγο-  
μένη, ἡ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποκειμένη  
πρὸς λέγει, μὴ δὲ ὑποκειμένη  
πρὸς ἑν. ὅς ὁ πρὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ  
ὁ πρὸς ἵππου. Arist. Categ.  
cap. 5. T. 1. p. 23.

Theor.  
Leg. ad Ar-  
men.

stance, which is the only true and proper Substance, to be that which is predicated of no Subject, nor is in any Subject, that is, what we call, a Subsisting Individual, as this Man, or this Horse. And therefore *Theorianus* observes, That the Catholick Fathers understood Essence and Hypostasis in a very different sense from the Greek Philosophers; that is, by Essence, and Substance, they did not mean one singular *Individuum*, or singular Nature and Substance, as *Aristotle* did; but a common Nature, not a common Notion, as Genus or Species, which are *Aristotle's* second Substances, but a common Subsisting Nature, which is one and the same, whole and perfect in every Individual of the same kind. And what *Aristotle* call'd his first Substance, a singular Subsisting Nature, that they called Hypostasis, a common Subsisting Nature, with its individuating Characters and Properties.

It is evident some Ages past, before these words *Essence* and *Hypostasis* were thus nicely distinguished, or at least be-fore

fore this Distinction was so unanimously received ; for as I have already observed, these Words were used very promiscuously, which occasioned the *Alexandrian* Schism ; and it does not appear to me, that this Distinction was settled by *Athanasius*, and the Bishops with him, in that Synod, as some seem to think ; though soon after it generally prevailed, as we may learn from *St. Basil*, *Gregory Nyssen*, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, *Damascen*, *Leontius*, *Theorianus*, *Theodorus Abucara*, *Ignatius Sinaita*, and generally all the Catholick Writers of the *Eutychian* and *Severian* Age, who universally agree in this, That Essence and Hypostasis differ as *ἡ γεννητο* and *ἡ οὐσία*, as that which is Universal, differs from what is Proper and Singular.

Now so far these Fathers were certainly in the right, That if they must apply Philosophical Terms to Divine Mysteries (which the Cavilling Objections of Hereticks made necessary) there was an absolute necessity for them to change their signification ; for as there is nothing common to God and Creatures, so there can be no words in the same sense common to them ; but then this only requires an accommodation of words to Divine Mysteries by way of analogy and resemblance, but not to change the Language and Philosophy of Created Nature, which after all our Attempts, and all our Art of Expression, will fall infinitely short of the Divine Nature, and give us but a very imperfect Image of it. And if by such Attempts we confound our Notions and Ideas of Nature too, we shall so much the more confound and perplex our Ideas of God. It may help to ease mens Minds of some Notions which lie cross and uneven : Briefly to state this matter.

I confess, I am not satisfied of that absolute necessity, which some pretend, of stating nicely and Philosophically this distinction between Nature and Person, in order to understand the Doctrine of the Trinity. This was the Catholick Faith long before this Distinction was univer-

fally received; and Men who understand little of this Distinction, may believe very orthodoxly in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, without it: Nay the best, the safest, and easiest way, to understand these and all other Philosophical Terms applied to the Explication of this Faith, is to fit them to those Scripture Ideas we have of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, each of them True and Perfect God, and all Three but One God, as I have shewn at large in the First Chapter. But since there is a very warm Dispute about Nature and Person, and has been for many Ages, and this Distinction is become necessary to secure the Catholick Faith against the Attempts of Hereticks on both sides, as the Church has found by long Experience; it will be necessary to set this matter in as clear a light as possible we can.

And the best way I can think of to do this, is 1. To consider this distinction of Nature and Person in Creatures: As for instance, in a Man; What the distinction between Nature and Person is in Man; and to shew, which way soever we state this matter, how improper all these Notions are to represent this distinction between Nature and Person in the Blessed Trinity. And 2. To shew how the Catholick Fathers accommodated these Names of Essence and Person to the Explication of this Mystery, and what Unity, and what Distinction they intended to represent by them.

1. As for the first, If the Infinite distance between God and Creatures will allow us to Philosophize freely about Created Nature, without incurring the Suspicion of Heresy; I must confess, I never could form a distinct notion of the difference between a subsisting Nature and Hypostasis, or Person in Man; but do what I can, I can conceive no otherwise of an Individual Subsisting Human Nature, but as of an Individual Subsisting Human Hypostasis



stasis, or Person; nor of an Individual Human Person, than as of an Individual Subsisting Human Nature. And I have some reason to think, that this is not peculiarly my Case; for besides that I find other thinking Men blundered in this matter, and could never yet meet with a clear and sensible Explication of it; I observe, that there is no word, which in its original institution signifies this difference; and it is reasonable to think, as to Created Nature, that Mankind have no notion of that, which they have no word for.

It is sufficiently known, that Hypostasis originally signifies Essence and Substance, not Person as distinguished from Nature, which is a later, and a mere Ecclesiastical use of it; and it is confessed, that *Persona* and *ὑπόστασις* were taken from the Stage, and when they were applied to signify a true and real Man, they signified only the Man himself, not the Personality of a Man, as distinguished from an Individual Subsisting Nature: And, which is much more considerable, some of the Fathers, as I observed before, confess, that *Aristotle* knew no such distinction; but in his Philosophy, Essence and Hypostasis signified the same thing; for Nature and Essence, which is his first Substance, is an Individuum, which subsists not as part of another, but as whole and compleat, which the Fathers call Hypostasis; and therefore *Aristotle's* first Substance, and what these Fathers call Hypostasis, is in Creatures one and the same thing; and yet all confess, That no man ever more nicely distinguished all the distinguishable Notions in Nature, than *Aristotle* did, that what escaped his observation, must be very nice indeed.

And though *St. Basil*, and *St. Gregory Nyssen*, and the other Catholick Writers of that Age, do distinguish between Essence and Hypostasis, that they differ as *τὸ κοινόν*, and *τὸ ἰδίον*, what is common to all the Individuals of the same kind, which is a common Nature, and what is pro-



per and peculiar to each Individual, and distinguishes one man from another; yet I do not remember, that they quarrelled with the *Greek* Philosophers, or apprehended that they themselves taught any new Philosophy in this Point, as afterwards *Theorianus*, and others did; nor can I see any other difference there is between them, if candidly interpreted, but only in words.

The short account of the matter is this. *Aristotle's* first Substance, which subsists by it self, these Fathers, as they themselves own, call Hypostasis, not Nature, Essence, and Substance; that is, every subsisting Individuum is *Aristotle's* Nature, Essence, and Substance, the Fathers Hypostasis; now when they mean the same thing, and own that they do so, so far they are agreed in the thing, and differ only in words. But then these Fathers in every Hypostasis distinguished between the common Nature, and such Personal Properties, which distinguished common Nature into Individuals, or were Characteristical Marks, whereby to know one Person from another. Now *Aristotle* indeed never made such a distinction as this; but yet all that is material in it, is included in his Notion and Definition of Substance.

For when these Fathers distinguish in every Hypostasis, what is common to the whole Kind, and what is proper and peculiar to each Individuum, they mean no more by it, but that *Peter*, for instance, considered as a Man, is perfectly the same that *James* and *John* are, considered also as Men, though there is something so peculiar to *Peter*, as to make him a particular Human Person, and to distinguish him from *James* and *John*, and all other Men in the World. Now it is certain, neither *Aristotle*, nor any Man of sense, would ever have denied any thing of all this; for it is evident, that there is something wherein all Men agree, and something proper to every particular Man. That which is the same in all Men, the Fathers call a common Nature,  
and

and so does *Aristotle*, a common Specifick Nature; but here is some appearance of difference between them, which I think, if rightly stated, is none at all. *Aristotle* makes Nature as actually subsisting by it self; as suppose Human Nature in *Peter* or *James*, to be τὸ ἄτομον, Individuum, a particular, Singular Nature, and that it is common only in Notion, as every particular Man has a Nature of the same kind, or a true Human Nature.

These Fathers on the contrary affirm, That Human Nature, as considered in *Peter*, or any other particular Man, is a common Nature, distinguished into Hypostases, by something proper, peculiar, and particular to each. That all Nature is common to all the Hypostases of the same kind, and that it is impossible to find a particular and appropriated Nature.

Πᾶσα ὅσα κοινὴ ἐστὶ τῇ  
αὐτῇ περιέχον ὑποστάσεων,  
καὶ ἔκ ἐστιν ἑστὶν μερικὴν καὶ ἰδι-  
οῦσαν φύσιν ἥτοι ὅσα. Damasc.  
Orth. Fid. l 3. c. 6.

Now as great an appearance as here is of a direct Contradiction, a little consideration, I believe, will satisfy all thinking Men, that *Aristotle* would have owned all that these Fathers say, and then the only Dispute will be, which of them speak most properly, which is of no great moment in this Cause.

For what do these Fathers mean by a common Nature? Do they mean, that there is but one Numerical Subsisting Nature common to all the Individuals? but one Universal Human Nature in all the particular men in the World? By no means. *Damascen* expressly teaches, That the κοινὴ φύσις, the common Nature in Creatures, is only τὰ λόγῳ θεωρεῖται, to be known by Reason; but the διαίρεσις ὑποστάσεων, the distinction of Hypostases, πραγματὶ θεωρεῖται, is seen in the things themselves, in their separate Existence. But what is this common Nature, which is seen by Reason? why, every particular Man is a

\* ἕκαστος ὃς αὐτῇ ζῶν λογικὴν  
ἔστιν, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐκ ἔστιν ἑμ-  
ψυχωμένη, ψυχῇ λογικῇ τι καὶ  
reasonable

πορρῶν ἂν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν φύσις τῶν  
 λογικῶν ἐστὶν ὁμοειδὴς ἢ ὁμοίᾳ τῶν αἰ-  
 νουμένων ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἰδίᾳ  
 τῶν ἐκείνων, καὶ ἀνὰ μέγεθος, ἡ γὰρ  
 ἡμεῖς ἐκαστὴν καὶ ἑαυτὴν. Damasc.  
 Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 11.

reasonable Mortal Creature; each of them is Flesh animated by a reasonable Soul and Mind, and this is the common Nature which is seen by Reason; common, because it is perfectly and invariably the same in all, though each of

these Hypostases, in which this common Nature is, subsist distinctly and separately by themselves, and therefore the common Nature too subsists distinctly and separately in these separate Hypostases. Now would *Aristotle*, or any one for him, deny that his first Substance, though it be an Individuum, which subsists compleatly and separately by it self, is in this sense a common Nature, as being perfectly the same in all the Individuals; or in the Language of the Fathers, in all the Hypostases of the same Nature?

There can be no such thing, as what *Aristotle* calls a Species, if every Individual have not the common Nature; for Nature subsists only in Individuals; and if that be not a common Nature, it cannot have a common Name and Definition; if Human Nature be not perfectly the same in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, the Name and Definition of a

Man cannot equally and universally belong to them all. And therefore *Damascen* was certainly in the right, who from an Universal Predication infers, that common Nature is the Species; and that for this reason, Nature is predicated of its Hypostases, or Individuals, because in every Hypostasis of the same kind, there is the same perfect Na-

ture. Every Man has the perfect Nature of a Man; and for that reason, and no other, the Name and Definition of a Man belongs to every Man.

Τὰ κοινὰ καὶ ἡ καθολικὴ ἡγεμονία  
 εἶναι ὅτι ἀνταίς ὑποκειμένην με-  
 ταξὺν κοινὴν τὴν φύσιν ἢ οὐσίαν ὡς  
 ἰδίᾳ ἡγεμονίᾳ ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τῆς  
 ὑποκειμένης, διότι ἐν ἐκείνῃ ὁμοει-  
 δῶς ὑποκειμένην, ταύτην ἢ οὐσίαν  
 ἐστίν. Damasc. Orth. Fid. l. 3.  
 c. 6.

Upon this account it is, that they reject *μερικὴν καὶ ἰδιόζωσαν φύσιν*, a particular, singular Nature; because then the same Hypostases must have both the same, and a diverse Nature, even the Persons of the Holy Trinity. If Nature be perfectly the same in all the Hypostases, it is a common Nature; but if Human Nature in *Peter* have any thing peculiar and different from Human Nature in *Paul*, it is then a particular Humanity, and *Peter* and *Paul* are not perfectly of the same kind, which is one Notion, wherein they rejected a particular Nature; which added to what I discoursed above, that by a particular Nature, they meant a whole, absolute Individual Nature, it includes, I think, all that they meant, when they rejected as Heresy, *τρὴς μερικῆς εἰσὶν*, Three Individual Natures in the Trinity: By Three particular Natures, they always understood Three Absolute, Whole, Individual Natures, and this alone is *Tritheism*, for Three such Absolute Divinities must be Three Gods; but besides this, they thought there could not be Three Individual Natures, without some essential difference to distinguish and number Natures, and this added a mixture of *Arianism* to *Tritheism*, and made, at least in part, Three different Divinities, that they were partly of the same, and partly of a different Nature. For, as far as I can understand this matter, the reason why they rejected Singular and Individual Natures, was not, that Human Nature, for instance, does not subsist singly and individually, *ἀνὰ μέρη*, as *Damascen* speaks, in *Peter* and *Paul*, and every individual Man in the World; but because what is common to all without the least Alterity or Diversity, can be but one in all, for Alterity and Diversity is necessary to make a Number; and therefore Nature, which is perfectly the same in all, though it subsists singly in Individuals, is not an Individual it self,

as

Ἐπὶ ἀνέκτῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ ὁμοούσιῳ καὶ ἰσπερσοῦσι λέγον, καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην τελευτῶν, καὶ ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἰσπερσοῦτον, καὶ ὅτι δὲ διότι λέγον. Ibid.

as having no principle of Individuation in it self, that is, no Diversity : For which reason it may be numbred with the Hypostases, with the numbring Number ; but the *res numerata*, that Nature which is numbred with the Hypostases, is but one in all, as I have shewn above.

In this sense also these Fathers rejected an Individual Nature, *per se* *ex se* *solus*, in their Disputes with the *Severians*, concerning the Personality of Christ's Human Nature : These Hereticks taught, That every Nature is an Individuum, Hypostasis, or Person, and therefore the Human Nature of Christ, if it were true Human Nature, must be a Human Hypostasis or Person too : In answer to which, these Fathers absolutely denied that there is any such thing as an Individual Nature ; that pure Nature is no Hypostasis, not that it can't subsist, for the Human Nature of Christ does actually subsist ; but that meer Nature has no individuating Principle in it self to distinguish it into different Hypostases, but is distinguished not by any Essential Diversity, but by Personal Properties ; that Nature with Personal Properties is a Person, and therefore if there be a Subsisting Nature, which has no Personal Properties, but is distinguished some other way from Human Nature in Human Persons, it is certain it is Human Nature, but no Human Person : And thus it is with the Human Nature of Christ, which is distinguished from Human Nature in all others by its Hypostatical Union to the Eternal Word, which is no Personal Property, and therefore does not make it a distinct Person, though it be a perfect Subsisting Nature.

This is the best and easiest Account I can give of the Philosophy of these Fathers, concerning a Common and Individual Nature, which if it be thought a new way of speaking, yet it is what may be understood, and has a great deal of old Truth in it ; and will help us to understand the  
Fathers



Fathers in these Disputes about the Trinity and Incarnation, a little better than I find many men do.

Let us then in the next place, inquire what these Fathers mean by Hypostasis, and how they distinguish it from Nature in Created Beings. Now they themselves tell us, That by Hypostasis, they mean *Aristotle's* first Substance, or that which subsists by it self; not as a Part in a Whole, nor as Accidents in a Subject, but is a perfect whole it self, and has a compleat Subsistence of its own. What is it then that subsists by it self? For that is *Aristotle's* first Substance, and the Fathers Hypostasis: And that is *ἔσς*, Nature, Essence, and Substance: For nothing else can subsist by it self, as is evident in *Aristotle's* Definition of Essence and Substance; and though the Fa-

thers put something more into their Definition of Hypostasis, yet it comes all to one. For as *Damascen* tells us, Every Hypostasis is perfect Nature and Substance; and therefore the Hypostases do not differ from each other in Nature, but only in such peculiar and Characteristical Accidents, as distinguish Hypostases. For the Definition of Hypostasis is Nature with its Accidents: That every Hypostasis has the common Nature with its peculiar dis-

tinguishing Accidents, subsisting by it self. So that an Hypostasis is nothing else but Nature with its Accidents and distinguishing Characters, subsisting by it self: Now we know Accidents do not subsist by themselves, but if they be Inherent Accidents, they subsist in Nature and Substance; and therefore though they may distinguish Hypostases and Persons, do not constitute an Hypostasis, and therefore are owned to be only *ἰδιώματα*, *χαρακτῆρες γνωρίσματα*, the peculiar distinguishing Marks and Cha-

Κατηγορίᾳ τῆς ἑστῆς τῆς ὑποστάσεως, διότι ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῷ ὑποστάσει πλείον ἢ ἔσς ἐστὶ· διὸ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἕκαστ' ἑστῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἅπαντα εἰσι τὰ χαρακτηριστικὰ ἰδιώματα, χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ ἡ οὐσίας, καὶ ὅτι τῆς ὑποστάσεως δεῖξιν ἡ ἔσς καὶ συμβεβηκότων· ὥστε τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὰ ἰδιώματα τῆς ἑστῆς ἢ ὑποστάσεως, καὶ τὸ ἕκαστὴν ὑποστᾶναι.  
Dam. Orth. Fid. l. 3. c. 6.



acters of Hypostases or Persons, whereby they are known from each other : But the Marks and Characters which distinguish Hypostases, are not the Hypostases themselves ; such as the Time when they were born, the Place where they lived, their Parentage, Name, Features of Body, Endowments of Mind, and a hundred other distinguishing Marks, for these are very different in different Persons, and as changeable in the same Persons, as Time, Age, Place, Features of Body, Endowments of Mind, Trades, Offices, &c. and yet all these are Persons, and the same Persons under all these Changes.

Now setting aside all these Characters and Accidents, which cannot make a Person, but only distinguish one Person from another, there is nothing left to be the Hypostasis or Person, but only the common Nature subsisting by it self : Common, as it is the same in every Individual, but an Hypostasis or Individuum by a separate Existence, or subsisting by it self. For an Individuum, *ἄτομον*, is one undivided Whole, subsisting by it self, and therefore a whole, perfect, undivided Human Nature, subsisting by it self, is an Hypostasis, or Person, one single, individual Man, though there were no other Mark and Character to distinguish him from other Men, but only this Separate Subsistence.

The Humanity of our Saviour is a plain Demonstration of this, that it is only a Separate Existence, or subsisting by it self (which in Created Beings is the same thing) that makes Human Nature an Hypostasis, or Person. All Catholick Christians own, that Christ took Human Nature on him, but not a Human Hypostasis or Person, and therefore in him we may see the difference between Nature and Person.

What then was Christ's Human Nature? I know no more of it, but that he had a true Body of Flesh, animated by a Reasonable Soul, such a Body, and such a Soul, as other

other Men have, and this is Human Nature : But why is not this Human Body and Soul a Human Person too ? Did he want the *ἰδιώματα, ὑποστατικά, γνωρίσματα*, some peculiar Marks and Characters to distinguish him from all other Human Persons ? By no means ! He had more of these Marks of Distinction, and more Authentick ones, than any other Man ever had. The Time and Place of his Birth, his Parentage, his Miracles, his Doctrine, the minute Circumstances of his Death, his Resurrection, &c. were foretold by Ancient Prophets, and he distinguished himself from all the rest of Mankind by those wonderful things he did, that if peculiar distinguishing Characters make a Person, he was more a Person than ever any Man was before or since. What then was wanting to make us Human Nature a Human Person ? Truly nothing, but only subsisting by it self, which it never did, but in union to the Eternal Word. This I think looks very like a Demonstration, that an Hypostasis is nothing but Nature subsisting by it self ; for all that the Humanity of Christ had, without being a Human Person, cannot make a Person, for then the Human Nature of Christ must have been a Human Person too ; and that which alone was wanting to make the Human Nature of Christ a Person, which was subsisting by it self, must be the only thing which makes Nature a Person.

I have the rather chose this Instance, because the Humanity of Christ, which is no Person, is often alledged to prove, that there must be some peculiar *mode of Subsistence*, which must *coalesce* with common Nature to make a Person.

This, I confess, is Language which I do not understand, if there be any thing more meant by it, than that Nature subsisting by it self is a Person : For Nature which does not subsist, is nothing but in Idea, and Subsistence is a mere Notion without something that subsists ; now we may unite these two Notions of Nature and Subsistence,

and form the Idea of a Subsisting Nature, which is all the *coalescing* I know of; but actual Production makes a Subsisting Nature, which is not *Nature and Subsistence*, or a *mode of Subsistence coalescing*, but Nature in Act. In a Subsisting Created Nature, which does not necessarily exist, we may distinguish between the Notions of Nature and Subsistence, but a Subsisting Nature is nothing but Nature in being, Nature which is, that is, Nature it self; for the meer Idea of Nature is not Nature. But *Subsistence has a Mode*, and there must be a peculiar manner of Subsistence to make a Person: Must every Person then have a peculiar manner of Subsistence? Are there then as many peculiar Manners and Modes of Subsistence, as there are, or ever have been, or ever shall be, distinct Persons in the World? This is beyond my Philosophy. I have heard of a Compleat and Incompleat Subsistence, to subsist by it self, or to subsist as a Part in the Whole, or an Accident in a Subject, &c. but I never could understand, that any other Subsistence strictly belongs to the Notion of an Hypostasis or Person, but to subsist by it self. The Human Nature of Christ did upon all other Accounts, as truly and properly subsist, as any other Man in the World, but was no Person, as not subsisting by it self, but in Union to the Eternal Word; which made it the Human Nature of the Word, which was made Flesh, and dwelt amongst us.

All this Talk about the different Modes and manner of Subsistence, seems to be a mistake of the Fathers Doctrine concerning the *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, which these Men translate *Modes of Subsistence*, of which more anon; but at present I only observe, That the Fathers do not place the Personality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in these Modes of Subsistence, but only distinguish and characterize their Persons by them, and from thence prove the real distinction of Persons in the Individual Unity of the Divine Essence: But then I do not remember, that they so much as distinguish

guish all Created Persons by their *peculiar Modes of Subsistence*.

I know very well, that both *Damascen* and others, give an Example of this in *Adam*, *Eve*, and *Seth*; that *Adam* was immediately formed by God of the Dust of the Earth, *Eve* formed of one of *Adam's* Ribs, and *Seth* begotten of *Adam* and *Eve*, which they call their *τετραὶ ὑποστάσεις*, which in this Example can signify nothing else but their different manner of Production, not different Modes of Subsistence; but then they do not alledge this as the formal Reason of Personality, nay not as necessary to the distinction of Persons, (though such Peculiarities, whenever they are, will always distinguish Persons) but all they designed by it, was to prove, that such different ways of coming into being, made no change or alteration in Nature; for *Adam*, *Eve*, and *Seth*, had all the same Human Nature, though formed after such a different manner; in answer to the *Arian* Objection against the *Homoeousion*, that an Unbegotten and Begotten Nature cannot be the same, and therefore Father and Son not Consubstantial. Indeed this would have been a very ill Example of the Distinction of Persons by these different Modes of Subsistence, because it could only distinguish *Adam* and *Eve* from all the rest of Mankind; for all Mankind ever since, excepting our Saviour, have come into the World the same way that *Seth* did, and therefore are not distinguished by a peculiar manner of Subsistence, for they have all the same; and consequently either are not distinct Persons, or else such peculiar Modes of Subsistence, *coalescing with common Nature*, do not constitute the Person. And yet I can meet with no other Account of any Modes of Subsistence necessary to the constitution of a Created Person (excepting their Personal Properties and Characters, which do not make, but only distinguish Persons, which are not properly Modes of Subsistence, but Modes, Affections, and Properties of the Sub-

Damasc.  
Orth. Fid.  
l. i. c. 9.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἰσὶν, ἰδέα ὅ ἐκείνη, καὶ ἀνὰ μέγεθος, ἥσαν καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ζώεισιν.

Πλέον ὅ πάντων, τοῦ μὴ ἐν ἀλλήλαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ χωριστῶς ἔχοντες ὅθεν καὶ δύο, καὶ τρεῖς ἀνθρώποι λέγονται, καὶ πολλοί. Damasc. Ibid. l. i. c. 11.

Subsisting Nature); but only a separate Subsistence, that every Created Hypostasis, or Person, subsists by it self, and separately from all others. And herein both Fathers and Philosophers, notwithstanding some difference in words, seem well enough agreed, and this is all that I need say concerning the Distinction between Nature and Person in Created Beings.

But now every one who understands the True Catholick Faith of the Trinity, must needs be sensible, how improper all this is to explain that Venerable Mystery of One Nature, and Three Persons, in the Unity of the Godhead, if we apply these Terms strictly and properly.

The Catholick Fathers would not allow *Aristotle's* Definition of *ἔσας*, Nature, Essence, and Substance, that it is that which subsists by it self; because this leaves no possible distinction between Essence and Hypostasis, without which we can never defend the Faith of One Nature in Three Persons; for what in his Sense thus subsists by it self, is an Individual and Singular Nature, which is the same with Hypostasis, and then it is impossible there should be Three Hypostases in One Singular Nature, which is but One Hypostasis.

But after all, Do these Fathers deny, that the Divine Nature is One Individual Nature? Do they not, as I have largely shewn, make this the Fundamental Reason of the Divine Unity, That there is but *μία θεότης ἐν τριῶν τελείαις ὑποστάσεσι*, One Divinity in Three Perfect Hypostases; and that this One Divinity is *ἄτομον ἔσας, ἑνός, μονάς*, a Perfect Indivisible Unit, and Monad; and that in a very different Sense from what they own in Creatures? So that in some Sense these Fathers own, That the Divine Nature is as True an Individuum, and infinitely a more Perfect Unit



*Unit* and *Monad*, than *Aristotle's* First Substance, though his First Substance is, and can be but One Hypostasis, and the Divine Nature subsists perfectly in Three.

And therefore to qualify this, they tell us, That Nature signifies the *τὸ κοινόν*, that which is common to all the Hypostases of the same Nature; but the Hypostasis is the common Nature with some peculiar and distinguishing Properties, subsisting separately by it self; and this seems to give us a better image and resemblance of One Nature in Three Hypostases; for here is one common Nature, not only in Three, but in all the distinct Hypostases of that Nature, that ever were, or ever shall be: But I'm sure this needs greater qualification, when applied to the Mystery of the Trinity, than *Aristotle's* First Substance, or it will unavoidably introduce, not merely *Tritheism*, but *Polytheism* without end; for God can limit the Numbers of Created Hypostases, but the number of Hypostases in an Infinite necessary Nature can never be limited, if the Divine Nature be common to the Divine Hypostases, only as Humane Nature is common to Human Hypostases.

They teach, as I have already observed, That Human Nature, for instance, is a common Nature, and that every Hypostasis, or every particular Man has this same common Nature; but then it is a common Nature, not as it is numerically One in all, for it subsists separately in every Hypostasis, and therefore in this sense is not One common Numerical, Individual Nature; but it is common only, as it is perfectly the same in all. Which they will not allow to be a meer common Notion, but a common Specifick Nature; for the Nature is the Species, which is the foundation of the common Predication: For therefore all Men have the common Name and Definition of a Man, because they have the same common Human Nature.

And



And thus, though every Hypostasis has not *μὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ*, a particular Nature, as that signifies a distinction in the Nature it self, yet it has the common Specifick Individual Nature; that is, that Nature which makes the Species, and is common, as it is the same in all, but yet subsists individually *ἀνὰ μέρη*, and separately in each Hypostasis. But now will any Catholick Christian say, that thus it is in the Ever Blessed Trinity? That the One Common Divinity is One and Common, only as One Common Humanity is, that is, that it is perfectly the same in all? not One Individual, but One Specifick Nature: Or will he say, That each Divine Person has one whole intire Specifick Divinity, as every Human Person has a whole Specifick Humanity? As far as I can see, this would as unavoidably make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Gods, as *Peter, James, and John*, are three Men; and a common Nature, and personal Properties, and different Modes of Subsistence, would no more prevent a Trinity of Gods. than a Trinity of Men.

This, I think, plainly shews, how vain an Attempt it is to find out any Notions of Unity and Distinction, of Nature and Person, or any words to express those Notions by, common to God and Creatures. These Creature-Ideas, and Creature-Terms, can be applied to God only by way of Analogy and Accommodation, and that a very imperfect one too.

2. Let us then consider, how the Catholick Fathers accommodated these Names of *Essence* and *Person* to the explication of this Mystery, and what they intended to represent by them. I shall do this in as few words as possibly I can, that what I have to say may be the more easily understood.

They tell us, That all Nature is common, that Human Nature is common to all Mankind, and the Divine Nature common to all the Three Divine Persons, Father, Son, and

and Holy Ghost; not that they thought the Divinity or Godhead a common Nature, merely as Human Nature is common, but there is this Analogy between them; that the Divine Nature is not singular, or does not subsist in Singularity, but in Three Hypostases, as Human Nature is common, because it is not confined to one, but is in all Human Hypostases; and that the Divine Nature is perfectly and invariably the same in each Hypostasis, as the Human Nature is, which for this Reason is called a common, not a particular Nature; which is the *ταυτότης ἐστὶς*, the Sameness, Identity, not Singularity, of Nature in the Blessed Trinity. Thus far the Analogy holds, (which is a direct opposition both to *Sabellianism* and *Arianism*) but it reaches no farther; for the Divine Nature is not a common Specifick Nature, as all Created Nature is common, for the Godhead is no Species; that is, there is, and can be but One God: Which I have already at large shewn to be the Sense of the Fathers. They expressly teach, That the Divine Nature is an Individual Nature, but not Singular; it is common, as being whole and perfect in more Hypostases than One, which excludes Singularity, but it is one whole Entire, Individual Nature; so one Individual, as Human Nature is one in one Man. For though Individual and Singular is the same in Creatures, it is not so in the Divine Nature; nor can it be, if the Catholick Faith be One Nature, One Divinity in Three Perfect Hypostases: And if we can form any sensible Notion of this, it will silence all the pretences of Jargon, Nonsense, Contradiction, Tritheism, which are so constantly objected against this Venerable Mystery. And therefore I shall briefly inquire, 1. What that One Divinity is, which is common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and how it is common: 2. How this common Nature is in a strict and proper Sense, One Individual Nature. And I think this is easily accounted for from the Doctrine of the Fathers.

1. As for the first; This *μία θεότης*, One Divinity, is the Divinity of the Father, the *Natura Patris*, the *πατρική θεότης*, the Nature of the Father, and the Divinity of the Father, who is the Eternal Self-originated Mind, which has no Second, and therefore there can be no other, no Second, or Third Divinity. Now this One Divine Nature, One Divinity of the Father, is common to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit: Common, I say, not merely as Human Nature is common to all Men, because it is the same in all, perfectly the same *ὁ λόγος ὁ αἰώνιος*, though it be not the same Individual Nature in all, which is singular and incommunicable in Creatures; but it is common by a perfect communication, whole of whole; that it is no New Divinity, but the Divinity of the Father, which is in the Son, who is therefore so often, as I observed above, called the Nature, and Divinity, and Mind of the Father, his Image and Character, and that which is signified by all this, his Eternal, Living, Omnipotent Word. I do not intend to prove all this over again, which I have abundantly proved already, but only to put every thing into its proper place, that we may view the Whole in a true light.

This Divine Nature then of the Father which is but One, is that One Divinity, which is by an Eternal Ineffable Generation communicated whole and perfect to the Son, and by a like Eternal and Ineffable Procession to the Holy Spirit: But still the difficulty is, How this is One Nature, which is not Singular, nor subsists in Singularity, but in Three Proper, Distinct, Compleat Hypostases, or Persons.

2. And therefore rightly to apprehend this, we must inquire into the Notion of One Individual Nature. Now that which is most obvious, and which the Fathers perpetually alledge in justification of the Divine Unity, is, That an Individual is an undivided Nature, and therefore the One Divinity of the Father, though actually communi-  
cated

cated to the Son, and Holy Spirit, is One Individual Divinity, because it is communicated whole and perfect, without Division or Separation; and that which is undivided is One.

But though to be *undivided* be essential to the Notion of an Individual Nature, yet there must be something else to compleat this Notion, or at least to give us a more distinct conception of it.

Could Human Nature propagate it self whole and compleat to Two or Three, without any division or separation of Substance, this could not make it One Individual Nature, though they were undivided; for One Individual Nature, is One whole Compleat Nature, without division; which is all that is essential to such a Being, and is this all but once, and that without division.

But how will this agree with the Notion of One Divinity, or One Individual Divine Nature? For does not the One Divine Nature, which is the Divinity of the Father, subsist compleatly and distinctly, though without division and separation, in the Son and Holy Ghost; and will you call this One Individual Nature, which is not singularly in One, but subsists distinctly in Three? Yes, I will, because all these Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are essential to the Notion of One Divinity, and therefore are One Individual Divinity in Three; for an Individual Nature is that, which without division has all that is essential to such a Nature.

Well, But is not the Father then, in his own Person, True and Perfect God, and the Son True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost True and Perfect God? that is, Have not each of these Divine Persons all the Divine Perfections included in the Notion and Idea of God? And are they not Three who have all the Perfections of the Divine Nature? and how then is this One Individual Nature?



I answer: When I say, That One Individual Nature is that which has all that is essential to such a Nature; by *Essential* I mean, not only Essential Properties, Qualities, Powers, and Perfections, (which are commonly called Nature, there being no other notion of Nature in Created Beings) but Essential Productions too, which (when there is any such thing) are as essential to Nature, as any other Properties or Perfections. In the first Sense of *Essential*, the Divine Nature is not singular, but communicated by the Eternal Father to the Eternal Son, and by Father and Son to the Eternal Spirit, and all Three are Infinite in Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, and all other Divine Perfections. This is but One Divinity, One Godhead; for there is not a Second and Third Divinity in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, but the One Divinity of the Father.

But yet we must confess, that here is Number; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are Three, and how can that Divinity, which is perfectly and distinctly in Three, be One Individual Nature, One Numerically; One as Human Nature in every particular Man is One?

Now this must be resolved into the second Notion of *Essential*, for Essential Productions; for all Essential Productions in the Unity of Nature, though they may be distinguished and numbred among themselves, are but One Individual Nature. It will be in vain to seek for an Example of this in Created Nature, and I believe the reason of it will be evident without it.

An Eternal Self-originated Mind is True and Perfect God, the First Supreme Cause of all things, and has all the Perfections of the Divinity wholly in it self, is the One and only True God: But if it be essential to an Eternal Mind to have an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word and Spirit, by an Eternal Generation and Procession, then this Eternal Word and Spirit are essential to an Eternal Mind,

Mind, not as Essential Perfections, or Essential Parts, but as Essential Productions or Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature. Thus the Scripture represents this Mystery, That there is One God, who has an Eternal Word, and an Eternal Spirit; and the Catholick Fathers, as I have already observed, insist on this as a natural Demonstration of a Trinity, That the Eternal Mind must have its Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit. Now if the Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit are essential to the Eternal Mind, it is certain, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Eternal Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are but One Individual Divinity; every thing that is essential, is included in the Notion of an Individual Nature; for that is not a Compleat and Perfect Nature, nor an adequate notion of Nature, that wants any thing that is essential. Now though we may have a general Notion and Idea of a God, That he is an Absolutely Perfect Being, which Includes all the Divine Attributes and Perfections, without knowing any thing of the Son, or Holy Ghost; yet if we consider this Absolutely Perfect Being as Eternal Self-originated Mind, with its Eternal Word and Spirit, as essential Productions or Processions, we can consider them no otherwise, but as One Individual Divinity; this Eternal Word and Spirit being essential Processions of the Eternal Mind, which can never be separated from it: For such essential Processions are not only coeval and consubstantial with the Nature from whence they proceed; as the Sun, its Light and Heat, (by which Argument the Catholick Fathers proved the Coeternity and Consubstantiality of the Son and Holy Spirit with the Eternal Father) but whatever distinction there is between them, they are One Individual Nature, if all that be One Individual Nature, which is essential to such a Being; and such all essential Processions are, as well as essential Perfections. These are two very different Questions; and of a very different consideration,

bat M

What ..



*What God is?* and *Who this God is?* In an answer to the first, we form the Idea and Notion of all Divine Perfections, or of an absolutely Perfect Being, which is the true notion of the Divinity, and whoever has all these Divine Perfections, is True and Perfect God; and this is our natural notion of God, as that signifies the Divinity, which gives no notice of any distinction in the Divinity; for there can be no diversity in Absolute Perfections, and therefore no distinction or number, according to the Philosophy of the Fathers.

But when we consider who God is, or what is the Subject of all these Divine Perfections, we can form no other Idea of it, but an *Eternal, Infinite, Self-originated Mind*; this the Wisest Philosophers, as well as Christians, are agreed in, That God is an Infinite Mind; and this rightly explained, may teach us some distinction in the Divinity; for all Men must grant, what they feel in themselves, that every Mind has its Word and Spirit, and cannot be conceived without them; and therefore the Eternal Mind must have its Eternal word and Spirit too; and the reason why this did not lead all Mankind into the natural belief of a Trinity of Persons, *Mind, Word, and Spirit*, in the Unity of the Godhead, was plainly this, Because they found that their own Word and Spirit were not permanent, subsisting Persons, but were the perishing Creatures of the Mind, which were no sooner produced, but died and vanished as our Thoughts do, and thus they conceived it was with the Divine Mind; which is one kind of *Sabellianism*, as I observed above: But yet the Catholick Fathers thought this natural belief, That the *πῶς λέγεται* is not *ἀόριστος*, that the Divinity, or Divine Mind, is not without its Word, a very proper Medium to prove a real subsisting Word in the Divinity; for an Infinite Perfect Mind, which is all Life, Being, Substance, if it begets its own Word, as every Mind does, must beget a Living, Substantial, Subsisting Word,



ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ αἰνῇ ἀρχῇ ἰ-  
κεῖν ὅτι, καὶ ἐκδοξῶς, καὶ ἀδια-  
στάτως, τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τῇ  
ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, τὰ αὐτὰ  
θεογονήματα, &c. Damasc.  
Fid. Orth. l. i. c. ii.

shews the distinction of Persons in the  
Unity of the Divine Nature. But then  
(which is what I intended in all this)  
this very distinction proves one indivi-  
dual Divinity, because it is in the indi-  
vidual Unity of the same Numerical,

not Specifick Nature; for all essential Processions, as the  
Eternal Word and Spirit are, which cannot so much as in  
Thought be separated from Original Mind, must continue  
in the Unity of the same individual Nature.

This is what the Fathers meant by the *τὸ ἓν*, the One  
common Divinity, which is individually One in Three  
perfect Hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: The  
Divinity of the Father, of Eternal, Self-originated Mind,  
is the common Divinity, communicated to the Eternal  
Word and Spirit, in the individual Unity of Nature.

2. Now this will give us some Notion of the distinction  
of *Nature* and *Persons* in the Eternal Godhead. I say,  
*Persons*, not *Person*; which I take to be the fundamental  
Mistake which has obscured and perplex'd this Mystery.  
Men have rack'd their Inventions, to find out some distin-  
ction between Nature and Person in every single Person in  
the Godhead; which it is certain these Fathers never  
thought of; though their Attempt to distinguish between  
Nature and Person in every Man, gave some occasion to  
this Mistake: But I have already proved both from Fathers  
and Schoolmen, That when they spoke distinctly of each  
particular Person, they made Person and Nature the same:  
That the Person of the Father is the Nature of the Father,  
and the Person of the Son the Nature of the Son. Nor  
indeed had they any occasion to distinguish between Nature  
and Person in each single Person, which could do no ser-  
vice in this Mystery: For the true reason and occasion for  
this distinction, was to reconcile the Individual Unity of  
the Divine Nature, with a Trinity of real Hypostases or  
Persons;

Persons ; how One Nature can subsist in Three distinct Hypostases, and continue One Individual Nature : Which had been no difficulty at all, were not each Divine Person by himself the Divine Nature. But how the Divine Nature should subsist whole and perfect in Three distinct Persons, and not be Three distinct Natures, but One Nature, and One Divinity ; not specifically, but individually and numerically One ; This was the difficulty they were concerned to answer ; which the distinction between Nature and Person in each single Person could not answer : For let us suppose such a distinction as this, whatever it be ; if the Divine Nature subsist whole and perfect in each distinct Person, the difficulty still remains how the Persons are distinct, and the Nature individually One : As, to put the Case in Human Nature ; whatever distinction we allow between Nature and Person in every particular Man ; if we allow that every Man has Human Nature as distinctly in himself, as he is a distinct Person, the distinction between Nature and Person can never prove the Individual Numerical Unity of Human Nature in Three Men.

The Question then is, Not how Nature and Person is distinguish'd in each single Person, (much less, how Three Persons in One singular Nature are distinguished from that singular Nature, which unavoidably reduces a Trinity of Persons to an unintelligible Trinity of Modes) ; but, How the Three Persons in the Ever-blessed Trinity, which are Three in number, and each of them the Divine Nature, are distinguished from that One Individual Divinity which is in them all, or rather, which they all are. Now what I have already said, seems to me to give a very intelligible Notion of this, *viz. That the Divine Nature, which is but One, is the Eternal, Self-originated Divinity, without Eternal, Essential Processions or Productions ; which, as I have already shewn, are but One, not Singular, but Individual Nature, and Individual Divinity : But then*



this One Self-originated Divinity is most certainly an Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Person, if Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Mind be a Person; and these Eternal Essential Processions are Persons also, if an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word be a Person, and an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Spirit be a Person; and then it is evident, that there are Three Eternal, Subsisting Persons in the Individual Unity of Nature. These Divine Processions do not multiply nor divide the Divine Nature, because they are essential to an Infinite Mind, and are Processions *ad intra* in the perfect Identity (ἑαυτότητι) and Individual Unity of Nature; but they are distinct Persons, as being Eternal, Subsisting, Living, Intelligent Processions, which is all that we mean by Persons in this Mystery, with reference to the Eternal Word and Spirit.

For these Three Divine Persons have their different Characters and Order, whereby they are distinguished from each other, which the Fathers call the *τρόπος ὑπόστασεως*, by which they meant their different manner of subsisting in the Individual Unity of the Divine Nature, that though they have all the same Divinity, as that signifies all Divine Perfections, yet they have it after a different manner that is, as they constantly explain it, *Unbegotten*, *Begotten*, and *Proceeding*, as the *Athanasian Creed* teaches

Καὶ διὰ τὸ πατέρας, ἔχει ὁ υἱὸς  
καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, πάντα ἃ ἔχει, το-  
τίσι, διὰ τὸ πατέρα ἔχειν αὐτῷ,  
πάντ' ἃ ἀ-φυησθῆς, καὶ τὸ φωνήσας,  
καὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως· ἐν ταύταις  
τὸ μόνον τὸ ὑποστατικῶς ἰδιότησι  
διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων αἰ ἄμειν τρεῖς  
ὑποστάσεις, ἐκ ὧσα, τὸ ὅ καὶ κα-  
τασκευασθῇ τῆς ἰδέας ὑποστάσεως,  
ἀδιαφύκτως διακρίβωται. Da-  
masc. Orth. Fid. l. i. c. 10.

us to believe; *The Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father, and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.* This is the only distinction which the Catholick Fathers allow between the Three Divine Persons, and let us consider the nature of it.

Now

Now *ἡ ἀρχὴ* signifies actual Existence, and that which does actually exist; and therefore the *τρεῖς ἰσότητες*, signify that there are Three that do actually exist, but after a different manner: That is, That the Father is Unbegotten, Self-originated Divinity, is God of himself, without any other cause of his Being, and this Self-originated Unbegotten Divinity is the Person of the Father, and in the highest and most absolute sense the One God. The Son is Eternally begotten of his Father's Substance, and lives and subsists in him; and so the Holy Ghost Eternally proceeds from Father and Son: That is, There is One Eternal Self-originated Divinity with its two Eternal Processions in the perfect Unity and Identity of the same Nature. The Father's manner of subsistence is easily understood, and secures to him the Prerogative of the One True God; but we must shew this a little more plainly with reference to the Son and Holy Spirit, each of which is by himself True and Perfect God, but not a Second and Third God: The right understanding of which depends upon the true stating of their different manners of subsistence.

And here I need only refer to what I have already discoursed concerning the difference between an Absolute Nature, and Relative Subsistencies in the same Nature. An Absolute Nature is a whole Compleat Nature, with all that essentially belongs to such a Nature, as every perfect Man has all that belongs essentially to the Nature of Man, and thus a Man begets a Man in his own Nature and Likeness; and the Son, which is begotten, is upon all accounts as much a Man, as he who begets, and Father and Son are two Men: And to beget, and to be begotten, tho they prove their Persons to be distinct, yet are but External Relations, not different manners of subsistence in the same Nature. And thus God does not beget a Son, which would be to beget a Second God: For to beget, and to be begotten, when he who begets, begets in an absolute sense all the same that he



is himself, makes two of the same kind. And therefore we must observe, That *ἀφ' ἑωσέως*, which is the Personal Character and Property of the Father, does not only signify, that he has no cause of his Being and Nature, but that what he is, he is absolutely in himself, has an Absolute, not a Relative Nature and Subsistence; and so consequently the *ἡμῶς*, which is the Personal Property of the Son, signifies that his Being and Nature is Relative; not only, that he receives his Being and Nature from his Father, but that he so receives it, as to be a Relative Subsistence in his Father's Nature; and the like may be said of the Procession of the Holy Ghost. As to shew this more particularly.

God begets a Son, his own perfect Image and Likeness, but he does not beget his own Absolute Nature in his Son, as Man does, though he begets his Son of his own Nature and Substance; as for instance. God is Perfect, Absolute, Original Mind, not only as Original is opposed to what has a Cause, and a Beginning, but as opposed to an Image; but God does not beget an Absolute Original Mind in his Son, but only his own Eternal, Essential Word, which is the Perfect, Living Image of Eternal, Self-originated Mind, and is it self Eternal, Infinite Mind, in the Eternal Word; but is in its own proper Character, the Eternal Word of the Eternal Mind, not originally an Eternal Mind it self. It has all the Perfections of an Eternal Mind, as a Perfect Word must of necessity have, which is the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature; but it has all these Perfections, not as Original Mind, but as a Begotten Word, which is a different Mode of Subsistence, and a sensible distinction between the Eternal Mind and its Word in the perfect Identity of Nature.

This I take to be a True and Intelligible Account of these different manners of Subsistence, which distinguish the Divine Persons in the perfect Unity of Nature, that they have all the same Nature, and same Perfections, but  
after

after a different manner ; which can never be understood in Absolute Natures and Persons, for three Men, though Father, Son, and Grandson, have all of them Human Nature after the very same manner ; but in an Absolute Nature, and Relative Essential Proceffions, this is to be understood, and proves a real distinction, and perfect Unity. It is evident to all Men, that the Mind and its Word are Two ; and it is as evident, that Life, Wisdom, Knowledge, are in Absolute, Original Mind, after another manner than they are in its Word ; and yet the very Notion of a Mind, and its Word, and that Essential Relation that is between them, makes it a contradiction to say, that any other Life, Wisdom, Knowledge, can be in the Word, than what is in the Mind ; which would be to say, That the Word is not the Word of the Mind, if it have any thing that is not in the Mind : For a Natural Word can have nothing but what is in the Mind, and is no farther a Word, than it is the Natural Image of the Mind : And the like may be said concerning the Holy Spirit, which hath all the same Divine Perfections, but in a different manner, from Original Mind, and its Word, as eternally proceeding from both.

This is the Account which the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of Nature, and Distinction of Persons, in the Ever Blessed Trinity, which answers the Objections of our *Sabellian*, *Arian* and *Socinian* Adversaries, and vindicates those Catholick Forms of Speech, which they charge with Tritheism, Contradiction, and Nonsense : As to shew this briefly in one view, for each part of it has been sufficiently confirmed already.

The Catholick Faith teaches us, That there is but One God ; and this is demonstrable from the Doctrine of these Fathers. For in this Account I have now given, there is but *μία θεός*, One Absolute Divinity, One Divine Nature, and therefore but One God.

But

But, say our Adversaries, One God in Natural Religion, and according to the general Sense of Mankind, signifies One Person, who is God : And this also in some sense has always been owned by the Catholick Church ; That as there is but One Absolute Divinity, so the Person of the Father, who is this One Absolute Divinity, is this One God ; *εἰς θεός, ὅτι εἰς πατήρ*, there is but One Person, who is God, in this Absolute Sense, because there is but One Father, who, as they often speak, is the Fountain of the Deity, that is, of the Divine Processions, of the Son and Holy Spirit : He is the Whole Absolute Divinity himself, and whatever is Divine, Eternally and Essentially proceeds from him, in the Unity of his own Nature.

But at this rate, what Divinity do we leave for the Son, and the Holy Spirit ? Truly, the very same by Eternal Generation and Procession, which is originally and absolutely in the Father : For it is the Nature of the Father, and the Divinity of the Father, which is in the Son and Holy Spirit ; as the Fathers constantly own, and as of necessity it must be, because there is no other.

This Eternal Generation and Procession has always been owned as an ineffable Mystery ; which we must believe upon the Authority of the Scriptures, without pretending to know how God begets an Eternal Son, or how the Eternal Spirit proceeds from Father and Son, which we confess we have no Notion of ; but we know likewise, That this is no reason to reject this Faith, no more than it is a reason to reject the belief of an Eternal, Self-originated Being ; because though it be demonstrable, That there must be an Eternal First Cause of all things, which has no Cause of its own Being, but an Eternal necessary Nature, yet we can no more conceive this, than we can an Eternal Generation and Procession.

Supposing therefore (without disputing that matter at present) that God has an Eternal Son ; that Eternal, Self-originated

originated Mind has an Eternal, Subsisting Word, and an Eternal Spirit, it is evident that this Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit, must have all the same Perfections of the Eternal Mind, must be all that the Eternal Mind is, *πλὴν τῆς ἀξυμνότητος*, excepting its being an Absolute, Self-originated Mind. Now if he be God, who has the whole Divine Nature and Perfections, then the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, who by Eternal Generation and Procession have that same Divinity which is absolutely and originally in the Father.

Well then : Here is One Divine Person, *viz.* the Eternal Father, who is absolutely and originally God ; and Two more, the Son, and Holy Ghost, who are each of them in his own Person, true and perfect God, by having all the Divine Perfections : But are not these Three then Three Gods ? the Unbegotten God, who is originally and absolutely God, the Begotten God, and the Proceeding God. No, it is the constant Doctrine of the Catholick Fathers, that the Trinity is but One Divinity, and One God, *una Summa res*, One Supreme Being, as *St. Austin* taught, and from him *Peter Lombard*, and was confirmed by the Council of *Lateran*, in the Condemnation of *Abbot Joachim*. For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they are Three true and proper Persons, are but One Individual Nature ; for it is Essential to the Eternal Mind to have its Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit, and the Eternal Word and Spirit live and subsist in the Mind ; and though living, subsisting Persons, yet are as individually One with the Mind, as a Created Mind, its Word and Spirit are One.

Whatever is Essential to Nature, is in the Individual Unity of it ; and that is but One Individual Nature, which has nothing but what is Essential to it ; and therefore if, as I have already observed, and as the Catholick Faith teaches, the Son and Spirit, the Eternal Word and Eternal

nal Spirit, are Essential Processions of Eternal Original Mind, and essentially, indivisibly, and inseparably in it; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are as essentially and inseparably One Individual Divinity, as any One Nature is One with it self.

But is not this a kind of *Sabellian* Composition of a God? A whole Divinity made up of Three partial and incomplete Divinities? Which St. *Austin* calls a *Triformis Deus*: By no means! What is compounded, is made up of Parts, which make a compound Nature; but perfect Hypostases, how-

εκαμὴν ὃ ἔχουσιν ἑξ ὧν τελῶν τε-  
λειάν ἔχειν ὑπόστασις, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ  
ἑξ ὧν τελῶν ἀτελῶν μίαν σωθέντων  
φύσιν τελίαν γνωρίζωμεν, ἀλλ'  
ἐν ταύτῃ, τελείας ὑποστάσεις μίαν  
ἀπλῶς ὅσας ὑπερτελλῇ καὶ παντέ-  
λειον· πᾶν γὰρ ἔξ ἀτελῶν συλlei-  
μνον, σωθέντων πάντως ἐστίν, ἐκ  
ὃ τελείων ὑποστάσεων, ἀνώματον  
σωθέντων φύσιν; ὅθεν ἐν λέγουμεν  
τὸ εἶδος ἔξ ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλ' ἐν  
ὑποστάσεσι.

Τελείας μὲν ἔν ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι  
εκαμὴν, ἵνα μὴ σωθέντων ἐπὶ τῆς  
θείας νοήσεως φύσεως, σωθέντες  
γὰρ ἀρξὴ διαστάσεις· καὶ πάλιν ἐν  
ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις λέγουμεν,  
ἵνα μὴ πᾶσι καὶ ὅμοιον θεῶν  
εἰσαγάγωμεν· διὰ μὲν ἑξ ὧν τελῶν  
ὑποστάσεων τὸ ἀσωθέντων, καὶ ἀπύ-  
χτων, διὰ δὲ τῶ ὁμοούσιου, καὶ τοῦ  
ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἶναι τὰς ὑποστάσεις,  
τῆς ταυτότητος δὲ τοῦ θελήματος,  
καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως,  
καὶ τῆς ἔξουσίας, καὶ τῆς κινήσεως,  
ἐν ἑποῖς εἶπω, τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ  
τὸ εἶναι θεῶν γνωρίζωμεν· καὶ  
γὰρ ὅντως διδόν, ὁ διδόν, καὶ ὁ λό-  
γος, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Da-  
masc. Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 10.  
& cap. 11.

ever united, can make no Composition: However you unite *James* and *John*, you can never make a compound Man of them, because each of them have a perfect Human Nature; and as *Damascen* observes, we do not say, That the Nature or Species is made up of the Hypostases, but is in the Hypostases: So that each Divine Person, being a complete and perfect Hypostasis, having the whole Divine Nature in himself, as being True and Perfect God; their Union in the same Individual Nature, though it makes them One Essential Divinity, yet it cannot make a Compound God; for however their Persons are united, the Divinity or Divine Nature is not compounded, each of them being True and Perfect God, and not One God by Composition, but by an Individual Unity of Nature in Three. For every Divine Person is not God, in the same sense, that



that every Human Person is a Man, as having an Absolute Individual Nature of his own ; for in this sense the Father only is God, as being Absolute Original Divinity, an Eternal, Self-originated Mind ; and Three such Persons must be acknowledged to be Three Gods ; but as I have been forced often to repeat it, the Son and Holy Spirit are Divine Persons, as they are Eternal, Living, Subsisting Processions in the Divine Nature, which proves them to have the very same Divinity, and to be but One Individual Divinity, but not One Compound God. For One Individual Nature in Three, though distinguished into Distinct Subsisting Persons, makes such a natural, inseparable Unity of Will, Energy, and Power, that they are as perfectly One Almighty Agent, as every single Person is One Agent, as I have shewn above.

It is thought by some a manifest Contradiction to say, as the *Athanasian Creed* teaches us, *The Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet there are not Three Gods, but One God.* But whoever carefully considers what I have now said, must own, that this is the only true and proper way of speaking in this Mystery. If there be but One Absolute Divinity, there can be but One God ; for the Divine Processions in the Unity and Identity of the same Individual Nature, cannot multiply the Divinity, nor multiply the Name and Title of God ; for the Name God does not originally, absolutely, and immediately belong to them, but only relatively : The proper immediate Character of the Second Person in the Trinity is, not God, but the Son of God, and the Word of God ; and so the Third, is the Spirit of God. And though we must necessarily own, that the Son of God, and the Spirit of God, are each of them True and Perfect God, equal in all Divine Perfections to the Father, as being all the same that the Father is, excepting his being a Father ; yet they are not Three Gods, for this is not their immediate, Original Cha-



raſter, but there is One God the Father, his Eternal Son,  
 and Eternal Spirit. This is what I have above obſerved  
 from *Tertullian*, That there is One God with his Oecono-  
 my, that is, his Son and Spirit, and that Chriſt is called God,  
 when he is ſpoken of by himſelf; but when he is named to-  
 gether with the Father, he muſt have his own proper Title,  
 which is the Son of God; and the Reason is the ſame, as  
 to the Holy Spirit; by which Rule, we can never ſay,  
 That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, though each of them  
 be God, are Three Gods; but there are Three, God the  
 Father, his Son, and Holy Spirit: The Father God of him-  
 ſelf, the Son and Spirit Eternal Proceſſions, and Divine  
 Subſiſting Relations in the Unity and Identity of the Fa-  
 ther's Godhead. They have all the ſame Divinity, their  
 Glory equal, their Majeſty coeternal, but their different  
 manner of having it, the *τεσντοι ιεωδρξεως*, diſtinguiſhes  
 their Names and Characters: The Father is God, abſo-  
 lutely God, an Unbegotten, Self-originated Being; ſo  
 God, that there is no other God beſides him. The Son  
 is not abſolutely God, but the Son of God; and when he  
 is called God in Scripture, it is in no other ſenſe, but as  
 the Son of God; for the Son of God, muſt be God the  
 Son: Nor is the Holy Spirit abſolutely God, but the Spi-  
 rit of God, which is all we mean, when we call him God;  
 for the Spirit of God muſt be God the Holy Ghoſt: This  
 is the Catholick Faith, and let any Man try if he can find  
 Three Gods in it: For when we number Father, Son, and  
 Holy Ghoſt, we muſt not number them by the common  
 Name of Nature, which is One Undivided Divinity in  
 them all; but by their Relative Names and Characters,  
 which do not only diſtinguiſh their Perſons, but ſignify  
 their Unity, Order, and Relations in the ſame Nature.  
 We muſt not call them Three Gods, becauſe God is not  
 the original Name of the Son, or Spirit, and therefore  
 they are not Three Gods; but there are Three in the Unity  
 of

of the Godhead. The One God the Father, the Son of God, and the Spirit of God; so that there is but One God in the Christian Faith, if the Son of God be the Son of this One God the Father; and the Spirit of God, be the Spirit of this same One God: And though the Son of God be God, and the Spirit of God be God, that is the Name of their Nature, not of their Persons, and therefore can no more be multiplied with the Persons, than the Divine Nature is. The Son of God is God, but it is *Authoritate Paterna Natura*, as St. Hilary speaks, not by any Absolute Godhead of his own, but in right of his Father's Nature and Divinity, which he received by an Eternal Generation. Thus it must be, where there is but One Absolute Nature, with its Internal Processions.

Let us put the Case in a Human Mind, and suppose, That its Word and Spirit were Distinct, Living, Intelligent Hypostases in the Mind, Essential Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature, perfectly the same with the Mind, but distinct Hypostases; but would any one for this Reason, call these Three, Three Men, or Three Minds? And yet such a Living, Subsisting Word, and a Living Subsisting Spirit, would as perfectly have the Nature of the Mind as the Mind it self, but neither of them would be an absolute Mind, but one the Word of the Mind, and the other the Spirit of the Mind; not Three Minds, but One Mind, with its Essential Word, and Spirit.

This, though an Imaginary Case, gives us a sensible representation of the difference between the Eternal Mind, and its Eternal Word and Spirit; which I freely acknowledge cannot properly be called Three Infinite Minds and Spirits; for though the Eternal, Subsisting Word is an Infinite Mind, and so the Eternal, Subsisting Spirit, yet *Mind*, as well as *God*, is the Name of their Nature, not of their Persons, which is Identically one and the same in all.

This, as I take it, is what some Learned and truly Catholick Writers mean, in distinguishing the several Acceptations of this Name *God*. That sometimes it signifies the Divine Nature and Essence in general; as when we say, The Trinity is One God, that is, One Divinity; that there is but One Divine Nature and Essence in all the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity: Sometimes it signifies Personally, as when we say, The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; that is, the Person of the Father, the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Holy Ghost is God: But then they are still forced to acknowledge, that the Name *God* is not predicated *Univocally* of all Three Persons; but that the Father is God in a more excellent and eminent Sense, than the Son is God, or the Holy Ghost God, as being God of himself, an Unbegotten, Self-originated God, the Fountain of the Deity to the Son and Holy Spirit: Upon which account he is so often by the Catholick Fathers called the One God, and the only True God. Now all this is very True, and very Catholick, but with all submission, it seems to me to be an inconvenient way of speaking, which perplexes the Article with different Senses, and is liable to great Cavils and Misconstructions, as the Examples of Dr. *Payn*, and the Author of the 28 Propositions, witness; and when most dexterously managed, will sooner silence than convince an Adversary.

See Doctor  
Payn's  
Letter to  
the B of R.

The Divine Essence must be considered only as in the Divine Persons; when we say, That the Trinity is One God, the true meaning is, That Three Persons are One God; and the general abstract Notion of the Unity of Essence does not account for this, but the Unity of the Divine Essence in Three.

Thus to say, That the Father is God in the highest sense of that Name *God*; and that He alone (*strictly speaking*) is a Being absolutely perfect, because he alone is Self-existent, and all other Beings, even the Son and Holy Ghost are from him;

*him*; may be expounded to a very Catholick Sense, and was certainly so meant; but is liable to great Cavils, when Men take more pains to pick Quarrels with Words, than to understand an Author. An Absolutely Perfect God; and a God that wants any Perfection, sounds not only like Two Gods, but like Gods of different Kinds; for every diversity of Nature alters the Species.

All that is meant by this is certainly True and Catholick, and taught in express words by the Primitive Fathers; That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father; that the Son is all that the Father is, excepting his being the Father, and unbegotten, that is, excepting Paternity, and *Self-existence*, or Self-origination; and that upon this Account the Father is eminently called the One God, the Son, God of God; that is, God as the Son of God.

What I have now discoursed seems to me to give the fairest Account of this Matter. I take the Name *God* always to signify a Person, in whom the Divine Nature is, not the Divinity in the Abstract; and then the Name *God* must belong to any Person after the same manner, as the Divine Nature is his; that is, he must be called God in no other sense than as he is God. Now, as I have already shewn, there is but One Absolute Divinity, with Two Internal Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature: And if we make this our Rule of Speaking, (as we must do, if this be the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, and we will fit our words to the nature of things) then it is very plain, That the Name *God* absolutely belongs only to him, who is this Absolute Divinity, that is, the Person of the Father, that no other Person is God *in reſto*, absolutely and simply God, but only he; that he is the One God, the only True God, as both the Scripture and Fathers own.

But what becomes then of the Son, and Holy Ghost? Is not the Son God? and the Spirit God? Yes! the Name and Title of God belongs to them, as the Divine Nature does;



does ; that is, not absolutely, as to the Absolute Divinity, but as to Divine Processions, to Divine Subsisting Relations in the Unity of the Godhead ; that is, the Second Person in the Trinity is God, but not *in seipso*, as God signifies that Person, who is the Divinity ; but as the Son of God, as *habens Deitatem*, having the Divinity, not absolutely and originally, but by Communication, by Eternal Generation : And so the Holy Spirit is not absolutely God, but the Spirit of God ; and God only as the Spirit of God, as an Internal Procession in the Divine Nature.

But in what sense then can we say, That the Trinity is One God, or that Three Persons are One God? Must we not necessarily own, that *God* in these Propositions is taken *Essentially* for the Deity in the abstract, and not as considered in any One Person? For will we say, That the Trinity, or Three Persons, are but One Person? No! and yet in this Proposition, *The Trinity is One God*; by *One God*, I understand, One, who is absolutely God, One Absolute Divinity, which is the Father, who has indeed a Son and Spirit, in the Unity of his own Nature and Godhead, each of which is True and Perfect God, but not a Second, and Third God, but the Son of God, and the Spirit of God; Divine Subsisting Relations in the One Absolute Godhead of the Father, which does not multiply the Name nor Nature of God.

This is the Account the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of God in a Trinity of Persons, and therefore this must be the Catholick Sense of this Proposition: And here it will be proper to observe, That in the Account they give of the Unity of God, that is, the Unity in Trinity, they indifferently assign One Divinity, and One Father, as the Reason of it: *ὁς ὁ θεός, ὁν μία θεότης, & ὁς ὁ πατήρ, ὁν ἡ πατρις*. There is One God, because there is One Divinity; and there is One God, because there is One Father, which are not two different Reasons, but one and the same;

same; from whence it necessarily follows, That this One Divinity is the Divinity of the Father, and that this One God in Trinity, is the Father; for One God must necessarily signify One Person, when the Father is the One God.

So that the Father, who is the One Absolute Divinity, is the One God, who ceases not to be the One God, (as *St. Hilary* and others constantly teach) by having a Son, and Holy Spirit, who receive all from him, live and subsist in him, and are eternally and inseparably One with him: Thus we are taught in the *Athanasian Creed*, to worship One God in Trinity, that is, the Eternal Father, who is the One God, with his Son, and Holy Spirit; and the Trinity in Unity, that is, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, not Three Gods, but One in the Unity of the Father's Godhead. For the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the Glory equal, the Majesty Coeternal: There is but One Godhead, One Glory, One Majesty, and that is the Godhead, Glory, and Majesty of the Father; and the Son and Spirit are in the Godhead, Glory, Majesty of the Father, as Internal Processions, Living, Subsisting Relations in the Father's Godhead.

This Account, which I confess is the only Account of this Matter that I can understand, whatever other Faults it may have, which I do not yet see, I'm sure is perfectly Orthodox; is neither *Tritheism*, *Sabellianism*, *Arianism*, nor *Socinianism*, but the True Catholick Faith, of a Trinity in Unity.

Here is but One Absolute Divinity, but One Father with his Eternal Son and Spirit, in the Unity of his own Nature and Godhead, and therefore but One God: For Three Gods must be Three Absolute Divinities, without any Internal Relation, or dependence on each other. Internal Relations, though Real, Subsisting Relations, can't multiply Nature, and therefore can't multiply Gods.

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Here are Three Real, Proper, Living, Intelligent, Substantial, Divine Persons, and therefore no *Sabellianism*, not One Personal God, with three Names, Offices, Manifestations, Modes, Powers, Parts.

Here are Three truly Divine Persons, each of which is by himself, or in his own Person, True and Perfect God. The Father God of himself, Unbegotten, Self-originated God, the Fountain of the Deity to the Son and Holy Spirit. The Son, the Son of God, and True and Perfect God, as the Son of God. The Spirit, the Spirit of the Father, and the Son, and True and Perfect God, as the Spirit of God: So that here is neither *Arianism*, *Macedonianism*, nor *Socinianism*; no Made or Created Nature, no Creature in the Ever Blessed Trinity.

No, say our *Arian* and *Socinian* Adversaries, neither the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, according to this Hypothesis, are True and Perfect God, as the Father is: Neither of them have Self-existence, or a Fecundity of Nature, which are thought great Perfections in the Father; but the Son is not of himself, but begotten of his Father; nor is the Spirit of himself, but proceeds from Father and Son; and neither of them have a Son, or Spirit of their own, as the Father has.

All this I readily grant; for it is the Catholick Faith, that the Father is *ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ*, so a Father, that he never was a Son, and the Son *ὁ θεὸς υἱός*, so a Son, that he never was, nor can be a Father, and so of the Holy Spirit; That *there is but One Father, not Three Fathers; One Son, not Three Sons; One Holy Ghost, not Three Holy Ghosts*, as the *Athanasian Creed* teaches.

This proves indeed, as we all own, that neither the Son, nor Spirit, are absolutely God, an Absolute Divinity, as the Father is, but only Divine Processions; an Absolute Divinity has a Fecundity of Nature; Absolute, Original Mind, according to this Hypothesis must have its Word  
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and Spirit, in the Unity of its Nature; but the Word being no Absolute Nature, can't beget another Word, nor the Spirit another Spirit. So that this Objection only delivers us from the Charge of Tritheism, by proving Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be but One Divinity, One God: For if the Son were as absolutely God, as the Father is, there is no account to be given, why he should not beget a Son, as his Father did him, as we see it is among Men, where the Son begets a Son, and becomes a Father, and thus there could be no possible end of Divine Generations; but these are Generations *ad extra*, which give as compleat and absolute a Nature, and absolute Subsistence to the Son, as the Father has; but Internal, Essential Relations are in the Individual Unity of Nature, and therefore cannot multiply, when Nature has all that is essential to it. So that Self-existence and Generation do not belong to the Character of a Son; and with the Catholick Church, we teach, That the Son of God is God, only as the Son; and it would be Heresy to ascribe the peculiar Prerogatives of the Father to him: And then it can be no Objection against the Divinity of the Son, that he has not what is peculiar and proper only to the Person of the Father, as Self-existence and Generation is.

Self-existence, Self-origination, to have no cause of his Being, I grant, is essential to the Idea of a God: And Eternal and Necessary Existence to the Notion of any Person, who is in any sense God; for he, who ever began to be, and subsists precariously, can in no sense be God. But then though Self-existence be essential to the Notion of an Absolute Divinity, yet a Person, who is a Son, and therefore not Self-originated, but eternally begotten of a Self-originated Father, and subsists eternally and necessarily as an Essential Procession and Relation in a Self-originated Nature, must be the Son of God; and God the Son, True and Perfect God, as the Eternal, Necessary, Essential Proce-

sion of a Self-originated Divinity. For what is internally and essentially related to a Self-existent Nature, can be no Creature, and therefore must be True and Perfect God.

Thus to proceed: The same Rule of speaking (if Men be peaceably and charitably disposed to understand one another) will easily reconcile that late warm Dispute, about One Substance, and Three Substances, in the Unity of the Godhead; for the Dispute is the very same, in other words, with One Nature and Three Persons.

The *Nicene* Fathers, who asserted the *Homoousion*, the One Nature and Substance of Father, and Son, did not by this mean One Singular Substance, as I have abundantly shewn; and those who assert Three Substances in opposition to *Sabellianism*, do not mean Three Absolute, nor Three divided and separated Substances, but One Individual Substance, as there is One Individual Nature in Three Substantial, Subsisting Persons. That is, There is but One Absolute Substance, with Two Relative, Substantial Processions in the Individual Unity of the same One Substance: Which the Schools make no scruple to call Three Relative Substances. All Catholick Writers, both Ancient and Modern, own, that the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost Substance; but yet are cautious of saying Three Substances; nor will they say, *ter Una*, thrice One Substance, because Number does not belong to the Nature, but to the Persons; though at the same time they own, that *Deus trinus* signifies *tria supposita Deitatis*.

Aqu. p. 1.  
Quæst. 31.  
Art. 1.

These seem to be great Niceties, and Arbitrary Distinctions, without any reason and foundation in Nature; for what difference is there between Three Substances, and Three Relative Substances? For Relative Substances are Substances. What difference between Three Substances, and *tria supposita*? when *suppositum* is only another name for Substance; and so St. *Hilary*, as I have observed, called them, *tres substantias*, & *tria in substantia*, Three Substances,

stances, and Three in Substance. When there are Three, each of which is in his own Person Substance, and neither of them each other, what difference is there between saying, *Tres in una substantia*, & *ter una substantia*? Three in One Substance, and thrice Once Substance? *Marinus Victorinus*, as I observed before, ventures to say, *ter ipsa Substantia*, (not *ter una*, as it is mistaken in a late Treatise, by trusting too much to memory) thrice the very same Substance; now thrice the same One Substance, is thrice One Substance; where the Number belongs to the Essence and Substance, which is *Aquinas's* Objection against it.

The Distinction between Real and Nominal Trinitarian Examine.  
p. 24.

But the whole Account of this must be resolved into the Distinction between Absolute and Relative. Substance, when it stands by it self, signifies Absolutely, and so Three Substances are Three Absolute Substances; Three Human Substances, Three Humanities; and Three Divine Substances, Three Divinities; and therefore we must not without great caution, say Three Substances in the Trinity, for fear of asserting Three Gods; but yet we must own, that each Person is True and Perfect Substance; and both the Fathers and Schools own this; and Three in Substance are Three Substances, but not Three Absolute but Relative Substances, Three Subsisting Relations in the Unity of the Divine Essence and Substance: Though, as I have more than once observed, in proper speaking, we cannot say Three Relative Substances; for though the Father speaks a Relation to the Son, and Holy Spirit, it is as he is the Fountain of the Deity, Original, Absolute, Divinity, Essence, Substance, in his own Person, not a Relative Subsistence; and therefore in the Blessed Trinity, there is One Absolute Substance, Absolute Divinity, and Two Relative Substances, as there are Two Internal Substantial Relations in the Unity of the same Substance. And to prevent Mistakes, I must here observe, That by *Absolute* we do not mean *Complete* and *Perfect*, for so the Son is Ab-

solute Substance, and the Holy Spirit Absolute Substance, Compleat and Perfect Substance, as each of them in his own Person is True and Perfect God; in which Sense St. *Austin* tells us, that *persona ad se dicitur*, that Person is predicated absolutely; that every Person, as considered in himself, is a Person, and not merely as related to another; but when we say, that there is but One *Absolute* Substance in the Godhead, by Absolute we mean *Original*, as I have already explained it, as distinguished from Relative Processions, as the Original is distinguished from the Image; though the Image, if a Living, Subsisting Image, is as Compleat and Perfect Nature and Substance, as the Original is. And this is the only difference I know, between *Substance*, *Nature*, *Essence*, and Suppositum, Subject, *ὑποκείμενον*, Res, *οὐσία*, Thing, Being, *ὕπαρξις*, Subsistence, and the like: That the first signify Absolutely, or as the Schools speak, the Form; that is, an Original Substance, Nature, and Essence; and therefore these must not be multiplied in the Divinity, by saying Three Substances, Natures, or Essences, for fear of a Diversity or Number of Divinities, and Gods. The other Terms, though they do not in common use signify Relatively, as Subject, Suppositum, Thing, Being, Subsistence, do not, yet they signify any thing that really is, that has a Compleat, Actual Subsistence of its own, and therefore are applicable, to all substantial relative Processions, which are compleat Subsistencies, Things, Beings, as well as to original Nature and Substance: And both the Fathers and Schools for this reason owned the Three Divine Persons to be Three Things, Three Beings, *Tres Entes*, *Tria Entia*, *Tres Res*, *τρία ὀνείσματα*; and scruple not the use of any such transcendental Terms, as do not necessarily multiply the absolute and original Form.

Thus the *One Substance* of the Godhead either signifies the absolute Divinity of the Father, and this is but One,  
and



and can never be *Ter Una*, Thrice One; or it signifies the One individual undivided Divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; that is, the absolute Divinity of the Father, with his internal essential Processions in the perfect Unity and Identity of Nature, and this it is but One Substance, for there is but One Individual Nature; not *Ter Una*, but *Tres in Una*; not Thrice One Substance, but Three in One Undivided Nature and Substance; *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μὴ αἰσ,* which I have sometimes, not so properly, translated a Thrice subsisting Monad, but it is a Monad with Three Hypostases; which, in other words, is One Nature and Three Persons; not One singular Nature Thrice subsisting (which I cannot understand), but One individual Nature, and Three subsisting Hypostases; *Una Substantia, non Unus Subsistens*; One Substance, not One that subsists: This Individual Nature subsists but once; but in the Individual Unity of the Father's Essence and Godhead, are those Eternal, Substantial, Subsisting Processions, the Hypostases of the Son, and Holy Spirit. And in this sense the One Individual Substance of the Divinity may properly enough be stiled *Ter ipsa*, or *Ter Una Substantia*; Thrice the same One Substance, not Thrice One Absolute Substance, in which sense *Aquinas* rejected it; but *Tria Supposita Unius Substantia*, or *Deitatis*; which is One Substance, by the individual Unity, and invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; as I have shewn above.

Thus that warm Dispute among the Schoolmen, about one Absolute Subsistence and Existence in the Trinity, and Three Relative Subsistencies and Existences, which is managed with so much perplexing Subtily, as far as I can understand any thing by it, may easily be composed after the same manner. For there is but One Absolute Being and Nature in the Divinity, and therefore there can be but One Absolute Subsistence and Existence, as *Absolute* signifies, not *Complete and Perfect*, but, to subsist and exist as



an Original, which in the Godhead signifies a self-originated Subsistence and Existence: But then to deny all relative Subsistencies and Existencies, is to deny the compleat Subsistence and Existence of the Son and Spirit, who are essential Relations in the Unity of the Father's Godhead, and therefore subsist not as Originals, but as Relatives, which is the meaning of a Relative Subsistence. There is but One Absolute Divinity, and Two Relative Processions, and therefore in this sense, but One Absolute, and Two, not Three, Relative Subsistencies; which seems fairly to divide the Question between them.

Thus, once more: It is a known Rule of speaking in this Mystery, That Substantives must be predicated in the Singular Number, Adjectives will admit a Plural Predication; and the same difference is made between Abstract and Concrete Terms. There are not Three Gods, but *Tres Deitatem habentes*, there are Three who have the Divinity; not Three Omnipotencies, or Three Omnisciences, but Three who are Omnipotent and Omniscient. And the approved reason for this is, That Substantives and Abstract Terms, signify the Nature, Essence, and Form, and to multiply them, is to multiply Natures; but Adjectives immediately signify the Subjects, Suppositums, and Persons, and only connote the Nature and Form, which multiplies the Persons, but not the Nature. Now though I understand what is meant by this, when applied to the Divinity, yet I never could understand this Reason for it; for there is no such difference between Substantive and Adjective Predications in any other Case; Three men, and Three, who have Human Nature, signify the very same thing, and multiply the Form, as well as the Persons; Three, who have Human Nature, are truly and properly Three men; and then the meer difference between Substantives and Adjectives cannot be a good Reason, why Three, who have the Divine Nature, are not Three Gods. But the difference  
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between an Absolute and Relative Predication does give an account of this. Substantives and Abstract Terms always signify the Form, as the Schools speak, that is, an Absolute and Original Nature, and in this Sense Number multiplies Nature, as well as Persons, and Three Gods are Three Absolute Original Divinities, as well as Three Divine Persons; and thus it is as to Adjective Predications in all Creatures, as I observed before, because there is no such distinction in Creatures between an Absolute Nature, and Internal Subsisting Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature; and when Nature always signifies the Original Form, a Substantive or Adjective Predication can make no difference: but where there is such a distinction, as there is in the Divinity, Substantives and Adjectives do most aptly represent it, because Adjectives admit of a Relative Predication, and may signify a Person, who has the Divine Nature, as an Internal, Subsisting Procession in the Divinity, but is not the Absolute Divinity, nor in an Absolute Sense God, but the Son of God, and the Spirit of God.

Indeed in such Forms of Speech we must have more regard to the Absolute or Relative Signification, than to the Substantive or Adjective Form of the Words. Adjectives in an Absolute Sense must no more be multiplied than Substantives, which I take to be an easier Account of the *tres aeterni*, and *unus aeternus* in the *Athanasian Creed*, than to turn it with *Aquinas* into *tria aeterna*, and *unum aeternum*. For Three Eternals, whether Substantives or Adjectives, in an Absolute Sense are Three Gods; Three Eternal, Three Intelligent, Three Omniscient Persons, in an Absolute Sense, are Three Eternities, Three Omnisciences, and in this Sense there is but *unus aeternus*, One Eternal Self Originated Person, as there is but One God: and on the other hand, *Deus* or God, though a Substantive, may signify Relatively, as it does in the *Nicene Creed*, God  
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of God ; and in this Sense some of the Schoolmen, thought it very Orthodox to say Three Gods, if we explained in what Sense we meant it, as I observed above, *Tertullian* did, *Ecce duos deos*, though at the same time he rejects the use of such Forms, for their ambiguous Signification which might betray men into *Polytheism*. And if God may have a Relative Signification, so may *Mind* and *Spirit* too, and then *Three Minds and Spirits* is as Orthodox, as Three that have an Intelligent and Spiritual Nature.

In short ; as far as I can hitherto observe, all the Catholick Rules of Speaking relating to this Mystery must be resolved into this distinction of Absolute and Relative : This is the only distinction we know of in the Godhead, and this we as certainly know there is, as we know, that there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit ; One Absolute, Self-Originated Divinity, with its Internal, Essential Processions in the Individual Unity and Identity of Nature : and if this be the Unity and Distinction of the Divinity, this must be our Rule of Speaking also, to have a due regard to the One Absolute Nature, and the Relative Processions of the Godhead ; which will secure us both from a *Sabellian* Singularity, and a *Tritheistick* Trinity of Absolute Divinities.

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## The CONCLUSION.

*With a short Application to the Socinians.*

**I** Proposed one thing more to be considered in relation to this Subject; *viz.* Whether the Catholick Faith of a Real and Substantial Trinity, can be as reasonably and intelligibly explained by the Notion of One Singular Substance in the Divinity, as by asserting Three Personal Substances or Suppositums: And whether the Singularity of the Divine Essence in this Notion, delivers the Asserters of it from any Inconveniences and Objections, which the contrary Opinion is thought liable to. But, I hope, after what I have already said, there is no occasion for this, and I will not needlessly revive old Quarrels. Let but Men sincerely and heartily believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Eternal, Infinite, Substantial, Living, Intelligent, Omnipotent, All-wise Persons, each of which is in his own Person True and Perfect God, and all Three but One Divinity, and One God; and I will dispute with no such Orthodox Christians concerning the Philosophy of the Divine Nature, which is so infinitely above our comprehension. There may be a necessity for such Disputes, when we have to do with Hereticks, who ridicule the Catholick Faith as contradictory and absurd; but when Men agree in the Faith, such Disputes are of no use to them, and may prove of dangerous consequence; for there are too many, who will be sooner disputed out of their Faith, than out of their Philosophy; which should teach all Catholick Christians, as much as it is possible, to silence all Disputes amongst themselves, which their common Adversaries are so apt to improve into Scepticism, Infidelity, or Heresy.

And therefore for a Conclusion, I shall only take a brief Review of the Doctrine of the Fathers concerning this Article of a Trinity in Unity, and apply it in a few words to our *Socinian* Adversaries.

The Faith of the Catholick Church taught by Christ and his Apostles is, that there is but One God; but this One God is a Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, in the Essential Unity of the same Undivided and Undiversified Godhead: And this is the Faith which all the Catholick Fathers have owned and taught in their several Ages. The whole Christian Church Baptizes, as our Saviour commanded, in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; and this is the Rule of their Faith, to believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: A plain, simple Faith, could Men have been contented to believe God concerning himself.

Let our *Socinian* Adversaries tell us, what there is absurd, impossible, or contradictory in this Faith? Will they venture to say, That it is absurd or contradictory, that God should have a Son? No! in some sense they will allow this true; they themselves believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; they acknowledge Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, as he is frequently called in Scripture, and that in a higher sense, than any other Man is the Son of God; but that he is but a Man after all, though advanced by God to Divine Honours, above all Principalities and Powers, and made the Judge both of the Quick and of the Dead; and this they affirm to be all that the Scripture means, in calling Christ the Son of God.

But this is not the present Dispute: They know that the Catholick Church believed otherwise, that Christ is the Eternal Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, very God of very God; and they know also, that thus the Catholick Fathers expounded those Texts which concern the Sonship and Divinity of our Saviour;  
and



and they cannot but confess, That they are very capable of such an Exposition; nay, that it is very difficult to put any other sense upon many Texts; and the only reason why they reject these Catholick Expositions, is the pretended Absurdity and Contradiction of the Catholick Faith. Here then we join issue with them, and desire them to shew us, what is impossible or contradictory in this Faith?

That there is something incomprehensible in this Mystery, that is, something which we have no Natural adequate Ideas of, we readily acknowledge with the whole Catholick Church; and some of our Adversaries grant, That it is possible for a thing to be, whereof we have no Idea; and then it seems to me very unreasonable to add, but we are no ways concerned, nor can we Reason or Discourse about those things whereof we have no Ideas: For the direct contrary seems to be the more natural consequence, that if God thinks fit to reveal such things to us, of which we have no Ideas, we are concerned and obliged to believe them; for if they may be true, they are the proper Objects of Faith, though they want the Evidence of Natural Ideas. But I do not intend to dispute this now, but refer them to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Lock's Second Letter; and to a late Sermon, and its Vindication, Concerning the Danger of Corrupting the Faith by Philosophy. What I have now to say, is of another Nature, viz. That we have an Idea of a Trinity in Unity, and such an Idea, as contains nothing absurd, impossible, or contradictory in it: That very Idea, which I have so largely explained, One Absolute Divinity, with Two Eternal, Essential Processions, in the Unity and Identity of Nature. The Eternal Father, Eternal Self-originated Mind, with his Eternal Word, his Eternal Son, and the Eternal Spirit of Father and Son.

Reply to the Second Defence of the Twenty eight Propositions, p. 16.

This



This is that Idea which the Scripture gives us of it, and which the Catholick Church hath always taught: Every Man may understand what is meant by it; and therefore it is not Jargon and Nonsense; and I think I have sufficiently vindicated it from *Trisbeism* and Contradiction, and have no more to say of that nature, till I hear what they have to object against what is already said; and when they come to consider this Matter again, as Men that shall certainly be called to an Account for it in this World, as well as in the next, I hope they will see reason to grow out of conceit with their own Philosophy, about Emanations and Processions, a Priority of Time, and Priority of Nature, Self-Existence and Necessary Existence, and such like *Arian* Objections, which were made and answered many Ages since, and which they may find sufficiently answered in this Treatise.

This brings back the Dispute to Scripture, where the last Appeal must lie in all such Matters, without appealing for the Sense of Scripture to Natural Ideas and Philosophy: And if the Interpretations of the Catholick Fathers were of any Authority with these Men, I have already shewn how they expounded Scripture, which will always be a venerable Authority to modest Men and sober Christians, how much soever it be despised by Hereticks. But it is time to put an end to this Treatise; we may consider their Expositions of Scripture some other time.

T H E E N D.

**D**R. *Sherlock*, Dean of *St. Paul's* Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity.  
Third Edition. *Quarto*.

— Apology for Writing against *Socinians*. *Quarto*.

— The Danger of Corrupting the Faith by Philosophy. A Sermon. *Quarto*.

— A Vindication of the Sermon, in Answer to some *Socinian* Remarks.

— An Answer to the Animadversions on the Dean of *St. Paul's* Vindication of the Trinity. By *J. B. A. M.* *Quarto*.

— A Defence of the Dean of *St. Paul's* Apology for Writing against *Socinians*. *Quarto*.

✕ A Defence of Dr. *Sherlock's* Notion of a Trinity in Unity. *Quarto*.

— The Distinction between Real and Nominal *Trinitarians* examined; in Answer to a *Socinian* Pamphlet. *Quarto*. All Printed for *William Rogers*.

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232+ The Post-Nicene fathers while they  
244+ stoutly maintained  $\frac{1}{2}$  Trinity, held also as firm  
290 against "Pagan Polytheism", & there can  
291 be but One God, "without any possibility of  
"change" (231) "of absolute perfection, for ab-  
"solute perfection can be but ONE". 233  
233. They well understood the laws of reasoning". 238.  
— 294+ Philosophers vindicated from the charge  
of Tritheism. 294+

— 310 The Post Nicenes follow the Scriptures,  
ΤΑΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΥΡΑΦΗΣ ΥΠΟΔΗΧΑΙΣ ΕΠΟΛΕΥΟΙ, 328. 334

— 313+ The Defense of Athanasius's notion of a Trinity  
in Unity" appears to be recognized as his own  
production, & still further defended here.

— 320+ Enumeration of the passages of Scripture  
on w<sup>ch</sup> the necessity is founded.

— 366+ It is no more difficult to conceive  
of the eternal generation of the Son, & the  
eternal procession of the H<sup>ly</sup> S<sup>t</sup> of revealed  
religion, than of the self origination, of  
the Deity, in natural religion. 366

442 Athanasius says that the mistakes of the Sabellians  
187+ "were owing to corporeal Imaginations that they  
306+ "conceive of God after the manner of bodies". 116  
314 Tholuck replies to John Howe the Reverend Canon Langens  
"possibility of a Trinity"

- 126 Thurock says that Gasterell has given  
us the most complete & artificial scheme of  
Sabellianism he has ever met with. 126  
— 145 Elaborate refutation of those ancient  
and modern Sabellians, who maintain  
F. S. & H. F. are each only one third of Deity.  
— 147 South, Wallis & other late writers  
leading to modalism "solemnly warning  
1268. 1268. 1268.  
153. Basil says  $\frac{1}{3}$  term "homousion", in  
its proper acceptation, directly opposed to  
"Sabellian as well as  $\frac{1}{3}$  Adrian party." 153  
— 160 Hilary in his book de Synodis opposes  
several Oriental errors, as very orthodox,  
tho' they left out  $\frac{1}{3}$  "homousion" because  
in its stead I inserted  $\chi\alpha\tau\alpha\ \pi\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\ \sigma\mu\omega\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma$   
— 162 St. Austin says  $\frac{1}{3}$  "tho' himself hath taken  
the homousion, thus - "I am in the Father  
& the F. in me" and says Thurock "I &  $\frac{1}{3}$  F. are One."  
— 175 The splitting of hairs on the eternal  
generation of  $\frac{1}{3}$  Son, well termed "blasphemous"  
— 191. "The divine nature is not multiplied over  
the persons." 191.  
— 227 That 3 persons can subsist in one Edd.  
illustrated from 500 persons hearing the same  
voice: are there 500 voices, or one only? or  
in 500 hearing the same obj. at the 227  
— 168 Dr. Bull.



- 17<sup>th</sup> Modes are less than accidents.
- 18<sup>th</sup> I, thou, & he, are personal pronouns & imply  
three selfs: therefore the Fathers, against Sabellians  
maintain I, & I, & I are three Persons; because  
the scripture applies these Pronouns to each." 18<sup>th</sup>
- 23<sup>rd</sup> The Son, begotten eternally, from Himself. 25.
- 34<sup>th</sup> Tertullian & Athanasius say; Urisiput hit with Indo in
- 40<sup>th</sup> Hilary & Tertullian deduce another Duty from  
Genesis i.; "Let them be a firmament" i.e. "one God",  
the Father "commanded", & other, "makes all things."
- 49 The doctrine of the Trinity, perfectly agreeable  
to Reason. 252.
- 62 Some, in Shulock's days desired to "purge our  
Liturgies of every thing T savours of; worship  
of the Trinity." 62.
- 64<sup>th</sup> Before his baptism, Simon Magnus called himself  
only "some great power of God" Acts 8; 9, 10. but after  
baptism, both Father & Son, & his Hilena, the Th Th.
- 68<sup>th</sup> The Sons of the Valentinians were divine  
persons, who were propagated from the Divine Father  
in casual descents, & altogether made up a complete &  
perfect deity, or πανθεων? 68.
- 78<sup>th</sup> Some of Texts from the O. T. brought by the Fathers  
to prove Trinity modern critics will not allow  
to be proper & apposite, but "mythical & forced." 78.
90. Melancthon seems to have treated Scripture  
with the same disdain as Calvin did.
- 110 Shulock very severe on Gastrell as a dis-  
-ciple of Locke.
- 113<sup>th</sup> The true nature of the Incarnation unfolded: on  
the scheme of G. Gastrell & other modalists; if the Son were

